*

+
          On How Philosophy & History Converge
.
/ Subject > Re: Some Defects in Russell's Teaching /
/ Newsgroups > alt.religion.christian.biblestudy and /
/ alt.religion.apologetics and alt.philosophy / 21oct02 /
.
    "Writing is not, therefore, a secondary but one of the primary tasks of the historian."
                                       - - from "Clio Rediscovered" by G.M.Treevelyan
.
>>> "Chad L" <[email protected]> previously wrote:
>>> <big-snip> Many folks want to put free-will in the category
>>> of "self-determination" (believe me, I was one of them for
>>> many years). But self determination, when further examined
>>> is no more than a complex mix of random and determined
>>> events.
.
>> tx: It APPEARS to be no more than a complex mix [eg. to
>> someone observing human beings from a distant planet], but
>> it is impossible to establish it beyond all reasonable
>> doubt.
.
> Chad: It's impossible to establish anything beyond all
> reasonable doubt (other than your own existence; which even
> then, cannot be established beyond the reasonable doubt of
> others).
.
 textman replies: This is what I call a classic example of
radical skepticism. It is not a philosophical attitude or
method that any working historian could seriously consider;
for the problems that would immediately arise (upon embarking
on any historical problem or question) would at once halt all
forward momentum, and very quickly bring the entire historical
enterprise crashing down into a dusty heap of moldering paper
and ashes. Perhaps blueknight is thus content to let it be (and
so remain in ignorance about who and what he is), but I'm not.
.
 Thus we see that radical skepticism is not so much logically
flawed (although it certainly is that too) as it is entirely
useless in its functional application. As to this latter point,
it would appear that the whole sum of its utility lies in
denying *ALL* the claims of everyone who is NOT a radical
skeptic!
.
 Hmmm ... Repeat after me: No. no, no. Can you say 'no, no,
no'? Sure you can. It's easy. Just say NO, NO, NO! ...
Who said philosophy has to involve any effort on the part
of those old gray cells? Not me. Nope!
.
> I'm looking for the better argument,
.
 ... right :)
.
> and I'm pretty sure I've found it.
.
 In radical skepticism?
.
> But I'm always willing to test it out in case someone's
> already been at the stage of thought that I'm at now, and
> would like to see me progress past it by providing new
> information for me.
.
 Sure. No problem. Here's all the new information you require:
Drop this radical skepticism *B*S* and GET ON WITH IT, man!
.
> I'm saying that I've probably already been at the stage of
> thought that you're at now (on this particular subject).
.
 Which is what again? I keep losing sight of it owing to the
annoying presence of M. Descartes ... Did you say something
about stages? Tell me what you know about K's three stages
before you jump to any hasty conclusions as to where we're
all at stage-wise.
.
>> <snip> It is the philosopher's business to question
>> everything; even warm and fuzzy beliefs that seem harmless.
.
> Some people wonder if anything would ever get done if
> everyone were a philosopher.  lol.
.
 I've seen this sort of thing before too. It's like the
suggestion that in a world free of strife and challenge every-
one would be happy and content, and so absolutely nothing would
ever get done. And because nothing would or could change, the
socialist utopia must necessarily be a static and timeless
condition of contentment deprived of wants, of happiness
deprived of sorrow, of peace deprived of strife, of order
deprived of chaos.
.
 Now I have only one question to place before all this: How the
hell is *any* of that supposed to work in reality? I ask this
because there is no room in this structure for anything even
remotely resembling reality! In the same way, the notion that
nothing would ever get done if everyone were a philosopher is
based on the mistaken conception that philosophy is merely
contemplation: it begins with contemplation, and it ends in
contemplation, and in between is a whole lot of contemplation
... Needless to say, this is a conception of philosophy that
the offensive one finds *exceedingly* offensive indeed!
.
 <snippage-please>
.
>>> You find that most informal logical fallacies are centered
>>> around an illegal shift of burden of proof. i.e., if one
>>> were to appeal to the people as a kind of substitute for
>>> supporting their assertions. i.e., "pulling a fast one".
.
>> So then you're the one who's pulling a fast one, eh?
.
> Listen, I promise that I will not use the principles of
> informal logic unfairly. I know exactly how they are to be
> used and what they are used for.
.
 They are used to hamper historians from doing their work?
.
> Thus, if you call me out for using a deceptive tactic (or a
> logical "blunder" - as the case usually is), then I will
> admit it. I'm not one of these gung-ho atheists that are
> going to try and shoot anyone down by whatever means
> necessary who remotely disagrees with me in order to "win the
> battle"; ent eh, that's not my style. Notice, also that I've
> not noticed you "pulling a fast one" yet. But if I do, you
> may rest assured that I will mention it properly. I've got a
> lot more to say about informal logic and informal fallacies
> and people who abuse it and incorrectly appeal to
> "fallacies", but I won't say it here.
.
 thx. I appreciate that, since I'm not a logician by training.
.
>>> Close, but not quite what I mean. there is an element of
>>> motivation, and an element of what actually causes one
>>> to do what they do.
.
>> Oh yeah?
.
> yes. we'll get to that when we talk about the act of choosing.
.
 Okay.  ummmm  Aren't we always choosing? . . .
Even when we're not talking about it?
.
>> <snip> Instead let us assert the necessary distinction
>> between the religion of Jesus (which is pragmatic and
>> basically rational), and the religion about Jesus (ie.
>> Christianity, which is essentially irrational, mysterious,
>> sacramental, and theological in the worst sense of the term).
.
> yes. this I'm interested in that distinction
> (does Lessing cover it as well?).
.
 Oh sure. Most of the Enlightenment thinkers did.
.
> You sound very much like this Gnostic fellow I bumped
> into the other year. I think if I were forced to become a
> Christian it would be either Gnostic or whatever you're
> saying here.
.
 The only true form of gnostic-christianity is the form it
takes within the larger Christian-prophetic tradition. Thus
2Peter is a classic expression of faithful gnosticism; and
this tradition varies considerably thereafter, reaching a peak
in the great Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Clement and
Origen, who were gnostics, prophets, AND philosophers (as well
as being pioneers in the art of biblical criticism). After
them, gnosticism and the prophetic-faith both died a lingering
and tragic death by slow strangulation (ie. the general
descent into intellectual and cultural ignorance which
eventually developed into the so-called Dark Ages).
.
> Still though, I have to wonder what exactly you mean by
> "pragmatic". I have my own understanding of the word -
> as was espoused by Charles Peirce.
.
 Let's hear it!
.
>> tx: <snip> Absolutely right. Philosophy is also useful in a
>> more general way, inasmuch as it helps to expand and clarify
>> your mind, and thus to expand the possibilities of human
>> being and becoming.
.
> agreed. (and is that a hint of Sartre's existentialism?)
.
 Certainly not. This is something that many philosophers have
known since the earliest days of the pre-socratics.
.
>>> I have been conditioned to choose the best argument, and
>>> often I find that the best argument is not the one I had
>>> uncritically adopted.
.
>> So you will exercise your reason in the comparison of two
>> contrasting arguments, and thus arrive at a sober judgment
>> of which is (objectively) the better of the two. Well and
>> good!
.
> that's what I try to do.
.
>> Now explain to me how such a judgment can be arrived at
>> through purely mechanistic or materialistic cause and effect?
.
> Before I step into that (I think we are headed there anyway
> with "choice"), I'd like to understand what is implied by
> "purely mechanistic". cheers. -- cl
.
 Behaviorism, the stimulus-response model of action, the
denial of all subjective realities as live factors in the
determination or explanation of human behavior. You know, all
the stuff that comes with the no-free-will point of view.
x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
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/ Subject > Re: More Stuff On the Impossibility of Free-Will /
.
>>> On 8oct Chad L ([email protected]) wrote:
>>> <snip> But my question at this point is:
>>> What exactly DO we know (about God)?
.
>> textman answered: We know that God is spirit and love.
.
> On 11oct blueknight replies: great.
> but that doesn't tell anyone much.
.
 tx: It tells me a lot! ;)
.
> A person then asks,
.
 That is, an unbeliever and/or radical skeptic then asks
.
> what do you mean by "spirit" and "love"? eventually this
> gets reduced down to things that we may observe and no more.
.
 In other words, you systematically destroy all meaning-content
in the words we use until nothing intelligible can be said.
Then even the possibility of language and communication begins
to dissolve such that we are all left holding the empty bag of
solipsism. Sheesh! Let's NOT go there.
.
> pragmatically speaking to call God - "love" is fine,
> but what else can be known?
.
 Without faith, not even that much can be known.
.
>>> And how exactly are we able to know it?
.
>> Through the revelation given in the Anointed One: The Word
>> made flesh; according to the testimony of the scriptures.
.
> why should we accept everything that the scriptures say?
.
 I'm not asking anyone to accept *everything* that the
scriptures say. Only the really good bits! :)
.
>> <snip> Not just in his actions, but also in his teachings,
>> and even in his person.
.
> note. I use the word "actions" very broadly. teachings and
> "person" are included.
.
 I don't think I see much logic in reducing being to action.
.
>> This is important to understand, because both his words and
>> actions arose from out of his being/personality.
.
> personality is nothing more than specific set of actions
> that we characterize with word "personality".
.
 Wut? There is no internal component to personality? I knew it!
You *are* a swine behaviorist! "Behaviorism is a theory which
emphasizes watching human actions and behavior to discover
facts esp. about the human brain, rather than looking at
private conscious experience or mental events" (Cambridge
International Dictionary of English).
.
>>> <snip> I notice that you use "Lessing" as a source
>>> for your view of what Jesus was.
.
>> Not at all. My view of Jesus is formed by the Word; which
>> is to say, by my own particular reading of the scriptures.
.
> hmmm. so Lessing is not an influence on how you interpret
> the Word?
.
 I should say not! Enlightenment methods are a bit too crude
to be of much value to a post-modern bible-reader. For example:
Lessing thought that Matthew was very obviously the first (and
greatest) gospel to be written, and he goes on at great length
(and with the utmost conviction) about how and why this must
be so. Clearly Lessing is not a suitable or useful guide for
believers to follow.
.
>>> Yes, that's how a lot of people look at it. And to an
>>> extent so do I. However, I'm not certain that a random
>>> event necessarily has cause imbedded within it. And I'm
>>> definitely not certain that (in SOME cases) there actually
>>> exists an explanation to found for an event in reference
>>> to causality. Of course I have my reasons. ...
.
>> Chaos theory? :)
.
> yes and no. It seems as if "infinity" is the case. And it
> seems to me that nothing can come from something. Just as
> something cannot come from nothing.
.
 Right ;)
.
> If something is here, it came from something somewhere else.
.
 Thus the present world came from the totality of all the
previous past worlds stretching back some five billion years.
Thus the world itself is not infinite (in the sense of eternal)
but it does manifest the principle of infinite continuity
through time.
.
> This implies infinity. Things are not created; rather,
> they've always been.
.
 This pencil in my hand right now has always been?
.
> More precisely, basic things have always been.
.
 You mean the four elements? Earth, wind, fire, and water?
.
> The particular arrangements of things may be finite.
.
 Such as the periodic table? But might there not be other
elements which as yet are unknown to our world's chemists?
.
> If there were a "Creator" it would not be creating it would
> be arranging, so I'd have to call it the "Arranger".
.
 Look out world, here comes the prophet of the Mighty Cosmic
Arranger! Hey, I rather like that. It's got a nice ring to
it, alright. And it sort of implies the immanence and ongoing
providence of God within the world-process, so that's right in
line with biblical teachings. Say there, Chad, you don't mind
if I hang on to this idea of yours kinda permanent-like? Do
you? ... No, of course not. Thx bud! :D
.
> However, I don't think that it's necessary for there to be
> conscious forces that arranges things like we would. I think
> people are automatically tempted to instantly assume that
> the Arranger thinks like we do. As if it thinks according to
> higher goals and purpose. But why would it do that? Because
> we do? ha! People tend to think of how we think, and then
> extrapolate to some consciousness that is more "advanced" -
> which is absurd. It may be that the Arranger is less advanced
> in the way that we think of as "advanced". It may be that the
> Arranger is more powerful, but it may not have any calculated
> goals, i.e., it may not think like humans think.
.
 Yes, I agree entirely that Arranger's awareness is *VERY*
much different from those of these many puny (but extremely
arrogant) human creatures. So perhaps the Arranger is even
now arranging for the people of this world to get a very
long overdue spanking!?
.
> Perhaps it's existence has evolved beyond thinking
> and calculation.
.
 Perhaps. But not beyond awareness itself, I should hope.
.
> Have you ever wondered why we talk and think in the
> first place?
.
 Oy! All the time, blueknight!
.
> I tell you this, we don't need to pretend that there is some
> god-force that wills it so, to imagine such a scenario. So
> what makes the god-force scenario better? simple, it ties
> into supporting warm fuzzy feelings.
.
 Maybe the cosmos is just a big Warm&Fuzzy creature because
the Arranger deliberately (and/or randomly) made it so?
.
> Well, I have learned to get my warm-fuzzy feelings
> elsewhere (no, not Satan).
.
 Watson? Spencer? Hobbes? Freud? Marx? ... Mein Gott!
There are just *so* many unbelievers to choose from!
.
>> <snip> Just so. In the early church this sort of confusion
>> about what this or that loaded term actually meant led
>> to much needless controversy, and even bloodshed. 4X:
>> Does 'essence' mean the same thing as 'substance'? One
>> theologian will prefer to use the former word, another
>> the latter, but both are basically thinking the same
>> thing! How confusing is that?
.
> very confusing. even modern philosophy has that problem.
> up until recently philosophers were allowed to write
> kinda sloppily and unclearly - causing much frustration.
.
 Much *ongoing* frustration that is itself generating MUCH
ongoing sloppy and unclear thinking! It's a vicious cycle.
.
> Now-a-days, philosophers are insanely vigilant and picky
> about clarity.
.
 Thx largely to Russell and the philosopher-analysts!
.
> To some it may seem pedantic, but its worth it to avoid
> bloodshed in the future. :)
.
 Absolutely. And now that philosophers are finally agreed as
to the primacy of clarity in all of our thinking and naming
and describing of things, one might easily conclude that this
is not the death of philosophy, but rather a new beginning
with the road ahead thrown wide open.
.
>>> <snip> I agree that we may choose our actions.
.
>> Does this not imply that a modicum of free will must be a
>> real possibility on some obscure and indefinite level of
>> being?!?
.
> I once thought so. But no more. Free-will is an unnecessary
> construct when describing why we choose one action over
> another.
.
 Right. But when one is actually faced with a tough choice,
it's kind of hard to describe your way into making the right
choice.
.
>>> But no longer do I stop there. Many people will not analyze
>>> it further, because if they allow themselves to stop there,
>>> then they won't risk losing their main support for free-
>>> will.
.
>> I should think that their main support for free-will stems
>> largely (if not entirely) from their mundane experiences of
>> choice, direction, intention, etc, as these many and various
>> subjective realities flow (more or less naturally) within
>> the context of daily life.
.
> its easier to say that someone did something cause they are
> "brave" or "good people" or "stupid" or "irrational", rather
> than get to the real reasons for their actions. A lot of
> people don't like that because it seems to take away credit.
.
 Right. No free-will means no moral responsibility.
.
> And they think it releases a person from accountability for
> being "evil" or whatever. Not the case. There's no "god" I
> could think of that would torture someone for allegedly
> being "evil" (that's how a human would think, not a god).
> I would love to talk more about that if you have questions.
.
 So if a person can't help being evil, society still has the
right and duty to protect itself by removing these creatures
from out of the social body.
.
>>> And so I'm curious to see how you'll react to the question
>>> of, "Why (or how, or what) do we choose one action over
>>> another?"
.
>> Well, that's the thing. There's no easy or single answer to
>> these questions. It all depends on the individual and his or
>> her particular circumstances. One businessman will choose
>> one action over another (eg. buy or sell?) on the basis of
>> maximizing profits, while another businessman (in a similar
>> situation) will do something else from out of the same
>> motive. Which one is acting freely? Which one is merely
>> reacting to an external stimulus as his conditioning has
>> determined? ...
.
> Well, there is only one thing that determines behavior. The
> environment. The environment can be broken up into 3 or 4
> different categories. I'll do 3 for simplicity. (1) immediate
> circumstances. (2) biology and (3) history of reinforcement
> and punishment. One businessman will act differently
> from another businessman given the same set of immediate
> circumstances, depending upon their differing biologies and
> histories of reinforcement. This concept used to frustrate
> the hell out of me, mostly because I couldn't find any holes
> in it that would render it "unprobable". I'll let you think
> about that. I hope you have some questions because this is
> one of my favorite things to talk about.
.
 Talking behaviorism can only be a colossal waste of time
since it is based on a vision of human realities that we know
to be manifestly false. Psychology says 'let's pretend that
human beings are bio-machines, and see where that takes us'.
Philosophy says 'let's not pretend that human beings are bio-
machines, and see where *that* takes us'. I'm now exercising
my free-will to choose between these alternatives, but since
I've been conditioned to abhor nonsense and foolishness, I find
that I have no choice but to rule in favor of philosophy. And
so we solemnly consign the efforts of the psychologists to the
flames, with not a little amount of relief too. Good riddance
to bad rubbish!
.
> I think there's a good chance we can enlighten each other
> in this dialogue.
.
 I'm beginning to have serious doubts about that. :(
.
>> So many people act almost entirely out of their own
>> emotions; and since they have no real control over these
>> chaotic and constantly fluctuating emotional states, these
>> people are all but entirely devoid of free-will because
>> they are essentially the slaves of their emotions (which
>> while subconsciously intended, are nevertheless little more
>> than habitual reactions to external conditions). If I were
>> thinking from your stance, I would very quickly present
>> such people as the best evidence that free-will is merely
>> an illusion!
.
> well. emotions have 1 of 2 effects.
.
 Oh brother! Only two?
.
> Either they cause someone to avoid a stimulus, or they
> cause someone to seek a stimulus.
.
 So then I guess we can safely say that life is basically
one long stimulating process, eh? :D
.
> Emotions are sensations that have been paired throughout
> our species history with either pain or pleasure.
.
 Or both at the same time, don't forget. If your paradigm only
allows for two alternatives when in fact and in reality there
are three, then this raises a serious question: What is at
fault here: reality, or the materialistic-mechanist philosophy?
.
> So they become conditioned aversives or conditioned
> reinforcers; if the former, we avoid them and whatever would
> elicit them; if the latter, we go towards them or whatever
> would elicit them.  e.g., we avoid the emotion of fear and
> things that cause fear (unless we've been desensitized); or
> we seek out the emotion of love and things that cause love
> (or things that we THINK cause love).
.
 Do you see the parallels here with Buddhism? It too is a
philosophy that starts out claiming to be entirely reasonable
and empirical AND *totally* unbiased, and then the first thing
they conclude about human life is that it is a thoroughly
PAINFUL business from start to finish!
.
>> Thus it would appear that the possibility of choosing among
>> alternatives cannot by itself constitute evidence for free-
>> will. If we make a choice out of habit or expectation, then
>> this action must be, in some sense, determined by something
>> other than the person acting. It may well be the case that
>> most of our actions (both individually and collectively)
>> are not truly free in the strictest sense of the word. If
>> this is so, then free-will must be something (a power?; a
>> capacity?; an ability?) that transcends both habit and
>> irrationality.
.
> yeah, you could postulate that, but such a postulate is
> not necessary to explain choices and human behavior.
.
Here then is the crucial point at which our reasonings diverge.
A materialistic, mechanistic, and/or empirical philosophy (or
vision) of human beings and their individual and collective
behaviors says that it can apply purely objective and
scientific methods and techniques to the study of these alien
human creatures, and thereby explain not only this or that
individual's behavior, not only this or that group or
nation's behavior, but indeed the entire course of human
history in these 'purely scientific terms'.
.
 And, in fact, this has been tried many times. Freud tried to
"explain" Moses according to the categories of his more mature
thinking, but his success in doing so remains much debated. In
the same way, Marx and Engels tried to explain the progress
of human history in the economic terms of the dialectical-
materialism philosophy. This vision is also 'a live option'
in some quarters, although I imagine that only a very few
first-class philosophers would be unable to see some serious
problems within that entire ideology. And so on.
.
Now the interesting thing about all this (from our perspective)
is that while all of these supposedly "objective" techniques
are admittedly quite good at *describing* complex events,
persons, and behaviors, they are not nearly as good at
*explaining* them. To me, this right here is the most decisive
distinction we can make. Describing things (eg. in terms of
aversion) is one thing. Claming to have thus explained them
is another thing altogether!
.
 In the fascinating history of historical science, there was a
time, not long passed, when those who conceived of 'history'
as a pure science made war upon those who recognized history
as a form of literature. Much blood was shed all around in
these efforts to set a straight course for all historians to
follow. But as it was, in the course of things, it was the
historical-scientists who were *more* discredited, I think.
And this is an important lesson for all philosophers to ponder
and appreciate: ie. that history cannot be reduced to the
level of mere science!
.
 Thus it was G.M.Trevelyan who settled this controversy in his
essay "Clio Rediscovered", where the historian explains that
the goal of history is the education of the human race. Within
this primary orientation, history manifests three distinct
functions: (1) the scientific (ie. the accumulation of facts
and evidence); (2) imaginative or speculative (ie. selection,
classification, generalization); and (3) the literary
(exposition and explanation unto education).
.
 What I find so interesting about this vision of history is
that it is very similar to our understanding of philosophy.
Thus philosophy also has its more scientific aspects (analysis
and empiricism in general), its more speculative aspects
(epistemology and metaphysics), and also has a strong literary
core to it. Not only that, but the purpose of philosophy is
exactly the same as that of history, namely the education
of the race as a whole.
.
From these observations we can easily see that philosophy's
closest kin is not theology (as was LONG supposed), nor
science (as is still often supposed), but rather history.
In fact, the two are so close that some philosophers (most
notably the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce) have
claimed that philosophy and history are one! "History
should be written only by philosophers, and philosophy
only by historians."
.
>> Let us say, therefore, that will is not enough,
.
> its okay for you stipulate that, but I wouldn't say that
> (unless you were only including randomness - which isn't
> what most people mean by free-will).
.
 Right. I would also have to include more than randomness,
since randomness by itself alone cannot really explain or
even describe anything.
.
>> that will requires the addition of a sharp awareness of all
>> possibilities and alternatives simply in order to create the
>> necessary foundation for the actualization of free-will. So
>> now you have the will and the mind in place; and with the
>> addition of reason (not necessarily barren logic, or even
>> enlightened self-interest) the engine turns over and begins
>> to generate free-will which is manifested and/or actualized
>> through concrete actions that are fundamentally rational in
>> nature. For freedom IS reason (in the sense that they cannot
>> appear apart from each other, because 'freedom' as such
>> cannot emerge out of irrationality, just as 'reason' cannot
>> spring forth out of chaos).
.
> I'm not sure what you're saying here.
.
 Well, that's just dandy! And here I was immensely pleased
with my little epistle; gladly thinking that I had finally
managed to convey a complex philosophical concept in just a
handful of relatively unambiguous words. But NOOO! You had
to go and spoil everything! Did Surak have this much trouble
trying to convince the primitive Vulcans of the reality and
power of the Universal Logos? I don't think so!
.
 "On this topic we have much to say; and it is difficult to
explain, since you have become sluggish in hearing. For though
you should in fact be teachers by this time, you need someone
to teach you the beginning elements of God's utterances. You
have gone back to needing milk, not solid food. For everyone
who lives on milk is inexperienced in the message of right-
eousness, because he is an infant. But solid food is for
the mature, whose perceptions are trained by practice for
discerning both good and evil. Therefore we must progress
beyond the elementary instructions about Christ and move
on to maturity ..."  -- Hebrews 5:11-6:1 / NET Bible
.
 So I don't really know how I can make my meaning any plainer
than as already stated. All I can suggest to the reader is
that he/she keep on re-reading that last paragraph, and keep on
pondering it while otherwise engaged with the business of daily
living. Perhaps the meaning will become clear in time. I cannot
guarantee that enlightenment will follow from this procedure,
but I can guarantee that you won't figure it out if you don't
dwell and ponder and consider and meditate long and hard upon
it! Philosophy is hard work, to be sure; therefore set thy
proboscis upon thy grindstone, and ignore the ensuing pain
of it :D
.
>> P.S. Please proceed to 'On the Impossibility of Free-Will/2'
.
> eh? are you starting a new thread?
.
 Not at all. My mistake, Chad. Sorry. Just ignore that P.S.
.
> peace, cl
.
 Peace and Joy!
.
        - the almost pooped-out one - textman ;;>
.
P.S. If people can't freely decide between various
alternatives, and make responsible decisions for them-
selves and others, then they shouldn't be allowed to
vote for Saddam Hussein!
x

+
     Re: On How Philosophy & History Converge
.
/ Subject: Re: Some Defects in Russell's Teaching /
/ Newsgroups: alt.religion.christian.biblestudy /
/ alt.religion.apologetics and alt.philosophy / 22oct02 /
.
> On 22oct John Jones ([email protected]) wrote:
> I worked with Russel.
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 textman replies: Hey there jJ. Glad to hear that you knew the
Big Dog his-self. Did he let you call him Bertie? What did you
work with him on? When was this anyway? Where was this anyway?
And how is it, if you knew him well, that you don't know how
to spell his name, eh?
.
> Whats he supposed to have said then?
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 Since I never met or saw him, I can't testify to anything
that he may or may not have said. All I know is what's in
his Furious Fifty, no more, but perhaps much less ... :D
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> in a nutshell? -- jJ
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 Wut? ... Are you asking me to sum up the totality of the Big
Dog's teachings (as found in the 50) "in a nutshell"?! Sheesh!
You don't ask for much, do you, bud? ... hmmmm ... Tough nut
to crack there alright ... ummmm ... Oh, I know! How about
this: "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by
knowledge." ... You can't get much more nutshell than that!
And pulled straight from the bigdog's mouth, no less! LOL
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 - one who claims that philosophy is unboring - textman ;>
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