The Myanmar Issue and ASEAN Engagement

 

Wichai Chucherd

 

Background

 

The Kingdom of Burma was occupied and included into Indian Empire of Britain in 1886. Then Britain took control directly in 1937. During WWII, Burmese Nationalists led by U Aung San dismissed the British and declared their independent in January 1948. However, before becoming to be the first Prime Minister of the Union of Burma, U Aung San was assassinated by rebels, U Nu came up to be the Prime Minister instead (Neher 2001).

 

Ne Win and military party, Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), took control the country by coup d’e’tat in 1962 and ran the state by socialist ideology. The massive uprising in August 1988 compelled Ne Win to step back into a shadow. Sein Lwin and then Muang Muang were resigned to be a leader. However, the situation was still chaos; consequently, Saw Muang seized power in September 1988 (Neher 2001).

 

In 1989, Saw Muang changed the country’s name to be Myanmar, and changed the party’s name to be State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in the following year. Surprisingly, in 1990, SLORC conducted the elections for a new People’s Assembly. However, there was unexpected result for SLORC, 81% belonged to National League for Democracy (NLD), Saw Maung refused the result. Consequently, in 1991, university students demonstrated and crashed with military (Neher 2001).        

 

Than Shwe sized power in 1992, and then he changed the SLORC to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. After that, the country has been controlled by 19 high-ranking military such as Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye (Neher 2001).  

 

Internal problems in Myanmar and their consequences

 

The consequence of the 1988 uprising and the 1990 election in Myanmar, the US, Canada and most European nations ignored investment and development loan of Myanmar (Moller 1998; Kraft 2000: 463; Neher 2001: 162; Steinberg 2001: 243). The UN condemned the use of forced labor, torturing prisoners, abusing woman and conducting executions (Moller 1998). Furthermore, the US policy, which devote to humanitarian, human rights and good government in Myanmar, (Steinberg 2001: 237) has been trying to discharge SPDC and replace by NLD of Aung San Suu Kyi (Haacke 2003: 142-3).

 

Since Myanmar’s strategic location is a nexus between south Asia, South East Asia and China, she should be a central position of trade and diplomacy in the region (Neher 2001: 157; Steinberg 2001: 224). However, she isolated herself and became to be one of the poorest nations in the world (Neher 2001: 157). Economic indicators have pointed out the crisis of Myanmar’s Economy (Neher 2001: 162). Myanmar survived by dark market along her boarder (Steinberg 2001: 225) and by the aids from China and Japan (Steinberg 2001: 226). Consequently, her foreign policy was affected by Chinese, while domestic policy especially economic issues was persuaded by Japan (Steinberg 2001: 225).

 

There are arm conflicts between Myanmar military and minority groups, such as Chinese Nationalist forces supported by the CIA, Thai military, and Taiwan in Shan state, Muslims in Arakan and rebels along Thai border (Steinberg 2001: 227). In addition, in Shan State, Northeast and Eastern of Myanmar are the main productive area of opium.  

  

ASEAN’s diplomatic development 

 

For many reasons, such as fear of Chinese domination in Myanmar both economically and militarily (Moller 1998; Kraft 2000: 463; Steinberg 2001: 230; Haacke 2003: 143), spillover of internal problems from Myanmar, economic interest (Haacke 2003: 143), and refugee and illegal workers in Thai (Steinberg 2001: 246) encouraged ASEAN especially Thailand to invite Myanmar to be a member. In 1995 ASEAN’s Bangkok summit, Myanmar represented by Than Shwe (Haacke 2003: 144) signed for a member, and Myanmar became a member in 1997. ASEAN believed that because of membership position they should persuade Myanmar to change her behavior on human rights, democracy and other positive impacts (Kraft 2000: 463; Neher 2001: 162; Steinberg 2001: 238; Haacke 2003: 146). In contrast, Myanmar membership caused many problems for ASEAN. 

  

 ASEAN’s member found that the relationship with the West increasing strained over Myanmar (Moller 1998). In 1998, Asia European Meeting (ASEM) in London, Myanmar was prohibited, ASEAN dialogue moved from Washington to Manila (Moller 1998), and ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Conference was postponed (Moller 1998; Steinberg 2001: 243-5). Indeed the main impacts of Myanmar membership came from the US.

 

ASEAN state welcome the US because of five reasons; the access to American markets, external security for ASEAN states, safety of sea lines of communication, the US did not claim territorial in Southeast Asia, balance of power in the region (Haacke 2003: 139-41). However, between 1995 and 1997 when Myanmar membership was in the process, the US and western countries had tried hard with strong protest to stop the membership of Myanmar (Haacke 2003: 143-5). ASEAN ignored because they think that the human right and economic sanction is not effective for Myanmar; moreover, they need equality between the US and ASEAN countries (Haacke 2003: 148-9). Consequently, after 1997, ASEAN lost partially their interest from the US. Furthermore, the US challenged the ASEAN way approach (Haacke 2003: 146) and changed the policy by moving her interest from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia. In addition, to engage regional security, the US changed her policy from dealing with ASEAN to dealing with the other means, such as APEC, military alliance through US PACOM, US-Thai Cobra Gold Exercise, Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI), and other bilateral diplomacy (Haacke 2003: 159-63). Therefore, ASEAN is going to less importance. 

 

China-ASEAN relations have developed after the end of Cold War. China deal with ASEAN both ASEAN as a group and ASEAN as individual, she participate in ARF and TAC (Haacke 2003: 112). Consequently, process to solve the problem between China and ASEAN countries in South China Sea has improved (Haacke 2003: 115). China recognized ASEAN’s Declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Hoadley 2001.221). China fairly followed the ARF 1995 such as confidence-building measures (CBM) (Haacke 2003: 118-9). However, China quite dismissed with transferring from CBM to preventive diplomacy (Haacke 2003: 120-1). In general, China supported partially ASEAN diplomacy. However, the 1997 financial crisis and the change of the US policy have weakened ASEAN in the term of regional organization, it caused China changing her policy from mainly deal with ASEAN as a group to deal with as an individual by bilateralism (Haacke 2003: 137-8).  

 

Way ahead

 

Myanmar membership has complicated ASEAN in dealing with dialogue partners. In addition, Asian financial and economic crisis is a further problem of the enlargement. We may argue that the economic crisis is a result of the enlargement (Haacke 2003: 166). Economic crisis showed that the US still maintain her influence in economic and politic in the region by using IMF as a tool to control the region to reform their economic and political system (Beeson 2001.234). Meanwhile EU countries try to use ASEM to encourage ASEAN to do so (Beeson 2001.235). 

 

Post economic crisis, ASEAN discussed the problem and considered that there may be something link between Myanmar, Cambodia membership and the crisis. They try to look for a new approach (Moller 1998: 1088). ASEAN may have reached its plateau to influence the region, it needs to be reformed (Kraft 2000: 463). Flexible engagement proposed by Thai foreign minister is an attempt to reform ASEAN diplomacy, which some countries realized that it has to be reexamined if ASEAN want to exist in the globalization of western influence nowadays. 

 

Conclusion

 

The phenomenon aftermath Myanmar’s membership have proved that ASEAN’s diplomatic capacity has decreased. ASEAN lost political power to deal with western partners, also China. It lost its importance of its regional security organization. At first glance, we might condemn that the internal problems of Myanmar bound to have a deleterious effect on the ASEAN’s diplomatic capacity. However, many factors may cause the decrease of the ASEAN’s diplomatic capacity too. ASEAN diplomacy or ASEAN way is different from western and international society, it is inevitable that the evolution of this diplomatic approach could appear. The evolution may cost something, such as economic crisis and lost of importance, prior ASEAN could adjust itself in the new environment. To be reform may be the answer for ASEAN to deal with problems in the future.

 

Reference list

 

Beeson, M., 2001. ‘Worlds in collision: Southeast Asia and the West’, in P. Heenan and M. Lamontagne (eds), The Southeast Asia Handbook, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, London: 231-240.

 

Haacke, J., 2003. ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, development and prospects, Routledge Curzon, London.

 

Hoadley, S., 2001. ‘Relation with Northeast Asia’, in P. Heenan and M. Lamontagne (eds), The Southeast Asia Handbook, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, London: 219-230.

 

Kraft, H.J.S., 2000. ‘ASEAN and intra-ASEAN relations: weathering the storm?’, The Pacific Review, 13(3): 453-472.

 

Matthews, B., 1998. ‘The present fortune of tradition-bound authoritarianism in Myanmar’, Pacific Affairs, 71(1): 7-24.

 

Moller, K., 1998. ‘Cambodia and Burma: the ASEAN way ends here’, Asian Survey, 38(12): 1087-1104.

 

Neher, C.D., 2001. ‘Burma’ in P. Heenan and M. Lamontagne (eds), The Southeast Asia Handbook, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, London: 157-164.

 

Steinberg, D.I., 2001. ‘Foreign affairs: Myanmar as regional nexus’, in D.I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, Georgetown, Washington: 223-251.