Januray 9, 1998

Japan		United States

U.S.-Japanese Squabble over Japanese Spy Satellite

United States/Japan:
According to Japan's Kyodo News Agency, U.S. officials are expressing opposition to the development of a Japanese spy satellite. The Japanese, who have been discussing the need to enhance their intelligence capabilities in general, and their space based reconnaissance in particular, have recently intensified their consideration of the development of an independent reconnaissance capability. The Japanese Foreign Ministry recently requested that funds be allocated in the 1998 budget for a second year of studies. The U.S. concerns were leaked just as Japan's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukushiro Nukaga, a close aide of Prime Minister Hashimoto, was leaving for Washington to discuss both defense matters and attempts by the Japanese government to solve its economic problems. Also leaked was the news that American defense and intelligence officials were considering the suspension of technical assistance to Japan if Japan continued to build the satellite.

The official reason behind the American opposition is that American officials are concerned that the Japanese would be duplicating American capabilities, and that this would not be an efficient utilization of Japanese resources. They noted that the treaty tying U.S. and Japanese defenses together specifically stresses that each nation should seek to exploit areas in which they have superior capabilities. Duplicating superb American capabilities, they argue, both violates the spirit of the treaty and squanders scarce resources on an unnecessary capability.

American concerns go deeper than budgetary considerations. The American reconnaissance capability is a powerful tool in managing both enemies and allies. Apart from the intelligence and military capabilities space-based systems provide the United States, American control over intelligence assets creates a dependency relationship with allies. During Desert Storm, the ability of the United States to withhold some or all space-based intelligence from coalition partners gave the United States the ability to shape strategy and limit allied options. The French reacted vigorously after the war, working to develop an autonomous European spy satellite capability in order that they not be placed at a disadvantage again.

The Japanese are obviously concerned about divergences between U.S. and Asian interests. One immediate issue is Korea, where the willingness of the Americans to release spy satellite photos to Japan will shape not only Japan's ability to act independently, but even Japan's perception of any crisis on the Korean peninsula. In a broader area, Japan is extremely dependent on the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan. Monitoring sea lanes is, of course, of fundamental interest to Japan and Tokyo is concerned that the United States might not always share Japan's interests.

The sharp U.S. response on the satellite issue demonstrates that the U.S. would be losing an important card in U.S.-Japanese relations and signals Japan that Washington is not prepared to give up that card easily. The choice of the budget issue as a rationale is particularly interesting. The Japanese very much want the United States to take a leading role in bailing out Asia in general and Japan in particular. The United States is pointing out that Japan can't both ask for financial support and not submit to American concerns, particularly where this involves how Japan spends its money.

Japan wishes to decrease its dependency on the United States in some areas while increasing it in other areas. The Asian financial crisis increases Japan's dependency on the United States dramatically. Absent a renewed Russian or credible Chinese threat, Japan has few cards to play with the Americans. This means that the U.S. can name a high price for aid to Japan. The first price: Japan's abandonment of an autonomous intelligence capability. The real price: continued and intensified Japanese strategic subservience to the United States.

But here is the problem. Japan might be willing to pay this price in return for substantial financial solutions. The United States is not really in a position to bail out Asia in the way that Asia wants to be bailed out: painlessly. On the other hand, the United States is prepared to make tremendous demands in return for insufficient assistance. This will inevitably lead to increased tensions between the United States and Japan. We expect the satellite squabble to expand into a much broader debate over U.S. control over Japanese security policy in an era of Japanese economic dependency on the United States.