Wichai Chucherd
Universality, which is argued to be a precondition of collective security, was the main cause of the failure of the League of Nation. However, the UN, the organization that achieved the status of universality, has not succeeded to contain its central purposes (Roberts 1996: 309). It raised the interesting questions. Is the collective security appropriate to be a mechanism for the UN to maintain peace and security? Should it be changed or reformed? What is its problem? How can it work effectively?
To answer
the questions, I illustrate a definition of collective security and its
history. Then I explain how it could emerge in the UN and what extent it has
become the core of the UN. I examine some of the UN missions to find out what
the problems and obstacles are. Finally, I present an alternative resolution.
Collective security has dominated the way of though of security theory for a
long time. It quite works well to solve a military conflict. However, the
threats to international security have been changing. The more concentrate on
military aspect of collective security could not be the answer of the new
threats. It needs to be reformed. The ideas of common security, cooperative
security and comprehensive security have to have something different and useful
to maintain peace and security in the world. To analyze and synthesis these
ideas may give an apt answer for peace and security in the new environment.
Concept of collective security and its
Implementations
Collective security is an idea that was defined in a different way; in addition, there is an extraordinary broad gap between the idea and reality (Miller 1999: 303). Roberts (1996: 310) defines collective security as a system, which each member concerns a threat of one as a threat of all and they are ready to respond collectively to aggression. In addition, he confines the system regionally and globally. Butfoy (1993: 1) accepted collective security as an international community’s policies dealing with threats to the global peace and security. Wight (1978: 206) argues that collective security is a concept of internationalized defence. Miller (1999: 303) uses a proverb ‘the all-for-one-and-one-for-all’ to explain the idea, which he prefers it in term of international security. He argues that members of the global community should cooperate against any potential or real illegal aggressive threat. To achieve this status, states have to bind an obligation to defend aggression. For the collective security in a region or specific area, Miller believes that it is not a pure concept of collective security.
There seems to be some confusion about the concept of collective security. Regional communities binding with collective defense always use collective security as their masks (Butfoy 1993: 2; Miller 1999: 304). Although, the two concepts can overlap, but they are different. Collective defence concentrates on military alliances of a region or group of states and it plays on the balance of power, while collective security focuses on international security and accepts balance of power as a main problem. Collective defence’s motto is ‘us against them’, which is helping alliances against outsiders, while collective security’s motto means to protect a weaker from threats (Butfoy 1993: 2). Additionally, officials always cloud the concept by disguising national interests, alliance interests and international interests together in order to gain some advantages for their regime (Miller 1999: 304).
Butfoy
(1993: 2-4) mentions four preconditions of implementation collective security;
common norms of international behaviour, common
purpose and commitment with royalty to the world community, cooperative
framework to anticipate an unusual behaviour, and the
existence of major powers in community. These preconditions unlikely happen in
one time. Moreover, the idea is always selectively applied, such as the UN
intervened in
There are some positive effects of the concept, it has banned aggression and created nonviolent behavior in the world, advanced the idea of a universal obligation to oppose the aggression, developed a more general sense on prevent aggression, characterized a more authoritative international organization against aggressor, made regional institution more effective, and democratized the world community (Miller 1999: 323-7). In addition, Kupchan and Kupchan (1995: 54) argue that it can develop a balancing power against aggressors, and promoting trust and cooperation.
However, the concept depends on states that want to hand over their security to the group of collective system, which is led by major powers who decide a course of action. States always hesitate to against an aggression until they have considered that it is their favour and serves their interest. Although, they have joined force against aggression, they still disagree over the structure of force, and the risk and budget issues. Agents of enforcement action are always dominated by great powers instead of universal participant of its community (Miller 1999: 309). These major powers may use force for other purposes outside defence aggressions (Roberts 1996: 311). It is no doubt that the confusion of the concept should cause some problems when it is applied in an institution.
Roberts (1996: 310) argues
that the historical concept of collective security can draw back as long as
systems of states. However, its implementation appeared regionally during
1815-1854 with the existence of the Concert of Europe (Bennett and Lepgold 1993: 213). Miller (1999: 303-4) disagrees, he
argues that before the commitment of sovereign states to the
The UN was created in
wartime by the military alliance binding with the collective will to against
aggression. It was proposed to be a comprehensive and effective organization,
which more use of forces than the
The UN is close to be an universal organization, which is a basic condition of international collective security. However, the reality has proofed that the UN could not manage its universality effectively. A reason may be that its members only exist for their exercises in a few interests on them (Roberts 1996: 314-5). Although the UN members have accepted the language in the covenant, Chapter VII was always unanticipated. States have not admired fully to give up partially their sovereign. After the end of the Cold War, states more commit to the UN, but some states especially major powers still react against the UN decision. It is difficult for an international authority to enforce an aggression in the world of state sovereign doctrine (Miller 1999: 320).
Collective security is explicit in Article 39-54 of the UN Charter. Article 39 gives a power to the UN Security Council to determine the use of forces or other means for maintaining or restoring international peace and security. To avoid a worse situation, Article 40 provides a ‘provisional measures’ to deal with the problem such Boutros-Ghali proposed ‘peace-enforcement units’ to guarantee cease-fires and ‘Chapter VI ½’ (Miller 1999: 319). If the conflict is continue, Article 41 provides authority for the Council to determine a variety of means other than military force to deal with the conflict (Roberts 1996: 317). If it ought to use military force, Article 43-47 provide authority and mechanism for the UN Security Council.
Article 43 calls the members for contribution of armed forces creating the UN enforcement unit, while Article 45 provides air-force contingents to act immediately. Article 46 and 47 set up and provide the assistance of the Military Staff Committee for the Security Council. However, the creation of the Military Staff Committee, which compose of five permanent members’ chief of staff, has never been implemented (Miller 1999: 312). It closed the door for the UN to enforce by the UN force itself and it opened the chance for major powers to dominate an enforcement action using their provision. After the end of the Cold War, the UN tried to review Article 43-7. In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued ‘Agenda for Peace’, which introduced preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement units and the Military Staff Committee. However, the proposal was least accepted because of the reasons that it would create so much military authority to the UN and it was too interventionist (Miller 1999: 314-5).
In contrast, Article 51
gives a right for individual state to use a collective self-defence
based on their self-interest. Article 52-54 express the role of regional
organizations in using their collective security regionally (Roberts 1996:
312). It is no doubt that Article 51, which subject to individual state not to
the Security Council (Miller 1999: 307), only can be used by major powers. For
example, the
The UN Security Council and General Assembly play an important role in implementing collective security in the UN. The Security Council comprises five permanent and nine rotation members. The council has some degrees of authority over the UN members. Its function is to calculate the source of threats to peace and security of the world, and then decide whether to use military force or other means to anticipate the threats (Roberts 1996: 313). However, five permanent members wanted to ensure that the UN could not affect their crucial interest; therefore, they created the veto privilege. History has shown that this privilege obstructed enforcement actions against aggression and caused some complicate consequences (Butfoy 1993: 4; Roberts 1996: 315). On one hand, veto can maintain the existence of major powers. On the other hand, it has created the image of the UN such a talking-shop. Consequently, the UN members tend to look for the other means to ensure their security, such as to be an alliance of major powers or to be a member of regional collective security (Roberts 1996: 315-7). Moreover, drawing a decision, the Security Council sometime adopts a resolution, which is illegitimate, too wide, too narrow, or no standard (Caron 1993: 19). The Security Council should be checked a balance by the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General (Roberts 1996: 314); however, it is not.
To exercise its function,
the Security Council can use both non-military and military mean. The use of
economic sanctions and arms embargoes based on Article 41 may seem more
appropriate than military force; however, it caused widespread problems. After
1990, implementation of Article 41 has come to be an active act, sanctions in
Iraq case in 1990, former Yugoslavia in 1991, Serbia, Montenegro, Libya,
Somalia, and Liberia in 1992, Haiti and Angola in 1993, and Rwanda in 1994.
These sanctions were both success and failure. They might cause the countries
to change their behaviors, but in the same time, they also caused people the
suffering. Moreover, sanctions that imposed by regional organization and
individual state, which tend to be a tool for their interest on behalf of international
peace, have caused the situations more complexes (Roberts 1996: 317-8). It
seems that a timing of military enforcement and an appropriate sanction that
could reach the aim still unclear in the UN process. For examples, the
sanctions against
In 1946-7, the UN’s
Military Staff Committee proposed the implementation of Article 43, but the UN
Security Council ignored it because of the disagreements concern the size and
composition of forces. In consequence, the UN has to employ a variety of
collective security forces, such as regional alliances, UN authorizations of
the use of force, and international peacekeeping forces instead of the UN
military forces (Roberts 1996: 318-9). Regional alliances and multilateral
military are more united than the UN. They bind with their blood, commerce,
religion, common culture, and political system. They stress on defence and the UN’s Charter to legitimate their right to
use of force. The collective of these regional organizations based on their
regional interest against the external threats. In consequence, they were
sometime engaged in military interventions, such as Warsaw Pact involved in
Soviet-led invasion of
As the lack of an
effective force in its organization, the UN has to practice its authority
through individual state or group of states, which are mainly dominated by
major powers. For instances, in 1950-1953, the UN authorized a unified command
under the
Peacekeeping force under a unified UN-appointed command is normally authorized by the UN Security Council. It works under the Secretary-General or his/her representative. It is supposed to be a neutral force among conflict parties, a force, which is established and deployed with consensus of a target state. The UN had experienced thirty-five UN peacekeeping missions by 1994. It presented some problems, such as lack of an effective command system, an appropriate doctrine and its implementation, and an effective decision process (Roberts 1996: 328-9).
Development of collective security in the UN and its problems
An act of aggression and
consequent collective respond should be defined appropriately by the Security
Council; however, it is far from reality. History of the UN proved that an
individual member and a regional organization’s interest always calculate the
definition of aggression, legal defence or offence
and the respond by collective security or not (Miller 1999: 306). During the
Cold War era, the
In 1998, the
These reflected the major
power behavior that always respects their own national
interest much more than peace and security of the world. In 2003, we witnessed
together the use of force of the
Miller (1999: 310-3)
stresses that the right of veto of five permanent members changes an
enforcement action of the UN to be only an enforcement action for the great
powers. Korean War in 1950 and Gulf War in 1990-1, which both concern
collective security globally, show that the
In addition, there are much more criticism on collective security in the UN. Claude (1966: 17) claims that the outcome of the implementation of collective security may be for better or for worse. States behavior, which always try to utilize the UN for their purposes such as for their national interests or for their alliance, may conduct a dangerous outcome to international community. Therefore, pure collective security is hard to achieve. Butfoy (1993: 1) argues that collective security is irrelevant and dangerous when it practices in the world of state centric, which there are competition among nations base on their culture and ideology. Furthermore, he mentions seven problems of the concept. Firstly, the common norm of behavior is far from reality; secondly, the preconditions have not been reached. Thirdly, if they have, collective security will not necessary to exercise. Fourthly, the idea can be destroyed easily if only a major power accepts international interest less than domestic interest. Fifthly, collective security tends to be more concentrate on state than on other actors. Sixthly, misplace hope in the concept may give a chance for aggressors to express their behavior. Lastly, organization which gains a power of collective security may abuse in using it (Butfoy 1993: 5-7). Miller (1999: 305) pointed out the four complex issues of the implementation of collective security. Firstly, its members, who the core members are to be served by the idea, individual member, regional community, or universal. Secondly, its agent, who the agents of its enforcement action should be, a major power, coalition, or all. Thirdly, its instruments, what the tools and their consequences are, political and economic sanction, or military mean. Lastly, its obligations, what international institution in conflict management should be, international law, agreement, or commitment.
In sum, on one hand, collective security expresses the international rules that states have to commit and fallow. On the other hand, states continue to be a preeminent actor in international society. The concept contrast in itself, the responsibility and the power of collective security organization is so great, while political bargaining for self-interest plays the supreme role in its implementation to international relation (Miller 1999: 322-4).
Concept of collective security has taken
root in human society for a long time. It was seen as only one answer for
maintaining peace and security. However, there are some alternatives that may
be the answers too, such as common security (Butfoy
1993: 9-11), and cooperative security (Roberts 1996: 331). Butfoy
(1993: 9-11) argues that the blur line between peacekeeping and peace
enforcement caused by the expanded task of the UN needs some system more than
collective security to anticipate. Common security, which is broader than
collective security and tends to ignore state and military centric, may be the
system. It accepts security as a shared and multidimensional phenomenon based
on levels, which are local security, state security, regional security and
global security, and based on areas, which are defence,
economics and environment. For the implementation of common security, Butfoy (1993: 10-2) claims that collective security could
be used as a tool of common security. He urges to call for an active Military
Staff Committee. This should improve the readiness of the UN enforcement force,
East-West relations, monitoring of conflict, motivation of the UN staff,
deterrent aggression, common behavior in the world, and it should obstruct
state centric behavior. Bennett and Lepgold (1993:
232-5) quite agree with Butfoy. However, they add
that
Caron (1993: 33-55) presents the reformation of the UN Security Council to strengthen the legitimacy of the UN for the acceptation of the world community. To solve the problem of a dominance state and unfair decision, he urges to reform the veto and modify a voting clause. He quite agrees with the increasing of the permanent members in the Council, yet he argues that increasing a member will cause a slow process of decision making, which affect in solving emergency. Therefore, he prefers to present a modified voting clause, which concern the number of affirmative vote to stop a resolution.
Roberts (1996: 331) presents a ‘cooperative security’, which is a wider approach than collective security. It stresses on UN peacekeeping, arms control agreements, and defensive military structure. However, cooperative security still based on a general idea of collective security. Consequently, it can be an alternative approach in solving a problem beside collective security.
In
conclusion, I argue that the collective security in the UN needs to be
reformed. Concept of collective security was rooted in a collective group of
states or regional community three-century ago. The concept was applied to
international community after the end of WWI. It is inevitable that the idea of
collective security of a group of states, which based on their interests, will
mix up with the idea of collective security of the international community,
which based on the interests of the global. Furthermore, the concept
that more concentrate on military aspect have to confront with contemporary
problems, which extend beyond the boarder of military aspect to economic,
political and social aspect. Consequently, the pure collective security could
not be able to solve the problems effectively. It needs to be combined with
another concept, which accept security as a
multidimensional approach. It needs the cooperation from the world community to
participate in solving the problems that affect peace and security of the
world. Therefore, the concept of cooperative security may help to evaluate
collective security. Comprehensive security, which explain security in term of
political, economic and society security, is the another one that could
evaluate and combine with collective security. The outcome of this combination
should be the concept that can examine conflicts in overall aspect and direct
some approach that is effective to maintain peace and security of the world.
Collective
security was implemented beyond the UN Charter as a policy or strategy. The UN
applies the policy through the UN organ and its means. It works under
legitimate committed by its members. The concept could not work well if it is
not implied in the UN Charter accurately, and/or its means are not well
organized and managed. The UN’s member states should comply fully with the UN,
which serves the world community as a whole. They should adopt their domestic
policies according to the UN Charter and international laws. They should hand
over their rights that concern security of the world community to the UN, and
states centric should change to be the international centric. States especially
major powers should consider international interests outclass their self-interests.
The UN Security Council should evaluate the veto privilege. The Council’s
decision should be more universality than decision of five permanent members.
The UN Charter should be review. It should have some automatic mechanism in the
UN process in solving a problem. Article 43-7 especially the UN military
enforcement unit and the Military Staff Committee should be applied fully.
Finally, the UN should look for its standard in anticipation conflicts around
the world.
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