http://arts-humanities.cant.ac.uk/History/Extranet/VIETNAMCOURSEBOOK2002-2003.doc
WAR AND REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM
1930-1975
Coursebook
2002-2003

ã Dr Kevin Ruane
Department of History
CCCUC
September 2002 
Kjr1@cant.ac.uk

COURSE OUTLINE
Classes are scheduled for Mondays 1400-1600

7 October 2002	   		Lecture: Introduction to the Course

14 October 2002	   		Lecture: The Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution

21 October 2002	   		Seminar: The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945
			  	
28 October 2002			(1) Video: “Uncle Ho and Uncle Sam” 
				(2) America and the Cold War, 1945-1950

4 November 2002	  		Lecture: The Franco-Vietminh War, 1946-54

11 November 2002   		Seminar: 1954 - Year of Decision

18 November 2002   		Seminar: The 1954 Vietnam Crisis Dissected

25 November 2002   		Lecture: Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1961

2 December 2002			Seminar: The Formation of the NLF, December1960

9 December 2002			Lecture: The Kennedy Strategy, 1961-63

16 December 2002 		Seminar: The Kennedy “withdrawal” debate

     CHRISTMAS VACATION

13 January 2003			Lecture: Johnson and US Escalation in Vietnam, 1963-65
				
20 January 2003			Seminar: On Hanoi’s Escalation, 1963-65

27 January 2003			Seminar: Air War and Ground War, 1965-68		

3 February 2003			Lecture: The Tet Offensive

10 February 2003			Seminar: The American anti-war movement
				
17 February 2003			(1) Lecture: Assessing Johnson
				(2) Video: ‘Johnson’s War?’

24 February 2003			(1) Timed Essay
				(2) Lecture: Nixon and the World

3 March 2003			Seminar: The Nixon Strategy

10 March 2003			Lecture: A Savage War of Peace, 1971-75

17 March 2003			Seminar:  Hanoi’s relations with Beijing and Moscow

24 March 2003			Seminar: Consequences, Explanations, Reflections
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LECTURE, SEMINAR & DISCUSSION PREPARATION

On the following pages you find lecture/seminar briefings and discussion formats.  

u Lectures: 
It is important that you do not come to lectures completely ‘cold’.  You will get far more out of the sessions if you are already familiar with the topics, themes and issues to be covered.  Therefore, use the time between lectures efficiently and effectively by reading along the lines suggested.  And remember that lectures are only an aid to understanding, a guide to further independent study.  They will not provide you with everything you need to know, only a route map through the particular historical terrain under discussion.  Follow-up reading is essential if you are to fill the gaps in your knowledge and comprehension.

u Seminars: 
The seminars will usually revolve around key ‘readings’, highlighted in the briefings.  These are available, in master copy form, at Glebe House, where they can be photocopied for a flat rate fee of 75 pence.  In addition to the key readings, you are encouraged to read something else in order to broaden your contextual understanding of the issues and identify conflicting or competing viewpoints.
 
u Recommended reading: 
At the back of this course-book you will find the Select Bibliography for the course. The recommended reading for lecture and seminars contained in the briefings is in the form of abbreviated references to texts and articles in the bibliography where full publication details can be found.  Precise pages or chapters have not always been highlighted in the lecture and seminar recommendations - it is up to you to use your texts judiciously, although most will indicate quite clearly the specific topic or area to be read-up for a given session.  Pressure on book stocks, rather like death and taxes, will always be with us, but if you experience major problems please let me know.  

Articles are a very important resource for this course - make sure you use them.  Articles can be borrowed from the History Resources Centre at Glebe House.  

To reiterate: a master copy of the key readings for the seminars will be kept at Glebe House and can be photocopied, on the Departmental copier, for a flat rate of 75 pence.

u Tutorials: 
I am more than happy to see students on a one-to-one basis, but you must arrange a tutorial with me in advance rather than turn up at my room on the off chance.  I always bring my diary to lectures and seminars, so catch me at the end of a session.

*
COURSEWORK

Coursework makes up 40 PER CENT of your final mark.  A written three-hour examination makes up the remaining 60 PER CENT.
YOU MUST PASS THE WRITTEN EXAMINATION IN ORDER TO 
PASS THE COURSE AS A WHOLE

You are required to produce FOUR pieces of coursework with 10 PER CENT of the total coursework marks allotted to each individual piece.

Your coursework complement comprises:
a)	two essays of approximately 1,500 words
b)	one timed essay, undertaken in approximate examination conditions
c)	one document question

The two conventional essays should be chosen from the list of titles on page 4.  You must choose one title from section A and one from section B.  You must also include an annotated bibliography with your conventional essays - a sentence or two outlining your thoughts on the texts you have consulted, commenting on general line of argument, value as a source, persuasiveness of case etc.  The document question will be set mid-way through the first (Michaelmas) term.
SUBMISSION DEADLINES: all work to be handed in to the Departmental Secretary at Glebe House
Document Question:  	Wednesday 18 December 2002, 4pm
Essay #1: 	    	Monday 3 February 2003, 4pm
Essay #2:            		Monday 28 April 2003, 4pm
Timed Essay		Paper to be given out and essay to be written in class on 24 February 2003

NOTE
 these submission dates are not negotiable … 
You should be warned that failure to submit ALL FOUR pieces of work will be penalised.

***

ESSAY TITLES

SECTION A (Essay #1, due 3 Feb. 2003)

1)	Why did the Truman administration acquiesce in the return of the French to Vietnam in 1945?

2)	Why did it take the United States until 1950 to come out in support of the French war in Vietnam?

3)	What evidence is there to support Dean Acheson’s claim that France 'blackmailed' America into providing ever increasing amounts of military assistance for Vietnam in the period 1950-54?

4)	Assess the value of Chinese and Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese Communists in the 1945 to 1954 period.

5)	How important was the British role in deterring American intervention in Vietnam in 1954?

6		Was the creation of the NLF in 1960 a reaction to the excesses of Diem's 	rule, America's 'nation 
	building' policy, or North Vietnam's encouragement?	

2		Do you accept that the United States ‘both wanted and inspired the removal of Diem in 1963’ 
	(Michael Charlton) ?
 
8)	A TITLE OF YOUR CHOICE (period up to 1960, but cleared with me in advance)

SECTION B (Essay #2, due 28 Apr. 2003)

1)	How successful was the Kennedy administration’s counter-insurgency strategy

2)	Why did President Johnson favour gradual escalation in Vietnam rather than all-out war between 1963 and 1968?

3)	Compare and contrast Hanoi's relations with Beijing and Moscow between 1963 and 1969.

4)	Was Vietnam by 1967-68 'Johnson's war'?

5)	What was the significance of Operation Lamson 719 in 1971?

6)	Did Nixon achieve 'peace with honor' in 1973?

7)  	Was Vietnam a war that America could never win? 

8)	A TITLE OF YOUR CHOICE (period after 1960, but cleared with me in advance)
LECTURE AND DISCUSSION BRIEFINGS
All sessions run Mondays 1400-1600

7 October 2002
Lecture
 Introduction to the Course
You will be introduced to the key themes and issues to be examined during the course and given a grounding Vietnam War and Cold War historiography.  Why is Vietnam worthy of study?  Why are you here?  

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14 October 2002
Lecture
The Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution
In February 1930, a small group of Vietnamese communists met together in Hong Kong.  Political exiles from their own country where they were wanted by the French colonial authorities, and in danger of arrest by a British colonial administration that viewed them as dangerous subversives, the gathering took place - legend has it - at a football match at Hong Kong stadium.  By the time the final whistle blew, a single and united Vietnamese communist party had been formed.  Presiding over this unity conference was a forty-year-old Annamite, Ho Chi Minh.  A long-time, well-known and much respected nationalist, Ho was also a dedicated communist and agent of Comintern.  He and his comrades committed themselves to the creation of a free and ultimately communist Vietnam, hence to two revolutions, a national and a social.  In pursuit of these goals, they would eventually humble a European colonial power and bring to its knees the world's greatest super-power.  This lecture will thus focus on the nature of Vietnamese communism, its relationship to Comintern and the Soviet Union during the 1930s, the national and social objectives that Ho and his followers set themselves (and which they remained loyal to throughout four decades of struggle), the 'fall' of France in 1940 and the gradual annexation of Indochina by Japan in 1940-41, and the birth of the Vietnamese Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi) in May 1941, better known as the Vietminh.  The lecture will culminate in an account of the August Revolution of 1945, the subject of next week’s seminar session.

READING

Bibliography: Section A, Overviews
De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road; Duiker, Sacred War (chap.1); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Kolko, Anatomy; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War; McMahon, Major Problems (chap. 2); Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Short, Origins of the Vietnam War; Schulzinger, Time for War (chap.1); Wintle, Viet Nam Wars; Young, Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section B, Vietnam before 1945
Books:- 
Curry, Victory at Any Cost; Gardner, Approaching Vietnam; Karnow, Vietnam, chap.3 and most of chap.4; Marr, Vietnamese Tradition; Marr, Vietnam 1945; Tonnesson, Vietnamese Revolution
Articles:- 
D27, D28, H21, H34, H50, L27, P14, T9

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21 October 2002
Seminar
 The Vietnamese Revolution of August 1945
There are three readings for this session.  Reading A deals with the Vietminh's plans and preparations for seizing power, and how, in August 1945, they managed to achieve their objective - culminating in Ho Chi Minh's declaration of Vietnam's independence on 2 September 1945.  Reading B looks at American policy during this period, in particular President Franklin D. Roosevelt's oft-stated determination that France should not return to Vietnam and, by implication, his support for the cause of national self-determination for the Vietnamese people; and then his successor, President Truman, and his decision to restore French sovereignty in the summer of 1945.  Reading C comprises a series of documentary sources.

READING A: From William J. Duiker's Sacred War, pp.37-52 

READING B: Article H22, George C. Herring, 'The Truman Administration and the restoration of French sovereignty in French Indochina'

READING C: From Ruane, Vietnam Wars, Chapter 1, esp. documents 1.1-1.11 (pp.11-27)

Further reading as last week

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28 October 2002
Video
‘Uncle Ho and Uncle Sam’
During the last months of the Second World War, the Vietminh assisted the American OSS - the forerunner of the CIA - to locate 'downed' US pilots in Vietnam.  In return, the Vietminh were given arms and supplies and, most importantly, encouragement that Washington would indeed support its claims for independence at the end of the war.  However, the alliance between 'Uncle Sam and Uncle Ho' came to nothing, as this programme from the BBC's Timewatch series explains.

Lecture
America and the Cold War, 1945-1950
This is an important background lecture insofar as American involvement in Vietnam from 1950 can be seen as a direct result of Washington's adherence to the national security doctrine known as Containment.  The US government came to embrace Containment in 1946 as a means of countering what was perceived to be the aggressive expansionist policy of the Soviet Union.  In other words, it became America's chosen method for waging the Cold War up to and including the 1970s.  But Containment was not born fully-formed.  It grew, and in some ways transformed itself, in the period 1946 to 1950.  In your background reading, you should look first at the way in which US-Soviet relations soured after April 1945 (was it mere coincidence that the deterioration set in after Roosevelt's death?).  Also note the confusion in Washington in 1945-46 about how to respond to what was seen as Soviet aggression: direct confrontation meant war, while a do-nothing approach was equally unsatisfactory.  Enter George F Kennan, Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in Moscow, with his famous Long Telegram of February 1946 in which the outline of Containment was first drawn.  Neither war, nor peace, but ... Containment.  An acceptance of the division of the world as it was, while ensuring that the Communists made no more gains at the expense of the West.  If Western military defences and political resolve could be strengthened, Kennan argued, the Soviet Union would be hemmed in.  At root, Containment meant maintaining the status quo and a related readiness to adopt the offensive should the Communist bloc attempt to disrupt the global balance in the diplomatic, political, economic or military sphere.  Trip-wire diplomacy, it might be called, or symmetrical strategic response.
	Look at the way Kennan's idea of Containment developed in 1946 and 1947.  What kind of a threat did he consider the Communist world to pose?  Was it purely military?  Note his 'X' article (published in Foreign Affairs in July 1947), and consider to what extent the Truman administration adopted Kennanite Containment in the same period, and how far it refined it after its own taste - Kennan, after all, was only an adviser to the US government which could take, leave, or adapt his 'advice'.  Look at the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 and the Marshall Plan of 1947-48 in this light.  Move on to consider American motives for signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949.  Most importantly, think about the Truman administration's reaction to the twin disasters of late 1949: the 'loss' of China to Mao Tse-tung's Communists, and the Soviet explosion of a nuclear weapon thereby ending America's atomic monopoly.  In response, Truman ordered a major national security review. This landed on his desk in April 1950 under the prefix NSC-68.  How did NSC-68 redefine Kennanite Containment?  It certainly gave rise to the concept of the National Security State, but what did that mean?  And finally, what implications was the birth of NSC-68 (the universalisation and militarisation of containment?) likely to have for American policy towards the French effort to regain and retain its former position in Vietnam, now entering its fifth year?

READING: the literature on Containment is massive, but a good starting point  (in Section A of the bibliography) would be Ambrose Globalism chaps. 4 to 6 inclusive, then move on the more detailed analysis to be found in Gaddis Strategies of Containment chaps. 2 and 3.  

Bibliography: Section J, General
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; Ball, Cold War; Bartlett, Global Conflict; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Dockrill, Cold War; Dunabain, Cold War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Gardner, Covenant with Power; Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy; Smith, Cold War; Spanier, American Foreign Policy; Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists

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4 November 2002
Lecture
The Franco-Vietminh War, 1946-54

Now began the conflict between the tiger and the elephant which [Ho Chi Minh] had described, back in September [1946], to the American journalist David Schoenbrun: 'If the tiger ever stands still the elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks.  But the tiger does not stand still.  He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges by night.  He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his hide, and then he will leap back into the dark jungle.  And slowly the elephant will bleed to death'.  And to a French Socialist minister, at a time when he was still hoping to achieve a peaceful solution, [Ho] had summed up the war as follows: 'You would kill ten of my men for every one I killed of yours.  But even at that rate you would be unable to hold out, and victory would go to me'.

From Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, London 1968, p.138

LECTURE: Section I, 1946-50
From 1946 to 1950, the Vietminh waged a guerrilla campaign against the French, with the latter in control of most of the towns and larger conurbations, the former holding sway in the countryside.  On the face of it, the nature of the conflict was quite clear.  A European colonial power was attempting to recover a former colony in Southeast Asia, and was opposed by a militant indigenous nationalist movement led by communists.  The French, however, were at pains to portray the conflict in a different light.  It was the communist leadership and direction of the Vietminh that allowed them to do so.  To those who denounced them as imperialists and spoke of la sale guerre, the French government countered with references to la guerre pour civilisation occidentale.  Which was it?  An old-fashioned colonial war, or a war against the agents of Moscow?  It is difficult to believe that the French regarded it as a wholly Cold War issue, although much depends on how one views the political orientation of the Vietminh and how one considers this appeared to the French at the time.  The more plausible and cynical interpretation is that in order to obtain money, arms and ancillary support from a United States increasingly in the grip of Cold War and anti-communist paranoia, the French overstated the ideological nature of the war and downplayed its colonial aspects.  Yet, through 1946, 1947 and 1948 it did not work.  America remained aloof.  Until ... two events in 1949 forced Washington to look afresh at the struggle in Vietnam, namely the fall of China to communism, and the Soviet attainment of an atomic bomb.  In the hysteria which followed these events - the background to the creation of NSC-68 - the United States began to view the war in terms pleasing to the French, and the long sought American commitment soon materialised.  Ironically, it would be matched, and even outstripped, by Chinese help for the Vietminh.

LECTURE: Part II, 1950-54
The Truman administration's May 1950 decision to offer $10 million of financial assistance to the French for use in Vietnam is regarded by many historians as the first step on the slippery slope to full-scale American involvement in the Vietnam conflict. For, from this point onwards, success or failure was no longer just a matter of French prestige and credibility but of American as well.  And herein resides the seeds of the crisis that was to engulf America in Vietnam, first in 1954 when the Franco-Vietminh war reached its climax, and then, a decade on, in 1964-65, when the American war in Vietnam began.
 
READING
Bibliography: Section A, Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why (chap.2); De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (chap.7); Duiker, Sacred War (pp.62-75); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War; McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Short, Origins of the Vietnam War; Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars; Young, Vietnam Wars; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section J
Books which deal well with the general Cold War scene and the background to NSC-68 include:- 
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (chap.6 and first part of chap.7); Ball, Cold War; Bartlett, Global Conflict; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Dockrill, Cold War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (chap.4); Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy; Smith, Cold War; Spanier, American Foreign Policy

Bibliography: Section C, Franco-Vietminh War
Books:- 
Curry, Victory at Any Cost; Duiker, US Containment Policy; Gardner, Approaching Vietnam (chaps.2-3); Herring, America’s Longest War; Irving, First Indochina War; Karnow, Vietnam (first part of chap.5); Macdonald, Giap
Articles:- 
C23, D22, D27, E5, H24, L28, L29, M10, K18, M23, R9, W8, Z2
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11 November 2002
Seminar
1954 - Year of Decision
1954 was a critical year in the history of Vietnam - the year in which the Franco-Vietminh war came to a climax.  As it did, it spawned a Cold War crisis of major proportions which, for a time, appeared to be a potential catalyst for a general Asian conflagration and even a Third World War with all its attendant nuclear dangers. In the event, a semblance of peace was brought to Vietnam - but in that very peace process one can detect the seeds of the later, and greater, conflict that engulfed both Vietnam and, in its own way, the United States.  In preparing for this pivotal seminar, you should read as widely as possible and, in so doing, try and answer the following questions:

A	Why did the French occupy Dien Bien Phu in November 1953

B	What is the relationship of the Berlin Conference on European problems in January-February 1954 to the war in Vietnam?

C	When did the battle of Dien Bien Phu open?

D.	What was the Eisenhower administration’s initial response to the Vietminh attack?

E	What was ‘United Action’, and were there any conditions attached to its implementation?

F	What was the British attitude to ‘United Action’?

G.	Why was there no military intervention in Vietnam before the opening of the Geneva Conference?

H	What did each of the key contestants at Geneva hope to gain from the Conference?  Think especially of the USA, France, Britain, the Soviet Union,. Communist China and the Vietminh

J	How was agreement finally arrived at in Geneva in July 1954?  And who were the winners and who were the losers from the final settlement? 

This is a complex but vitally important area.  Nothing that follows, either in this course or, historically, in Vietnam itself makes sense unless you fully understand these events, most especially the Geneva Accords.

READING

Bibliography: Section A,  Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why (chap.2); De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (pp.162-79); Duiker, Sacred War (pp.81-94); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War; McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Short, Origins of the Vietnam War (pp.124-86); Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (pp.81-98); Young, Vietnam Wars (pp.30-47); Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section C, Franco-Vietminh War
Books:- 
Anderson, Trapped by Success; Cable, Geneva Conference (British policy); Curry, Victory at Any Cost; Duiker, US Containment Policy; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Dienbienphu); Gardner, Approaching Vietnam (chaps.5-10, very detailed account); Herring, America’s Longest War; Irving, First Indochina War; Kaplan et al, Dienbienphu; Karnow, Vietnam (first part of chap.5); Macdonald, Giap
Articles:- 
C25, D23, E5, H15, H32, H44, I1, I13, J7, M8, R10, W21, W23, Y2, Z2, Z7, Z8

Not in the course bibliography but containing excellent coverage of the 1954 crisis and Geneva Conference from a British angle: Lord AVON (Anthony Eden) Memoirs: Full Circle; C.J.BARTLETT British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century; David CARLTON Anthony Eden;  John CHARMLEY Churchill's Grand Alliance; Robert RHODES JAMES Anthony Eden; John YOUNG Churchill's Last Campaign

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18 November 2002
Seminar 
The 1954 Vietnam Crisis Dissected
On 22 May 1954, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wrote to his wife from the Geneva Conference (where he was co-chairman along with Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister) to confide to her his estimate of the current situation.  'It is still even money we may reach an armistice', he concluded.  'I am more than ever convinced of dangers of 3rd World War if we don't.  The following day, Eden flew to London and, on 24 May, briefed the British Cabinet, convened in special session, on the state of the Conference.  In doing so, he left none of his colleagues in any doubt that it was the United States, not the Soviet Union or China, that he regarded as the principal threat to world peace at this time.  The Cabinet minutes record:

The Foreign Secretary said that he believed there was a fair chance of securing agreement at Geneva on the terms for a cease-fire in Indo-China.  He would continue to work for such a settlement, for he was gravely concerned about the dangers of the alternative courses of action which the United States Government were likely to favour if a settlement were not now secured by negotiation.

This seminar revolves around the issue of US military intervention in Vietnam to save the beleaguered French - it was this that Eden feared would invite Chinese counter-intervention on the Korean model and perhaps precipitate general war with all its attendant atomic dangers (note the Britain could be hit by Soviet atomic weapons in 1954, but not the United States - the Americans could afford to be more provocative than the British!).  US intervention (as the head of an international coalition if possible) falls into two phases: March-April 1954, before the Geneva Conference opened; and April-July 1954 during which time Eden, and others, understood that the price of diplomatic failure in Geneva might be major war in Asia.  

READING A: Stephen E. Ambrose, ‘The Wisdom of US Nonintervention’, from McMahon, Major Problems of the Vietnam War, pp.135-45

READING B: Ruane, Vietnam Wars, Chapter 2, documents 2.5-2.16 (pp.40-55)

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25 November 2002
Lecture
Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-61
It was obvious to most observers that the United States was unhappy with the final Geneva settlement but had no option other than to accept it - or work to circumvent it! The Eisenhower administration chose the latter approach, and from July 1954 engaged in a damage limitation policy with respect to so-called 'retained' Vietnam.  The north had been lost, but the south was still intact.  The United States therefore sought to create a strong anti-communist and democratic state in South Vietnam, capable of sustaining itself economically and defending itself militarily from internal or external enemies.  Washington's approach was labelled 'nation-building'.  In adopting it, however, a number of the Geneva accords were openly violated.  For one, neither the Eisenhower administration, nor the government of Diem in Saigon, were prepared to countenance the nationwide elections scheduled for July 1956 as these appeared certain to produce a Vietminh landslide and, by extension, the communisation of Vietnam.  Opposition to elections was justified on the grounds that since nothing had been signed at Geneva, the Americans and South Vietnamese were not legally bound to uphold the Conference accords.  Another violation came with the inclusion of South Vietnam in SEATO via the creation of a special protocol.  Finally, after 1954 the American government disseminated the fiction that Geneva had created two separate independent sovereign states when, in actual fact, the wording of the final declaration of the Conference was explicit in insisting the division of Vietnam was temporary, merely a military regrouping arrangement.  However, from Washington's standpoint it was important to establish the principle of 'two' Vietnams, for this justified American political, diplomatic and economic intervention - and finally massive military involvement - on the grounds that South Vietnam was under assault from an 'external' communist power, namely North Vietnam.  The truth, of course, was that the struggle in South Vietnam in the 1960s was essentially a civil war - a matter for nobody other than the Vietnamese themselves, certainly not the Americans.  But Washington convinced itself that it was part of the global struggle against international communism, and intervened accordingly.

READING
Bibliography: Section A,  Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (chap.8); Duiker, Sacred War (chap.3); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War; McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Short, Origins of the Vietnam War (chap.5); Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (chap.3); Young, Vietnam Wars (chaps.3-4); Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section D, Interregnum
Books:- 
Anderson, Trapped by Success; Bui Tin, Following Ho Chi Minh; Cable, Geneva Conference (British policy); Curry, Victory at Any Cost; Duiker, US Containment Policy; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Dienbienphu); Gardner, Approaching Vietnam (chaps.5-10, very detailed account); Herring, America’s Longest War; Irving, First Indochina War; Kaplan et al, Dienbienphu; Karnow, Vietnam (chap.6); Macdonald, Giap; Smith, International History, Vol.I
Articles:- A6, A15, C20, M42, S52, X1
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2 December 2002
Seminar
The formation of the National Liberation Front, December 1960
In December 1960, South Vietnamese communists took the lead in founding the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF).  The NLF was an umbrella grouping encompassing a wide variety of nationalist/anti-Saigon sentiment.  Peasants, workers, intellectuals, members of the professions and religious sects, representatives from ethnic minorities and Buddhists were all to be found within its ranks.  But, like the Vietminh before it, the handle of the umbrella was in the firm - if disguised - grip of the communists.  By early 1962, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) had emerged as the dominant force within the NLF's Central Committee: in spite of the absence of any obvious links with North Vietnam, the PRP is now regarded as the effective southern branch of the VWP, controlled by and answerable to Hanoi.  The NLF's programme, first revealed in January 1961, deliberately avoided communist slogans and instead stressed patriotic-nationalist goals, democratic freedoms, anti-colonialism, anti-Americanism, land reform, fairer wages, promotion of domestic industry over foreign imports, a neutral foreign policy and peaceful re-unification with the north.  Later, the insistence on reunification would become less prominent in Front pronouncements in order to maintain the support of those non-Communists who were committed to the destruction of the Diem regime but not to facilitating northern - hence communist - control of the south.  In July 1962, the NLF's goals were codified in a four-point manifesto (an end to the US military presence; and end to Diemist repression; the formation of a coalition government in Saigon to include all political parties, including the NLF; and this coalition government to pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality).
	There was, for reasons already noted, no mention of reunification.  But this was still the abiding aim of the VWP in the north and its adherents in the south, an aim to be facilitated by NLF domination of the projected 'national coalition government' and, in due course, overt communist domination of the NLF.  Whatever the truth about the extent of North Vietnam's role in the period leading up to the outbreak of the insurgency, there is now no doubt that the NLF was, in the words of a leading authority on the communist side of the war, 'an insurgent movement inspired by local conditions in the south but guided and directed from Hanoi' [Duiker, Sacred War, p.137].
	Reading A charts the background to, and birth of, the NLF, while Reading B is a compendium of documents pertaining to differing aspects of the NLF's origins and make-up.

READING A: from William J. Duiker's Sacred War, pp.116-137

READING B: Ruane, Vietnam Wars, Chapter3, documents 3.1-3.11 (pp.58-80)

ADDITIONAL READING (which is advised) should be based on a selective approach to the recommendations accompanying the previous lecture on the origins of the insurgency.

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9 December 2002
Lecture
The Kennedy Strategy

LECTURE: Part 1, Kennedy and the World
In an oft-quoted passage from his inaugural address in January 1961, Kennedy established the tenor of his Administration's foreign policy:

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty.  This much we pledge - and more.
	
Henry Steel Commager, Documents of American History (New York 	
						1968) Volume II, p.668

What this meant in practice was a dynamic, interventionist and aggressive approach to the Cold War.  Kennedy's Republican predecessors had talked a good Cold War, with hostile rhetoric full of references to roll-back, liberation and victory, but had been negative, cautious and circumspect in practice.  So much so that Democrats charged that Eisenhower had allowed a nuclear missile gap to develop in favour of the Soviet Union, and that he had done little to counter the appeal of Communism in the Third World, with two countries - Cuba and North Vietnam - actually slipping out of the Western and into the Soviet orbit in the 1950s.  Furthermore, Eisenhower had come to rely too heavily on nuclear weapons, reducing America's options in a confrontation with Soviet or Chinese power to holocaust or humiliation.  Above all, Eisenhower had conceded the initiative in the Cold War - his administration had been just as negative and reactive as the Truman government, and the concept of victory had been replaced by one of permanent global tension.  Kennedy would change all of this, he said.  His administration would not just talk a good Cold War, it would wage one as well.  As Stephen Ambrose notes:

Kennedy and the men around him had been inpatient with Eisenhower's leadership.  Ike had not been aggressive enough, he tended to compromise, he could not stir the nation to great deeds.  Fundamentally, Eisenhower had rejected the idea that there could be a military solution to Cold War problems or that America could shape the world's destiny.  He had accepted limitations on America's role.  Kennedy did not.  Where Eisenhower had been passive, Kennedy would be active.  Where Ike had been cautious,  JFK would be bold ... He surrounded himself with the very best minds America had to offer, appointed men who had the techniques and the brains that would enable the new administration to solve any problem,  indeed to go out and find new problems so that they could solve them.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 5th edn. (London 1988), p.181

Whereas Eisenhower had determined that America should have the best security that it could afford (even if that meant relying predominantly on cost-effective nuclear weapons) Kennedy maintained that there should be no financial ceiling on defence spending.  He duly reversed Eisenhower's philosophy: while continuing to invest massively in nuclear weapons programmes, he also increased defence spending on the army, navy and air force, and injected new funds into covert operations under the auspices of the CIA.  Kennedy's goal was the ability to respond to a threat at an appropriate level: covert, conventional, and if need be nuclear.  Under Eisenhower, the U.S. had only one response - nuclear.  In consequence, Kennedy's foreign-defence policy is often termed Flexible Response.  And there was no way to get Flexible Response on the cheap: America's security was paramount, and the cost irrelevant.  Eisenhower's conservative economic policy had imperilled the US, according to the Kennedy camp.  For the latter, rampant communism was a greater danger than rampant inflation.
	In preparing for this lecture, consider the theoretical premises upon which the Kennedy administration based its foreign-defence policy.  Then move on to look at how far the theory was made reality.  In doing so, familiarise yourself with the Kennedy administration's approach to specific issues such as a) the missile gap and the nuclear arms race; b) the Berlin crisis of 1961; c) the Vienna summit of the same year; d) the intensification of the Cold War struggle for the Third World, with Cuba as the classic case-study; inevitably e) the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and its aftermath; and f) Vietnam.  Also consider the impact of Kennedy's personality on all of these events.  Ask yourself whether the Kennedy years marked a period of success or failure in foreign and defence policy, and whether the Kennedy myth has hindered rather than helped an objective analysis of his performance in international affairs.

LECTURE: Part II, Kennedy and Vietnam
In your preparatory reading for this discussion, bear in mind the following questions.

1	Kennedy sent two fact-finding teams to Vietnam in 1961: 

		a) May 1961 - Lyndon B. Johnson's mission
b	October 1961 - the [General Maxwell] Taylor-[Walt] Rostow mission
	
     What were their conclusions?

2.  What was Kennedy's reaction to their findings?

3	Kennedy's Vietnam policy ...

		a) To what extent did US 'advisers' increase in South Vietnam during
		    Kennedy's Presidency?
		b) What were the Green Berets?
c	What was the 'Strategic Hamlet Programme' and how successful 	
     was it?

4.Kennedy's problem ... Diem

		a) What was the problem with Diem?
		b) How did Kennedy propose to solve it?
		c) How deeply was the US involved in Diem's assassination?

READING

Bibliography: Section A, Vietnam  Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (pp.215-39); Duiker, Sacred War (pp.138-64); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War (chaps.4-5); McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Short, Origins of the Vietnam War (chap.6); Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (pp.111-22); Young, Vietnam Wars (pp.70-104); Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section J, General on JFK and the Cold War
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; Ball, Cold War; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy

Bibliography: Section D, Interregnum, 1954-63
Books:- 
Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars; Halberstam, Best and the Brightest; Herring, America’s Longest War (chap.3); Kaiser, American Tragedy; Karnow, Vietnam (chps.7-8); Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam; Schlesinger Jr., Bitter Heritage
Articles:- 
B18, H46, L37, M45, M47, N33, N34, S17

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16 December 2002
Seminar
The Kennedy “withdrawal” debate
In spite of the removal of Diem and Nhu, South Vietnam's military and political fortunes deteriorated to such an extent that, by the spring of 1965, the NLF/Vietcong appeared to be on the brink of complete victory.  In Washington, Kennedy's successor as President, Lyndon B. Johnson, reacted to this danger by ordering an enormous increase in the US military commitment that included the widespread aerial bombing of North Vietnam and, eventually, the despatch of more than half-a-million combat troops to South Vietnam.  Instead of producing victory, however, this escalation resulted in American entrapment, appalling casualty figures on all sides and the devastation of much of Vietnam.  It also led many Americans to conclude that the conflict was 'Johnson's war', that the horror was in some way the sole responsibility of the President.  It was a characterisation Johnson himself deplored.  'This is America's war', he insisted in October 1967.  'If I drop dead tomorrow, this war will still be with you'.  Nevertheless, the perception took root and, later, assumed more disquieting form in the writings of former Kennedy associates like Arthur Schlesinger Jnr., Pierre Salinger and Kenneth O'Donnell who all argued that Kennedy, at the time of his death, had decided that South Vietnam could not be saved and was on the verge of terminating the US commitment.  The ensuing escalation under Johnson was, therefore, a betrayal of the Kennedy legacy, an interpretation of events that reached its widest ever audience in 1992 in the form of Oliver Stone's highly successful motion picture, JFK.  But is the withdrawal thesis merely wishful thinking on the part of those Americans who want to believe that Vietnam was an avoidable disaster, or does it rest on firm evidential foundations?  
	According to US government sources, in the summer of 1962 Kennedy instructed McNamara to begin investigation of disengagement options.  The process culminated in October 1963 with Kennedy's approval of National Security Action Memorandum #263 (NSAM-263) which recommended 'implementation of plans to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963'.  Kennedy died the following month and instead of gradual disengagement the United States embarked on gradual escalation.  Adherents of the withdrawal thesis contend that Johnson, a domestic politician naive in the ways of international affairs, was either manipulated by bellicose military advisers into accepting a more war-like policy or, alternatively, that his aggressive personality led him willingly to embrace a more offensive approach.  In contrast, opponents of the thesis argue that it is based on a deliberate misreading of the evidence and that an objective analysis leads to a wholly different conclusion, namely that Kennedy would have battled on in Vietnam.  In endorsing NSAM-263, Kennedy was actually approving - to quote directly from the document - 'Section I B (1-3)' of a report drawn up by McNamara and Maxwell Taylor.  The relevant section of the report stated that the projected withdrawal of advisers was to be announced 'in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort'.  The latter caveat is critical.  Withdrawal plans were clearly conditional on prior success, and success meant either total victory against the insurgents or, at a minimum, proof that the South Vietnamese government could cope with the insurgency on its own.  Johnson went on to abandon NSAM-263 because it was only in the weeks following Diem's overthrow that an accurate assessment of the situation finally emerged - one that revealed NLF/Vietcong strength, Saigon politico-military weakness, and hence the total absence of the indispensable pre-requisite for withdrawal.  This was the reality Johnson faced.  It was also the reality Kennedy would have faced had he lived.

READING A:: Article N34, John Newman, ‘Kennedy’s Plan for American Withdrawal’

READING B: Article L37, Fred Logevall, ‘Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been’

READING C: Ruane, Vietnam Wars, Chapter 4, documents 4.4-4.11 (p.88-96)

For further reading, consult the recommendations for last week’s session.
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13 January 2003
Lecture
Johnson and US Escalation in Vietnam, 1963-65

LECTURE Part I:  LBJ - an overview
The central theme of this first half of the lecture is whether the Johnson administration was a departure from or a continuation of the Kennedy administration in terms of foreign and domestic policy in general and Vietnam policy in particular.  One thing is certain - the style of the new President was light-years away from that of his ill-starred predecessor.  Kennedy had been suave, sophisticated, charming,  dynamic, vigorous, gregarious.  Johnson was highly intelligent but extremely blunt and up-front in expressing his views - undiplomatic, even rude. The contrast could not have been greater. As Robert Schulzinger observes ...

Lyndon Johnson never wanted to be vice-president ...  A great bear of a man, Johnson seemed to shrink physically as he went through the ceremonial duties of the vice-presidency.  He never gained admission to the inner circle of Kennedy's advisers, who shunned him as a rude Texan given to telling dirty jokes and emitting uncouth noises ... Johnson had deep insecurities about his own grasp of international relations which he covered with bravura and by twitting "experts".  During a vice-presidential visit to West Berlin, a worried Foreign Service officer went on at great length about German affairs and then asked: "Is there anything else?"   Johnson fixed him with a withering gaze and said, "Yeah, tuck in your shirt ..." After dinner with the king of Norway, he whispered to an aide, "That's the dumbest king I ever met.  I didn't know they made kings that dumb ...'
 
Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, (OUP 1990), p.273

The point of all this is: was there a fundamental change in US foreign policy to match the fundamental change in the personality of the Chief Executive?  Or does the huge difference in Presidential style lead to the erroneous conclusion that policy must have altered as well?  Bear this in mind when reading for this session.

LECTURE Part II: Decisions for War
The key decisions that would produce the huge escalation in US involvement in Vietnam were taken in the period 1963-65.  In preparing for this part of the lecture you should think about the following questions ...

1.	Given Johnson's popular reputation as a crazy war-monger, what evidence can you find to support this claim in the first months of his Presidency, November 1963-May 1964?

2.	By mid-1964, plans for bombing North Vietnam were complete.  What did those who advocated 'air war' give as its justification, and what did they think it would achieve?

3.	What was the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident?

4		What was significance of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (see below), both in the short and the long term?
	
READING

Bibliography: Section A, Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Hess, Vietnam and America; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War; McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Short, Origins of the Vietnam War; Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars; Young, Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section J, General
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; Ball, Cold War; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Dockrill, Cold War; Dunabain, Cold War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Gardner, Covenant with Power; Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Lafeber, American Age; Mason, Cold War; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy; Smith, Cold War; Spanier, American Foreign Policy; Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists

Bibliography: Section E, American War
Books:-
Barrett, Uncertain Warriors; Barrett (ed.), Johnson’s Vietnam Papers; Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War; Berman, Planning a Tragedy; Cable, Unholy Grail; Gardner, Pay Any Price; Herring, America’s Longest War; Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War; Kaiser, American Tragedy; Karnow, Vietnam; Logevall, Choosing War; McNamara, In Retrospect; Schlesinger Jr., Bitter Heritage; Smith, International History Volume II; Vandemark, Into the Quagmire; Vandiver, Shadows of Vietnam
Articles:-
B28, D20, H47, I5, L11, L26, S28, T11
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20 January 2003
Seminar
On Hanoi's Escalation, 1963-65
In December 1963, the Communist Party Central Committee in Hanoi passed a resolution supporting a dramatic escalation in the insurgency.  The objective was to destroy the ARVN, eliminate the remaining Strategic Hamlets and seize control of the Central Highlands and Mekong Delta in preparation for the launch of the long-planned general offensive and popular uprising.  Thereafter, two possibilities beckoned.  As a first step, there was to be an expansion in the numbers and fighting quality of the Vietcong through a recruitment drive in the south and greater infiltration of arms and supplies via the Ho Chi Minh trail.  On the political front, the NLF was to broaden still further its popular base whilst, within the NLF itself, the southern communists were to extend their hidden-hand influence.  Le Duan, Party General Secretary since 1960, later recalled that the resolution was only passed after heated debate between those who feared American retaliation against the north (via bombing, invasion or both) and so counselled caution, and a more militant faction - led by Le Duan himself - that believed the situation in the south demanded escalation.  With Ho Chi Minh in failing health, Le Duan had begun to exercise an increasing dominance over Party decision-making, arguing on this occasion that the removal of Diem was a mixed blessing, for it had been the excesses of his rule that had helped create the revolutionary opportunity in the south in the first place.  If the new Saigon leadership confounded expectations and introduced a meaningful reformist political programme attractive to moderates in the NLF, the revolutionary momentum could be lost.  Of equal concern was increased American participation in the defence of South Vietnam even if the insurgency remained at current levels, something the Generals on the Military Revolutionary Council might have less inclination to resist than the previous government.  In accepting Le Duan's arguments and in agreeing to step-up the insurgency, therefore, Party leaders sought to pre-empt this dual threat to the completion of the Vietnamese 
revolution.
	Because of the resolution on escalation, the Central Committee's 1963 Plenum has come to be seen as one of the most important in VWP history.  But some historians have invested it with added significance, seeing it as the point when the restraint that had hitherto characterised Hanoi's thinking was abandoned and a decision taken to commit units of the regular North Vietnamese Army (the Peoples Army of Vietnam, PAVN) to fight in the south.  It now appears that between five and six thousand North Vietnamese troops were infiltrated into the RVN in 1964-65 (as distinct from an estimated 28,000 northern-based southerners who returned home between 1959 and 1964), and that the most senior North Vietnamese commander next to Giap, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, was appointed to head the COSVN and oversee the expansion of the war.  But it is less certain that this had been the intention in December 1963, and the available record of the Plenum, captured later in the war by the Americans, is by no means clear on the matter.  It may have been that the continuing fragmentation of the RVN during the first half of 1964 encouraged Hanoi to go for broke.  The risk of inviting American counter-escalation was obvious, but it was evidently outweighed by the prospect of delivering a final crushing blow to the South Vietnamese government and armed forces and ensuring, in the process, that there was little left for the United States to intervene to defend.  Confronted with a hopeless situation, the Johnson administration would cut its losses and withdraw.  If, as seems likely, this was Hanoi's reasoning, it proved to be a serious miscalculation.  The Saigon regime survived the ensuing onslaught - just - and the United States set out to match North Vietnam's escalation with massive escalation of its own.	

READING A: Article C29, King C Chen, 'Hanoi's three decisions and the escalation of the Vietnam war’ (Political Science Quarterly, Vol.80, 1975, pp.239-59)

READING B: From William J. Duiker's Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, pp.235-45

READING C: Ruane, Vietnam Wars, Chapter 4, document 4.11 (pp.93-6)

Additional Reading on Communist View of Events …

Bibliography: Section H, Vietnamese perspectives
Books:-
Curry, Victory at any Cost; Kolko, Vietnam; Smith, International History Volume II;
Articles:-
D26, N11

Bibliography: Section  I, Soviet and Chinese perspectives
Books:-
Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War; Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars
Articles:-
G36, G41, G45, G53, J9, J11, X1, Z3, Z10

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 27 January 2003
Seminar
Air War and Ground War, 1965-68
From 1965 to 1968 the United States waged what it called a 'limited' war in Vietnam.  Compared to what the US military might have been able to do if not restrained by Johnson's commitment to flexible response, what took place was, in some senses, limited.  But in practice the distinction was more apparent than real - certainly to the Vietnamese, both North and South.  By the spring of 1967 the intensity of the 'limited' air war against North Vietnam had resulted in what the US Joint Chiefs termed 'target saturation' [Herring, America's Longest War, p.176].  In 1965, 25,000 sorties dropped 63,000 tons of bombs, rising to 108,000 sorties and 226,000 tons of bombs in 1967 [Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.247].  A more graphic illustration of the 'limitations' of the campaign is provided by Stephen Ambrose:

First the headlines proclaimed that America had dropped more bombs on tiny Vietnam than in the entire Pacific Theater in World War II.  By 1967 it was more bombs than in the European Theater.  Then more than in the whole of World War II.  Finally, by 1970, more bombs had been dropped on Vietnam than on all targets in the whole of human history

Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (5th edn, London, 1988), p.216

Yet for all the tonnage of bombs dropped, the operation failed in its objectives - there was no significant reduction in the infiltration of men, weapons and supplies from North Vietnam to the NLF, no real political stability in South Vietnam, and no chastened and humble representatives of the North Vietnamese government suing for peace on American terms.  The fact of the failure was obvious, the reasons less so.
	The United States also waged a 'limited' war in South Vietnam, although the actions that were taken in its name would, in other places and in different circumstances, have constituted all-out war.  What was undoubtedly limited (or rather graduated or calibrated) was the level of US troop commitment, rising from 184,300 at the end of 1965 to a high of 536,100 in 1968.  Flexible response, together with avoidance of provocation to Peking and Moscow and Johnson's determination to do only what was necessary and no more and in that way husband his financial resources for domestic programmes, contributed to this gradual escalation. Yet despite this overwhelming American military presence, and in spite of possession of an arsenal comprising the most deadly and up-to-date weaponry, the US and ARVN forces never seriously challenged NLF control of large areas of South Vietnamese countryside.  The Saigon government's remit, such as it was, extended to the cities and larger urban areas. Yet throughout this period, until January 1968, the Johnson administration claimed that it was making progress.  Did it really believe this, or was it telling the American public and Congress what it wanted to hear in the full knowledge that the situation was far less encouraging?

READING A: Article H37, Gary R Hess, 'The US-North Vietnamese War, 1965-69’, from Hess, Vietnam and America, pp.85-111

READING B: Ruane, Vietnam Wars, documents 5.1-5.11 (pp.105-118)

ADDITIONAL READING

Bibliography: Section A, Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (chap.10); Duiker, Sacred War (pp.183-208); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War (chaps.10-12); McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (pp.133-53); Young, Vietnam Wars (pp.150-216); Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section J , General on the war
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; Ball, Cold War; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy

Bibliography: Section E, American War
Books:-
Barrett, Uncertain Warriors; Barrett (ed.), Johnson’s Vietnam Papers; Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War; Berman, Planning a Tragedy; Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy; Cable, Unholy Grail; Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War; Gardner, Pay Any Price; Herring, LBJ and Vietnam; Herring, America’s Longest War; Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War; Karnow, Vietnam; McNamara, In Retrospect; Oberdorfer, Tet ; Smith, International History Volume III

Articles:-
B28, D20, H37, H45, H47, I5, L11, L26, P20, S28, T11

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3 February 2003
Lecture
The Tet Offensive, 1968
By any standards, the Tet Offensive was a major turning point in the Vietnam war - and arguably the greatest of all.  The historian David Hunt, looking back on the event, had this to say:

Over a quarter of a century ago, the NLF, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, launched its Tet Offensive.  The Offensive was a momentous event in modern history, comparable in importance to the storming of the Bastille at the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789, or to the Long March which saved the Chinese Communist Party in 1935 and set it on the road to eventual victory fourteen years later.  Tet was decisive within Vietnam, where it marked the turning point in the struggle which had been inaugurated when the Vietnamese declared their independence from France in 1945 and which ended with the liberation of Saigon in April 1975.
	Marvin E Gettleman et al., Vietnam and America (New York, 1995), p.359

Tet was certainly all this and more.  But why, exactly, was it so important?  This is the question that the lecture will attempt to answer, and which you should bear in mind in your reading.

READING:
As for the previous seminar, with your antennae tuned to 1967-1968

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10 February 2003
Seminar
The American anti-war movement
Whether Johnson's pre-Tet assurances - and those of others in his administration - that victory was 'round the corner' were sincere expressions of belief or a calculated refusal to accept reality, they did ensure that domestic anti-war protest was held in check.  So long as there appeared to be an end to the American commitment and so long as progress was being made, Johnson was able to carry the majority of public and political opinion along with him.  Nevertheless, the period 1965-68 witnessed a burgeoning of anti-war sentiment - and this would be the basis of the domestic 'explosion' against the war in the wake of the Tet offensive and, later, against Nixon's incendiary policy.  The following codification of the issues relating to the anti-war 'movement', from the introduction to a recent collection of primary source material on the war, will set the tone of the lecture ...

The movement of American people against the US government's actions in Indochina forms one of the most complex and controversial elements of the Vietnam war.  Was it a futile, ineffective gesture, or did it actually prevent a US military victory?  Was it the outburst of a vocal minority, or did it express the deepest convictions of a majority of Americans?  Was it mainly an activity of affluent youths on college campuses, or did it appear in its most militant forms among poor and working-class peoples in urban slums and within the army itself?  Was the protest tantamount to treason, or did it represent the noblest traditions of American history?  Did it divert from or reinforce the movement of black and other non-white people for equality?  Did the revitalization of the movement for women's equality grow from the antiwar movement or develop as a reaction against male domination within it?  Was the movement's cultural thrust co-opted, nullified, even reversed by diffusion into designer jeans, disco, and cocaine, or did it profoundly advance the values of post-Vietnam War America?  Did the movement disappear with the war, or did it continue to evolve into movements for social change in the ensuing decades? ... [N]either the political nor the military history of the war can be understood without some comprehension of the character and role of the antiwar movement.
			Gettleman et al., Vietnam and America, pp.295-6

READING A: from Marilyn B. Young's The Vietnam Wars, chap. 10

READING B: Contributions of Small, DeBenedetti/Chatfield, and Appy in McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, pp.487-520

Additional Reading
In general see Bibliography: Section G, Vietnam antiwar protest.
Antiwar protest is also covered in the following:

Bibliography: Section A,  Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Hess, Vietnam and America; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War; McMahon, Major Problems; Schulzinger, Time for War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (pp.133-53); Young, Vietnam Wars (pp.150-216)

Bibliography: Section  E, American War
Books:-
Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War; Gardner, Pay Any Price; Herring, America’s Longest War; Herring, LBJ and Vietnam; Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War; Karnow, Vietnam
Articles:- D20, I5, L26, T11

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17 February 2003
Lecture
Assessing Johnson
American historians of the Vietnam war, not content with the fact of American defeat, have attempted to construct interpretative or analytical frameworks to help explain that defeat.  This session, the last on Johnson, aims (in Reading A) to define the two most popular methods for assessing the 1963-68 period and to test their validity, namely the Stalemate and Quagmire theories.  Reading B assesses the wisdom of Johnson’s refusal to seek Congressional backing for escalation in Vietnam and his preference for relying on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Reading: You should be familiar with LBJ by now, but the following reflective articles from Section A of the bibliography are recommended:

D6, H27 (focus on LBJ only); S47;

And from Section E of the bibliography

B28, D20, H20, H45, H47, I5, S28, T11

Video
Johnson's War
Another programme from the acclaimed 1996 BBC series, Wheeler's America, in which Charles Wheeler assesses the strength of the popular claim that the escalation of 1965-68 was due principally to the aggressive, assertive and even war-mongering attitude of Lyndon Johnson.  More than an end to the Johnson section of the course, this programme is an important introduction to the Nixon period.  Note in this connection the claim that the Nixon team in the 1968 Presidential election secretly scuppered the peace negotiations in Vietnam in order to enhance its domestic political prospects.

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24 February 2003
Timed Essay
Yes, sorry folks.  But this hurts me more than it hurts you!  A dry run of the compulsory document question in the examination - the particular area will have been signalled to you some weeks earlier.

Lecture
Nixon, Kissinger the World
This mini-lecture will examine the theory and the practice of Détente, as the foreign-defence policy of Nixon's Republican administration came to be known.  In your preparation, you should focus on the various elements which made up Détente, in particular the concept known as Linkage.  Assess also the role of Nixon's chief National Security adviser, Henry Kissinger, in the formulation and application of Détente, and consider how far the strategy was a response to the problem of Vietnam and how far it was a means of solving that problem.  Nixon, and especially Kissinger, maintained that Détente was a completely new departure in American foreign policy.  Was it?  Or was it just Containment in a new packaging?  And how successful was Détente in practice, given its pre-defined objectives?  Focus especially on the SALT-1 negotiations; Nixon's 'opening' to China; US negotiations with the USSR on economic matters; US-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East and Africa.  Relate these to the overall Nixon-Kissinger strategy - a strategy accurately if tortuously described by John Gaddis as one that would 'combine the tactical flexibility of the Kennedy-Johnson system with the structure and coherence of Eisenhower's, while avoiding the short-sighted fixations that had led to Vietnam or the equally myopic ideological rigidities of a John Foster Dulles' [Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.275]

READING

Bibliography: Section J, General
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; Ball, Cold War; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Dockrill, Cold War; Dunabain, Cold War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Gardner, Covenant with Power; Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Lafeber, American Age; Mason, Cold War; Roberts, Soviet Union; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy; Smith, Cold War; Spanier, American Foreign Policy; Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists

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3 March 2003
Seminar
The Nixon Strategy
In your reading, concentrate on the period January 1969 to February 1971, and end with operation Lamson 719.  Do not get too diverted by the Paris peace negotiations, which dragged on over this same period, as they will be addressed in isolation next week.  Besides, until Lamson 719 the Nixon administration did not take the peace talks very seriously, hoping that the Nixon Doctrine and other tactics would produce a satisfactory result in Vietnam regardless of what happened in Paris.  This should be the focus of your preparatory reading.  And remember to relate Nixon's Vietnam policy to his overall foreign policy objectives when addressing the following questions ...

1.	What was the Nixon Doctrine?

2.	How, specifically, was the Nixon Doctrine to be applied to Vietnam?

3.	'Nixon sought to wind down the war in Vietnam by escalating it in Cambodia' (Lafeber).  Explain this paradox.

4.	What was the 'secret bombing' of Cambodia?

5.	In 1970, parallel with the 'secret bombing', Nixon sent US troops into Cambodia.  Why - and what was the impact of this action in the US?

6.	What far-reaching consequences did the so-called 'secret bombing' of Cambodia have for that country?

7.	Summarise Nixon's policy towards Laos and assess its impact and consequences?

8.	How successful was the Nixon Doctrine in Vietnam (be careful how you define 'success') by 1971?

9.	What links are there between Nixon's Vietnam policy and the Watergate affair, which led to his downfall in 1974?

READING:
As last week ie. peruse the general (Section J) in search of the Vietnam-specific. Plus:

Bibliography: Section A, Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (chap.11); Duiker, Sacred War (chap.6); Duiker, Ho Chi Minh; Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War (chap.18); McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (pp.161-77); Young, Vietnam Wars (chaps.12-13); Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars

Bibliography: Section E American War
Books:-
Berman, No Peace, No Honour; Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy; Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War; Herring, America’s Longest War (chap.7); Karnow, Vietnam (chaps.15-16); Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War; Kolko, Vietnam; Shawcross, Sideshow
Articles:-
G41, G42, K17, K25, V1, X1

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10 March 2003
Lecture
A Savage War of Peace, 1969-75

LECTURE: Part 1, ‘Peace with Honor’?
This lecture will chart the course of the Paris peace talks, from their inception in 1968-69 but particularly from 1971 and Operation Lamson 719.  The latter disaster appeared to signal  the failure of the Nixon Doctrine as a method of fully extricating the United States from the Vietnam imbroglio, certainly before the 1972 Presidential election when Nixon would be forced to confront the failure of his 1968 promise to end the war.  Unless, that was, an alternative escape route could be found.  There was still Détente, but this proved a chimera: it presupposed that in return for concessions in other areas, Moscow and Peking would force Hanoi to accept American peace terms, but failed in practice as neither Communist giant had any decisive influence over North Vietnam.  Nor was Moscow ready to end its material support for Hanoi lest Peking step in to the breach to gain an ally in the Communist bloc's own Cold War.  Needless to say, Peking took a similar view.  Thus there was to be no swift exit for the United States other than through direct negotiations with Hanoi.  Gradually, as 1972 progressed, North Vietnam and America resolved the issues which had blocked an armistice since 1968.  The Communists worked on the premise that once America left Vietnam it was most unlikely to return, therefore almost any concession was worth making to achieve this goal.  Hanoi was confident it could cope with the South Vietnamese army in a straight head-to-head confrontation.  The American negotiators worked on the premise that if a peace agreement could be reached which allowed America to withdraw with South Vietnam still in existence as an independent entity, any later disaster that befell the Saigon regime would not implicate the United States.  On this basis, in January 1973 a Peace accord was finally signed in Paris by the US and North Vietnam.  In preparation for this lecture, you should focus on the progress of the negotiations between mid-1971 and January 1973.
	Nixon called the Paris Accords 'peace with honor'.  Were they?  Was it peace?  For the United States, perhaps.  But for the Vietnamese?  Kissinger and the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.  Kissinger accepted it, Le Duc Tho refused it - a gesture that spoke volumes for the reality of the settlement.  And where was the honour?  Could anything disguise an American defeat?  Possibly.  Nixon promised the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, that America would re-activate its involvement if in the future the Communists sought to take over the country by force.  Yet, when North Vietnam and the NLF indeed reverted to the offensive in 1974-75 and Thieu appealed to Washington to make good that promise, he was ignored.  Saigon fell to the communists in April 1975.  Vietnam was reunited under Hanoi's control, and the Vietnam war was formally ended.
	Why was there no American reaction?  The answer may be found in the idea of a 'decent interval'.  This has both a cynical and a principled dimension.  The cynical view is that Nixon made an empty promise to Thieu simply to get South Vietnamese support for the 1973 Paris Accord.  Nixon had no intention of re-opening the war once America had evacuated Vietnam, and he worked on the assumption that as long as a decent internal elapsed between the American withdrawal and the final and inevitable Communist triumph, it would be seen by the world as a South Vietnamese defeat, not an American one.  In the event, the interval amounted to a little over two years, insufficient to hide the fact that America, as well as the Saigon regime, had lost the war.  The principled version is Nixon's personal property.  He maintained right to the end of his life that he had been genuine in his promise to re-open the war, but that a) he had left office under the cloud of Watergate in August 1974 and could not directly influence events thereafter, and b) that in any case he had created the conditions for upholding the Paris accords even in his absence, but Congress refused to respond to Saigon's calls for help.  Congress, not Nixon, should be blamed.  If North Vietnam had understood that it could not expect to act with impunity against the South without prompting American retaliation, the accords might have held.  Instead, the US Congress sent the opposite signal to Hanoi.  Thus Nixon would reject the notion of a conscious or unconscious decent interval strategy.  What Nixon omits, however, in blaming Congress for the final defeat in Vietnam is that it was his own actions - his blatant violations of Congressional and Constitutional procedure - which brought about the backlash.  Not to mention the Watergate scandal, which convinced Congress that it had had a criminal President in its midst since 1969, one whose policy decisions it felt no great loyalty to uphold.  What do you think?

LECTURE Part II; The Ho Chi Minh Campaign
This lecture will chronicle the breakdown of the Paris peace accords and the final great Communist offensive in the spring of 1975 that produced, after more than thirty years of struggle, a united and independent Vietnam.  It will also reflect further on the Congressional backlash against re-opening American involvement in the conflict, even though it was clear that everything that the United States had laboured to construct in South Vietnam stood to be lost, and all the sacrifice in blood and treasure rendered meaningless, by a policy of disassociation.

READING

Bibliography: Section  A,  Overviews
Anderson, Shadow on the White House; Charlton & Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why; De Groot, Noble Cause; Duiker, Communist Road (chap.11); Duiker, Sacred War (chap.6); Harrison, Endless War; Hess, Vietnam and America; Kolko, Anatomy; Langguth, Our Vietnam; Maclear, Ten Thousand Day War (chap.18); McMahon, Major Problems; Ruane, War and Revolution; Ruane, Vietnam Wars; Schulzinger, Time for War; Turley, Second Indochina War; Wintle, Viet Nam Wars (pp.161-77); Young, Vietnam Wars (chaps.12-13); Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars 

Bibliography: Section J, General
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism; Ball, Cold War; Boyle, American-Soviet Relations; Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power; Crockatt, Fifty Years War; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War; Schulzinger, American Diplomacy

Bibliography: Section E, American War
Books:-
Berman, No Peace, No Honour,; Brigham, Guerrilla Diplomacy; Gaiduk, Soviet Union and the Vietnam War; Herring, America’s Longest War (chap.7); Karnow, Vietnam (chaps.15-16); Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War; Kolko, Vietnam; Shawcross, Sideshow
Articles: R56

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17 March 2003
Seminar
Hanoi’s relations with Moscow & Beijing
A  major point of interest relating to the December 1963 Communist Party Plenum is the inference, drawn by some historians, that Hanoi's decision to intensify the insurgency meant that North Vietnam firmly aligned itself with Communist China in its developing confrontation with the Soviet Union.  Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Moscow and Beijing became locked in a struggle for the leadership of World Communism.  By the early-1960s, territorial disputes along their 2,000-mile common border had exacerbated already profound ideological differences to a point where war between the communist giants was a possibility.  From North Vietnam's standpoint, however, it was not a question of which side to take in the dispute so much as which side was the more committed to the Vietnamese revolution.  And in 1963 that appeared to be China.  Under Nikita Khrushchev's leadership, the Soviet Union, despite its professed support for wars of national liberation, still seemed more interested in establishing a basis for peaceful co-existence with America and the West.  Whilst continuing to furnish North Vietnam with valuable material assistance, therefore, Moscow also made plain its disapproval of any action in South Vietnam that risked large-scale US intervention and a wider war.  Beijing, on the other hand, violently denounced the 'revisionism' of peaceful co-existence, were much more supportive of Third World revolutions, and took a special interest in the struggle in Vietnam.  Between 1956 and 1963, Chinese arms shipments to North Vietnam exceeded those of the Soviet Union, and included 270,000 guns, over 10,000 pieces of artillery, 200 million bullets, more than 2 million artillery shells, 5,000 radio transmitters and 28 naval vessels.
	Although, like the Soviets, the Chinese also warned of the dangers of confronting American power in South Vietnam and at times seemed ready to accept permanent partition, once Hanoi took the decision to adopt a policy of forced reunification, Beijing's support actually increased.  In 1964, it pledged ground troops to North Vietnam's defence in the event of a US-led invasion from the south, for in such an event the DRV would become China's own first-line of defence.  Then, in 1965, Chinese engineering and anti-aircraft units were despatched to North Vietnam to help keep road and rail lines open and defend important strategic targets against US air attack, all of which freed DRV manpower for the fight in the south.  Yet, significantly, North Vietnam never moved so close to China as to completely alienate the Soviet Union - if anything, the historical-traditional Vietnamese mistrust of all things Chinese (communist or otherwise) made the Soviets the preferred partner.  This became evident when, following the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 and the advent of a new leadership more sympathetic to its objectives, Hanoi began to cultivate close relations with Moscow.  Keen to secure an ally in the communist bloc's own Cold War, the Kremlin responded positively by supplying North Vietnam with surface-to-air missiles (to be manned by Soviet personnel), advanced aircraft, and training for Vietnamese pilots.  Thus, whilst not denying the existence of distinct pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet factions within the VWP hierarchy, Hanoi generally adopted a flexible and ultimately self-serving approach to the Sino-Soviet split that bore the stamp of Ho Chi Minh's political pragmatism.
	The two readings will examine some aspects of the complicated but vitally important triangular relationship between Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow.

READING A: Article G36, Ilya Gaiduk, 'Soviet policy towards US participation in the Vietnam war', from History, Vol. 81, Jan. 1996, pp.40-54

READING B: Article J9, Chen Jian, 'China's involvement in the Vietnam war, 1964-69'. From The China Quarterly, Vol. 142, June 1995, pp.356-87

Additional Reading: you should know your way around the sources by now (!) so home-in on information on the Hanoi-Beijing-Moscow relationship.  See in particular Bibliography: Section H, Vietnamese perspectives, and Section I, Soviet and Chinese perspectives

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24 March 2002
Seminar
Consequences, Explanations, Reflections

Reading A: Ruane, Vietnam Wars, Chapter  7, all documents

Reading B: Article M 29, McNamara, ‘The Lessons of Vietnam’
*************************************************************************************************************************************

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

*

SECTION A
VIETNAM

OVERVIEWS, REFLECTIONS, HISTORIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

ANDERSON, David L.		Shadow on the White House: Presidents &  the Vietnam War 1945-75 
				(Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993)
CAPPS, Walter			The Vietnam Reader [London: Routledge, 1990)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 
				1999)
 BUZZANCO, Robert		Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era 
				(Cambridge: CUP 1997 edn)
CHARLTON, M. &		Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam (New York: 
           MONCRIEFF, A.           	Hill & Wang, 1989 and other editions)
DAVIDSON, Phillip B.		Secrets of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presido, 1990)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America & the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: 
				Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
DUIKER, William J.		US Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina  (Stanford: 
				Stanford University Press, 1994)
DUIKER, William J		Ho Chi Minh: A Life (New York: Hyperion, 2000)
HARRISON, James P.		The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence  (New York: 
				Columbia University Press, 1989 edn)
HERRING, George C (ed)		The Pentagon Papers: Abridged Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
				1993)
HERRING, George C.		America in Vietnam: A Documentary History (New York: Norton 
				1989)
HERRING, George C.		America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-75  (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1986 and later editions)
HESS, Gary R.			Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War  (Boston: 
				Twayne, 1990 and later editions)
ISAACS, Arnold R		Vietnam Shadows: the War, its Ghosts and its Legacy (Baltimore: Johns 
				Hopkins University Press, 2000)
JEFFRYS-JONES, Rhodri		Peace Now!  American Society and the end of the Vietnam War (New 
				Haven: Yale University Press, 1999)
KALB, E. & ABEL, E.		Roots of Involvement: the United States in Asia, 1784-1971  (London: 
				Pall Mall, 1971)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Penguin 1984 & other editions)
KIMBALL, Jeffrey P. (ed)		The Reason Why: The Debate about the Causes of American Involvement 
				in Vietnam (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990)
KOLKO, Gabriel			Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
				Historical Experience (New York: NewPress, 1994)
LANGGUTH, A. J.		Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-75 (Touchstone Books, 2002)
LEVY, David W.	            		The Debate over Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1991)
LIND, Michael			Vietnam, the Necessary War: a Reinterpretation of America’s most 
				Disastrous Military Conflict (New York: Free Press 2000)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		The War Everyone Lost - and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's 
				Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U.P., 1984)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
				Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: Uni. of North Carolina Press, 1996)
LOUVRE, A. & WALSH, J (eds) 	Tell Me Lies About Vietnam: Cultural Battles for the Meaning of the War 
				(Milton Keynes: OUP Press, 1988)
LOWE, Peter (ed.)		The Vietnam War (Manchester: MUP, 1998)
MACDONALD, Peter		Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin 1992)
McMAHON, Robert J (ed.)	Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War (Lexington: Heath & 
				Co., 1995)
McNAMARA, Robert S.		In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: 
Random House, 1995)
McNAMARA, Robert S. et al	Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy  
(New York: Public Affairs, 1999)
MOSS, George Donelson		Vietnam: An American Ordeal (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998 edn)
PALMER, Bruce			Twenty Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam  (New York: 
				Da Capo, 1984)
PRADOS, John			The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1995)
PRADOS, John			The Blood Road: the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War  (New 
				York: Wiley, 2000)
PRATT, John Clark		Vietnam Voices: Perspectives on the War Years, 1941-1982  (London: 
				Penguin, 1984)
RUANE, Kevin			War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998)
RUANE, Kevin			The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
SANTOLI, Al et al (eds)		To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and its Aftermath in the words of 
				Americans and Southeast Asians (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1999)
SCHULZINGER, Robert		A Time for War: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975  (New York: 
				Oxford University Press, 1997)
SHEEHAN, Neil et al		The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times  (New York: 
				Quadrangle, 1971)
SHORT, Anthony		The Origins of the Vietnam War (London: Longman, 1989)
SUMMERS, Harry G.		On Strategy: Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato: Presido, 
				1982)
TRAGER, Frank N.		Why Vietnam? (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966)
TUCKER, Spencer C   		Vietnam  (London: Routledge 1998)
TURLEY, William S.		The Second Indochina War: a Short Military and Political History 
				(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986)
WALTON, C. Dale		The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam (London: Cass, 2002)
WARBY, William, M.P.		Vietnam: the Truth (London: Merlin Press, 1966)
WILLIAMS, W.A. et al		America in Vietnam: a Documentary History (New York: Norton, 1989)
ZHAI, Qiang			China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: Uni. of North 
				Carolina Press, 2000)	
WALSH, J & AULICH, J (eds)	Vietnam Images: War and Representation (London: Macmillan, 1989)
WINTLE, Justin	            		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)

ARTICLES

A17 ANDERSON, D	‘The United States and Vietnam [1954-73]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The 
			Vietnam War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.95-114
B31 BUZZANCO, R	‘Myths, Panaceas and Perfect Strategies: Debunking the Vietnam War’ 
			(Diplomatic History, 17/4, 1993, pp.29-32 ALSO in library]
B42 BUI DIEM		‘Reflections on the Vietnam War: the Views of a Vietnamese on Vietnamese-
			American Misperceptions’ from Head & Grinter (eds.), Looking Back on the 
			Vietnam War, pp.241-9
B51 BRIGHAM, R	‘Vietnam at the Center: Patterns of Diplomacy and Resistance’ from Lloyd C. 
			Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam (College 
			Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.98-107
B52 BRANDS, H		‘Vietnam: Toward an International History’ from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted 
			Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas 
			A&M University Press, 2000), pp.225-34
B54 BRIDGE, C           	‘Australia and the Vietnam War’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War 
			(Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.181-96
C27 COHEN, W            	‘Vietnam: New Light on the Nature of the War?’ [historiography]
			 (International History Review, ix/1, 1987, pp.108-16
C32 CROWELL, L	‘The Lessons and Ghosts of Vietnam’, from Head & Grinter (eds.), Looking 
			Back on the Vietnam War, pp.229-40
C35 CHOMSKY, N	‘The United States and Indochina: Far from an Aberration’ from Douglas 
			Allen & Ngo Vinh Long (eds), Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, 
			and the War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp.161-88
D6   DIVINE, R		‘Vietnam Reconsidered’ (Diplomatic History, 12/1, 1988, pp.79-93)
D26 DUIKER, W		‘A Nation Divided [Vietnam’ 1954-73], from William J. Duiker, Vietnam: 
			Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp.49-70
F9  FENN, C		‘Prometheus and Victor’ [Ho Chi Minh, 1954-69] from Charles Fenn, Ho Chi 
			Minh: A Biographical Introduction (London: StudioVista, 1973), pp.109-28
G44 GATES, J. M.	‘If At First You Don’t Succeed, Try to Rewrite History: Revisionism and the 
			Vietnam War’, from Head & Grinter (eds.), Looking Back on the Vietnam War, 
			pp.177-90
G54 GAIDUK, I		‘Developing an Alliance: the Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1954-75’ from Peter 
			Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.133-51
H27 HESS, G		‘The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War’ (Diplomatic History, 
			18/2, 1994, pp.239-64 ALSO in library)
H40 HERRING, G	‘American Strategy in Vietnam: the Postwar Debate’ (Military Affairs,XLVI/
			2, 1982, pp.56-63)
H41 HERRING, G	‘Vietnam Remembered’ (Journal of American History, 73, 1986, pp.152-64)
H42 HERRING, G	‘The Vietnam Analogy and the 'Lessons' of History’, from Elizabeth Jane 
			Errington & B. J. McKercher (eds), The Vietnam War as History  (New York, 
			1990), pp.3-15
H43 HEAD, W		Vietnam and its Wars: a Historical Overview’, from Head & Grinter  (eds.), 
			Looking Back on the Vietnam War, pp.15-49
H51 H-DIPLO		‘Who Were We in Vietnam?’, on-line discussion by historians from H-Diplo, 
			May-2000
H53 H-DIPLO		Roundtable Review of Frederik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for 
			Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of 
			California Press, 1999), on-line discussion on H-Diplo, Feb. 2000
J11 JIAN, Chen		‘China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-75’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam 
			War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.152-80
K13 KIERNAN, B	‘The Vietnam War: Alternative Endings’ (American Historical Review, 97/4, 
			1992, pp.1118-1137 also in library)
K16 KIMBALL, J		‘The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War’ (Armed Forces and 
			Society, 14/3, 1988, pp.433-48)
L30 LACOUTURE, J	‘Uncle Ho and Uncle Sam’ [Ho's relationship with the USA], from Jean 
			Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh (London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.208-19)
L31 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - Clues to a Revolutionary’, from Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh 
			(London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.77-92)
M20 MORROCK, R	‘Revolution and Intervention in Vietnam’, from David Horowitz (ed.), 
			Containment and Revolution: Western Policy towards Social Revolution, 1917 to 
			Vietnam (London: Blond, 1967), pp.218-49)
M27 MIRSKY, J		‘Reconsidering Vietnam’ (New York Review of Books, 10 Oct. 1991, pp44-51)
M29 McNAMARA, R	‘The Lessons of Vietnam’, from McNamara, In Retrospect, pp.319-35
M43 MOISE, E		‘Recent Accounts of the Vietnam War - A Review Article’ (Journal of Asian 
			Studies, XLIV/2, 1985, pp.343-48)
M49 McMAHON, R	‘What difference did it make?  Assessing the Vietnam War’s impact on 
			Southeast Asia’ from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International 
			Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M U>p., 2000), pp.189-203
N11 NGO VINH LONG  	‘Vietnam’ [overview and history of entire conflict] from Douglas Allen & 
			Ngo Vinh Long (eds), Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the 
			War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp.9-64 for LOAN only
N15  NGUYEN VU TUNG	‘Coping with the United States: Hanoi’s Search for an Effective Strategy 
			[1945-75]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War  (MUP, 1998), pp.30-61
N16 NGO VINH LONG	‘South Vietnam [1954-75]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War (MUP, 
			1998), pp.62-94
P25 PARKER, A		‘International Aspects of the Vietnam War’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The 
			Vietnam War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.196-218)
R7  RIDDICK, P		‘The Vietnam War’ (The Historian, 34, 1992, pp.10-12)
R34 RUANE, K		‘Was Vietnam a War that America Could Never Win?’ from Peter Catterall 
			(ed.), Exam Essays in 20th Century World History (London: Heinemann, 1999)
R55 RUANE, K		‘Putting America in its Place?  Recent Writing on the Vietnam Wars’ (Journal
			Of Contemporary History, 371/1 2002, pp.115-28)
S32 SMITH, G		‘Light at the End of the Tunnel?  New Perspectives on the Vietnam War’ 
			(Canadian Journal of History, XXVI/I, 1991, pp.67-86)
S47 SMITH, R. B.		‘Choosing War in Vietnam’ (Journal of Military History, 64/2, 2000, pp.503-13)
T13 TUCKER, N		‘Vietnam: the Never-Ending War’, from Elizabeth Jane Errington & B. J. 
			McKercher (eds), The Vietnam War as History (New York, 1990)
T14 TURNER, R		‘Myths and Realities in the Vietnam Debate’ (World Politics, 149/1, 1986, 
			pp.35-47
X1   XIAOMING ZHANG	‘Communist Powers Divided: China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam 
			War’ from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives 
			on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.77-97

SECTION B
VIETNAM

BEFORE 1945

BOOKS

CHARLTON, M. &		Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam New York:
           MONCRIEFF, A.           	Hill & Wang, 1989 and other editions)
CURRY, Cecil B.			Victory at Any Cost: the Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap 
				(London: Aurum Press, 1998)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America and the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: 
				Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam  (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
GARDNER, Lloyd C.		Approaching Vietnam: from World War II through Dienbienphu  (New 
				York: Norton, 1988)
HARRISON, James P.		The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence (New York: 
				Columbia University Press, 1989 edn)
HESS, Gary R.			Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War  (Boston: 
				Twayne, 1990 and later editions)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Century Hutchinson,1983 & later edns)
KOLKO, Gabriel			Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
				Historical Experience (New York: New Press, 1994)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
				Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
				1996)
MACDONALD, Peter		Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin, 1992 edn)
MARR, David G.			Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-45 (Berkeley: University of 
				California Press, 1981)
MARR, David G.			Vietnam 1945: the Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California 
				Press, 1995)
RUANE, Kevin			War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998)
RUANE, Kevin			The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
SCHULZINGER, Robert		A Time for War: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975  (New York: 
				Oxford University Press, 1997)
SHIPWAY, Martin		The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-47 (Oxford: Berghahn, 
				1996)
SHORT, Anthony		The Origins of the Vietnam War (London: Longman, 1989)
THORNE, Christopher		Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 
				1941-45 (Oxford: OUP, 1979 edn.)
TONNESSON, Stein		The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945 (London: Sage, 1993)
WINTLE, Justin	            		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)

ARTICLES

D27 DUIKER, W		‘The Roots of Revolution’ [Vietnam to 1954] from William J. Duiker, Vietnam: 
			Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp.28-48
D28 DUIKER, W		‘Vietnamese Communism, 1930-45’, from Duiker, Sacred War, pp.33-52
H21 HESS, G		‘Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina’ (Journal of American History, 59, 1972-73, 
			pp.353-68
H22 HERRING, G	‘The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty in 
			Indochina’ (Diplomatic History, 1\2, 1977, pp.97-117)
H34 HAMMER, E	'We Have Fought for a Thousand Years' [origins of Vietnamese nationalism 
			and communism to 1941], from Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 
			(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp.54-93
H50 HUYNH KIM	‘The Vietnamese August Revolution Reinterpreted’ (Journal of Asian Studies,
	HANH		30,  1971, pp.761-82)
L5   LAFEBER, W		‘Roosevelt, Churchill and Indochina: 1942-45’ (American Historical Review, 80, 
			1975, pp.1277-1295)
L27 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - the Liberator [1943-46]’, from Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi  Minh 
			(London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.68-85)
N3   NITZ, K		‘Independence without Nationalists: the Japanese and Vietnamese 
			Nationalism during the Japanese Period’ (Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
			|XV/1, 1984, pp.108-33)
P14 PENTAGON		‘Indochina in US wartime Policy 1941-45’, The Pentagon: Papers: Senator 
	PAPERS		Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Vol.I, pp.7-19
S15 SPECTOR, R		‘Allied Intelligence and Indochina 1943-45’ (Pacific Historical Review, LI, 1982, 
			pp.23-50.
T9   THORNE, C		‘Indochina and Anglo-American Relations 1942-45’ (The Pacific Historical 
			Review, Vol.XLV, 1976, pp.73-96
T15 THOMAS, M	‘Free France, the British Government and the Future of French Indochina 
			1940-45’ (Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 28/1, 1997, pp.137-60)
___________________________________________________________________________________________

SECTION C
VIETNAM

FRANCO-VIETMINH WAR (1945-54)

BOOKS

ANDERSON, David L.		Trapped by success: the Eisenhower administration and Vietnam 1953-61 
				(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)
ANDERSON, David L.		Shadow on the White House: Presidents &  the Vietnam war 1945-75 
				(Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993)
BURKE, John P. &		How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam 1954 and 1965
   GREENSTEIN, Fred I		 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Vietnam & the Transformation of American Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 
				1999)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era 
				(Cambridge: CUP 1997 edn)
CABLE, James			The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indo-China (London: Macmillan, 
				1986)
CHARLTON, M. &		Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam (New York:
           MONCRIEFF, A.          	Hill & Wang, 1989 and other editions)
CURRY, Cecil B.			Victory at Any Cost: the Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap 
				(London: Aurum Press, 1998)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America & the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: 
				Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam  (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
DUIKER, William J.		US Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina  (Stanford: 
				Stanford University Press, 1994)
FALL, Bernard			Hell in a Very Small Place: the Siege of Dien Bien Phu (New York: De 
				Capo, 1985 edn)
GARDNER, Lloyd C.		Approaching Vietnam: from World War II through Dienbienphu  (New 
				York: Norton, 1988)
HARRISON, James P.		The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence (New York: 
				Columbia University Press, 1989 edn)
HERRING, George C.		America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-75 (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 and later edns)
HERRING, George C.		The Pentagon Papers: Abridged Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
				1993)
HESS, Gary R.			Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War  (Boston: 
				Twayne, 1990 and later editions)
IRVING, R.E.M.	            		The First Indochina war: French and American Policy, 1945-1954 
				(London: Croom Helm, 1975)
KAPLAN, L., et al			Dien Bien Phu and the crisis of Franco-American Relations 1954-55 
				(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Press, 1989)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Century Hutchinson,1983 & later edns)
KOLKO, Gabriel			Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
				Historical Experience (New York: New Press, 1994)
LEE, Steven Hugh		Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in 
				Southeast Asia 1949-54 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		The War Everyone Lost - and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's 
				Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
				University Press, 1984)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
				Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: Uni. of North Carolina Press, 1996)
MACDONALD, Peter		Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin, 1992 edn)
ROTTER, Andrew J.		Path to Vietnam: the Origins of the American Commitment in Southeast 
				Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1987) 
RUANE, Kevin			War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998)
RUANE, Kevin			The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
SCHULZINGER, Robert		A Time for War: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975  (New York: 
				Oxford University Press, 1997)
SHIPWAY, Martin		The Road to War: France & Vietnam, 1944-47 (Oxford: Berghahn, 
				1996)
SHORT, Anthony		The Origins of the Vietnam War (London: Longman, 1989)
TURLEY, William S.		The Second Indochina War: a Short Military and Political History 
				(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986)
WINTLE, Justin	      		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)
ZHAI, Qiang			China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of 
				North Carolina Press, 2000)	
ZHAI, Qiang			The Dragon, the Lion and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations 
				1949-58 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994)

ARTICLES

B20 BUZZANCO, R	‘Prologue to Tragedy: US Military Opposition to Intervention in Vietnam 
			1950-54’ [Diplomatic History, 17/2, 1993, pp.201-22 ALSO in library)
C23 CLAYTON, A	‘Indochina 1945-50’ from Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization 
			(London: Longman, 1994), pp.39-58
C24 CLAYTON, A	‘Indochina 1950-55’ from Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization 
			(London: Longman, 1994), pp.59-78
C25 CABLE, J		‘Myths & Epilogue’ from Cable, Geneva Conference, pp.129-44
C28 CABLE, J		‘The 1954 Geneva Conference: After a Decent Interval’, from Elizabeth Jane 
			Errington & B. J. McKercher (eds), The Vietnam War as History (New York, 
			1990) pp.43-56
D22 DALLOZ, J 		‘Front line in the Cold War’ [Vietnam from 1949], from Jacques Dalloz, The 
			War in Indo-China 1945-1954 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan,1990), pp.116-48
D23 DALLOZ, J           	‘Liquidations’ [the end of the Franco-Vietminh war in Vietnam], from 
			Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China 1945-1954 (Dublin: Gill  & Macmillan, 
			1990), pp.149-82)
D24 DUIKER, W		‘The Franco-Vietminh War 1947-54’, from Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 
			pp.133-77)
D27 DUIKER, W		‘The Roots of Revolution’ [Vietnam to 1954] from William J. Duiker, Vietnam: 
			Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp.28-48
D30 DUNN, P		‘The First Vietnam War: Aftershocks in the East’, from Elizabeth Jane 
			Errington & B. J. McKercher (eds), The Vietnam War as History  (New York, 
			1990), pp.17-41
E5  EDEN, A		‘The War in Indo-China’, from Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Full Circle  (London: 
			Cassell, 1960), pp.77-145
H15 HERRING, G &	‘Eisenhower, Dulles and Dienbienphu: “The Day We Didn't Go To War”
        IMMERMAN, R	Revisited’ (Journal of American History, 71/2, 1984, pp.343-63)
H22 HERRING, G	‘The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty in 
			Indochina’ (Diplomatic History, 1\2, 1977, pp.97-117)
H24 HESS, G		‘The First American Commitment in Indochina - the Acceptance of the Bao 
			Dai Experiment, 1950’ (Diplomatic History, 2/4, 1978, pp.331-50)
H32 HESS, G		‘The United States and the Geneva and Manila Conferences [1954]’, from 
			Kaplan et al, Dien Bien Phu, pp.123-48
H44 HERRING, G	‘A Good Stout Effort’: John Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-55’, 
			from Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles, pp.213-33
I1    IMMERMAN, R	‘The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954: A New Look’ 
			(Diplomatic History, 14, 1990, pp.43-66)
I13  IMMERMAN, R	‘Between the Unattainable and the Unacceptable: Eisenhower and Dienbien-
			phu’ from Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (eds), Reevaluating 
			Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s  (Urbana: University of 
			Illinois Press, 1987), pp.121-54
J7   JIAN, Chen		‘China & the First Indo-China War’ (The China Quarterly, 133, 1993, pp.85-
			106)
L28 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - the Negotiator [1946: Ho-Sainteny agreement]’, from Jean 
			Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh (London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.86-114)
L29 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - the Visitor [May-Dec. 1946]’, from Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi 
			Minh (London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.115-38)
M8   MARKS, F		‘The Real Hawk at Dienbienphu: Dulles or Eisenhower?’ (Pacific ‘Historical 
			Review, LIX, 1990, pp.297-321
M10 MARSOT, A	The Crucial Year: Indochina 1946’ (Journal of Contemporary History, 19, 1984, 
			pp.337-54)
K18 KAHIN, G		‘The Origins of US Involvement in Vietnam’, from Elizabeth Jane Errington 
			& B. McKercher (eds) The Vietnam War as History (New York, 1990), pp.57-71)
M23 McMAHON, R	‘Harry S. Truman and the Roots of US Involvement in Indochina, 1945-53’ 
			from Anderson (ed.), Shadow on the White House, pp.19-42
P5  PEMBERTON, G	‘Australia and the Indochina Crisis of 1954’ (Diplomatic History, 13/1, 1989, 
			pp.45-66)
P13 PORCH, D		‘Dien Bien Phu Reconsidered’ (Vietnam, Jun. 1994, pp.46-53)
R9  ROTTER, A		‘The Triangular Route to Vietnam: the United States, Great Britain and South
			-east Asia, 1945-50’ (The International History Review, VI/3, 1984, pp.404-23)
R10 RUANE, K		‘Anthony Eden, British Diplomacy and the Origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954’ (The Historical Journal, 37/1, 1994, pp.153-72)
R11 RUANE, K		‘Refusing to Pay the Price: British Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Victory 
			in Vietnam, 1952-54’ (The English Historical Review, CX/435, 1995, pp.70-92)
R14 RUANE, K		‘Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Office and the Indochina War, 1951-54’ 
			(conclusions from 1991 Ph.D thesis)
R18 RUANE, K		‘A Cold War Conundrum: British Foreign Policy, German Rearmament and 
			the Vietnam War 1952-54’, paper presented to the 6th Annual Conference of 
			the British International History Group, University of Lancaster, Sept. 1994
S10 SHAO, K		‘Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy and the Neutralisation of Indochina 1954-55’ (The 
			China Quarterly, 107, 1986, pp.483-504)
S13 SMITH, R		‘China and Southeast Asia: the Revolutionary Perspective, 1951’ (Journal of 
			Southeast Asian Studies, XIX/1, 1988, pp.97-110)
S34 SAVILLE, J		‘The British intervention in Vietnam, 1945’, from John Saville, The Politics of 
			Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1945-46 (London: 
			Verso,1993), pp.176-204
S52 SHORT, A		‘Origins and Alternatives: Comments, Counter-Facts and Commitments 
			[Vietnam pre-1960]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War  (Manchester: 
			MUP, 1998), pp.9-29)
S62 SHU GUANG ZHANG	‘Confrontation in Indochina, 1953-1954’ from Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence 
			and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 
			1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) pp.152-88
T16 TURNBULL, M	‘Britain and Vietnam 1948-55’ (War and Society, 6/2, 1988, pp.104-24)
W6   WARNER, G	‘The United States and Vietnam: Two Episodes’ [Bao Dai/1954 crisis] 
			(International Affairs, 65/3, 1989, pp.513-18)
W8   WARNER, G	‘The United States and Vietnam 1945-65: Part I, 1945-54’ (International Affairs, 
			48/3, 1972, pp.379-94)
W11 WARNER, G	‘Escalation in Vietnam: The Precedents of 1954’ (International Affairs, 41/2, 
			1965, pp.267-77)
W21 WARNER, G	‘From Geneva to Manila: British Policy towards Indochina and SEATO, 
			May-September 1954’, from Kaplan et al., Dien Bien Phu, pp.149-69
W23 WARNER, G	‘The Settlement of the Indochina War’, from John W. Young (ed.), The 
			Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration, 1951-1955 (Leicester: 
			Leicester University Press, 1988), pp.233-5
W24 WARNER, G	‘The United States and the Fall of Diem: Part 1 - The Coup That Never Was’ 
			(Australian Outlook, 28, 1974, pp.245-
W25 WARNER, G	‘The United States and the Fall of Diem: Part 2 - The Death of Diem’ 
			(Australian Outlook, 29, 1975, pp.3-17)
Y2  YUN, M Billings	‘Ike and Vietnam’ (History Today, 38, 1988, pp.13-19)
Z2  ZHAI, Qiang		‘Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First 
			Vietnam War, 1950-1954’ (Journal of Military History, 57/5, 1993, pp.689-715)
Z7  ZHAI, Qiang		‘The Settlement of the Indochina Crisis of 1954’, from Qiang Zhai, The 
			Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, pp.133-52
Z8  ZHAI, Qiang    	‘China and the Geneva conference of 1954’ (The China Quarterly, 129, 1992, 
			pp.103-22)
___________________________________________________________________________________________

 SECTION D
VIETNAM
INTERREGNUM (1954-63)

BOOKS

ANDERSON, David L.		Trapped by success: the Eisenhower administration and Vietnam 1953-61 
				(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)
ANDERSON, David L.		Shadow on the White House: Presidents &  the Vietnam war 1945-75 
				(Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam 
				Era (Cambridge: CUP 1997 edn)
BUI TIN				Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel 
				(London: Hurst & Co., 1995)
BRIGHAM, Robert K		Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War  
				(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1999)
CHARLTON, M. &		Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam
           MONCRIEFF, A.           	(New York: Hill & Wang, 1989 and other editions)
CHOMSKY, Noam		Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War and US Political Culture 
				(London: Verso, 1993)
CURRY, Cecil B.			Victory at Any Cost: the Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap 
				(London: Aurum Press, 1998)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America and the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam  (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
DUIKER, William J.		US Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina  (Stanford: 
				Stanford University Press, 1994)
FREEDMAN, Lawrence		Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford: OUP, 2001)
GELB, Leslie H.	           		The Irony of Vietnam: the System Worked (Washington: Brookings 
      & BETTS, Richard		Institute, 1979)
GOODWIN, Doris Kearns		Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (London: André Deutsch, 
				1976)
HALBERSTAM, David		The Best and the Brightest (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972)
HALBERSTAM, David		The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Ballantine Books, 1965)
HARRISON, James P.		The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence  (New York: 
				Columbia University Press, 1989 edn)
HERRING, George C.		America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-75 (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 and later edns)
HERRING, George C.		The Pentagon Papers: Abridged Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
				1993)
HESS, Gary R.			Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War  (Boston: 
				Twayne, 1990 and later editions)
HUNT, Michael H.		Lyndon Johnson's War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-
				1968 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996)
KAISER, David 			American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam 
				War (Harvard: Harvard U.P., 2000)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Century Hutchinson,1983 & later edns)
KOLKO, Gabriel			Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
				Historical Experience (New York: New Press, 1994)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		The War Everyone Lost - and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's 
				Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1984)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
				Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: Uni. of North Carolina Press, 1996)
MACDONALD, Peter		Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin, 1992 edn)
PRADOS, John  			The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War  (New 
York: Wiley & Sons, 2000)		
RACE, Jeffrey			War comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict  in a Vietnamese Province 
				(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)
RUANE, Kevin			War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998)
RUANE, Kevin			The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
RUST, W			Kennedy in Vietnam (New York: Da Capo, 1985)
SCHLESINGER Jr., Arthur	The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966 
				(London: André Deutsch, 1967)
SCHULZINGER, Robert		A Time for War: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975  (New York: 
				Oxford University Press, 1997)
SHEEHAN, Neil	           		A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam  
				(London: Cape, 1989 edn)
SHORT, Anthony		The Origins of the Vietnam War (London: Longman, 1989)
SMITH, R. B.			An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol 1 - Revolution versus 
				Containment, 1955-1961 (London: Macmillan, 1983)
SUMMERS, Harry G.		On Strategy: Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: 
				Presido, 1982)
TURLEY, William S.		The Second Indochina War: a Short Military and Political History 
				(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986)
TRULLINGER, James W.		Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam (Stanford: Stanford 
				University Press, 1994)
TRUONG NHU TANG		A Vietcong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1986)
WINTLE, Justin	            		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)
ZHAI, Qiang			China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of 
				North Carolina Press, 2000)	
ZHAI, Qiang			The Dragon, the Lion and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations 
				1949-58 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994)

ARTICLES

A6   ANDERSON, D	‘J. Lawton Collins, John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower Administration's 
			'point of no return' in Vietnam [1954-55]’ (Diplomatic History, 12/2, 1988, 
			pp.127-47)
A15 ANDERSON, D	‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’ from 
			Anderson (ed.), Shadow on the White House, pp.43-62
A20 ARTAUD, D		‘The United States, France and Southeast Asia as a Threat to the Cohesion of 
			the Atlantic Alliance, 1954-1955’ from Smith (ed.), NATO, pp.141-55
B18 BASSET L & 	‘The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War [Kennedy 
	PELZ S		[1961-63]’ from Paterson (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, pp.223-52)
B62 BROGAN, H	 	‘Vietnam’ from Brogan, Kennedy, pp.179-203
C17 CHOMSKY, N	‘From terror to aggression [Kennedy and Vietnam 1961-63]’, from Chomsky, 
			Rethinking Camelot, pp.39-104
C20 COMBS, A		‘The Path Not Taken: the British Alternative to US Policy in Vietnam, 1954-
			56 [Diplomatic History, 19/1, 1995, pp.33-57 ALSO in library)
C22 CABLE, J		‘Improvising International Supervision in Indochina’ [post-1954 Geneva 
			agreements], personal copy of conference paper, 1989
C29 CHEN, K C            	‘Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War’ (Political 
			Science Quarterly, 90/2, 1975, pp.239-59)
D25 DUIKER, W		‘Peace and Division’ [Vietnam, 1954-61], from Duiker, Communist Road to 
			Power, pp.179-214
G37 GREENE, D		‘John Foster Dulles and the End of the Franco-American Entente in 
			Indochina’ (Diplomatic History, 16/4, 1992, pp.551-71)
G50 GREENSTEIN, F	‘What did Eisenhower tell Kennedy about Indochina?  The Politics
       & IMMERMAN, R	of Misperception’ (Journal of American History, 79, 1992, pp.568-87)
H44 HERRING, G	‘A Good Stout Effort’: John Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-55’, 
			from Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles, pp.213-33
H46 HESS, G		‘Commitment in the Age of Counterinsurgency: Kennedy’s Vietnam Options 
			and Decisions, 1961-63’, from Anderson (ed.), Shadow on the White House, 
			pp.63-86
L37 LOGEVALL, F	‘Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been’, from Mark J. White 
			(ed), Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.19-62
M42 MOISE, E		‘Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam’ (Pacific Affairs, 
			49/1, 1976, pp.70-92)
M45 MACDONALD, D	‘The New Commitment to Diem, 1961’, from Douglas J. Macdonald, 
			Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World 
			(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp.187-212
M47 MACDONALD, D	‘Successes and Failures, 1962 [Kennedy administration and Diem]’, from 
			Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform 
			in the Third World (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
			pp.213-48
N33 NEWMAN, John	‘’Conclusion’ to John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception,Intrigue and the 
			Struggle for Power (New York: Warner, 1992), pp.451-60
N34 NEWMAN, John	‘Kennedy’s Plan for American Withdrawal’ from McMahon (ed.), Major 
			Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, pp.195-206
P12 PELZ, S		‘John F. Kennedy's 1961 Vietnam War Decisions’ (Journal of Strategic Studies, 
			4/4, 1981, pp.356-85)
S17 SINGH, A		‘Containment through Diplomacy: Britain, India and the Cold War in 
			Indochina 1954-56’ (Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and 
			Related Disciplines, International Studies paper 
S52 SHORT, A		‘Origins and Alternatives: Comments, Counter-Facts and Commitments 
			[Vietnam pre-1960]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War  (Manchester: 
			MUP, 1998), pp.9-29)1987/III)
X1   XIAOMING ZHANG	‘Communist Powers Divided: China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam 
			War’ from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives 
			on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.77-97
__________________________________________________________________________________________

SECTION E
VIETNAM

THE AMERICAN WAR (1963-73)

BOOKS

ANDERSON, David L.		Shadow on the White House: Presidents &  the Vietnam war 1945-75 
				(Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993)
ARNOLD, J.R			The Tet Offensive: Turning Point in Vietnam (London: Osprey, 1990)
BARRETT, David M.		Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam Advisers 
				(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993)
BARRETT, David M (ed.)		Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam Papers: a Documentary Collection  (College 
				Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998)
BERGERUD, Eric M.		The Dynamics of Defeat: the Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province 
				(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991)
BERMAN, Larry	            		Lyndon Johnson's War: the Road to Stalemate in Vietnam  (New York: 
				Norton, 1991 edn)
BERMAN, Larry	            		Planning a Tragedy; the Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New 
				York: Norton, 1982)
BERMAN, Larry			No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger and Betrayal in Vietnam (Free 
				Press, 2001)
BRAESTRUP, Peter		Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and 
				Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (New 
				Haven: Yale University Press, 1983 edn)
BURKE, John P. &		How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam 1954 and 1965
   GREENSTEIN, Fred I		(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 
				1999)
BUZZANCO, Robert		Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era 
				(Cambridge: CUP 1997 edn)
BUI TIN				Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel 
				(London: Hurst & Co., 1995)
BRIGHAM, Robert K		Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War  
				(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1999)
CABLE, Larry			Unholy Grail: the United States and the Wars in Vietnam 1965-1968 
				(London: Routledge, 1991)
CHARLTON, M. &		Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam
           MONCRIEFF, A.           	(New York: Hill & Wang, 1989 and other editions)
CURRY, Cecil B.			Victory at Any Cost: the Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap 
				(London: Aurum Press, 1998)
DALLEK, Robert			Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and his Times (Oxford: OUP, 2000)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America and the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DIVINE, Robert A. (ed.)		The Johnson Years: Vol.II, Vietnam, the Environment, Science 
				 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1987)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: 
				Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
DUIKER, William J.		US Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina  (Stanford: 
				Stanford University Press, 1994)
GAIDUK, Ilya V.	           		The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan. R. Dee, 1996)
GARDNER, Lloyd C.		Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam  (Chicago: 
				Ivan R. Dee, 1995)
GELB, Leslie H.	           		The Irony of Vietnam: the System Worked (Washington: Brookings
      & BETTS, Richard		Institute, 1979)
HALBERSTAM, David		The Best and the Brightest (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972)
HALBERSTAM, David		The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Ballantine Books, 1965)
HARRISON, James P.		The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence  (New York: 
				Columbia University Press, 1989 edn)
HERRING, George C.		America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-75 (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 and later edns)
HERRING, George C.		The Pentagon Papers: Abridged Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
				1993)
HESS, Gary R.			Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War  (Boston: 
				Twayne, 1990 and later editions)
HERRING, George C.		LBJ and Vietnam: a Different Kind of War (College Station: University 
				of Texas Press, 1996)
HO CHI MINH			Against US Aggression for National Salvation (Hanoi: Foreign 
				Languages Publishing House, 1967)
HOOPES, Townshend		Limits of Intervention: How Vietnam Policy was Made and Reversed 
				during the Johnson Administration (New York: Norton, 1973 edn)
HUNT, Michael H.		Lyndon Johnson's War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-
				1968 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996)
KAISER, David 			American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam 
				War (Harvard: Harvard U.P., 2000)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Century Hutchinson, 1983 & later eds)
KIMBALL, Jeffrey P.		Nixon’s Vietnam War  (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1998)
KOLKO, Gabriel			Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
				Historical Experience (New York: New Press, 1994)
LOGEVALL, Frederik		Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation in Vietnam  
				(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		The War Everyone Lost - and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's 
				Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1984)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
				Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
				1996)
MACDONALD, Peter		Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin, 1992 edn)
McMASTER, H. R.		Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York, Harper Collins 1997)
McNAMARA, Robert S.		In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: 
Random House, 1995)
McQUAID, Kim			The Anxious Years: America in the Vietnam and Watergate Era (New 
				York: Basic Books, 1989)
MOYER, Mark			Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: the CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the 
				Vietcong (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997)
OBERDORFER, Don		Tet: The Turning Point of the Vietnam War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
				Uni. Press, 2001)
PALMER, Bruce			Twenty Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam  (New York: 
				Da Capo, 1984)
PRADOS, John  			The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War  (New 
York: Wiley & Sons, 2000)		
RACE, Jeffrey			War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict  in a Vietnamese Province 
				(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)
ROBERTS, R & OLSEN, J		My Lai: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford Books, 
				1998)
RUANE, Kevin			War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998)
RUANE, Kevin			The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
SCHLESINGER Jr., Arthur	The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966 
				(London: André Deutsch, 1967)
SCHULZINGER, Robert		A Time for War: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975  (New York: 
				Oxford University Press, 1997)
SHAWCROSS, William		Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia  (London: 
				Hogarth Press, 1993 edn)
SHEEHAN, Neil	           		A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam 
				(London: Cape, 1989 edn)
SHORT, Anthony		The Origins of the Vietnam War (London: Longman, 1989)
SMITH, R.B.			An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol.2 - The Struggle for 
				Southeast Asia 1961-65 (London: Macmillan, 1985)
SMITH, R.B.			An International History of the Vietnam War: Vol.3 - The Making of a 
				Limited War 1965-66 (London: Macmillan, 1991)
SPECTOR, Ronald H.		After Tet: the Bloodiest year in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 
				1993)
STEVENS, Richard L		Mission on the Ho Chi Minh Trail: Nature, Myth and War in Viet Nam 
				(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995)
SUMMERS, Harry G.		On Strategy: Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: 
				Presido, 1982)
TURLEY, William S.		The Second Indochina War: a Short Military and Political History 
				(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986)
TRULLINGER, James W.		Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam (Stanford: Stanford 
				University Press, 1994)
TRUONG NHU TANG		A Vietcong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1986)
TURNER, Kathleen		Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: 
				University of Chicago Press, 1985)
VANDEMARK, Brian		Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam 
				War (Oxford: OUP, 1991)
VANDIVER, Frank E.		Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson's Wars (College Station: Texas 
				A&M University Press, 1997)
WINTERS, Francis X.		The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam, January 25, 1963 to February 
				15, 1964 (Athens: Uni. of Georgia Press, 1997)
WINTLE, Justin	            		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)
ZHAI, Qiang			China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of 
				North Carolina Press, 2000)	

ARTICLES

B28 BERMAN, L		‘Coming to Grips with Lyndon Johnson's War’ [Diplomatic History, 17/4, 
			1993, pp.519-38 ONLY in library]
B45 BRANDS, H		‘Johnson and Eisenhower: The President, the Former President, and the War 
			in Vietnam’ (Presidential Studies Quarterly, 15, 1985, pp.589-601)
C29 CHEN, K C  		‘Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War’ (Political 
			Science Quarterly, 90/2, 1975, pp.239-59)
C31 CABLE, L		‘Everything is Perfect and Getting Better: the Myths and Measures of the 
			American Ground War in Indochina, 1965-68’, from Head & Grinter (eds.), 
			Looking Back on the Vietnam War, pp.191-224
D20 DALLEK, R		‘Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: the Making of a Tragedy’ (Diplomatic History, 
			20/2, 1996, pp.147-62)
D32 DEVILLIERS, P	‘French Policy and the Second Vietnam War’ (World Today, Vol. XXIII, 1967, 
			pp.249-62)
G36 GAIDUK, I		‘Soviet Policy towards US Participation in the Vietnam War’ (History, 81/261, 1996, pp.40-54 ALSO in library)
G41 GAIDUK, I		‘The Vietnam War and Soviet-American relations, 1964-73: New Russian 
			Evidence’ (Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 6-7, 1995-96, pp.232, 
			250-7)
G45 GAIDUK, I		‘Turnabout?  The Soviet Policy Dilemma in the Vietnamese Conflict’, from 
			Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds.), Vietnam: The Early Decisions 
			(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), pp.207-19
G52 GARDNER, L	‘Fighting Vietnam: the Russian-American Conundrum’ from Lloyd C. 
			Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam  (College 
			Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.23-57
G53 GAIDUK, I		‘Containing the Warriors: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1960-
			65’  from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on 
			Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.58-76
H20 HUMPHREY, D	‘Tuesday Lunch at the Johnson White House: a Preliminary Assessment’ 
			(Diplomatic History, 8/1, 1984, pp.81-101)
H37 HESS, G		‘To Tet: the US-North Vietnamese War, 1965-68’, from Hess, Vietnam and 
			America, pp.85-113
H45 HERRING, G	‘The Johnson Administration’s Conduct of Limited War in Vietnam’, from 
			Head & Grinter (eds.), Looking Back on the Vietnam War, pp.79-94
H47 HERRING, G	‘The Reluctant Warrior: Lyndon Johnson as Commander-in-Chief’, from 
			Anderson (ed.), Shadow on the White House, pp.87-112
I5    IMMERMAN, R	‘A Time in the Tide of Men’s Affairs: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam’ from 
			Cohen & Tucker (eds), Johnson Confronts the World, pp.57-98
J9   JIAN, Chen		‘China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69’ (The China Quarterly, 142, 
			1995, pp.356-87)
K17 KISSINGER, H	‘The Viet Nam Negotiations’ (Foreign Affairs, 47/2, 1969, pp.211-34)
K23 KAHIN, G		‘The Decision on Major US Ground Forces: Phase II [July 1965]’,from George 
			McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New 
			York: Anchor Books, 1986), pp.366-97
K25 KIMBALL, J		‘Peace with Honor: Richard Nixon and the Diplomacy of Threat and 
			Symbolism’ from Anderson (ed.), Shadow on the White House, pp.152--84
L11 LOGEVALL, F	‘De Gaulle, Neutralisation and American Involvement in Vietnam 1963-64’ 
			(Pacific Historical Review, LXI/1, 1992, pp.69-102)
L26 LAFEBER, W		‘Johnson, Vietnam and Tocqueville’, from Cohen & Tucker (eds), Johnson 
			Confronts the World, pp.31-55)
P20 PIKE, D		‘North Vietnamese Air Defenses during the Vietnam War’, from Head & 
			Grinter (eds.), Looking Back on the Vietnam War, pp.161-72
R56 RUANE, K		‘Fighting while Negotiating: The United States, North Vietnam and the Paris 
			Peace Process, May 1968-January 1973 (Modern History Review, 13/2, 2001, 
			pp.14-20)
S28 STOESSINGER, J	‘The American Empire: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam’, from Stoessinger, 
			Crusaders and Pragmatists, pp.177-202
S56  SIEG, K		‘The Lodge Peace Mission of 1969 and Nixon’s Vietnam Policy’  (Diplomacy 
			& Statecraft, 7/1, 1996, pp.175-96)
T11 TUCKER, N		‘Lyndon Johnson: a Final Reckoning’, from Cohen and Tucker (eds), Johnson 
			Confronts the World, pp.311-20)
V1   VAN NESS, P	‘Richard Nixon, the Vietnam War and the American Accommodation with 
			China: A Review Article’ (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 8/3, 1986, pp.231-45)
W11 WARNER, G	‘Escalation in Vietnam: The Precedents of 1954’ (International Affairs, 41/2, 
			1965, pp.267-77)
W34 WUNDERLIN, C	‘Paradox of Power: Infiltration, Coastal Surveillance, and the United States 
			Navy in Vietnam, 1965-68’ (Journal of Military History, 53/3, 1989, pp.275-89)
X1   XIAOMING ZHANG	‘Communist Powers Divided: China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam 
			War’ from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives 
			on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.77-97
Z3  ZHAI, Qiang		‘Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: new Chinese Evidence’ (Cold 
			War International History Project, Bulletin 6-7, 1995-96, pp.233-50)
Z10 ZHAI, Qiang		‘An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV during the Vietnam War’ from 
			Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam 
			(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.108-42

SECTION F
VIETNAM

AFTER THE AMERICANS (1973 onwards)

BOOKS

ANDERSON, David L.		Shadow on the White House: Presidents &  the Vietnam war 1945-75 
				(Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993)
CURRY, Cecil B.			Victory at Any Cost: the Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap 
				(London: Aurum Press, 1998)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America and the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: 
				Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
ENGELMAN, Larry		Tears Before the Rain: An Oral History of the Fall of South Vietnam 
				(New York: Da Capo, 1997)
HARRISON, James P.		The Endless War: Vietnam’s Struggle for Independence  (New York: 
				Columbia University Press, 1989 edn)
HERRING, George C.		America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-75 (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1979 and later edns)
HESS, Gary R.			Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War  (Boston: 
				Twayne, 1990 and later editions)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Century Hutchinson, 1983 & later eds)
KIMBALL, Jeffrey P.		Nixon’s Vietnam War  (Kansas: University of Kansas  Press, 1998)
KOLKO, Gabriel			Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern 
				Historical Experience (New York: New Press, 1994)
LOMPERIS, Timothy		The War Everyone Lost - and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's 
				Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1984) 
LOMPERIS, Timothy		From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
				Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: Uni. of North Carolina Press, 1996)
MACDONALD, Peter		Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin, 1992 edn)
McQUAID, Kim			The Anxious Years: America in the Vietnam and Watergate Era (New 
				York: Basic Books, 1989)
RUANE, Kevin			War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998)
RUANE, Kevin			The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
SCHULZINGER, Robert		A Time for War: the United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975  (New York: 
				Oxford University Press, 1997)
TRUONG NHU TANG		A Vietcong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1986)
TURLEY, William S.		The Second Indochina War: a Short Military and Political History 
				(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986)
WINTLE, Justin	            		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)
ZHAI, Qiang			China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of 
				North Carolina Press, 2000)	

ARTICLES

A16 ANDERSON, D	‘Gerald R. Ford and the Presidents’ war in Vietnam’ from Anderson  (ed.), 
			Shadow on the White House, pp.184-207
H36 HURST, S		‘Regionalism or Globalism?  The Carter Administration and Vietnam’ 
			(Journal of Contemporary History, 32/1, 1997, pp.81-95)
H38 HESS, G		‘To the fall of Saigon: the End of a War and Fulfilment of a Revolution, 1968-
			75’, from Hess, Vietnam and America, pp.114-42
H39 HESS, G		‘Toward Reconciliation? The US and Vietnam since 1975’, from Hess, 
			Vietnam and America, pp.143-65
J15 JESPERSEN, T	‘The Bitter End and the Lost Chance in Vietnam: Congress, the Ford 
			Administration, and the Battle over Vietnam, 1975-76’  (Diplomatic History, 
			24/1, pp.265-96 ALSO in library)
S35 SUMMERS, H	‘The Last Years of the War: A Personal View’, from Elizabeth Jane Errington 
			& B. J. McKercher (eds), The Vietnam War as History (New York, 1990) pp.163-
			75
___________________________________________________________________________________________

SECTION G
VIETNAM

ANTIWAR PROTEST

BOOKS

BUZZANCO, Robert		Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 
				1999)
DeBENEDETTI, C. &		An American Ordeal: the Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (New 
                CHATFIELD, C		York: Syracuse University Press, 1991)
De GROOT, Gerald R.		A Noble Cause?  America and the Vietnam War (London: Longman 
				1999)
DUMBRELL, John (ed.)		Vietnam and the Anti-War Movement (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989)
GARFINKLE, Adam		Telltale Hearts: the Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Move-
				ment (London: Macmillan, 1997)
GIOGLIO, Gerald R.		Days of Decision: an Oral History of Conscientious Objectors In the 
				Military during the Vietnam War (Trenton, NJ: Broken Rifle Press, 
				1993 edn)
JEFFRYS-JONES, Rhodri		Peace Now!  American Society and the end of the Vietnam War (New 
				Haven: Yale University Press, 1999)
KARNOW, Stanley		Vietnam: A History (London: Century Hutchinson, 1983 & later eds)
MACLEAR, Michael		Vietnam: the Ten Thousand Day War (London: Mandarin, 1992 edn)
McQUAID, Kim			The Anxious Years: America in the Vietnam and Watergate Era (New 
				York: Basic Books, 1989)
MOSER, Richard			The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent during the Vietnam 
				Era (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers U.P., 1996)
SMALL, M. & HOOVER, D.	Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement (New 
				York: Syracuse University Press, 1992)
HUNT, Andrew E.		The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War  (New 
				York: New York University Press, 1999)
WINTLE, Justin	            		The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.		The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)

ARTICLES

A7   ANDERSON, T	‘An American Ordeal: the Vietnam War at Home [historiography]
			 (Diplomatic History, 16/1, 1992, pp.157-61)
B50 BOWEN, K		‘US Veterans: The War and the Long Road Home’ from Douglas Allen & 
			Ngo Vinh Long (eds), Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the 
			War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp.250-66
C30 CHARLTON, M	‘Protest at Home’, from Charlton & Moncrieff (eds), Many Reasons Why, 
			pp.150-67
D31 DeBENEDETTI, C	‘On the Significance of Citizen Peace Activism: America 1961-75’  (Peace and 
			Change, 9, 1983, pp.6-20
D33 DUMBRELL, J	‘Congress and the Antiwar Movement’, from Dumbrell (ed.), Vietnam and the 
			Antiwar Movement, pp.101-12
D41 DeBENEDETTI, C	‘Lyndon Johnson and the [Vietnam] Antiwar Opposition’ from Divine (ed.), 
			Johnson Years, Vol.2, pp.23-53
J10 JOHNSON, D	‘The Origins of Dissent: Senate Liberals and Vietnam, 1959-1964’ (Pacific 
			Historical Review, 65, 1996, pp.249-75)
L35 LUNCH, W &	‘American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam’ (Western Political
      SPERLICH, P		Quarterly, 32, 1979, pp.21-44)
S42 SMALL, M		‘Containing Domestic Enemies: Richard M. Nixon and the War at Home’, 
			from Anderson (ed.), Shadow on the White House, pp.130-52
S44  SCHMITZ, D &	‘Frank Church, the Senate, and the Emergence of Dissent on the Vietnam 
        FOUSEKIS, N		War’ (Pacific Historical Review, LXIII/4, 1994, pp.561-81)
S59 SMALL, M		‘The Impact of the Antiwar Movement on Lyndon Johnson, 1965-1968: A 
			Preliminary Report’ (Peace and Change, 9/1, 1985, pp.1-22)
T12 TURNER, K		‘Battles at Home and Abroad: the Influence of Lyndon Johnson's Press 
			Relations on the War in Vietnam’, from Elizabeth Jane Errington & B. J. 
			McKercher (eds), The Vietnam War as History (New York, 1990) pp.117-31
V3   VERBA, S., et al	‘Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam’ (The American Political Science 
			Review, LXI/2, 1967, pp.317-33)
V5   VICKERS, G		‘The Vietnam Antiwar Movement’ from Douglas Allen & Ngo Vinh Long 
			(eds), Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the War (Boulder, 
			Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp.189-210
W37 WELLS, T		‘The Anti-Vietnam War Movement in the United States’ from Peter Lowe 
			(ed.), The Vietnam War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.115-32
__________________________________________________________________________________________

 SECTION H
VIETNAM

VIETNAMESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONFLICT

BOOKS

BERGERUD, Eric M.	The Dynamics of Defeat: the Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, 
			Colorado: Westview Press, 1991)
BUI TIN			Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel (London: Hurst 
			& Co., 1995)
BRIGHAM, Robert K	Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War  (Ithaca: 
			Cornell University Press 1999)
CHANOFF, David &	Vietnam: A Portrait of its People (London: I. B. Taurus, 1996)
    DOAN VAN TOAI		
CURRY, Cecil B.		Victory at Any Cost: the Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap (London: 
			Aurum Press, 1998)
DUIKER, William J.	The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
			1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.	Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam  (New York: 
			McGraw-Hill, 1995)
DUIKER, William J		Ho Chi Minh: A Life (New York: Hyperion, 2000)
HO CHI MINH		Against US Aggression for National Salvation (Hanoi: Foreign Languages 
			Publishing House, 1967)
KOLKO, Gabriel		Vietnam: Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical 
			Experience (New York: New Press, 1994)
LOMPERIS, Timothy	From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of 
			Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996)
MACDONALD, Peter	Giap: Victor in Vietnam (London: Warner, 1994 edn)
MARR, David G.		Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-45 (Berkeley: University of California 
			Press, 1981)
MARR, David G.		Vietnam 1945: the Quest for Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
			1995)
PRADOS, John  		The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War  (New York: Wiley 
& Sons, 2000)		
RACE, Jeffrey		War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province 
			(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973)
RUANE, Kevin		The Vietnam Wars (Manchester: MUP, 2000)
SMITH, R.B.		An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 1, Revolution versus 
			Containment, 1955-61 (London: Macmillan, 1983)
SMITH, R. B.		An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 2, The Struggle for 
			Southeast Asia, 1961-65 (London: Macmillan, 1985)
SMITH, R. B.		An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 3, The Making of a Limited 
			War, 1965-66 (London: Macmillan, 1991)
STEVENS, Richard L.	Mission on the Ho Chi Minh Trail: Nature, Myth and War in Viet Nam (Norman: 
			University of Oklahoma Press, 1995)
TRULLINGER, James W.	Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam (Stanford: Stanford 
			University Press, 1994)
TRUONG NHU TANG	A Vietcong Memoir (New York: Vintage Books, 1986)
WINTLE, Justin	            	The Viet Nam Wars (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991)
YOUNG, Marilyn B.	The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990  (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1991)

ARTICLES

B42 BUI DIEM		‘Reflections on the Vietnam War: the Views of a Vietnamese on Vietnamese-
			American Misperceptions’ from Head & Grinter (eds.), Looking Back on the 
			Vietnam War, pp.241-9
B51 BRIGHAM, R	‘Vietnam at the Center: Patterns of Diplomacy and Resistance’ from Lloyd C. 
			Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam (College 
			Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.98-107
C29 CHEN, K C            	‘Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the Vietnam War’  (Political 
		        	 Science Quarterly, 90/2, 1975, pp.239-59)
D24 DUIKER, W		‘The Franco-Vietminh War 1947-54’, from Duiker, Communist Road 
			to Power, pp.133-77)
D25 DUIKER, W		‘Peace and Division’ [Vietnam, 1954-61], from Duiker, Communist Road to 
			Power, pp.179-214
D26 DUIKER, W		‘A Nation Divided [Vietnam’ 1954-73], from William J. Duiker, Vietnam: 
			Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp.49-70
D27 DUIKER, W		‘The Roots of Revolution’ [Vietnam to 1954] from William J. Duiker, Vietnam: 
			Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp.28-48
D27 DUIKER, W		‘The Roots of Revolution’ [Vietnam to 1954] from William J. Duiker, Vietnam: 
			Nation in Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp.28-48
D28 DUIKER, W		‘Vietnamese Communism, 1930-45’, from Duiker, Sacred War, pp.33-52
F9  FENN, C		‘Prometheus and Victor’ [Ho Chi Minh, 1954-69] from Charles Fenn, Ho Chi 
			Minh: A Biographical Introduction (London: StudioVista, 1973), pp.109-28
G62 GARVER, J		‘Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement’  (Political 
			Science Quarterly, 96/3, 1981, pp.445-61)
H34 HAMMER, E	'We Have Fought for a Thousand Years' [origins of Vietnamese nationalism 
			and communism to 1941], from Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 
			(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp.54-93
H50 HUYNH KIM	‘The Vietnamese August Revolution Reinterpreted’ (Journal of Asian Studies
	HANH		 30, 1971, pp.761-82)
L27 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - the Liberator [1943-46]’, from Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi  Minh 
			(London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.68-85)
L28 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - the Negotiator [1946: Ho-Sainteny agreement]’, from Jean 
			Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh (London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.86-114)
L29 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - the Visitor [May-Dec. 1946]’, from Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi 
			Minh (London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.115-38)
L30 LACOUTURE, J	‘Uncle Ho and Uncle Sam’ [Ho's relationship with the USA], from Jean 
			Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh (London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.208-19)
L31 LACOUTURE, J	‘Ho Chi Minh - Clues to a Revolutionary’, from Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh 
			(London: Allen Lane, 1968), pp.77-92)
M42 MOISE, E		‘Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam’ (Pacific Affairs, 
			49/1, 1976, pp.70-92)
N11 NGO VINH LONG  	‘Vietnam’ [overview and history of entire conflict] from Douglas Allen & 
			Ngo Vinh Long (eds), Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the 
			War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp.9-64 for LOAN only
N15  NGUYEN VU TUNG	‘Coping with the United States: Hanoi’s Search for an Effective Strategy 
			[1945-75]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War  (Manchester: MUP, 1998), 
			pp.30-61
N16 NGO VINH LONG	‘South Vietnam [1954-75]’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War
			(Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.62-94
P20 PIKE, D		‘North Vietnamese Air Defenses during the Vietnam War’, from Head & 
			Grinter (eds.), Looking Back on the Vietnam War, pp.161-72
Z2  ZHAI, Qiang		‘Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First 
			Vietnam War, 1950-1954’ (Journal of Military History, 57/5, 1993, pp.689-715)
___________________________________________________________________________________________

SECTION  I
VIETNAM

SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT

BOOKS

CHEN JIAN			Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: Uni. of North Carolina 
				Press, 2001)
DUIKER, William J.		The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Colorado: 
				Westview Press, 1996 edn)
DUIKER, William J.		Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam  (New 
				York: McGraw-Hill, 1995)
GAIDUK, Ilya V.	           		The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan. R. Dee, 1996)
SMITH, R.B.			An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 1, Revolution 
				versus Containment, 1955-61 (London: Macmillan, 1983)
SMITH, R. B.			An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 2, The Struggle for 
				Southeast Asia, 1961-65 (London: Macmillan, 1985)
SMITH, R. B.			An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 3, The Making of a 
				Limited War, 1965-66 (London: Macmillan 1991)
ZHAI, Qiang			China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of 
				North Carolina Press, 2000)	

ARTICLES

G36 GAIDUK, I		‘Soviet Policy towards US Participation in the Vietnam War’ (History, 
			81/261, 1996, pp.40-54 ALSO in library) 
G41 GAIDUK, I		‘The Vietnam War and Soviet-American relations, 1964-73: New Russian 
			Evidence’ (Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 6-7, 1995-96, pp.232, 
			250-7)
G45 GAIDUK, I		‘Turnabout?  The Soviet Policy Dilemma in the Vietnamese Conflict’, from 
			Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds.), Vietnam: The Early Decisions 
			(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), pp.207-19
G52 GARDNER, L	‘Fighting Vietnam: the Russian-American Conundrum’ from Lloyd C.
			Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam  (College 
			Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.23-57
G53 GAIDUK, I		‘Containing the Warriors: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1960-
			65’  from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on 
			Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.58-76
G54 GAIDUK, I		‘Developing an Alliance: the Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1954-75’ from Peter 
			Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.133-51
G62 GARVER, J		‘Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement’  (Political 
			Science Quarterly, 96/3, 1981, pp.445-61)
J7   JIAN, Chen		‘China and the First Indo-China War’ (The China Quarterly, 133, 1993, pp.85-
			106)
J9   JIAN, Chen		‘China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69’ (The China 	Quarterly, 
			142, 1995, pp.356-87)
J11 JIAN, Chen		‘China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-75’ from Peter Lowe (ed.), The Vietnam 
			War (Manchester: MUP, 1998), pp.152-80
S10 SHAO, K		‘Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy and the Neutralisation of Indochina 1954-55’ (The 
			China Quarterly, 107, 1986, pp.483-504)
S13 SMITH, R		‘China and Southeast Asia: the Revolutionary Perspective, 1951’ (Journal of 
			Southeast Asian Studies, XIX/1, 1988, pp.97-110)
X1   XIAOMING ZHANG	‘Communist Powers Divided: China, the Soviet Union, and the Vietnam 
			War’ from Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives 
			on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.77-97
Z2  ZHAI, Qiang		‘Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First 
			Vietnam War, 1950-1954’ (Journal of Military History, 57/5, 1993, pp.689-715)
Z7  ZHAI, Qiang		‘The Settlement of the Indochina Crisis of 1954’, from Qiang Zhai, The 
			Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle, pp.133-52
Z8  ZHAI, Qiang    	‘China and the Geneva conference of 1954’ (The China Quarterly, 129, 1992, 
			pp.103-22)
Z3  ZHAI, Qiang		‘Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: new Chinese Evidence’ (Cold 
			War International History Project, Bulletin 6-7, 1995-96, pp.233-50)
Z10 ZHAI, Qiang		‘An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV during the Vietnam War’ from 
			Lloyd C. Gardner & Ted Gittinger (eds), International Perspectives on Vietnam 
			(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), pp.108-42

SECTION J
GENERAL TEXTS

OVERVIEWS OF THE COLD WAR
20th CENTURY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 UNITED STATES/SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

AMBROSE, Stephen E.	Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938  (London:
			Penguin/Pelican, various editions)
ASHTON, S.R.		The Search for Détente: the Politics of East-West Relations since 1945  (London: 
			Macmillan, 1989)
BALL, S.  J.		The Cold War: an International History, 1947-1991 (London: Arnold, 1998)
BARNET, Richard J.	Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Movements 
			around the World (New York: New American Library, 1972 and other edns)
BARTLETT, C.J.		The Global Conflict, 1880-1970 (London: Longman, 1984 and later edns)
BARTLETT, C.J.		The Rise and Fall of the Pax-Americana: US Foreign Policy in the Twentieth 
			Century (London: Paul Elek, 1974)
BARTLETT, C.J		The Special Relationship: a Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 
			1945 (London: Longman, 1992)
BOYLE, Peter G.		American-Soviet Relations; from the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism 
			(London: Routledge, 1993)
COHEN, Warren I.	America in the Age of Soviet Power 1945-91 (Cambridge: CUP, 1995 edn)
CROCKATT, Richard	The Fifty Years War: the United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics 
			1941-1991 (London: Routledge, 1996)
DOBSON A & MARSH, S	US Foreign Policy since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2000)
DOCKRILL, Michael	The Cold War, 1945-63 (London: Macmillan, 1988)
DUMBRELL, John	The Making of US Foreign Policy (Manchester: MUP, 1990)
GADDIS, John Lewis	Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
			Security Policy (Oxford: OUP, 1982)
GADDIS, John Lewis	The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: OUP, 
			1987)
GADDIS, John Lewis	Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: an Interpretative History (New 
			York: Wiley, 1978)
GADDIS, John Lewis	We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)
GADDIS, John Lewis	The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, 
			Provocations (Oxford: OUP, 1992)
GARDNER, Lloyd C	.A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan 
			(London: Macmillan, 1984)
GORODETSKY, G, (ed.)   Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-91: A  Retrospective (London: Cass, 1994)
GRAEBNER, Norman (ed.) 	The Cold War: a Conflict of Ideology and Power (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1976)
GREENWOOD, Sean	Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1991 (London: Macmillan, 2000)
HAMMOND, Paul	The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945  (Harcourt, Brace & 
			World Inc., 1969)
HIGGINS, Hugh	            	The Cold War (London: Heinemann, 1974)
HOGAN, Michael &	Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 1991)
    PATERSON, Thomas	
HOGAN, Michael G (ed.)	The Ambiguous Legacy: US Foreign Relations in the  “American Century” 
			(Cambridge: CUP, 1999)
HUNT, Michael		Ideology and United States Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
			1988)
KENNEDY-PIPE, Caroline	Russia and the World since 1917 (London: Arnold, 1998)
KENEZ, Peter		A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End  (Cambridge: CUP, 
			1999)
KILLEN, Linda		The Soviet Union and the United States: A New Look at the Cold War (Boston: 
			Hall, 1989)
LAFEBER, Walter	America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1992 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993 
			and later editions)
LAFEBER, Walter	The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 
			(New York: Norton, 1989)
LEFFLER, Melvyn (ed.)	The Origins of the Cold War: an International History (London: Routledge, 1994)
   & PAINTER, D.S	
LOTH, Wilfried		The Division of the World, 1941-55 (London: Routledge, 1988)
LOUIS, W. & BULL, H.	The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: 
			Clarendon Press, 1989 edn)
MARTEL, Gordon (ed.)	American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993  (London: Routledge, 1994)
MASON, John		The Cold War 1945-1991 (London: Routledge, 1996)
MASTNY, V		The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: the Stalin Years  (Oxford: OUP, 1998)
NINKOVICH, Frank	The Wilsonian Century: US Foreign Policy since 1900 (Uni. of Chicago P., 2001)
NOGEE, J.L. & 	     	Soviet Foreign Policy since the Second World War (New York: Pergamon, 1985)
   DONALDSON, R.H (eds)	
PATERSON, Thomas G.    On Every Front: the Making and Unmaking of the Cold War (revised 1993 edn.)
PATERSON, Thomas G &	The Origins of the Cold War (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1991)
 McMAHON, Robert  (eds)
PATERSON, T., et al	American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895 (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 
			1995)
ROBERTS, Geoffrey	The Soviet Union in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1999)
SCHULZINGER, Robert	American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: OUP, 1990 - note that 
			later editions are re-titled American Diplomacy since 1900)
SIVACHEV, N. &	Russia and the United States: US-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point
          YAKOLEV, N.	of View (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979)
SMITH, Joseph		The Cold War 1945-1991 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998 edn)
SPANIER, John	            	American Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
			Winston, 1985, and other edns)
STOESSINGER, J.G.	Crusaders and Pragmatists: Movers of Modern American Foreign Policy (New 
			York: Norton, 1979 and later editions)
YOUNG, John W.	The Longman Companion to Cold War and Détente  (London: Longman, 1993 
			and later editions)
YOUNG, John W		Cold War  Europe, 1945-89: A Political History (London: Arnold, 1991)

ELECTRONIC BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Cold War and related topics like Vietnam are very well served on the World Wide Web.  However, caution must apply when it comes to utilising materials you find on the Web.  The WWW is unregulated: dross, and every more worrying, self-serving distortions of history, exist alongside much valuable documentation.  If you wish to use the WWW in your essays, two rules apply: 1) only use Web material to illustrate a point, not to make it; and 2), confine yourselves to the following sites - material from sites I have not verified will not be accepted.  Note also that Website addresses - URLS - change from time-to-time; those that follow are correct at the time of going to print.  If you experience problems, you can of course type the name of the website into your search engine and take it from there.

ANU - VIETNAM WWW VIRTUAL LIBRARY
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVLPages/WWWVL-Vietnam.html)
An Australian-generated site devoted to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with links that emphasise Vietnamese culture, society, history and politics - the history sites, in particular, serve as a corrective to America’s web domination of the war.  But beware: connections seem to be patchy.  There are ‘school project ideas’ on both History and Culture.

ASIA SOURCE: VIETNAM 25 YEARS LATER
http://www.asiasource.org/news/at_mp_02.cfm?newsid=18414
On 30 April 2000, the people of Vietnam celebrated the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, the communist victory throughout the country, and the unification of North and South.  For obvious reasons, the Vietnam war continues to play an extremely important role in American political consciousness, particularly where it concerns foreign policy.  This Special ‘Asia Source’ Report includes links to articles and Vietnam-related websites.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
http://www/odci.gov/cia/index.html
In a new and welcome spirit of openness, the CIA is making more and more of its hitherto classified files available to the public, with much of the documentation posted on its web site.  Recent openings relate to the Guatemalan coup of 1954, the Gary Powers U2 incident of 1960, and UFO’s!  More topically, material has just been released covering US involvement in Chile in and after 1973, material that may well have a bearing on the current plight of General Pinochet.  In a slightly sinister PR development, the CIA have added a ‘Home Page for Kids’, which includes a link, ‘Who We Are and What We Do’.

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PR0JECT
http://cwihp.si.edu/default.htm
Another exciting, colourful and well-constructed site.  The main aim of the CWIHP is to obtain, translate and then make public as much documentation as it can get hold of from Communist and former-Communist countries, thus adding to the sum of our knowledge on the Cold War.  This site allows access to such documentation, as well as to ‘working papers’ online - the efforts of historians to utilise the new Communist sources in writing (and in some cases re-writing) the history of the Cold War.  Not as student-friendly as the previously mentioned sites, offering as it does a very densely detailed insight into the Cold War.  But on the whole the CWIHP does an important job very well.  Apply for a user-name etc. at the CWIHP homepage; hard copies of working papers and other materials can be obtained free. Vietnam gets extensive coverage.

CNN - THE COLD WAR
http://learning.turner.com/coldwar/index.html
A site that dovetails with the recent television series on ‘The Cold War’.  Exciting and colourful, the site develops many of the themes which were, of necessity, compressed into over-simplifications by the demands of television.  There are, for example, full transcripts of the interviews conducted with participants in the Cold War - not just the sound bites that found their way into the final script.  Note also the oral history project - a databank of experiences/eyewitness accounts of the events of the Cold War offered by ‘ordinary’ people.  Very student-friendly.

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE VIETNAM WAR
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam.htm)
A good array of primary source materials, combined with observational, scholarly essays and extracts from memoirs of participants (McNamara’s In Retrospect, for example).

EDWIN E. MOISE’S VIETNAM BIBLIOGRAPHY
http://hubcap.clemson.edu/~eemoise/bibliography.html
The most exhaustive bibliography of the conflict to date, this site is a testimony to Ed Moise’s amazing industry and scholarship.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
http://www.state.gov/www/about-state/history/frus.html
The FRUS series is the Bible of American Cold War history - huge volumes of densely detailed documentation, drawn from Presidential, State Department, National Security Council and Pentagon sources.  Arranged chronologically, the volumes also tend to focus on a region, an issue or a crisis.  Now, for the first time, the newest volumes have been placed on the WWW, where they can be downloaded (expensive, considering most volumes are nearly 1,000 pages), or documents printed selectively (use the ‘Find’ key on your browser to home in on what you want).  The online volumes are almost exclusively related to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, with many devoted to Vietnam and Cuba.

HISTORY NET
http://www.h-net.msu.edu/lists/
An American-based site that offers access to over 100 History discussion lists.  The Cold War and Vietnam are covered by the list entitled ‘H-Diplo’ (‘Diplomatic History’).  Subscribe to H-Diplo via the H-Net home page, and obtain access to on-going discussions on a vast range of Cold War related topics, with contributions from the most eminent scholars to the most humble students.  However, you must have an e-mail account, for the discussions are conducted wholly via that medium.  And check your email regularly, as H-Diplo has been known to mail up to 20 messages a day.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
http://www.seas.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/index.html
There is some wonderful primary material on this user-friendly and exciting site.  The NSA is dedicated to making public hitherto top secret material relating to the US role in the Cold War, particularly intelligence-related documentation, which even the much-vaunted American Freedom of Information Act had failed to bring to light.  Recent revelations relate to the Cuban Missile Crisis - excellent documentation here - and Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972.  Currently posted are documents relating to President Nixon’s White House meeting with Elvis Presley in 1970 - of limited scholarly worth, perhaps, but still the most heavily requested candidate for declassification in recent years!  For all you Elvis fans out there, I have appended some of the material … 
        The National Security Archive is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C.  The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Archive receives no U.S. government funding.

VIETNAM - YESTERDAY AND TODAY
http://servercc.oakton.edu/~wittman/
From the site introduction:-
“For many, the Vietnam War and the conflict, changes, and divisions it caused in the United States is the defining event of the later part of this century. Twenty years later, we still see and feel the effects of the war--in the veterans who suffer the affects of Agent Orange or post-traumatic stress disorder, in the list of the dead on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., the presence of a large population of Amerasian children and Vietnamese refugees now at home  n the United States, in our huge budget deficit, in the impact the war still makes on our foreign policy decisions, in our attitude toward political candidates and institutions, and in our popular culture. Vietnam still bears the burden of the effects of the war, particularly in its ruined infrastructure, its crippled victims of Agent Orange, and its hundreds of thousands of missing and wounded.  The purpose of this website, which has been created primarily for students and teachers, is to point those interested in studying and teaching the war to materials that will be useful. In addition, in the hope that we can put the war behind us now that two decades have passed and the United States has normalized relations with Vietnam, this site provides resources for understanding Vietnam--as it was then and as it is now.”

THE WARS FOR VIETNAM
http://students.vassar.edu/~vietnam/
An attractive, thoughtfully constructed site; a good, if rather limited selection of documents, but an impressive links page.