The Zionist Congress, established by Theodor Herzl was the highest authority in the Zionist Organisation. The first Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897. Subsequently the Congresses were held annually until 1901 and then biennially, apart from the period of the war years. As it was not possible during the periods of the Ottoman regime and the British Mandate to hold these Congresses in Palestine, the Congress delegates met in various European cities.
The twentieth Congress took place in Zurich, Switzerland, in early August 1937, a few weeks after the publication of the Peel Report.
The Zionist Labour Party had the highest representation at this Congress. Next in size was the Centralist General Zionists, which a few years earlier had split into two factions A and B, the latter being the smaller more right-wing group. Next in size was the Mizrachi Religious Zionists. There were also a few delegates of the Jewish State Party, a splinter group of the Revisionists, who had remained within the World Zionist Organisation, when the Revisionists had walked out a few years earlier. Finally, there were a number of unaffiliated delegates from countries under Nazi domination where elections were not possible.
In order to prepare himself for this Congress, Weizmann had had a secret meeting with the British Colonial Secretary, Ormsby-Gore at which Weizmann had stressed the vital importance of implementing the proposal to transfer the Arabs from the Jewish State. [Details of this secret meeting and its dramatic disclosure at the Zionist Congress have been described earlier.]
As was to be expected, the proceedings at this Zionist Congress were taken up by a detailed discussion of the Peel Report, whose proposals divided the Zionist Movement. There were those delegates led by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion who were prepared to accept partition in order to have an independent Jewish State. Opposition to partition was led by Menachem Ussishkin, President of the Jewish National Fund, who at the beginning of the century had led the opposition to the Uganda proposal.
At this Congress, the delegates delivered their speeches in Hebrew, Yiddish, German or English. These speeches were recorded verbatim in notebooks by the stenographers at the Congress. None of these notebooks seem to have survived.(161)
Immediately after the sessions, these speeches were translated into Hebrew and typed. Some of these typescripts still survive and are to be found in the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. (162)
A few days later, these speeches were published in the �Congress Newspaper� and several months later were published in an official book entitled �Stenographic Report of 20th Zionist Congress�.
In addition to all this, reports of the speeches appeared in the various newspapers of that period, including the �Daily News Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency� and the �Palcor Bulletin of the Zionist Telegraphic Agency�.
For all intensive purposes, the �Congress Newspaper� and published official book are identical. However a comparison between the typescript and the �Congress Newspaper� shows considerable differences, in particular in connection with the question of transfer. Many of the statements made by the various speakers on transfer, by the time the �Congress Newspaper� had been printed, had been modified, partially deleted or in some cases even completely deleted!
The historian Benny Morris considers that this editing was done by the speakers themselves, or by the Zionist Movement leaders, or by Moshe Kleinman, the editor of the �Congress Newspaper�, acting on orders from his political superiors! (163)
Possibly, due to the speed at which this �censoring:� was done, it was sometimes done in an amateurish manner. For example, whereas Ben-Gurion�s and Weizmann�s proposals on transfer were deleted from the �Congress Newspaper�, a number of these deleted comments were referred to by several other speakers in the very same �Congress Newspaper�!
During the course of the Congress, a number of delegates spoke on the question of transfer. Where relevant or significant, we shall bring, when known, both the statements appearing in the transcript and also those which appeared in the official printed book.
Naftali Landau, an engineer from Eastern Galicia, and delegate of the General Zionists B, considered that �without the transfer we will not succeed in carrying out our programme.� He suggested that it might be possible, by injecting large sums of money and engaging technical expertise, to increase the population density of Jewish settlement. He warned that �we must not forgo transfer. On the contrary, we must demand that England and the League of Nations implement it.�(164) [Since the Mandate for Palestine had been granted to Britain by the League of Nations, the final decision regarding the implementation of the proposals of the Peel Commission would lie with the League of Nations.]
Dr. Barnett Brickner of the United States, a delegate of the General Zionists A, said that experience from past population transfers showed that transfers were very difficult and imposed heavy responsibilities. However, in the Palestine case �we only want to transfer the Arabs from one place to another in the country where they live.�(165)
Joseph Baratz, a leading figure in the Mapai party and a founder of the collective settlement movement in Palestine said that he did not believe that it would be possible to transfer 300,000 Arabs and considered that increasing the Jewish population in Palestine did not depend on an Arab exodus but on Jewish immigration. Baratz assumed, however, that a proportion of Arabs would opt for transfer. He asked what �Hashomer Hazair� and the other opponents of transfer feared. �Has not transfer continued during our 40 - 50 years of work on the land? Have we not transferred Arabs form Degania, Kinneret, Merchavia, Minhalel and Mishmar Haemek?�(166)
Two of the five places mentioned by Baratz (Merchavia and Mishmar Haemek), were Kibbutzim belonging to the �Hashomer Hazair� movement, the same movement condemning transfer at this Congress!
A few days earlier in a lecture to the �World Unity� council, Ben-Gurion had revealed that in only a very few cases of modern Jewish settlement had it not been necessary to transfer Arabs, adding that a small number of these transfers had been achieved by compulsion.
Baratz mentioned the co-operative settlement, Merchavia, host in past years to a �Hashomer� conference. �There, there was transfer. In what way was that a sin?� He explained how the settlers had arranged for the best possible conditions for the transferred Arabs and said that the same would be done for the Arabs whose transfer was currently under discussion. �I know that even before the emergence of the recommendation for a Jewish State,� continued Baratz, �the members of one Jewish settlement had prepared a programme for the transfer of Arabs from certain villages in the Galilee to Transjordan.� He knew of cases where the Arabs, with the proceeds of the sale of their land in Palestine, had bought land in Transjordan, that was five times the size of their original plot. [A comparison of prices, made a few years later in 1944, showed that the Jews were paying ten times as much in Palestine for arid or semi-arid land, as the price paid for rich black soil in Iowa in the United States.] Baratz asked, �What therefore is this artificial panic which is being created on this subject?�(167)
From the official minutes, we can see that Chaim Weizmann told the Congress that he saw in the partition plan definite advantages. The size of the proposed Jewish State would be over a million dunams, the Jews would be in their own house �and there will also be the possibility of population transfer.�(168)
Unfortunately, the original transcript of Weizmann�s speech has not survived. However, from others sources (see later), we know that he said more on the subject of transfer than appeared in the official minutes!
Berl Katznelson spoke of the changes in attitude towards population transfer that had been achieved under the Mandate. �Years ago they said we were driving out the Arabs, but today they are speaking about the transfer of tens of thousands of Arabs from one place to another.�(169) We see that Katznelson's comments on the subject at the Congress were much more restrained than at the �World Unity� Council meeting held a few weeks earlier.
David Ben-Gurion made his speech to the Congress during the closed session of Saturday night, 7 August. What did he tell the Congress regarding the Peel proposed for population transfer? According to the official minutes of Ben-Gurion's speech to the Congress,(170) he did not mention population transfer. However, it is quite clear from the other sources that Ben-Gurion did speak on the subject of population transfer at the Congress, but that parts of his speech were deleted from the official minutes!
According to the original transcript, Ben-Gurion said that one needed to examine the question of transfer thoroughly and see whether it was possible, essential, ethical and beneficial. �We do not want to expel. Transfer of population [i.e. Arabs] has taken place until now, in the Emek, in the Sharon and in other places. The work of the J.N.F. on this subject is known to you. Now transfer will have to be done to a completely different extent. In many parts of the country it will not be possible to have new Jewish settlement unless there is transfer of Arab fellaheen.� Ben-Gurion pointed out that the Peel Commission had dealt seriously with this question and he felt it was important that the transfer proposal came from the Peel Commission and not from the Zionists. �Population transfer will permit an extensive settlement programme�, continued Ben-Gurion. He considered fortunate the fact that the Arab people had large and barren tracts of land and suggested that the continually increasing power of the Jews in Palestine would increase the possibility of implementing a large transfer.(171)
The various newspaper reports also show that Ben-Gurion spoke about transfer of Arabs. The Daily News Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency despatched from Zurich on 8 August quoted directly from his speech to the Congress. �For me, the decisive fact is that for the next 15 years the Jewish State will be able to receive another one-and-a-half million Jews and the possibility that Jewish-Arab understanding will be greater with the transfer of the Arabs, ethically necessary and practicable. Zionism fully recognises the rights of the Arabs in Palestine and shall refrain from infringing them. Transfer of Arabs has repeatedly taken place before in consequence of Jews settling in different districts, and we shall have to provide the transferred Arabs with money for settling under their own Government.�(172)
The Palcor Bulletin of the Zionist Telegraphic Agency also reported on Ben-Gurion's speech to the Congress but with a significant difference. Instead of reporting that Ben-Gurion referred to the transfer of Arabs as �ethically necessary and practicable�, Palcor reported Ben-Gurion as asking �Was the transfer of Arabs ethical, necessary and practicable?�(173)
A study of the official minutes of other speakers at the Congress also shows that Ben-Gurion spoke about population transfer. Yaacov Riftin, the Political Secretary of Hashomer Hazair said that �a number of labour leaders have now spoken from the podium of this Congress in their agreement to the transfer plan, which is anti-Socialist, and dangerous from the standpoint of Diaspora Jewry. If Ben-Gurion and Rubashov can say this - what can we expect from the Progressive Zionists?�(174)
Zalman Rubashov, was one of the founders of the Labour Zionist Movement, who later changed his name to Zalman Shazar and became the third President of the State of Israel. A study of the official minutes of Rubashov's speech shows that he .referred only indirectly to transfer. Rubashov told the Congress that �The question of Jews and Arabs in Palestine can be solved by separate territorial concentrations of the two peoples in Palestine on the basis of independent administrations.� He felt that the best solution which had been suggested up to then - the solution which was both the most Zionistic and the most humane - was for the two nations to live in close proximity without assimilation or exploitation by either side.(175)
Moshe Shertok was another delegate who mentioned Ben-Gurion's reference to transfer. He said, �Ben-Gurion has already pointed out that the Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek owes its existence to the transfer of Arabs from that place to another location.�(176)
According to the official minutes Yitzchak Tabenkin did not mention transfer. The original transcript, however, devotes a whole paragraph to his comments on transfer! He began by saying that in his opinion the transfer of Arabs was not possible. �I have nothing against this, that we transfer Arabs by their own freewill from extensive farming to intensive farming, but it is a completely different thing to establish an Arab state and be willing to put into effect a forcible transfer.� Tabenkin considered that the Arab would not freely move, he would not want to leave; economically it would not be good and a Jewish state would be a financial paradise for an Arab minority. �The only way remaining would be by force�, he concluded.(177)
Dr. Arthur Ruppin's comments on transfer also only appear in the original transcript. �First of all, we must prepare suitable land for farmers in the Arab state�, stated Ruppin, �and only then attempt to bring them there as far as possible with their agreement and only if another way is not found - by expropriation.� He then asked whether the Zionists were sure that the Arab state would be prepared to prepare land for Arab transferees from Palestine? It is possible that there would be passive resistance by the Arabs and after a number of years the British would say that they had done all that was possible. The bottom line would be that the Arabs would remain in the Jewish state and then there would be enormous difficulties in the spheres of internal, external and economic affairs.(178)
Later in his speech, Ruppin again spoke on transfer. He said that Weizmann was sceptical about the Peel Commission's proposal on transfer, and that he was even more sceptical than Weizmann. He did not believe that the Arabs would leave of their own free-will. He pointed out that they were speaking of about 300 villages; it was not a question of transferring individual Arabs, but people who had relatives in every village and who had lived there for generations. In any country, he said, it was difficult to move farmers from one place to another, and even the Peel Commission had thought that only with great difficulty after many years it might be possible to implement their transfer proposal.(179)
The delegates representing the extreme left-wing movement �Hashomer Hazair� were especially vocal in their opposition to the population transfer proposal. The first �Hashomer Hazair� speaker on this subject was Eliezer Perry, a founder of Kibbutz Merchavia, who described this transfer proposal as a �reactionary suggestion� which even if doomed to remain just an idle dream with no possibility of realisation, would �stain the flag of the Zionist movement� and show Jewish aspirations to be quite contrary to the needs of the Palestinian Arabs.(180)
Ya'acov Riftin, also representing �Hashomer Hazair� of Palestine felt that the plan which would sanction the transfer of Arabs from Palestine was an �attempt to kill the Zionism of today and would set up a barrier between Zionism and the `latter days' of justice and socialism freedom... The transfer idea is dangerous�. He wanted the Congress to oppose partition and population transfer strongly.(181)
Finally Mordechai Ben Tov of �Hashomer Hazair� wanted to know, �If, for example, we have here based the false, blemished and dangerous proposal of transfer on the fact that a few Arabs near Mishmar Haemek moved a distance of a few metres to tend their fields.� He was very surprised that Weizmann, whom he was accustomed to look upon as a man who carried a �dream in his heart�, could use this �fateful� word �transfer�.(182)
Mrs. Tamar De-Sola-Pool, from the United States, a delegate of the General Zionists A, said that she spoke on behalf of the majority of the Young �Hadassah� Women of America. [�Hadassah,� the largest Zionist organisation in the world is a �voluntary, non-profit organisation dedicated to the ideals of Judaism, Zionism, American democracy, healing, teaching and medical research�.] She was disturbed that the Jewish people, who had learned through generations of suffering to be merciful, were already speaking about the transfer of the Arab inhabitants, people who had dwelt there for many generations.(183)
Abba Hillel Silver, a delegate of the General Zionists A from the United States, after referring to Dr. Ruppin's views on the difficulties inherent in transferring three hundred thousand Arabs, concluded that �the transfer of the Arab population can not be achieved and from the ethical aspect it should not be supported.�(184) As we have already seen, eight years later, Silver was to come out in support of ex-President Hoover's plan for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine to Iraq.
Golda Myerson, a Mapai delegate, reminding the delegates that the Peel Report had proposed the transfer of Arabs to other places, asked whether the Arabs had agreed to such a transfer, or whether they were prepared to enter into negotiations on this proposal? She said that all this talk was wishful thinking. It would be fair for the Arabs who had plenty of other countries to forgo Palestine in the Jews' favour, but this would demand the consent and goodwill of the Arabs.(185)
Dr. Moshe Glikson, a delegate of the General Zionists A, a member of the Central Committee and editor of the newspaper �Ha'aretz� pointed out that there was a great vagueness regarding the transfer and that therefore no surprise should be occasioned by the discovery amongst the delegates of enthusiasts who believed that it was possible to transfer hundreds of thousands of Arabs from the Jewish State in one go. He went on to quote Dr. Weizmann who had given his opinion at the Congress that it was possible to transfer one hundred thousand Arabs to the Arab States during a period of twenty years. He added that there were others who believed in the possibility of a complete transfer of the Arabs during the course of a short period. However, Glikson regarded this as wishful thinking and dangerous wishful thinking at that. He said that Dr. Weizmann had told the delegates of the plan to set up a fund for a large resettlement, but that he personally was of the opinion that not many Arab fellahin would be found who would agree to leave the Jewish State.(186)
Glikson's concluding paragraph on transfer does not appear in the official minutes! In it he stated that �by way of compulsion we will not be able to remove the Arabs from the Jewish State and no settlement plan will rouse the Arab felaheen to leave the Jewish State and go to the impoverished Transjordan. And the Arab leaders and the nationalistic Arab youth for their part will make sure not to weaken the Arab 'irredenta' in the Jewish State.�(187)
Earlier in his speech, Glikson made a statement which also did not appear in the official minutes. He said that Shmuel Zuchovitsky, a leading figure in the agricultural sector, had asked Weizmann not to show any mercy on the question of a complete transfer of Arabs in a short period of time.(188)
Furthermore, in the official minutes, the statements on transfer which Glikson reports Weizmann as saying do not appear! Also, �The Jewish Chronicle� report on Weizmann's address to the Congress(189) brings a transfer proposal which finds no place in these official minutes.
The comments on transfer by Golda Myerson, Moshe Shertok and Ya'acov Riftin in the official minutes are in substance the same as in the original transcript.(190)
Menachem Ussishkin, a member of the Central Committee was also extremely sceptical about the possibility of putting the proposed transfer plan into operation. �Suddenly Mohammed will leave our State - Why?� he asked. Ussishkin doubted whether in the probable event of the Arabs not agreeing to transfer voluntarily, there was any hope that someone would compel them to depart from the country leaving their land to the Jews.(191)
The newspaper �The New Palestine� reproduced the text of the address by Stephen Wise, President of the Zionist Organization of America, to the Congress. In it, Wise devoted only one paragraph to transfer. He regarded a comparison of the proposed transfer in Palestine to the Greco-Turkish population transfer as �utterly illogical�. According to Wise's assessment, both the Greeks and the Turks were �eager� to be transferred and they were both �passionately yearning to return to their own land.� However, in the case of Palestine, there were two reasons why there could not be an exchange. Firstly, since there were hardly any Jews within the area designated to be the Arab State, there could hardly be any �exchange� of population, and secondly, the Arabs would not want a decrease in their standard of living, which would accompany their transfer from the Jewish to the Arab State.(192) This paragraph of Wise's on transfer is missing from the official minutes!(193)
The American Labor Zionist leader, Hayim Greenberg, delivered a very short address at the 20th Zionist Congress.(194) In it, he did not mention transfer. However, immediately after publication of the Peel Report, Greenberg addressed a meeting of the League for Labor Palestine Central Committee held in New Jersey, where he did mention transfer. He stated that the transfer of Arabs was unfeasible. He felt that there was no moral and political possibility to force the Arabs to leave the proposed Jewish State. Furthermore, there was no reason to think that they would voluntarily move to a place which had a lower standard of living. On the other hand, if they remained they would listen to the agitation of their Arab leaders and would be an irredenta in the proposed Jewish State.(195) It seems that Greenberg offered no solution to this dilemma.
After about two weeks of deliberations, nearly two-thirds of the delegates voted for a resolution which rejected the proposals of the Peel Commission on partition, but not the actual principle of partition and empowered the Executive Committee to negotiate with the British Government about the precise terms for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State.
As far as the accuracy of the minutes of the Congress are concerned, it is more than obvious that what is described as the �official� minutes are minutes which have been greatly tampered with and it would therefore be more accurate to describe them as �censored� minutes!
Benny Morris was very critical on this �doctoring� of historical documents, claiming that �the Zionist movement is perhaps one of the most skillful practitioners of this strange art� He added that a �large part� of �the historic Zionist documents and protocols� which have �been opened up now appears to be deficient and faulty, if not patently false�. At the end of his article, Morris claimed that �the speeches, debates, diaries and memoranda that the Zionist bureaucrats issued wholesale passed through the sieve of political censorship on the way to publication: a large portion disappeared or was distorted. What happened to the 1937 documents also happened to Zionist documents from other years.�(196)
A British Foreign Office minute (of December 1937) in summarising the general consensus at this Congress regarding compulsory transfer stated that �great stress was laid on the necessity for the enforced evacuation of the Arabs from the proposed Jewish area.� However, even were Britain not to implement any forcible eviction of Arabs, it would be of little real practical significance, since the refusal of the Jews on principle, to employ Arab labour and the urgency of the Jews to claim all available land for new immigrants would make the position of any Arabs left in the Jewish area most difficult so that �they may well be driven out by Jewish economic pressure in almost as disastrous a way as if they were removed by us by force.�(197) [As we shall see later, the opposition by the British Government, to this compulsory transfer was the result of a change in their attitude towards the recommendations of the Peel Report, which only arose several months after its publication.]
Jewish Agency Council
The �Mandate for Palestine� made specific mention of a �Jewish Agency� whose functions would include �to assist and take part in the development of the country�, subject always to the control of the British Administration. At first the Zionist Organisation acted as the Jewish Agency, but it was soon felt that the membership of the Jewish Agency should be extended in order to represent World Jewry. After negotiations, extending for several years, with American Jewry and other Jewish communities in the world, an extended Jewish Agency came into being in 1929, incorporating fifty per cent Zionists and fifty per cent non-Zionists. Congresses of the Zionist Organisation were to be followed by a meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency.
At the meeting of the Jewish Agency Council in Zurich immediately following the twentieth Zionist Congress, the non-Zionists on this Council showed themselves to be just as divided as the Zionists on the question of partition.
The first speaker to mention the transfer of the Arab population was Arthur Ruppin, who was concerned with the technical feasibility of such a transfer. He did not think that the transfer plan was impossible, but he felt that it would be very difficult to implement. He said that the analogy of the transfer of Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece was not relevant to Palestine, since there had been sufficient land in Greece for the transferees, whereas in Transjordan suitable land would have to be found. Ruppin maintained that the majority of the Arabs would remain in Palestine since the conditions there were far superior to those obtaining in Transjordan. There were better health conditions, better educational opportunities and a better market for products.(198) One might add that these better conditions were brought about not by Arab endeavours, but by Jewish colonisation, development and hard work in Palestine.
Menachem Ussishkin, one of the chief opponents of partition, challenged Weizmann's claim that �when we have our own sector in Palestine and they (the Arabs) have their own, we will be able to make a peace treaty because then we will have something to offer them.� Ussishkin said, �Dr. Weizmann, Sir, What will you have in our small State to offer the Arabs, that you cannot offer today? First of all, you will be able to offer the removal of three hundred thousand Arabs from our country. That is what they are discussing now (at the Permanent Mandates Commission sessions) in Geneva and at the (Zionist) Congress.� Immediately there were interjections from the plenum, �This is what the Royal Commission said - not us.�
Ussishkin continued, �When the proponents of partition are asked 'Where will we settle Jews in our small land in which there (are) so many Arabs?' they answer, 'We will resettle the Arabs in the neighbouring countries.'� He said that he agreed with Ruppin who had considered transfer to be very difficult, almost impossible. Ussishkin therefore concluded that there were but two alternatives. The first was for the Arabs to remain in Palestine, leaving no room for the Jews; the second was that the Jews would be forced to transfer the Arabs out of Palestine, a solution which seemed to Ussishkin to be unachievable.(199)
The next speaker on this question was Dr. Judah Leib Magnes. Magnes was Chancellor of the Hebrew University and one of the most radical of the adherents of the �Brit Shalom� movement, (an organisation advocating a bi-national state in Palestine), although he himself was not officially a member of this group. Magnes had submitted to the Arabs a programme according to which the Jews would remain as less than forty per cent of the population of Palestine, on condition that they be allowed to develop a spiritual centre for Judaism in Palestine.
In his speech to the Council, which was continually interrupted, Magnes said that people had, in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, been transferred from country to country against their will, from which compulsory transfers the world was still suffering. However he had full confidence in the Peel Commission's attempts to solve the Palestine problem.(200) According to Magnes, they had said, �We are forced to transfer these Arabs, otherwise there will not be room for Jews to settle.�
Magnes, however, seems to have misunderstood them. The Peel Commission's main concern had been not with the difficulty of accommodating Jewish immigrants within the proposed boundaries of the Jewish State, but with the fear that a mixed population of Jews and Arabs would be a constant source of friction. It was for this latter reason that the Commission recommended compulsory transfer from the areas of mixed population.
Magnes commented, �You say that you want to transfer the Arabs to Transjordan with their agreement, even though the Royal Commission has stated that if the Arabs refuse to leave the Jewish State voluntarily, it will be necessary to use compulsion.� He told the meeting that it was unrealistic to assume that the Arabs would be willing to leave the Jewish State. Even in the event of some Arabs agreeing to transfer, their fellow Arabs would not permit them to enter the Arab State, since the Arab leaders would prefer them to remain as a hostile element in the Jewish State. Magnes' speech was followed by stormy protests from the plenum!(201)
According to the Peel Commission's partition plan, the Negev was to be allocated, in its entirety, to the Arab State. Moshe Smilensky said that he would prefer an arrangement whereby the fellaheen remained in the Jewish State and the Jews received another one and-a-half million dunams of land in the Negev.(202) [A month earlier, Ben-Gurion has also weighed up the two alternatives - transfer of Arabs or the Negev. However, he had finally concluded that the transfer of Arabs was more important than the Negev.]
Jewish Agency Committee for Transfer of Arabs
Although a number of delegates at the Jewish Agency Council meeting held in Zurich in August 1937, had spoken of the impracticability of transferring the Arabs from Palestine, the Jewish Agency took the Peel transfer proposal very seriously. Towards the end of 1937, they established a �Committee for the Transfer of Population�, which, as part of its work, commissioned a number of memoranda and statistical surveys on various aspects of such a transfer.
In September 1937, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, informed the Council of the League of Nations that the British Government would be sending another commission to Palestine to work out details of the partition of the country. However, the composition of this new commission under Sir John Woodhead was not announced until early 1938.
On 25 October 1937, a conference was held in order to discuss a number of subjects including the �Transfer of Population�. The handwritten notes on this conference are headed by the initials of the participants. It would seem that they included David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Shertok and Dov Joseph. The notes include the various committees which it was planned to set up. The �Transfer of Population� committee was to comprise Thon. Weitz, Ashbel, a Farmers� representative, Bonne and Nachmani. Eliahu Epstein would be its secretary.(203)
At a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive held on 21 November 1937, Moshe Shertok, head of the Jewish Agency Political Department, said that his department was preparing for this new British Commission. He told the Executive that a number of committees had been set up and that some of them had already begun their work. Dr. Dov Joseph, legal adviser of the Jewish Agency's Political Department in Jerusalem, assisted by Dr. Fritz Simon, organised the work of all the committees.
He announced the membership of these various committees. The �Committee for the Transfer of Population� had the following membership: Dr. Jacob Thon, Doctor of Laws, previously Director of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organisation and then Director of the Palestine Land Development Company; Dr. Abraham Granovsky, Doctor of Laws, who had made a special study of population transfer and was on the Directorate of the Jewish National Fund; Joseph Weitz, Director of the Jewish National Fund's Land Development Division; Dr. Alfred Bonne, an economist who had directed the Economic Archives for the Near East in Jerusalem; and Joseph Nachami, Director of the Jewish National Fund Land Office for the Galilee area. Eliahu Epstein (later Elath), Director of the Middle East Section of the Jewish Agency's Political Department acted as secretary.(204)
The Population Transfer Committee held its first meeting on 15 November 1937. Dr. Joseph opened the meeting and told its members that their function was to �prepare a programme for the transfer of population and to coordinate the information required for this.� Their foremost task was to assemble comprehensive details on the Arab population dwelling in the area designated as the future Jewish State.
Weitz asked whether the Committee was to express its opinion on the expediency of existing possibilities for the transfer of the Arab population, or just to assemble the information. Thon answered that the Committee must first assemble and digest the information. Only then would it be possible to discuss Weitz's question.
Granovsky wanted the Committee to examine the possibility of granting the Arabs some favour in exchange for any concessions they might make to the Jews. He was very concerned with the mechanics of transfer and felt that the Committee should discuss �how the transfer of population will be carried out� and �by what means the transfer will be implemented.�
Thon said that the activities of the Committee should be divided between the assembling information concerning the Arab population, and investigating opportunities for agriculture in Transjordan. This, said Thon, was the only way to solve the problem of the transfer of the Arabs living within the borders of the proposed Jewish State. [The Peel Commission had also called for an investigation to determine the absorptive capacity of Transjordan.]
Nachmani said that the Committee �needs to find a solution to the question of the means of transfer. This forces us to deal not only with the details and minutae concerning a plan for the removal of the residents but also to concern ourselves with the possibilities for their resettlement elsewhere.�
Weitz disagreed. He felt that the Committee's first consideration should be how to free more land for Jewish settlement in areas of Arab concentration �and what is the optimum solution for the removal of the Arab residents from these areas.�
Joseph explained that coordinating information was only one of the functions of this Committee. It would have to deal with a number of other problems connected with the transfer, in the light of experience from other population transfers. The members of this Committee would have to familiarise themselves with all aspects of transfer as they would be the Jewish Agency experts on all questions connected with population transfer. The meeting ended with a discussion on nomination of further members to the Committee and allocation of duties among the members.(205)
After the first meeting, an invitation was extended to the Jewish Farmers' Federation of Palestine to nominate two representatives to the Committee,(206) which they did a few days later.(207)
The second meeting of the Population Transfer Committee took place less than a week later on 21 November, when Weitz delivered the opening lecture to the Committee. He explained that his two basic premises had been firstly, that the purpose of the transfer of Arabs from the proposed Jewish State was not only to �decrease the Arab population� but also to �vacate land at present settled and held by Arabs, and free it for Jewish settlement� and secondly, that �the transfer could not be accomplished by force since there was no such force available.� Hence the conditions would have to be such as would persuade the Arabs to agree to voluntary transfer. Such inducements would have to be both political, with international agreements and the establishment of a suitable atmosphere between the two sides, and financial, so that the Arabs would themselves recognise the advantages accruing to them from such a transfer.
According to Weitz's plan, about 87,000 Arabs were to be transferred to the areas of Palestine designated as the future Arab State, to Transjordan and to Syria. Weitz suggested that as the transfer should involve as little environmental or climatic change as possible for the transferees, the Arabs from the coastal plain should be transferred to the Gaza area; those from Upper Galilee to neighbouring Syria; those from Bet-Shean Valley to the eastern Jordan Valley; and those from the Galilean mountains to the hilly areas of Transjordan. Weitz then quoted figures for the area of land required for the transferees and the cost involved in such purchases and transfers.(208)
Weitz's plan allowed for the removal of from a quarter to a third of the Arab population from the area of the planned Jewish State. Bonne, however, stressed the need �to transfer the maximum possible number of Arabs and not be satisfied initially with a partial solution.� He considered that there would be many points to clarify, including those of procedure and finance. Priority must be given to clarification of the �compulsion� to be used in the transfer. Bonne said, �There is no cause to relinquish lightly the proposal of 'compulsion' proposed not by the Jews but by the English. Together with this it is clear that we do not want 'compulsion' in the full sense of the word, but are interested in applying as light a pressure as possible.� Bonne added that the Jews would not leave the transferred Arabs to their fate but would actively concern themselves with their resettlement. He was also concerned with fixing the rate of transfer of the Arabs. Bonne said that it was obvious that the process and means of transfer would be completely different should the transfer take five years or more as compared with transfer within a shorter period.(209)
Joseph considered that the Committee should not limit themselves to the transfer of the tenant farmers and the Bedouins alone. �We must work on a programme of transfer for the remaining classes of Arabs as well.� Thon agreed and said that the Committee's chief concern should be establishing the order of priority for the transfer of the various classes of Arabs. Ashbel pointed out that this could be done by utilising existing research on the social structure of the Arab population.(210)
Towards the conclusion of the meeting, Weitz stressed that the transfer proposal could only be implemented by political agreement and recommended that the transferees be directed especially to Transjordan, since such a destination would strengthen the development of the Arab State and have an important influence on the success of the partition plan. He added that �the possibility of transferring all the Arabs must be investigated�, but if this were not possible, then the Committee would have to decide �who it will be possible to transfer in the near future.� He thought that the transfer would be a lengthy proposition but that the aim should be the speediest possible completion of the transfer. Weitz concluded by proposing that the Committee set up two sub-committees, one of which would look into procedural matters and the other assemble information regarding land and population. His suggestion was accepted.(211)
Regarding this meeting Weitz wrote in his diary, �I opposed the view that on the one hand we must increase the number of Arabs to be transferred and on the other hand (accordingly) increase the time period (for its implementation). I said that in my opinion we will gain no benefit from this. The objective must be to decrease the [Arab] population by one third but during a period of two to three years.� He also commented that Dr. Joseph would use compulsion to implement the transfer were the matter to be put into his hands.(212)
At the following meeting held on 29 November, Dr. Kurt Mendelsohn, an expert on population transfer, from Holland, gave a lecture on the experiences and conclusions to be gained from past population transfers.
He began by asking whether, in view of the different conditions applying then in Palestine, as distinct from those in other countries, one could use the same methods for population transfer?
Even though a political solution was a precondition for population transfer, Mendelsohn stated that he would not deal with this aspect. His question was whether and how one could establish such conditions that the Arabs would leave Palestine of their own free-will and the land would thus pass into the hands of the Jews for settlement.
Experts in Greece were of the opinion that the transfer of villages on a large scale was almost impossible without compulsion or the threat of compulsion. The large scale transfer which had taken place in the Balkans could only be implemented by the use of intensive agrarian reform, and this would likewise have to be the case in Palestine. In addition, financial incentives would have to be given and specific financial arrangements made.
With regard to the time span to implement such a transfer, Mendelsohn said that the transfer of Turks from Greece involved 300,000 people and was accomplished in 12 months. One would have to see that at least the first stage of the Arab transfer from Palestine would be finished within a ten year period, otherwise the transfer would be offset by natural population growth.
After very briefly discussing the methods of resettlement in the Balkans, he went on to explain the special requirements regarding Palestine, namely: the order in which different classes of Arabs should be transferred; the development of Transjordan for the purpose of resettlement; the special arrangements for the transfer of Druze villages from the upper Galilee to Syria and Lebanon; and the moral responsibility towards the Arab transferees.
Mendelsohn concluded his lecture on a comment regarding the financial aspects of such a transfer.(213)
Following the lecture, various other speakers briefly mentioned a few of the points discussed by Mendelsohn in his lecture. These included agrarian reform and the question of the transfer of other minority groups such as the Druze and the Christians.(214)
In a letter written on the following day by Thon to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, he pointed out that �one of the foremost and decisive conditions for the success of the proposed Jewish State is the transfer of the Arab population from its area.� Thon said that public opinion in Europe and America and amongst the Diaspora Jews could be influenced positively by publicising the parallel between the successful compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange and the proposed Arab population transfer.(215)
A meeting of the Sub-Committee on Procedure for the Transfer of Arabs was held on 1 December. In the course of his opening speech, Thon pointed out the differences between the Peel Commission Report, which spoke of the possibility of compulsory transfer of the Arabs, and the comments of Ormsby-Gore at the Permanent Mandates Commission, rejecting compulsion. [Actually Ormsby-Gore was rather vague on this point when being cross-examined by the members of the Commission.] Thon said that in view of the importance of transfer for the successful establishment of the Jewish State, various inducements such as monetary grants should be used to urge the Arabs to transfer voluntarily and within a set period, �and only after all these methods fail should compulsion be considered.�
Granovsky felt that the use of compulsion could have dangerous repercussions for Diaspora Jewry. In his opinion �there .was no possibility of the use of compulsion, but the chances of voluntary transfer of Arabs were slight.� Mendelsohn also opposed the use of force. However, he supported the use of �pressure, such as agrarian reform or Governmental means� in order to encourage transfer.
Bonne opposed looking at the compulsory transfer in isolation. It was impossible to carry out both the partition of the country and the transfer against the will and open opposition of the Arabs. �On the other hand... when the Arabs realise that the partition is inevitable, and after Arab representatives will sit down with the Jews and the English to discuss future relations, then the question of transfer will become a matter of State policy that will be implemented even without the agreement of every rural Arab.�
The opinions of other Jewish groups were discussed. The answer in principle to the question of compulsion depended on the assessment of the viability of the Jewish State in the event of the Arabs' remaining and becoming an irredenta.(216)
The meeting continued on 5 December and �after a prolonged discussion it was decided unanimously to propose the following formula as the stand of the Committee on the question of compulsion. The proposed Jewish State will not be viable as long as a large Arab minority remains. The transfer of the Arab population in large numbers is therefore a pre-condition for the establishment of the State�, as Arabs in the Jewish State would form a fifth column and the land occupied by the Arabs was needed by the Jewish State. �In the event of not achieving the agreement of the Arabs to their transfer or of its non-implementation by England with or without the co-operation of international bodies, (the transfer) will not be realised.�(217) Thus the resolution which was to have defined the Sub-Committee's views on compulsion was disappointingly vague.
The second Sub-Committee which dealt with the details of resettlement also met on 5 December. Opening the meeting, Weitz said the Sub-Committee had to decide �if the population transfer must be total or if we should be satisfied in the early stages with a partial transfer.� Ben-Ami, a representative of the Jewish Farmers' Federation of Palestine felt that for practical reasons the transfer of population was impossible. Nachmani, in considering candidates for transfer said that there was �full justification� for the removal of homeless and unemployed Arabs from the area of the proposed Jewish State. �Now�, he said, �we must concentrate on that point and consider both a maximal and minimal plan.� Epstein said, �This Sub-Committee must prepare material concerning the question of a total transfer�, while admitting the right of the Sub-Committee to determine the order of priority in the transfer of the various classes of Arabs.
The meeting discussed other problems which would need verifying, such as land ownership, size of rural and urban populations, and social classes among the Arab population. Towards the end of the meeting, Nachmani proposed investigating the possibilities of settlement in Syria and Transjordan. Ben-Ami was against transferring Arabs to Transjordan as he required that this area be left empty for future Jewish settlement. However, he agreed that in the case of absolute necessity, the Arabs could be settled in the southern part of Transjordan. The meeting resolved that within a fortnight, Nachmani and Epstein should present material on the possibilities of settlement in Syria and Transjordan, after which the Committee would make a general inspection of the various sites in Syria.(218)
The minutes of the next meeting of the Sub-Committee on Procedure held on 19 December, again quoted the resolution on �compulsion� but very little else was reported.(219)
The Jewish Agency office in London was kept abreast of the discussions going on in these various committees in Jerusalem. On 29 December 1937, a letter was sent to Arthur Lourie at the Jewish Agency�s London office, including reports on the �composition and activities� of the Jerusalem, security, boundary, and transfer committees.(220) The report on the �Exchange of Land & Population Committee� and its two sub-committees, listed their membership, the papers which had been read by three of its members who were experts in this field, and referred to a study of �the question how to avoid, as far as possible, compulsory transfer by combining the transfer of the rural population with a planned agricultural reform...� and ��stock-taking� of the Arab agricultural assets in the territory of the proposed Jewish State�.(221)
At about the same time, the British Government issued a Despatch �Policy in Palestine� presenting a complete volte-face. According to this document the British Government had �not accepted the Commission's proposal for the compulsory transfer in the last resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area.�
Following this, on 27 January 1938, Simon sent a memorandum to Shertok saying, �Since the (British) Government has not accepted the principle of 'compulsion'�, the Sub-Committee on Procedure should end its theoretical debate on the subject and concentrate on a constructive plan for agrarian reform in Palestine and Transjordan, �which would permit the purchase of land in the Jewish State and attract the Arabs to intensive settlement� in the Arab State.(222)
A few weeks earlier, Dov Joseph had travelled to America. Before his departure, Simon wrote to him, worried that during his absence �not very much will be done� by the Transfer Committee and he should therefore appoint a member of the Jewish Agency Executive to take charge of this Committee.(223)
On 3 February 1938 Simon wrote to Thon informing him that Shertok wanted the Sub-Committee on Procedure to investigate the possibility of finding suitable vacant land in the proposed Arab State, in Transjordan and in Syria and to prepare a plan for the resettlement of the Arabs transferred there from the Jewish state. He continued, �Such a plan is a pre-condition for all negotiations on our part on the question of compulsion.�(224) From this we can see that although the British Government had by then rejected compulsory transfer, the Jewish Agency still proposed to consider the question.
At a meeting held on 10 March to discuss the collation of material for the Woodhead Commission, Simon was requested to convene an early meeting of the Transfer Committee, to invite Shertok, Hexter and Joseph to attend, and to ask this Committee to compile figures regarding the absorptive capacity of Palestine and Transjordan.(225) At this meeting which took place on 23 March, Thon reported to the Committee on the assemblage, then in progress, of data on Arab villages situated in the proposed Jewish State. A discussion on the report followed, after which Thon mentioned the search for vacant land, especially in Transjordan and Syria, for the resettlement of the Arabs leaving the Jewish State. Shertok pointed out that the Jewish Agency had a memorandum on the agricultural situation in Transjordan.
Hexter was convinced that there would be strong opposition from the Woodhead Commission, to a reduction in the size of the small-holdings of transferred Arabs, involving a change from �extensive� to �intensive� farming. Hence the Committee would be well-advised to base their calculations regarding transfer of the Arabs on �extensive� farming methods. Thon considered one hundred dunams to be quite sufficient for a peasant small-holding and said that even on this basis there was enough available land in Transjordan and Syria.
Thon raised the question of �compulsion�. Joseph said, �At the moment we should not concern ourselves with the question of compulsion in the transfer of the Arab population from Palestine�, and stressed the need to prove to the Woodhead Commission that there was enough land already available for the Arab transferees from the future Jewish State.(226)
Unlike many other committees, the activities of this Committee were not limited to meetings! During the period when it was in existence, there were in progress various surveys of potential areas outside Palestine for Arab transferees, and the collection of statistical data appertaining to the Arabs in Palestine.(227)
For example, a study was made of the el-Jezireh area of northern Syria. In mid-March 1938, Simon wrote a note to Epstein informing him that Shertok wanted him to finish as quickly as possible his research concerning �the Jezireh area as a place of resettlement for Arabs from the future Jewish state.�(228)
At a meeting of the �Population Transfer Committee� held about a week later on 23 March, Epstein delivered a report on the material he had assembled concerning the settling of Arabs from Palestine in this area. He felt that the Syrian Government might be interested in increasing the Arab population in that area since it was near the border with Turkey and was in constant danger from the Kurds and the Bedouins who lived there. He added that he still required additional information and after he received it, would present all the material in the form of a memorandum.(229)
Bonne observed that the population density in Syria was much lower than in Palestine and although the Committee had no details of land ownership in Syria, its sparse population made it an attractive proposition for resettlement of transferees. Later in the meeting he asked why Iraq should not be taken into consideration as a possible destination of transfer. Joseph said that Iraq was unsuitable as it did not have a common border with Palestine. Shertok, however, felt that the possibility should be investigated.(230)
Zalman Lipschitz considered that the material Epstein had assembled was too general and it was thus necessary for someone to go to Syria in order to check the population density and land-ownership there. The meeting agreed that Epstein should complete his memorandum on the Jezireh.(231)
In the days following, Lipschitz had a meeting with Epstein and they came to the conclusion that �there is no other way to obtain details regarding land ownership and valuations in connection with transfer of Arabs from Palestine and their resettlement in the Jezireh, other than by a visit and investigation on the site by a team of experts who would research and assemble the required information and would submit ... on the basis of their work, a general and detailed report of the entire problem.� He then suggested the composition of such a team, which would include Epstein and Weitz, and he considered that such a team could complete the work within eight to ten days. If Thon concurred, the team would be able to travel at the beginning of April.(232) However, from the minutes of a meeting of this committee held two months later, we can see from Weitz's comments that a committee of experts did not go to the Jezireh.(233) Epstein, however, wrote(234) that he went there in 1938, and he is quite possibly referring to this period of that year.
On 26 April, Simon sent Weitz, Thon and Lipschitz a memorandum on the Jezireh and asked that they should study it.(235) The author of this seventeen page memorandum (written in French)(236) was not stated, but it was not Epstein. Since Simon's representatives were at the time in Syria and thus had the opportunity to obtain any additional information from the author of the memorandum, he said that Weitz, Thon and Lipschitz should immediately indicate any questions that might need answering.(237) Two days later Epstein submitted a twenty-four page memorandum in Hebrew(238) to Thon, which included topographic, demographic, economic and political information and also �suggestions regarding transfer of the Arab population from the proposed Jewish state to the area.� Epstein explained that this memorandum had been prepared from official government sources, and also from oral and written information which he had obtained from both individuals and institutions during his last visits to Syria. He added that some of the details could not be fully verified due to the great difficulties appertaining to the collection of this data.(239)
On Epstein's memorandum, Lipschitz wrote that he had studied it and concluded that the author had succeeded in the objective given to him, namely �to compose a monograph on the Jezireh which would serve as information to the members of the committee in their deliberations on the problem of population transfer from the proposed Jewish State to the Jezireh area in Syria.� Lipschitz added however, that the practical problem of population transfer was only dealt with in this memorandum in a superficial manner. He considered that it would thus be difficult for the members of the committee to suggest a practical programme for population transfer based only on the information in their possession; the assembling of more detailed information would be necessary, and he listed out eleven points which would have to be verified. These included listing the various sparcely-populated areas of the Jezireh which would be suitable for the transferees, their present population, their agricultural potential, what preparatory work would have to been done on the agricultural land, the state of the transport and health facilities, and what would be the financial outlay to implement transfer. Lipschitz concluded that with such information the committee would be able to prepare a transfer plan.(240)
About a month earlier, on 31 March, Simon had written a letter to David Horowitz, who at that time was Director of the Economic Department of the Jewish Agency, informing him, that at a meeting of the �Borders Committee� the question was raised regarding the possibility of transfer of Arabs from the cities of Jaffa, Ramleh and Lod, to the proposed Arab State. It had been agreed to refer the matter to Horowitz for a report on the economic and financial possibilities of such a transfer.(241)
The next meeting of the Transfer Committee seems to have taken place on 22 May 1938. Wilhelm Hecker delivered a lecture on the question of fixing the borders of the proposed Jewish state and the transfer of Arabs. In his opinion �from 40 to 50 thousand families should be transferred to Iraq.�
Weitz regreted that the Committee had not sent its own experts to Syria and Transjordan and insisted on the need for members of the Committee to visit these countries and investigate the territory personally. Nachmani agreed with Weitz but said that the present political situation precluded the possibility of travelling to Syria and Transjordan. However, the Committee had sufficient data to consider transfer to the areas bordering Palestine. �The sole objection to this�, he said, �is that we have always thought of these areas as a reserve for our own settlement.�
Granovsky said that there was no need to destroy this reserve. �We must strive to transfer the Arabs as far as possible from our borders, if possible to Iraq.� Ashbel, agreeing said, �It is obviously worthwhile to distance the Arabs as much as possible.� However, he added that the living conditions of the transferees must be taken into consideration. Hence, it would be easier to transfer the Arabs to the other side of the Jordan, where the conditions prevailing were similar to those of Palestine, than to transfer them to distant countries with greater environmental differences. He therefore recommended transfer of the Arabs to the areas bordering Palestine.(242)
On the day following this meeting, Hecker wrote a letter to Simon, complaining that his memorandum had been �torn to pieces� and the pieces sent to different committees. He stressed that the main point of his memorandum concerned the division of Palestine into two or three areas, and that all his other suggestions were secondary. After explaining the problems which would arise from such a division of the country, he came on to the question of transfer.
He stressed that to transfer Arabs living in hilly areas to the coastal plain went against all logic. It was not for the Jews to suggest where the Arabs should be transferred - there were many possible areas. It would be first necessary to obtain agreement in principle for transfer from the British, which in his opinion would have to be by consent. The neighbouring countries would gladly accept fellahin, if it would not obligate them in any financial outlay.(243)
After receiving a copy of the minutes of this meeting, Hecker wrote a further letter, which mainly dealt with his ideas on transfer. He felt that the only solution was to contact the British Colonial Office and explain to them that England had to transfer a definite number of Arab families. The British representative would have to explain to the Iraqi government that for England to honour its obligations towards the Jews, �it would be necessary to transfer a proportion of the Arabs from Palestine to other places, under favourable conditions�.
Concerning a location for the transferees, the Jews could only �hint�. Hecker himself had ideas for such a location - parts of Iraq. Transjordan was another possibility, but he preferred not to settle Arabs exclusively in Transjordan. Also he was very doubtful whether it would be wise to transfer them to Syria and the Jezireh.
With regard to financing the transfer, Hecker said that Britain would have to make the necessary loans or guarantees. The only thing the Jews could do in the field was to pay for the land the Arabs would be vacating in Palestine. He added that the homes to be built for the Arab transferees should be of a good quality and have running water.(244)
There is also a memorandum written by Hecker in English entitled �Exchange of Land and Population�. This memorandum is undated. However, in a letter from Simon dated 3 March 1938 to various members of the Jewish Agency Executive, he writes that he is enclosing three memorandums by Hecker, one of which is on the subject of �population transfer�.(245) It is thus possible that Simon is referring to this memorandum of Hecker�s.
Hecker considered that the conclusion of the Peel Commission that �no land surplus would be available� for the transferred Arabs was an error and he felt that �the absorptive capacity of wide stretches of land in Cis- and Transjordan� could be �considerably increased�. Hecker suggested that the greatest possible area for the transferees should be considered, and this could include Iraq.(246)
He made an analysis of the population of Palestine and concluded that it was not Arab but a mixture of peoples who had migrated to Palestine, and this proved �that the Arabs have been and are always ready to emigrate to a country where economic prospects promise a better and easier life, they are an essentially mobile element. No genuine resistance against a transplantation would have to be feared in this respect, unless agitation with political arguments would work against the scheme.�(247)
With regard to the mechanics of transfer, Hecker stated that his �suggestions diverge from the recommendations of the Royal [Peel] Commission�. In his view transfer should be �entirely voluntary� and the Arabs should experience a �change for the better� as a result of transfer. With an improvement in living conditions, he felt sure the Arabs �would be only too glad to exchange their poor homes and scanty lives against new well planned estates which would also allow them to give their children a new start in life.�(248) Finance for transfer would have to come from the British - not by taking money from the British Treasury but by the giving of guarantees.(249)
On 12 June, the Sub-Committee on Population Transfer met and were presented with technical information on various matters pertaining to transfer, including the size of land-holdings among the Arabs.(250)
In oral testimony given by Eliahu Epstein to the historian Yossi Katz in September 1987, the former stated that the last meeting of this Committee was the meeting held on 12 June 1938. The Committee was never formally dissolved and no memorandum by it was ever presented to the Woodhead Commission.(251)
In summarising the reasons for this Committee not being able to �translate theoretical discussion into practicality�, Katz wrote that they had �insufficient data in their possession�. To obtain such further data would have required �vast amounts of time and capital�. In addition, there was no �body, either in Palestine or in the international arena� who �would impose a coerced transfer, which was a necessary condition for implementing any transfer whatsoever, given the Palestinian reality of that period�. (252)
On 14 June 1938, a meeting of the �Committee for Determination of Agricultural Absorptive Capacity of Different Areas of the Country� took place. At this meeting, Thon said that without the transfer of Arab agricultural workers to the neighbouring countries, there could be no large scale Jewish immigration - �in short, without transfer there can be no absorption.�(253) Granovsky felt that there were two alternatives; �Either we will be given the opportunity of transferring a decisive number of the Arab agricultural workers to the neighbouring countries, or in the event of this being impossible, that the Jewish State is given unlimited powers for agricultural legislation.� He said that, discounting the matter of population transfer, the Committee must arrange a temporary settlement programme, a programme of agrarian reform based on compulsory expropriation of excess land, and a development programme.(254)
At the end of July 1938, Bonne sent Joseph a twelve page confidential memorandum on the financial aspects of the transfer of the Arabs. The subjects in this memorandum included the Arab population in the Jewish State, the classes of peasants, the cost of resettlement of the Arabs, various problems regarding land prices, the methods and sources of finance and the purchase of land and other immovables belonging to Arabs within the Jewish State.(255)
As we have seen, over the course of nine months, the Jewish Agency spared no pains in assembling information and statistical data, and held numerous meetings, in order to prepare a programme for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine.