Change in Attitude of American Government
About the end of 1941, Dr. Immanuel Velikovsky was urging Norman to further his Iraq project. Velikovsky was born in Russia in 1895. His father was, with Herzl, one of the founders of modern political Zionism. Immanuel Velikovsky was a prominent scientist who had put forward the idea that a great natural catastrophe had taken place at the period of the Exodus from Egypt. He then researched this idea and wrote his books “Ages in Chaos” and “Worlds in Collision”. Between 1924 and 1939, he lived in Palestine, but after that he took up residence in the United States.
As a result of Velikovsky’s urging, Norman invited a number of people to a meeting at his house. At this meeting, he said that he had reached the stage in this matter where he was no longer willing to proceed entirely on his own initiative, without any other Jewish leaders being willing to share with him in the responsibilities of thinking through the practical plan of action to be pursued.(668)
A few months later, at the beginning of March 1942, Norman wrote a memorandum entitled “The Jews and the Post-War World”(669) which he submitted a few weeks later during a meeting with the State Department. In his memorandum, Norman wrote that as a result of the “racial” policies of “totalitarian” governments, the Jews of Europe would find it very difficult to rehabilitate financially after the war. He felt it might be beneficial if a large proportion of the Jews were to leave Europe, but the difficulty would be in finding a country which would be ready to accept them.(670)
Norman stated that research on this question had shown that the only suitable area for Jewish settlement was Palestine. There were however at that time restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine as a result of the opposition of the Arab leaders.
Norman's solution to this was “if a large proportion of the Arabs of Palestine could be induced to leave the country and to settle elsewhere.” He went on to summarise the work which he himself had done in this field since 1938.(671) He felt that the time was ripe “for taking the matter in hand again, perhaps with more boldness than previously.” Norman considered that the government of Iraq was firmly in the hands of Nuri es Said, who was considering declaring war on the Axis. In contrast to this, the former Mufti was carrying on intensive propaganda among the Arabs, “particularly in Palestine, in favor of the Axis.” Norman felt that the anti-Axis cause could be assisted “if the attention of the Palestinian Arabs could be diverted to a scheme whereby they might be able to better themselves, particularly as they are now known to be desirous to sell their land in Palestine at almost any price, in fear of an Axis invasion.”(672)
Amongst his conclusions, Norman felt that “if the matter were to be taken in hand very soon, it might be possible at the very least to cause the government of Iraq publicly to offer the necessary land to Arab settlers from Palestine.”(673)
On 25 March, Murray wrote to Norman, pointing out that since their recent meeting “information has come in to the effect that Nuri Pasha's position is far from stable” and that the State department “are not inclined to believe that the approach which you have in mind would be practicable in present circumstances.”(674)
Norman obviously could not refute Murray's statement regarding the instability of Nuri Pasha's position. He therefore in his reply considerably modified the views he expressed in his memorandum and said that although none of the governments in the Middle East could be considered very stable, in order to accomplish something, one had to deal with such “governments as one finds them.” Norman proposed giving very careful thought to this entire question and was of the opinion that “if the present government of Iraq, insecure though it may be at the present juncture, should make a public offer of land for settlement by Arab peasants from outside of Iraq, it would be very difficult, in the event of an anti-Axis victory in the war, for any subsequent government of Iraq to repudiate this offer.”(675)
The fact that emerges from the Norman-Murray exchanges is that the positive attitude of the American Government towards the Norman plan in the late 1930s had completely evaporated by 1942. In contrast to this, President Roosevelt, continued in private to support transfer.
In a letter to Weizmann, written in May of that year, Norman said that he had gone to the State Department to suggest that he “be sent to Iraq in some capacity or other for the United States Government” so that he could pursue this scheme. They considered his suggestion but politely declined it! In his letter to Weizmann, he thus concluded: “Until now I have been unable to think of any other way of accomplishing anything, unless I can obtain a berth in the Army that would take me to Iraq. I am now feeling out my way in this direction.”(676)
It was soon after that period, that Loy Henderson, the U.S. Minister to Iraq expressed the view that such a transfer of Arabs to Iraq would be “most helpful” This occurred at a meeting at the U.S. State Department between Henderson and Dr. Nahum Goldmann on 23 September 1943.
At this meeting, Henderson asked Goldmann for his frank opinion on “the eventual transfer of the Arabs to Iraq”. According to the minutes of this meeting, written up by Goldmann, Goldmann replied that such transfer was not part of the Zionist demands and that there was enough room in Palestine for the Arabs. “However”, he continued, “if the Arabs wanted, voluntarily, to be transferred, Zionists would be willing to help them in acquiring and developing land in Iraq”.
To this Henderson replied that “he understood the Zionist attitude and thought it wise, but he thought if a transfer could be arranged, it would be most helpful”.
Goldmann then answered “that the Zionists were a democratic people and would not ask any Arab to remain in Palestine if he preferred to go to Iraq, to which Mr. Henderson replied ‘This is very generous of you’”(677).
Furthermore, at about that period, a number of Americans, both Jewish and non-Jewish published articles advocating Arab transfer.
One of these advocates was Oscar Janowsky, Associate Professor of History in the City College of New York, who, towards the end of 1943 published an article entitled “Zionism Today” in “The Menorah Journal”. In this article, he pointed out that were Palestine not inhabited by non-Jews, a Jewish State would be the logical result of Jewish immigration. Thus he declared, “If considerable numbers of Arabs could be transferred from Palestine to neighboring countries, a Jewish State would likewise be feasible.” He felt that the “lure of good land plus other incentives might then induce large numbers of Palestine Arabs to move eastward.” In listing the points for “The Essentials of a Sound Zionist Position”, Janowsky stated that a plan involving the “reclamation of large areas in Iraq, for example, might induce considerable numbers of Palestine Arabs voluntarily to migrate to new and more fertile lands.”(678)
Earlier in the same year, the novelist Ludwig Lewisohn, writing about the conscience of Christendom on the martyrdom of European Jewry, asked “does Christendom care so little for its ethical integrity that it cannot envisage the resettlement of half or more of the Palestinian Arabs in the congenial and broad and sparsely settle Kingdom of Iraq?”(679)
This was not the first time that Lewisohn had proposed Arab transfer A few years earlier, in his book entitled “The Answer”, Lewisohn had written, “If man were not still a barbarian, there would be founded a great international bank to buy out the 1,000,000 Arabs in Eretz Yisrael and to resettle them in Iraq, in Arabia, in North Africa... Gentiles ought to finance this undertaking.” (680)
During 1943, Walter Duranty, a non-Jewish veteran correspondent of the “New York Times” writing on the rights of the Arabs in Palestine stated that in a Jewish state “provision would be made for the fair treatment of the Arab minority, and such Arabs as were unwilling to accept the change could retire to Arabia or anywhere else they liked.”(681)
At the end of the following year, Ruth Karpf, wife of Maurice Karpf, a non-Zionist member of the Jewish Agency, suggested that in exchange for the Jews agreeing to finance and organise the development of Transjordan, Transjordan would “declare its readiness to receive within its boundaries all Palestinian Arabs who prefer to live in an all-Arab community.”(682)
Also at the end of 1944, a proposal for transfer was made by Roberto Bachi, who was Professor of Statistics and Demography at the Hebrew University Jerusalem. In a secret detailed memorandum on his forecasts for the Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine in the decades to follow, he stated that the birthrate of Arabs in Palestine was the highest in the world(683) and even with a Jewish immigration of one million within the following five years, the Jewish population of Palestine would after about sixty years have dropped to between about one fifth and one third of the total population(684) A solution which he put forward to solve this problem was for the Jews “to create financial or political conditions” to allow peaceful transfer of “a large part” of the Arabs of Palestine to other countries.(685)
Further Developments
In a report written by Norman in October 1942, he stated that he had taken no further steps in his project since the outbreak of war in September 1939.(686) However, this conflicts with the fact that he had been in contact with the American Government in March 1942 and also that during 1941, a number of letters were exchanged between Bell and Norman, although the only one which has been traced was written by Bell on 9 October. In this letter, Bell referred to Norman's letter of 7 October, in which the latter asked Bell for a “concrete plan of procedure”. In answer, Bell wrote that he was “strongly of opinion that the movement for federation is invaluable to the carrying out of the [transfer] Scheme, and I would like to see the two combined.” He felt that “the desire for federation exists” and that it was “sine qua non that any federal project has to incorporate the Scheme”. Many of the details would have to be determined by the actual course of the events. Bell felt that it might be necessary to get the transfer scheme working before pressing for federation.(687)
In December 1941, Norman had a meeting with Ben-Gurion. Norman was obviously having doubts about his plan, because he asked Ben-Gurion whether he should continue with it. Ben-Gurion advised him to continue, even though there was not much hope of success.(688)
A month later, in a letter to Weizmann, Bell again expressed concern regarding the setting up of a federation without incorporating transfer. At that time, ideas were being tossed around the British ministries regarding the establishment of an Arab Federation of States which was to have included a Jewish State. Bell hoped that nothing would be done in this direction until he resumed his mission, which he hoped to do by September. Were the federation to be set up without this population transfer, it would be much more difficult to incorporate it later, since there would be an “inevitable tendency to avoid further changes.” Bell asked that if Weizmann, who was about to leave for America, agreed with this reasoning, he should impress it on Norman, when he met with him.(689) Weizmann's trip to America was delayed by a few months, due to the death of his son, an R.A.F. pilot. In May of that year, Norman called on Weizmann in New York. Weizmann, however, was not at home and he subsequently wrote to Norman that he hoped to see him soon.(690) It is not recorded whether they actually met.
Also that month, Bell met with Sir Maurice Peterson of the Foreign Office to discuss Norman's plan and to request assistance for a travel permit to Iraq. He felt that “the chances of success for this scheme would be greatly enhanced if it could be combined with the tactful promotion of a scheme of Arab Federation.” In reply, Peterson said that a lot of people were thinking of how to solve the Palestine problem, and that he should consult the Foreign Office nearer to the autumn regarding an exit permit.(691)
A few days after this meeting, Peterson spoke with Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner for Palestine, who was familiar with Norman's plan. According to Peterson, MacMichael “has no objection to the scheme in principle - rather favours it in fact - but is doubtful of the possibility of moving Arab villagers, which .he thinks do not possess the necessary cohesion, 'en masse'.”(692)
Confirmation of the positive views of the High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael on the transfer of Arabs from Palestine comes from a letter written by Norman to Solomon Goldman at the end of 1938. Norman had met with MacMichael soon after he had been appointed High Commissioner for Palestine, and at this meeting discussed Norman's plan. According to Norman, MacMichael “expressed hearty approval of the whole idea, and even went as far as to say that if it would not be possible to place a sufficient number of Arabs in Iraq to ease the situation in Palestine, he thought that he could be of help in settling the balance in the Sudan, where he had previously been Governor General.”(693)
It is of interest to note here, that in contrast to the hostile attitude of the British government ministries, the British High Commissioner to Palestine favoured the Norman plan, although he had doubts on certain of its aspects.
It seems that Bell had in early 1942, been continuing his efforts to get an exit permit, since in May of that year, Eyres of the Foreign Office had written in an internal minute, “Mr. Bell has been worrying the P.M. [Prime Minister]. the C.O. and ourselves [the F.O.] for a priority passage to Iraq.” (Whether Eyres was referring to Bell's contact with the P.M. in February 1941, or whether he had made further contact, is not clear from this minute.) Eyres reiterated that the F.O. had “always taken the line that we could not say that his self-imposed mission is one of national importance ... There seems to be no reason to change our views.” He concluded by suggesting that the real reason that Bell wanted to go to Iraq was that “he is not a rich man and the loss of the salary which he was paid to investigating the possibilities of the scheme is a serious matter to him.”(694)
From the contents of this minute, Bell obviously did not receive the required exit-permit and in addition, there is no record of his going to Iraq that year.
In October 1942, Norman began again in earnest to revive his plan. In a memorandum written that month, Norman noted that there were a number of new factors in relation to Iraq which appeared to make a start towards carrying out his plan possible and desirable. The transfer of peasants from the badly eroded hills and mountains of Palestine to the far more fertile and more easily cultivated rich alluvial land of Iraq, would enable them to produce a considerable surplus of grains and fodder. These urgently required foodstuffs would not only supply the resident populations of the area, but also the large numbers of British, American and other United Nations troops serving in the region.(695)
Norman did not feel that “any insuperable difficulties would be encountered in inducing Palestinian Arab peasants to proceed to Iraq to cultivate the land.” The use of “intelligent and careful propaganda methods” could be utilised to persuade them of the economic and spiritual advantages of migrating to Iraq and restoring it to its former glory and power. He downplayed the criticism regarding the differences in climate between Palestine and Iraq, and concluded that it should “not prove to be a serious deterrent”.(696)
In April 1943, a Christian Palestinian citizen named Francis A. Kettaneh submitted a memorandum to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden in which he proposed the establishment of a Jewish Home in the Cameroons. In the course of this memorandum he wrote that Norman had “widely distributed a memorandum in which he urges that the United Nations forcibly expatriate and transplant all Arabs, whether Moslem or Christian out of Palestine and settle them in Iraq. This action is urged so as to make place immediately for one million Jews who could immediately immigrate into the country.”(697) In the absence of this memorandum of Norman's, it is difficult to assess how objectively Kettaneh, was representing the intentions of Norman.
At the end of 1943, Bell had discussions with an unnamed person in the Zionist Organisation regarding his return to Iraq to resume his work,(698) but it seems to have gone no further than the discussion stage, since there is no record of Bell's returning to Iraq.(699) From the indices to the “Correspondence of the Foreign Office”,(700) we know that Bell put in an application in both 1943 and 1944 to travel to Iraq. Unfortunately, however, the appropriate files of the Foreign Office have not been preserved.(701) We do, however, know from a letter written by Bell in August 1942, that he “had received (this time unsolicited) information from the F.O. [Foreign Office] that as soon as I [Bell] am prepared to go out [to Iraq], I could count on the necessary facilities. A volte-face from two years ago.”(702) However, as we shall see later, the problem was then was one of financing his trip to Iraq.
Although there is no record of Bell's involvement with the plan after 1944, Norman still continued his efforts.
In addition, about this period – to be precise in December 1944 - a reference by some Iraqi leaders of their attitude towards transfer of Arabs from Palestine is to be found in the note of a conversation held in Baghdad by some British Foreign Office Official (signature illegible) with General Nuri Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs. However this conversation seems not to be connected, at least directly, with Norman.
The conversation dealt with the possible imposition of the partition of Palestine. As reported in the minutes, Nuri Said said, “There will of course … be troubles and disturbances in the Jewish State amongst the Arab population there. He [Nuri Said] … spoke of the necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish State and thought it could be done by exchange.”(703)
On the following day this official met with the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Iraqi Foreign Minister. They both spoke on Palestine and the possibility of partition but took rather different views. The Foreign Minister very much repeated what Nuri Said had said. “He…. took up much the same line as Nuri over probable reactions and also the necessity of removing the Arabs from the Jewish State.”(704)
We can notice that although both Nuri Said and the Foreign Minister proposed the transfer of Arabs from Palestine, they did not mention Iraq, or indeed any specific destination, for the transferees.
Nearly a year later, on 3 October 1945, Norman brought out a short memorandum entitled “A Fundamental Solution of the Palestinian Problem”, in which he considerably toned down his expectations. In it he referred to the resolution of the British Labour Party which included the clause, “Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out, as the Jews move in.” This resolution had been passed almost unanimously at their Annual Conference of 1944, and was again reiterated at the following year's Annual Conference.
Norman pointed out that the Palestine problem was not insoluble “particularly if the statesmanlike suggestion for Arab resettlement elsewhere” contained in this resolution were to be considered. Norman at this time maintained that from the economic standpoint it would not be necessary to transfer the Arabs, but that there might be non-Jews living in the country who would not care to continue living there or “agree to remain peaceable” in the event of the immigration of a large number of Jews being permitted. At that period Jewish immigration had been almost completely barred by the British. Norman therefore suggested that those Arabs who did not wish to remain in Palestine be offered a practical alternative place to settle. He said that it should not be necessary to compel any non-Jews to emigrate from the country, but that it would be necessary for the governing authority to suppress by police action any forcible attempts to interfere with Jewish immigration or attacks on Jews or their property. Norman said that anyone who objected to such Jewish immigration “would be faced with the alternatives of peaceful acquiescence or of emigrating.” To enable the implementation of this second alternative for those who would not have a place to emigrate to, or would not have the money to go there, Norman suggested that it be made possible for these Arabs to settle in Iraq.(705)
However, as we shall soon see, just a few weeks later Norman was to return to his original bold plan.
Remuneration to Bell
Until about mid-1940, Bell's retainer and all expenses including his two trips to Iraq were paid for by Norman.(706) After that date he stopped paying Bell his retainer,(707) thus putting the continuation of the scheme (and also Bell’s financial situation!) in jeopardy. Because of this, Bell tried to get the Zionist Organisation to help in this matter. Following a meeting with Professor Selig Brodetsky in mid-November 1940, Bell wrote to him clarifying the points he had made at this meeting.
Bell pointed out that because Norman had wanted to accompany Bell on his next visit to Iraq during the winter of 1939-40, he had postponed his departure until it was too late to go out that winter. Only towards the summer of 1940 had he suggested that Bell go out by himself, but by that time summer was approaching and for various reasons Bell felt that it was not the time to go and instead he suggested September or October. Norman replied that not much could be done during the war and the plan should thus be postponed until after the war. Meanwhile he would not be able to continue paying Bell his retaining fee.
Bell however considered that it was important that his work be continued without interruption and he gave his own assessment of the political situation. In addition he was very concerned with the loss of his retaining fee.
He asked that the Zionist Organisation should tell Norman that the scheme should be carried on despite the war and that they should pay him the retaining fee for the period that Norman had not paid him. He did not know whether they would be prepared to discuss with Norman any further financing by him of the scheme.(708)
Brodetsky reported on his meeting with Bell to the Jewish Agency Executive and sent them a copy of his letter.(709)
A few days later Bell’s request was discussed by this Executive. Weizmann felt that “Bell should be put in a position to carry on his work,” and suggested that Brodetsky, should find out how much money would be necessary for this purpose, with a ceiling of 500 pounds. It would seem that Weizmann intended the Zionist Organisation to advance money for the continuation of efforts to obtain a successful conclusion to the Norman plan. He hoped that Norman would repay any monies thus advanced to Bell.(710) In December 1940, Weizmann made an advance payment to Bell (711) - amount not known.
In a further letter written by Bell to Brodetsky after this meeting, he began by saying that he was “glad to learn that you and your colleagues are of opinion that the work already begun in the Middle East should be continued without undue delay.... I hold myself at your disposal to return to Iraq as soon as possible.” He then informed him of the details of payments which had been made to him by Norman. He pointed out that even if Norman would tell him to go to Iraq “tomorrow” and pay him as in the past, he would find it very difficult to go without having received the back-pay. Bell seemed to favour an arrangement in which Norman together with the Zionist Organisation would jointly finance the scheme.(712) About a month and a half later, the Acting Political Secretary of the Zionist Organisation, Joseph Linton, wrote to Bell: “Dr. Weizmann has asked me to let you know that he hopes it will shortly be possible to make definite arrangements for your journey.... Dr. Weizmann trusts it will be possible for him to arrange an early appointment with you in order to discuss the final arrangements.”(713)
A few weeks later, Linton wrote “to confirm the financial arrangements on which we have agreed in connection with your journey to Iraq.” Details of the payments then follow: A payment of 300 pounds to cover the six months when he received no payment from Norman; remuneration of 75 pounds per month from January 1941; travelling expenses and the cost of a return journey to Iraq. He added that “the above payments are of course subject to your being able to travel to Iraq this spring season ... and the arrangement is limited to a period of six months... The question of continuing the work after that date, and of any subsequent journey to Iraq, will be decided by Dr. Weizmann on the basis of your report, and in the light of circumstances as they may exist at the time.”(714)
As we have seen earlier, during the war one required a travel permit to leave Britain. As soon as Bell learned of this offer from the Zionist Organisation he tried desperately to receive such a permit, even going as far as to appeal to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. But all to no avail!
As a result of this refusal for such a permit, on 10 March, Linton informed Bell that the Zionist Organisation “did not see its way” to pay Bell “anything” since he could not “go out at once to Iraq.”(715) In reply Bell asked that, in order to be in a position to continue his work after the summer, Linton should “arrange for an immediate grant, or loan, of 500 pounds to be recovered” by the Zionist Organisation from Norman.(716)
It would thus seem that he received no such money, since on 31 March, Norman wrote to Weizmann saying that he had “received an airmail letter from Montague Bell, which indicates that he is in pretty bad financial shape, which makes our further discussion somewhat urgent.”(717) In his reply Weizmann agreed to such a meeting.(718) No details of such a meeting have been traced.
On 8 September 1941, Bell had a meeting with Weizmann and following this meeting telegraphed Norman asking him to arrange for the resumption of the work. He made it clear that until he had the funds to pay for a passage to Iraq, he was not even prepared to apply for such a passage.(719)
At that period, Bell wrote to Doris May, Weizmann’s private secretary in London, asking whether Weizmann really wanted him to go to Iraq?(720) Whether he also asked such a question to Linton, or whether May passed on Bell’s letter to Linton is not known. However, Linton wrote to Bell that “my own impression is that he [Weizmann] is really keen on the idea [of Bell going to Iraq].”(721)
In a letter to Norman written in the second week of October, Bell again said he had to have the money for the fares to Iraq before he could ask for a ticket.”(722) Nearly two weeks later, Weizmann cabled Norman: “Montague [Bell] asking urgently for payment stop is prepared to leave immediately stop please settle matter.”(723)
A few weeks later, in a meeting between Norman and Ben-Gurion, Norman asked whether he should continue with his Iraq plan. “It costs 100 Palestinian pounds a month [plus] 100 Palestinian pounds for expenses.” Ben-Gurion advised him to continue.(724) It is clear from various letters of that period, that Norman was not at that time actually paying Bell this sum each month, but was just telling Ben-Gurion what it would cost to continue with his Iraq plan.
During 1941, when Weizmann was in the United States, he succeeded in arranging for 250 pounds to be given to Bell and, also probably due to Weizmann’s efforts, Norman paid him 500 pounds.(725)
Bell also refers to an outlay of 2500 pounds by Weizmann.(726) This was the first installment of a 10,000 pounds bribe given to Suwaidy, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, to encourage him to support Norman’s transfer plan.(727) It is possible that this money was underwritten by Norman himself.(728) We do know that Norman was “very pleased” about the meeting with Suwaidy on this matter.(729) There is no record of any further installment being paid.(730)
In January 1942, Bell wrote to Weizmann that in order to return to Iraq in September 1942, he would require at least another 500 pounds.(731) A few months later, Weizmann wrote to Norman that he was under the impression that he, Norman, was going to settle the financial matter with Bell. Weizmann pointed out that Bell was “in great difficulties and it would be a pity if he were to nurse a grievance against us”, and Weizmann trusted that Norman would take care of this problem.(732) [A footnote in Weizmann’s printed book of letters states that no reply by Norman to this letter of Weizmann's was traced.(733) In fact this reply can be found in the Central Zionist Archives.]
In his reply Norman writes that he could not understand this attitude of Bell’s since he had during 1941 given him 580 pounds - (Bell reports this sum as 500 pounds!) - and even Weizmann had agreed that this was an adequate “severance payment”. Norman writes: “I cannot see that I am under any further obligation to him now in any way.... When I first employed Mr. Bell, as of February 1, 1938, he was without employment, and as far as I could tell without prospects of employment, so that I think he did very well, in the material sense, during the period that he received remuneration from me.”(734)
A month later, Norman wrote to Weizmann asking “whether or not you will be able to secure a sum like $10,000.00 with which we could send Mr. Bell to continue the work that was begun several years ago.”(735) On the same day, the two of them met together and they discussed no fewer than three letters and a cablegram which Bell had sent Norman during the previous two months. They were in complete agreement on the importance of taking up the work again but the sticking point was the finance. Norman said he was unable to carry the burden by himself. Weizmann said that “the burden should rest on a broader foundation” and “that it might be possible for him to obtain the necessary for a year’s work, but it would take some days for him to see if he could do so.”(736)
After a further month, Weizmann wrote to Norman: “With regard to Bell: - I have not failed to give this matter consideration. As you know his activities will require a considerable amount of money, which, as soon as we have it, will be forwarded.”(737)
No further developments on this subject have been traced until the end of 1943. It was then that Bell had discussions with the Zionist Organisation and came to “satisfactory arrangements” regarding his “pay and expenses”. The Zionist Organisation was unwilling, however, to include his previous debts and Norman wrote to Weizmann that this fact had “rather surprised” him, since it was proper to regard these debts as part of the aggregate.(738) Weizmann replied that he could “really hardly see how the Zionist Organisation can be expected to take over the debts which Mr. Montague Bell claims to have contracted as a result of the arrangements which he had with you.” He pointed out that they were “perfectly willing to give him an opportunity of continuing his work, and have set aside some 1,500 to 2,000 pounds for that purpose.” This was in fact a considerable sum and it was thus unjustifiable to expect the Zionist Organisation to undertake further expenditure. Weizmann felt that it would be only fair for Norman himself to take over these debts (about 500 pounds), although not necessarily in full. He hoped that Norman would clear up this matter with him in order that he might leave for Iraq as soon as possible.(739) There were obviously contacts between Weizmann and Norman on this matter during the next couple of months, since on 21 March, Weizmann wrote to Bell: “I think I have settled the matter with Mr. Norman. He is prepared to pay 450 pounds.” (740)
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Norman had enlisted in the United States Navy and in the summer of 1944 he was based in London. It would thus seem that as a result of being in the armed forces in London, he could not at that time pay his own money over to Bell. He therefore wrote to Weizmann in mid-May that he had informed Bell that Weizmann would arrange for him to receive 500 pounds as soon as possible. Weizmann had promised Norman that he would arrange for the Keren Hayesod to advance this sum to Bell. In return, Norman undertook to repay this amount to the Keren Hayesod within one year.(741) Whether or not such a loan came through or Bell received any money, is not known.
From all this we can see that Weizmann and various Zionist institutions were very interested in the success of Norman's plan to transfer the Arabs from Palestine even to the extent of arranging the financing of Bell's missions to Iraq.
A further point to note is that Norman was not a poor man - he was a multimillionaire! Why then was he not prepared to give Bell a few thousand dollars to advance his very own plan which he had already worked on for about a decade? Was he losing interest in the advancement of his plan?
Contacts with the American Government
Up to the autumn of 1945, Norman's efforts had been mainly with the British government. However, all his actions had been futile. Not only were the British civil servants, on the whole, hostile to his plan but they had repeatedly, year after year during the war, refused to grant Montague Bell an exit visa to travel to Iraq. After the Labour party's sweeping victory in the British general election in the summer of 1945, it was hoped that they would implement their Palestine resolution of December 1944. However, by the end of 1945 it was already clear that the officials in the British Foreign Office had persuaded Foreign Secretary Bevin to continue with their anti-Palestine policy. The subsequent outcry caused the new President of the United States, Harry S. Truman to send Earl Harrison to Europe to study the question of Jewish refugees. Following his report, Truman wrote to Attlee asking for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. This was the reason that Norman now turned his attention to the American government.
On 4 October, Norman wrote to the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, offering to put at his disposal information he had compiled on this question of transfer. In his letter, he pointed out, quoting a number of examples, that the “solution of political questions by means of the transfer of population has become a recognized procedure.” In connection with Palestine, he quoted the relevant section of the British Labour Party resolution pointing out that “the difficulties that are met with in Palestine arise because of the presence of the Arabs, who might have been transferred to other locations outside of Palestine although within Arab lands.” Norman pointed out that he had “made a thorough study of the capacity of Iraq to absorb a large proportion of the Palestinian Arabs” and that his findings indicated that “the resettling of some 750,000 Palestinian Arab peasants in Iraq would involve no practical (as distinguished from political) difficulties.”(742)
On 24th of that month, William Hassett, the Secretary to the President, replied to this letter, (reply untraced), showing interest and requesting information.(743) As a result, Norman prepared a memorandum on “The Practical Possibilities of Settling a Large Number of Palestinian Arab Peassnts in Iraq”, which he then sent to Hassett.
In his introduction to this memorandum, Norman referred to the British Labour Party resolution of 1944, and considered that “mass transfer of Arabs to any land other than a free one with a predominantly Arab population and culture obviously would be impractical, for social, psychological, and political reasons.” After considering the various Arab countries, he concluded that only Iraq was suitable for such a transfer.(744)
As in his earlier memoranda, Norman wrote about the great potential of Iraq, a country which was under-populated, yet extremely fertile, quoting a number of authorities to support his thesis. He explained that the recent construction of dams had made a large area of thinly-inhabited land available for cultivation but the present population of the country was unable to supply more than a very few settlers to populate these newly available areas.(745)
He felt that “the transportation of a large number of people, together with their personal belongings and livestock, from Palestine to Iraq should present no practical difficulties.” Because of “the attachment of the Arab peasants to their fellow-villagers”, Norman considered that the transfer “would be done best by entire villages”. The plans would also have to include provision for temporary accommodation for the settlers until they could build their own houses, and also supplying them with food until their new lands would yield their own produce.(746)
He went on to discuss the financing of such a plan. Norman concluded that were the government of Iraq to furnish the Arab transferees with land free of charge, then the money raised by the sale of Arab land in Palestine would be sufficient to transport 700,000 Arab peasants to Iraq, feed them and their animals for six months and cover other overhead expenses.(747)
In his final section, Norman pointed out that his memorandum only dealt with the resettling in Iraq of “Arab peasants” but did not deal with the half a million “urban Arabs” living in Palestine. He held the view that “many of these, such as artisans and merchants, would want to sell out their premises in Palestine and follow the peasants to Iraq.” He did not envisage any difficulty in finding Jewish purchasers for their properties in Palestine.(748)
Norman had previously encountered criticism from the British government officials on his total neglect of the political aspects to his plan. This was presumably the reason why in the last paragraph of his memorandum to the American president, Norman stated that he had made no attempt to deal with the political side of the transfer, This he defined as inducing Iraq to accept the immigrants, giving them free land and inducing the Palestinian Arab peasants to move to Iraq. “Those matters”, wrote Norman, “are subjects for negotiation between governments”.(749)
Norman was, to put it mildly, over-optimistic that Iraq would be amenable to his plan. When, only a few weeks later, ex-President Herbert Hoover put forward a similar plan in the course of a newspaper interview, the immediate reaction of the Iraqi press was extremely hostile.
Hoover however was not deterred by this Iraqi reaction and on 30 November which was about ten days later, he met with Norman.(750) This meeting had been arranged by a mutual friend George Sokolsky, a columnist for the “New York Post” and a member of the executive committee of the American Resettlement Committee for Uprooted European Jewry.
At this meeting, they discussed the possibility of Norman appearing before the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry in order to put forward his transfer plan. On 11 December, Hoover wrote to James McDonald, who had just been appointed a member of this Commission, to suggest that he meet with Norman to discuss the plan.(751) On the same day, Norman had written to Hoover stating that he was “available with all material prepared to be placed before the commission, provided the commission should indicate a desire to hear me.”(752) Hoover informed Norman that he had written to McDonald on this question.(753) McDonald replied to Hoover that he had written to Norman requesting a meeting,(754) although it seems that a face to face meeting did not materialise and that further contacts between them were only by correspondence and telephone.
McDonald added in this letter that he knew Norman well, “having discussed with him a few years ago in considerable detail his Iraq ideas”.(755) The only meeting between the two of them which we have a record of, is the meeting of October 1938; however the phrase “a few years ago”, used at the end of 1945, would seem to indicate a meeting around 1942.
About the end of December, Norman again wrote to Hoover (letter undated) to update him on developments. He said that McDonald had asked him (Norman) to “furnish him with a brief memorandum, with a half dozen copies thereof” of the transfer plan. He said that if he received them immediately he would place them before his colleagues on the commission and “would suggest to them that I be called to testify during their public hearings”.
For several weeks Norman heard nothing more from McDonald. It was on day previous to writing this letter that McDonald informed Norman that although he had done what he could, it was unlikely that the commission would call him to give evidence. McDonald added that he would try and take the matter up with the British members of the commission, but Norman was not optimistic.(756)
Resettlement Plan for Arab Refugees
The last stage of Norman's efforts in this field (as far as can be traced), took place in late 1948, In the months preceding and following the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, there was a mass exodus of Arabs - some by expulsion and some by freewill.(757)
On 8 August 1948, Norman wrote a letter (untraced) to Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister of the provisional government of Israel, regarding the “revival of his plan about resettlement of Arabs in Iraq.” By 15 October, Shertok had not yet replied to this letter. In consequence, Arthur Lourie, a member of the Israel foreign service, pointed out to Shertok that Norman was “a bit put out” by this omission, and suggested that he drop him a few lines thanking him for his suggestions and indicating “that the matter is not yet ripe for action at this time, or else that it would be useful for him to pursue his studies.”(758)
Two and a half months later, Shertok replied to Norman's letter apologising for the delay. He explained that the reason was that the provisional Israeli government was “engaged in setting up a small committee of investigation of the very subject which you have raised, and I thought that after a little time I might be able to tell you something of its findings and proposals.” The committee Shertok was referring to was the transfer committee comprising Joseph Weitz, Ezra Danin and Zalman Lipschitz.
Shertok pointed out that the committee had taken longer than expected to prepare its report. Lipschitz was at the time in the United States and Shertok suggested that Norman meet with him to receive “in detail (of) the results of his and his colleagues' research.” Shertok felt sure that Norman would share with Lipschitz his knowledge of the subject. “We are only at the very inception of the great historic task,” concluded Shertok, “and every place of knowledge and constructive thinking can be of distinct value at this formative stage.”(759)
Immediately on receipt of this letter, Norman replied saying, “I was very pleased to learn that the very idea that I had taken upon myself the liberty of proposing to you already had occurred to the minds of yourself and some others in Israel.” He informed Shertok that through the initiative of Eliahu Epstein, a meeting had already been held in the previous week in Washington between Epstein, Lipschitz, Elisha Friedman, Joseph Schechtman and himself. All these participants were people who had studied or had been involved in proposals to transfer Arabs from Palestine. Lipschitz informed this meeting about the Transfer Committee and felt that those present could work in two directions. The first was “the presentation of ideas and supporting data, on which a plan to be adopted by the Government of Israel might be based.” The second idea was “to mobilize the leaders of public opinion in this country [U.S.A.] to speak out in support of such a plan as soon as the Government of Israel would make public announcement of it.” The meeting had agreed that Friedman, Schechtman and Norman who were American citizens “would be considered a sort of advisory committee” under the chairmanship of Norman. Norman stated that it would be the advisory committee's “purpose now to produce a more or less detailed plan, which presumably will be forwarded to you for your consideration and possible presentation eventually to your [Israeli] government.” He hoped they could be of service in the solution of this “very serious problem of the Arabs with which your government is confronted.”(760) It is not known what were the future activities, if any, of this advisory committee.
We do, however know that a few weeks after the establishment of this Resettlement Committee, Norman resigned in protest after Shertok violated the secrecy by divulging to the “New York Times”, the very plan for the resettlement of the Arab refugees which Norman was supposed to recruit non-Jews to propose.(761)
We also know that on 6 December 1948, Schechtman wrote a letter to Ezra Danin addressed to the “Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ha-Kirya, Tel-Aviv, Israel”. Enclosed with this letter was material obtained from Norman concerning his transfer proposals. According to Schechtman, Norman had insisted “that a personal letter be sent to him by Mr. M. Shertok (and by Mr. Shertok only!) expressing recognition for all he has done in this particular field and for his putting at the disposal of the Israeli Government the results of his earlier activities.” Schechtman had promised him that he would receive such a letter and therefore asked Danin to ensure that Shertok would send it.(762)
The only letter that can be traced from Shertok to Norman is the letter of 17 December (referred to above), but this does not mention the papers handed over by Norman. Also, a search of the files of the Israel Foreign Ministry has not yielded them. It is of interest to note that this letter of Schechtman addressed to the Foreign Ministry was found, together with a number of Norman's memoranda and reports, in a file at the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. It was only discovered in 1986, in an un-numbered file,(763) amongst the papers of Joseph Weitz, who had been a member of the various transfer committees. It is therefore very possible that the contents of this file was the material sent by Schechtman to Danin. It was then passed on to Weitz to study, and then somehow got mixed up with his papers and ended up at the Central Zionist Archives.
Bartley Crum, who had been a member of the Anglo American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, wrote an article entitled “Bold New Plan for Palestine” which appeared in the November 1949 edition of the Bnai Brith journal “The National Jewish Monthly”. Norman had helped Crum to compose a five- paragraph appendix to this article. This appendix comprised a very brief summary of Norman's plan and its advantages and how it could now be utilised to solve the Arab refugee problem.(764) This seems to be one of the very few occasions when Norman's plans were publicly mentioned during his lifetime and also for many years afterwards.
The Saltiel Proposal
At the beginning of 1938, a Greek Jew by the name of Edwin N. Saltiel sent a letter to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, proposing a Jewish-Arab transfer of population. There was absolutely no connection between Saltiel and Norman or Bell - the only connection was in the comments of a senior civil servant in the Foreign Office, “Another wild scheme which is not dissimilar from that recently proposed to the CO (Colonial Office) by a certain Mr. Norman. It is to be noted that the author of this letter is a Jew.”(765)
Saltiel had studied the partition scheme which had recently been proposed by the Peel Commission and wrote a letter to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, pointing out that the fact that he lived in Greece was probably responsible for the suggestion which he wished to make. Saltiel spoke of the “very bold decision” which had been taken at the Lausanne Conference fifteen years previously to implement a compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Although at the time this drastic measure had been criticised, history had shown that it was a good decision.
Saltiel believed that “with good will on the part of all concerned a similar happy result could be arrived at if the Arabs of Palestine were persuaded (or compelled) with the consent of the Rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Transjordan to emigrate to those countries in exchange for the Jews living in the countries in question who would have to be persuaded (or compelled) to emigrate to Palestine.” (The words in parenthesis “or compelled” are Saltiel's). Saltiel added that the property .left behind by the respective populations would serve to indemnify the other party and that the Jews and Arabs affected by this transfer would be assisted financially under the auspices of the League of Nations.(766)
As to be expected, the hostile comments of the Foreign Office civil servant (quoted above) together with a letter which he drafted, caused this plan to be still-born.