World is a Battlefield: Social Darwinism as the New World Model of Korean Intelligentsia of the 1900s

 

Vladimir Tikhonov

 

I. The 1880-1890s – Rupture with the pPast and Social Darwinist “Baptism”

a) Shocking New World

The fForcible “opening” of Korea by the Japanese and subsequent shocks experiencedfelt by those Korean intellectuals who encountered the overwhelming grandeur of the industrial civilization in the West or Japan, contributed greatly to the in problematizing and, ultimately, subversion, of the traditional China-centred concepts of the world hierarchy. Already the practical politicians of the early 1880s  –– among them typified, for example, by Korea’s first envoy to the USA (1883), Min Yŏngik (1860-1914), –- described, so far without much pretence for theorizing, the West as the “kingdom of light”, sSinophileic Korea being, by contrast, the “land of darkness”. (McCune & Harrison 1951: 7)[1] The members of Min’s his rretinue attempted also, on the basis of their own experiences, to rank the foreign powers potentially most important for Korea’s entry into this “new world”. For one example, Min’s deputy, Hong Yŏngsik (1855-1884), felt no doubts replying on December 21, 1883, to King Kojong (1863-1907)’s question on the relative strength of the USA and Japan, that Japan was “no match for America’s fertile soils, width of the revenue sources, or state institutes.” Japan, as Hong saw it, “just began to emulate Western institutions” and “simply could not be compared to the USA.” (Kim Wŏnmo 1981: 216)[2] Interestingly enough, Hong offered quite a favourable description of America’s democratic institutions, explaining to the sceptical king that, for more than a century of USA’s independencindependencee, the U.S.its currency had been retaining its value, and the country remained sovereign despite the fact that its rulers “were replaced every four years.” (Kim Wŏnmo 1981: 226-227) Hong did not attempt to suggest that such system of rule might be of help for Korea’s self-strengthening, but he clearly indicated his belief in certain advantages of democracy over Europe’s monarchical polities. While these remarks did not yet constitute any coherent, theory-based vision of the “new” world order, they did show that even the first, immature impressions from Korea elite’s “sorties” to the West were strong enough to radically undermine the traditional Sino-centred worldview.

As to the general rules governing this “new” world, “ruthless competition” was the first important feature of the “new” world order to catch the eyes of Korea’s early envoys to Japan and the West. Ŏ Yunjung (1848-1896), one of the few members of the 1881 Korean cCourtiers’ oObservation mMission to Japan who were genuinely interested in emulating Meiji reforms on Korea’s soil, reported to Kojong in the following way on his return: “Recent times when all the states compete with their knowledge belittle the period of the Warring States. (…) Observing the recent situation, I can say that only enrichment and strength can keep the state from demise now, and that is the only thing both rulers and ruled should unite their efforts for.” (Ŏ Yunjung’s 2000: 194) In the famous 1888 “Memorial on dDomestic rReforms”, the exiled leader of the 1884 aborted Kapsin coup, Pak Yŏnghyo (1861-1939), viewed the contemporary world situation as extremely precarious and alarming:

“The myriad of the states in today’s world closely resemble the Warring States [of China] in past. They strengthen their armies, and the stronger annex the weaker, the bigger eats up the smaller. (…). They compete against each other in every possible way, and every wish to impose its will [on others] and demonstrate its might in the world. (…). Although such things as ‘international law’ and the theory of ‘balance of power’ do exist, those who have no strength to defend their independence are defeated and plundered, unable to maintain themselves. Thus, it is insufficient to rely on the ‘international law’ and ‘balance of power’ theories only. If even civilized powers of Europe are sometimes defeated, what can be said about a primitive and weak state in Asia? Generally, the Europeans are talking much about ‘laws’, but remain [as predatory as] tigers and wolves in their hearts. (…) They look voraciously [on the others], and what would be the result of their willingness [to conquest others]? It is time to stand up indignantly for our compatriots, for it is the question of survival or downfall for this country in the East of Asia.” (Yŏksa hakhwehoe 1982, vol 5: 52)

While the comparisons with the time of the Warring States (5^th – 3^rd C. B.C.) in China or keen awareness of the threat of European predations – undoubtedly suggested by the general mood of the Japanese society of the early 1880s – hardly can be considered an expression of systematic Social Darwinist beliefs,. Iit shows that the socio-psychological grounds for the reception of Social Darwinism were being gradually laid. The atmosphere of “unprecedented crisis”, permeated with the fears of “demise” and “extinction”, became a dominant element in the better-informed circles of the capital. This panicky mood was conducive to a definite break with the beliefs of the past,past and intense search for a new all-explaining system of reference relevant to the drastically changed realities. In the end, Social Darwinism, already well established in Japanese Meiji discourse on world and “nation”, was introduced in the role of an all-embracing paradigm, cosmic and social, cognitive and ontological – a role it hardly ever played in its Western “homeland”. From the mid-1890s up to the end of the colonial period, Social Darwinist assumptions internalized by Korea’s modernizing elite were normally taken for granted by most advocates of the “new learning”, very few younger intellectuals of the 1910s and some leftist radicals from the early 1920s onwards being one of the rare exceptions. Of course, Social Darwinism alone did not alone represent the new vision of the world and Korea in it in its entirety: various groups combined it with Christianity, liberalism, or reformist Confucianism in diverse ideological blends. Still, at least on the level of micro-discourse, the complete rupture with the past was only too conspicuous: even for the reformist Confucians, the teachings of the Master represented more of a tool for enabling their state to survive in the “struggle for existence”, and not an aim per se. The oOrderly, harmonious universe of the traditional worldview was displaced and supplanted by ever-changing, unstable hierarchies of the “fighting units” in the global “survival struggle”.

 

b) Darwinian Pioneers

The empirical understanding of thea new world order that was gradually integrating Korea into itself, was developed into some sort of theory by the three America- educated Koreans – Yu Kiljun  (1856-1914), Yun Ch’iho (1865-1945), and Sŏ JaepChaep’il (1866-1951). Their theorizing by the trio was influenced by Social Darwinism, but in different ways and dissimilar degrees. - In Yu GiljunKiljun’s case, the residual elements of the Confucian worldview were relatively stronger: in the “civilizational hierarchy” of the world, higher places were reserved for more “ethical” cultures, and the acknowledgement of the necessity of interstate competition was combined with the emphasis on the cooperation between the compatriots and loyalty to the sovereign. Being influenced by E.S.Morse`s (1838-1925)’s Social Darwinist theories, which he had first encountered while studying in Japan (1881-1883), but still remaining a sincere, tradition-bound adept of Confucian ethical values, Yu GiljunKiljun, in his pioneering treatise On Ccompetition (Kyŏngjaeng non; 1883), did recognise competition (kyŏngjaeng – thus this Japanese-coined “translation word” entered Korean vocabulary) as the primary driving force behind “progress” in the world, but strongly downplayed the competition between the fellow countrymen, emphasizing inter-country rivalries instead. His pet slogan was ch’wijang podan – “accepting the strong points [of others] in order to supplement our [weak points].” “Competition spirit”, in this view, was deemed necessaryeeded to strengthen economy and military, but was not supposed to substitute traditional values on higher levels. Yu GiljunKiljun’s representative work, Sŏyu kyŏnmun (A Rrecord of Ppersonal Eexperience in the West; written in 1887-1889, printed on April 25, 1895, in Japan), contained a chapter on competition, but also asserted (in the chapter on origins of Western religions) the moral superiority of Confucian rules. (Huh Dong-hyun ŏ Donghyŏn 20010: 41-63 xxxx: xx-xx & Tikhonov 2001: 42-50, 71-77).[3] While considering the incessant military competition a salient feature of the present world in general, Yu GiljunKiljun was visibly more tolerant about the overseas adventures of “fully civilized” Western European powers (especially Britain and France), suggesting that their influence abroad might lead to reforms and progress. The harshest criticism was reserved for the “half-civilized country in the North”, Russia, which Yu GiljunKiljun viewed as the greatest imaginable threat for all its neighbours, Korea included. His preface to his own translation of <The History of Crimean War between Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey> (Yŏngbŏpnot’o cheguk Karimia chŏnsa, Published by Kwanghak Sŏp’o, Seoul, 1908) featured, for example, the following flowery description of Russia’s “aggression” against its southern neighbour:

“Using Turkey’s internal problems, greedy tiger-like Russia, which always grinds its hawkish claws, began to expand at the expense of the Muslim warriors, whom it once feared like the ferocious tigers or ravenous bears, but now despises as if they were lonely quails or rotten mice. Russian strength, like a flood, swept and overrun the Ottoman mountains and rivers so that more than a half of Turkish territory was encroached upon and annexed. Still, Russia’s unlimited avarice was not satisfied, and its ultimate sinister aim remained to make the whole of Muslim territory into its provinces and render Muslims virtual slaves. By conquering Turkish capital, Constantinople, they wished to grasp the whole of the Mediterranean by the throat and, patting Europe’s back, become the masters of its fate.” (KKHMS 2000: 236)

In thise world of the unchecked dangers, where it was not even sure that Britain and France would once again rescue Turkey from Russia’s “claws” once again, Yu GiljunKiljun suggested immediate “reforms and self-strengthening”, instead of the “talks about international law”, as the only way to protect Turkey – and, by analogy, Korea – from ultimate destruction.[4] 

While Yu GiljunKiljun recognized Confucian Korea’s place in the “civilizational hierarchy” as somewhere in the middle between “barbarism” and “enlightenment”, a radical anti-Confucian Social Darwinist, Yun Ch’iho, rejected both Confucianism and the rest of Korea’s tradition as “worthless barbarism” and considered a Korea’s “Christian regeneration” of Korea to be its only chance to survive in the Darwinian international “battles”. In the beginning, his vision of the “civilization” was not unlike the views of some contemporary Chinese reformers, who understood Western’s progress in terms of fulfilment of Confucian standards of “humane governance”. In the context of such a view, the West’s world dominance was taken as an inescapable and, to a certain degree, positive extension of the “virtues” of its domestic rule. (Chŏng Yonghwa 2001: 304-305) Afterwards, however, Yun Ch’iho switched to the classical Social Darwinist model, which views world hegemony as a result of life-or-death, cut-throat “struggle for survival” rather than international recognition of the hegemon’s Confucian “virtues”. His perception of the “struggles for survival” was strongly influenced by both the realities of racial discrimination in the USA (which he painfully experienced himself while studying there in 1888-1893) and racial theories of contemporary Western and Japanese authors. Remaining a Christian and a believer in the superiority of “Western civilization”, he tended to perceive “racially close” Japan as both Korea’s model and perspective ally, and accepted the “racial battles” between the “Yellow and White races” as a sad inevitability of history. (Yu Yŏngnyŏl 1985: 75-88)[5] Having viewed the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 as a “victory of Wwesterniszed Japan over barbaric China”, he came to perceive the Russo-Japanese War (1904) – and, ultimately, the Pacific War more than 3 decades later – as the “Yellow race’s fight for survival” against “White predations”. In Yun Ch’iho’s own words (<Yun Ch’iho’s Diary>, September 7, 1905), “the islanders have gloriously vindicated the honours of the Yellow race. The white man has so long been the master of the situation that he has kept the Oriental races in awe for centuries. For Japan to break this spell single-handed is grand in its very conception. (…) I love and honour Japan as a member of the Yellow race; but hate her as a Korean from whom she is taking away everything, independence itself.” (Yun Ch’iho Ilgi 1976, vVol. 6: 143)

Sŏ JaepChaep’il (a.k.a. Philip Jaisohn), the first Korean to bea naturalized as American citizen (a.k.a. Philip Jaisohn) and the founder of Korea’s first private bilingual newspaper, The Independent (Tongnip Ssinmun; 1896.04.07 – 1899.12.04), took athe position that lay closer to the classic liberal models of the West. While accepting the inevitability of Japan’s economical dominance in the region, he still wished Korea, asso far as it was possible, to emulate some of the Western democratic institutes. His total rejection of Confucianism resembled Yun Ch’iho’s radicalism, but, unlike Yun Ch’iho, he highly approved of Korea’s “racial stock”, believed in its “superiority” over Chinese and Japanese “races”, and was generally more optimistic about Korea’s future successes in the “international battlefield”. The newspaper he founded, The The Independent, was the first periodical in Korea to assiduously popularizse in its editorials the ideas of the “competition”, both “racial” and, especially, “national”, in its editorials. Echoing the influential  prevailing Social Darwinist trend in the mainstream Western thought, strongly influenced by Social Darwinism at that period, The Independent viewed the penetration into and the domination over the non-Western regions by the Western powers as simply an extension of biological laws. Thus, its comments on Russia’s success in acquiring concessions in Manchuria was commented upon ere as follows:

We care very little who owns the railroads and steamships that carry our cargo and ourselves when we transport our good or when we are travelling. All we care for are good accommodation and rapid transportation. If these can be accomplished by Russia’s energy and diplomatic skill, we would rather praise her for it than entertain any jealousy or ill feeling. China is absolutely incapable of accomplishing any such feat for the good of her own people or the peoples of the world. Then, let some nation go there and open up the immense territory for the good of the whole universe. The result of such enterprise will certainly to benefit the(??) Chinese themselves. (…). History tells us that wherever Western civilization has made its appearance, the place was transformed into a new country altogether. The (…) plains of the Western prairies of America have become happy homes of many million souls (…). We hope the time will soon come when Western civilization will penetrate every corner of the Continent of Asia (…). (English editorial, The Independent, November 14^th, 1896) (Tongnip sinmun 1981, vVol. 1: 384)

Western commercial activities in Korea – and even the Japanese endeavorsendeavours, as ones so far as they did not explicitly threaten Korea’s vital interests – were greeted by Sŏ JaepChaep’il with equal enthusiasm:

“(…) We are greatly encouraged with the gradual development of commerce, industry, education, and the rapid propagation of Christianity. There are now four foreign banks in this city (Seoul, - V.T.) beside two small native institutions. The oldest and one of the most reliable banks here is the Dai Ichi Ginko, which has branch offices(??yes, plural is right) in Seoul as well as in Chemulpo. It was the first banking house established in the capital after the opening of the country. During the past ten years the bank has proven itself to the public to be thoroughly trustworthy (…). Now we have the Russo-Korean Bank in Seoul, and it is almost a certainty that the new-comer will soon be one of the chief banking houses in Korea.” (English editorial, The Independent, March 5^th, 1898) (Tongnip sinmun 1981, vVol. 8: 362)

In principle, Sŏ JaepChaep’il was an admirer of the Western civilization’s “competitive advantages” who professed scorn or, at best, indifference towards East Asia’s indigenous tradition (Schmid 2002: 81), but not necessarily a believer in the “innate superiority” of the “White race”. Still, he, not unlike Yun Ch’iho, also viewed the contemporary world in terms of “racial hierarchy” and “racial competition”: the “White race”, which acquired higher degree of “progress”, was inevitably establishing itself over the less advantaged “rivals”:

“As we already have mentioned, the humans also belong to the biological realm of animals, and, among the animals, they belong to the mammals. (…). If humans’ physical construction only is to be discussed, we are similar to the monkeys. (…). Among the humans, there are various categories: black humans, yellow humans, red humans, and also white humans. (…). The Blacks (…) are generally even more stupid than the Oriental race (tongyang injong), and much more despicable than the White race. The autochthonous race (t’ojong) in the USA (…) is even less civilized than the Oriental race. (…). Today, the White race is the most clever, diligent, and brave among all the races in the world. The Whites are spread all over the world, and gradually win over the inferior races, and take their lands, trees, and plants. That is why those among the inferior races which do not mix with the Whites and do not learn their knowledge in order to become their equals, are(?) gradually become get extinguished without being able to achieve progress in civilizing themselves. In the countries like the USA, the autochthonous race, being unable to learn the civilization and progress from the Whites, reduced in numbers from several tens of millions to just several thousands during the course of last two hundred years. Now, they live in the mountains and forests off the clothes and food given by the American government, their numbers being reduced every year, so that soon their seeds will disappear. (…).” (Tongnip sinmun 1981, vVol. 2: 229)

While vividly describing the plight of the Chinese or the American Indians, doomed to the domination by the foreign “races” due to their own inability to “learn from the Whites”, Sŏ JaepChaep’il, however, expressed an optimistic view on Korea’s prospects to join the “international community” on better conditions, once “civilization”, in the form of foreign trade, investment, and modern statehood would seriously take roots in histhe country. (Kim Yuwŏn 1999: 158-161) He even seriously hoped that Korea would be able to utilize China’s “failure to civilize” and win some concessions in Northern China, on par with other “civilized countries”. (Chŏn PBokhŭi 1996: 123)[6]. After Sŏ JaepChaep’il’s departure in May 1898, editorial policies of The Independent went under Yun Ch’iho’s control, and the newspaper’s accent on the “racial struggle between the Whitles and Yellows” and the desirability of the cooperation between two “Yellow” countries, Korea and Japan, became much stronger pronounced (Schmid 2002: 87). While criticising the heavy-handedness of the Japanese diplomacy in the dealings with the Korean government, The Independent in that period did not also fail to remind the readers that, as fellow “Yellow nations”, Korea and Japan should, in principle, cooperate for the crucial aim of “preserving the seeds of the Yellow race.” (Kim Minhwan 1988: 66-68)

As I mentioned before, Sŏ JaepChaep’il, as a matter of principle, rejected Confucianism, considering it, on par with Buddhism and Islam, to be a religion of “half-civilized” peoples, in contrast with “the religion of civilization”, Christianity. (Kim TDohyŏng 1994: 30) However,At the same time, it should be also mentioned that, albeit unwillingly, he still had to use the Confucianism-inspired tropes, idioms, and figures of speech in his attempts to explain his readership what “civilization and progress” were meant to be. In his editorials on “enlightenment civilization” (kaehwa)kaehwa)munhwa??), he defined the term as “the state when ten thousands of things are impartial and honest” – a definition an average Korean literati of the time hardly would perceive as “foreign” or “Western”. Some of his readers, whose letters were published in the newspaper, even suggested that the rule of ancient Chinese legendary sage kings, Yao and Shun, should be taken as an example of “civilization” – of course, with demands of the times being also duly considered. (Chu ChJino 1996: 21) That shows that even strongest possible rejection of the traditional world view by the early modern reformist intelligentsia necessarily had its conditions and limitations: the idioms of the past were still needed, if only to explain to the majority of the educated class the basics of the new world view in more or less acceptable, understandable terms.

 

c) First-ever Darwinian Ccanon of Mmodernity – Liang QichaoCh’i-ch’ao

In the 1900s, the “Confucianized Social Darwinism” of Yu GiljunKiljun, the more pessimistic and racialized Social Darwinism of Yun Ch’iho, and the more liberal and optimistic version of Social Darwinism by Sŏ JaepChaep’il all exerted deep influences on the public debates on Korea’s future strategies and prospects. AnoOther important influence was exerted by Liang QichaoCh’i-ch’ao (18 (1873-1930), whose reading of Social Darwinism was strongly optimistic and also provided a motivation for reform-minded Confucians to join the Darwinist ranks. Liang considered the “Yellow race” a strong, promising competitor in the “evolutionary battlefield”, provided that the East Asian states would emulate Japan in building powerful centralized nation-states and strengthening the state-centred loyalties of their citizens. His admonitions to “reinforce the(??) loyalty and faithfulness to the statehood” and  “strengthen the competitiveness of the state through modern education”, as well as his interpretation of Confucius as a “religious thinker free of superstition” (and thus superior to the Christiansity) and a “believer in progress and evolution”, could not but strike a deep chord in the hearts of Korea’s reformist Confucians, themselves impatient to find a way to reconcile their Confucian beliefs with what was perceived as the imperatives of the time.[7] Liang’s writing became the bestsellers of Korea’s 1900s, were frequently serialized in journals and newspapers, and generally strengthened the “reformist Confucian” flank of Korea’s “enlightenment” movement.[8] One good example was Liang’s article entitled “On China as an Adolescent” (Shaonian Zhongguo shuo), which first appeared in Qing Iyi b Baao (issue 35, February 10, 1900), which – newspaper Liang edited (from November 11 1898 till November 11, 1901) during  in his Japanese exile. In this article, Liang fiercely rebuffed the arguments of those who had claimed that China was already an “old” empire, its greatness being simply the matter of the past, its “vitality” having been sipped by long history of stable bureaucratic government. According to Liang, this argumentation, however suitable it might be suitable for those wishing “to delete China from the globe’s map”, was flawed in one crucial point: traditional China, its greatness notwithstanding, did not possess “statehood” in the modern meaning of the word, being simply a “private property of any of the ruling dynasties”. Liang claimed that China, as a “familial state”, Liang claimed, was just an “adolescent”, who still was about to “come of age” (i.e., to acquire “adult”-like constitutional forms) and “fully show all of its potential to the world.” China was, Liang wrote, rather an analogue to Italy – another “young man” on the international stage, who had emerged only recently as a full-blown actor in the world affairs, despite the venerable pedigree of its culture. (Liang Qichao xuanji 19843: 122-128) Liang’s article, which combined political pessimism (China’s current rulers were referred to as “old egoists, deaf and blind about everything inside and outside the country”) with long-term historical optimism, soon was translated by one of Korea’s foremost reformist Confucians, Chang ChJiyŏn (1864-1921), and put as a sort of preface to a collection of Liang Qichao’s translations, entitled <The Soul of China> (Chungguk hon) and published by Kwangmunsa in 1908. It decidedly invigorated Korea’s moderate reformist movement showing that Korea as well, once properly reformed, could play a promising “young man” role in the international community. Citations from this and other writings by Liang adorned almost all the reformist Confucian texts written in Korea between 1906 and 1910, the Chinese reformer beingen viewed as a visionary who explained the “great tendency of our times” (taese) in the terms compatible with Confucian thought and Chinese – or Korean – aspirations.

 

II. The 1900s – Darwinist Radicals Versus Darwinist Confucians

Indeed, the posture towards Confucianism (and, by extension, towards Korea’s traditional legacy as a whole), views on the West, Japan, and China, and the ideas on education apparentlyseemingly were the most important indicators of to which camp a participant in the “civilization” and “enlightenment” debates of the 1910s belonged.

 

a) New Creed, Renovated People: Radicals

The radical camp, predominantly influenced by Yun Ch’iho and Sŏ JaepChaep’il (and tracing its “genealogy” back to the radical masterminds of the 1884 Kapsin coup – Kim Okkyun and Pak Yŏnghyo), tended towards total and unconditioned rejection of Confucian legacy in favour of Christianity as more conducive to the “self-strengthening”. Religion was treated as a “crucial factor” in thise “self-strengthening” in the and “competition for survival”, as an embodiment of a “national essence” providing which provided the ground for all sorts of political reforms. This view was most explicitly expressed in the famous editorial that appeared in the Taehan mMaeil sSinbo on December 1^st, 1905, under the title “Believing in Religion and Self-Strengthening” (Singyo chagang): 

Generally, all over the globe under the Heaven, the myriads of people are always competing with each other. Both landscountries(??) and peoples cannot avoid [the laws of] ‘the struggle for survival’ (yangnyuk kangsik) and ‘survival of the fittest’ (usŭng yŏlp’ae).

In today’s world, those lacking the force to strengthen themselves, albeit called ‘people’, are never treated as such. They live as slaves, cows, or horses, cannot secure their freedom, are being lorded over by others, and, having been subjected to others’ rule, often get exterminated altogether in the end.

That is what has been witnessed by the peoples of the world, and how is it possible to describe this dreadful situation in words? Let us investigate what pertains to the self-strengthening abilities of the humanity.

There are both immaterial (muhyŏng) and material (yuhyŏng) types of self-strengthening: the former means such things as religious beliefs, and the latter – finances, armies, and so on.

Of course, in any state from the very beginning the immaterial strength precedes the acquisition of the material force: for example, the independence of the USA or Greece all are owed to the strengths of the religious beliefs [of their respective peoples].

So, even if the(??) finances and the(??) armiesy are weak, so far as the religion and history of the state are preserved, its independence spirit will not come to the end.

How cannot the immaterial strength be respected for the sake of restoring the(??) state’s sovereignty? In today’s Korea, it can be argued that the material strength is next to nothing, but we dare say that the immaterial strength of religion and society gives grounds for expectations. Today, the number of Christians in Korea reached several tens of thousands, and everybody of them, even in the point of death, prays to the(??) Heaven for the maintenance of Korea’s independence, and recommend [Christian religion] to the compatriots. This is the fundament of Korea’s independence. Some shallow fellows view these developments cynically, but in a few years they will surely see their results. (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo 1977, vVol. 2: 1353) 

Thus, Christianity was viewed as a main point of hope in the Social Darwinist “jungles” of the modern world – the cruelty of which was acutely felt by the nationalistically-minded Koreans just two weeks before that editorial appeared, on December 17^th, 1905, when Japan forced the so-called “Protectorate Treaty” on the  Korean king Kojong and deprived Korea of a large part of its sovereignty. But, even before the “Protectorate” instilled many Korean intellectuals with the sense of immanent danger for their state’s very existence, Taehan mMaeil sSinbo began to view Christianity as Korea’s future dominant ideology. On September 29^th, 1905, a relatively small essay, “Han’guk-ŭn Chang Yu Yasuo(??) Sin’gyuo(??) I(??) Rip(??) ???” (“韓國은 將由耶蘇新敎而立” - “In future, Oonly Protestant Christianity Wwill Sstand [Hihigh] in Korea”), wrote both Confucianism and Buddhism off as the “corrupt religions belonging to the past”, and proclaimed that Christian churches, where “patriotic, enthusiastic youth, which loath to obey others (foreigners, - V.T.)” werewas gathering, represented the country’s future. (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo 1977, vVol. 2: 1148) An editorial entitled “Pojongch’aek” (“Measures for Ppreserving the[Korean] Race),  and published on July 31, 1907, reminded the readers that the demise of Korea’s independent statehood would lead, “as history shows us”, to the annihilation of the “Korean race” as such, and stated that the only way to save both the state and the “race” from the ultimate ruin wereas Korea’s rapid Christianisation, for only the church could unite all the Koreans for the educational and entrepreneurial work for the benefit of “state and society”. Once the nation would be united by the religious standards, “even thousands of foreign canons” would not present any threat for it, the editorial stated. (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo 1977, vVol. 3: 3323) Impressions of one of the newspaper’s correspondents at a Salvation Army (which began its activities in Korea in September 1908) meeting, written down in rhythmic form (June 9, 1909, 2^nd page), included the following statement about the inseparable connections between national freedom and Christian salvation:

(…) being the Englishmen, they came to work so devotedly

To save another country from its predicament.

All of us, Koreans, must unite to love and help each other,

To exterminate all the devils throughout the country,

And make our country a first-rate paradise (…)

To lose the freedom our Heavenly Father has bestowed on us,

Isn’t it synonymous to death?

You may travel all over the world,

But Korea’s conditions are the most appalling.

So, let’s quickly accept the Salvation from the Heavenly Father!

If we will not restore freedom, we will never avoid hellish suffering! (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo 1977, vVol. 5: 5484)

In the case of Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, the favourable posture towards Christianity was additionally influenced by Christian beliefs of its actual founder and author of many editorials, Yang GKit’ak (1871-1938), former student of English, J.S.Gale’s aid helper in compiling the 1897 Korean-English Dictionary (Han-Yyŏng chajŏn), and future eminent émigré nationalist leader.[9] AnoOther prominent yangban convert, Yi Sŭngman (1875-1965), who became a Christian while in prison in 1899-1904, also described Christianity as an all-powerful instrument to “regenerate” the “degraded”, “beastly”, “utterly selfish” Koreans and “remake” them into a “patriotic nation” able to navigate in the troubled waters oif the modern world.[10] The fFamous pronouncement of Sŏ JaepChaep’il’s Tongnip sSinmun that “those states that diligently believe in Christ’s religion, are now the strongest, richest, and most civilized in he world” (Editorial, 1897, January 26^th),[11] seemingly remained the dominant paradigm in understanding the connections between status of a state in the world and its religion. 

At the same time, Confucianism was proclaimed to be a main “culprit” beyond Korea’s “backwardness”. On the verge of Japan’s final annexation of Korea, Taehan Mmaeil Ssinbo editorialised (1910, May 15-18^th):  

(…) In general, the thing called ‘religion’ is a great question of principle concerning our human society. (…) As the ancients said, ‘Looking at what was added to and subtracted from the ritual regulations (ye), it is possible to know the affairs of ten generations ahead’.[12] ‘Ritual regulations’ here have certain relationship with state policies and moral civilization (kyohwa) of the mundane mores (sedo). That is exactly what religion also does: it constitutes the internal part of a society, and has mutually inseparable relationship with it. Internally, religion assists the civilization of customs throughby [the ruler’s] virtues (p’unggi tŏkhwa), and externally, it is the decisive force in determining efflorescence or downfall of a state. Indeed, we may say without an exaggeration that it is likeas the brain (nwesu) for humans, or the national essence (kuksu) for a state! In history we see how some states were ruined by religion, and others were driven to prosperity by religion. (…)

If some religion, whatever it is, is designated as ‘state religion’ (kukkyo), and remains in such a status for longer than a century, those who are called ‘high class people’ necessarily become its followers, and its strong influence is a decided matter. In Korea, in recent history suchthis(??) religion used to be Confucianism (…). Although for more than five hundreds years the benefits of its civilizational virtuous influence (tŏkhwa) were not small, its methods included lots of other [social] systems, and were intimately connected to autocratic policies of the isolationist period, class society, and veneration for the past. In fact, Confucianism was a product of that period. Itn not only does not fit this epoch and this society, but also can be utterly deleterious. The followers of this religion recently have(??) come up organizing such [new Confucian societies as] Kongjagyo, Taedonggyo, or T’aegŭkkyo. Although the purpose of revering the sage(s??) is extremely laudable, do they aim at the preservation of the national essence or restoration of state sovereignty? Or do they aim at the importation of new knowledge? (…). (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo 1977, vVol. 6: 6563, & 6567)

Unlike Yun Ch’iho, who was a radical enough in his anti-Confucian stance enough to reduce the basic Confucian value, filial piety, to banal family-centrism (and, ultimately, immoral egoism) and “despotism”, (Yun Ch’iho ilgi, vVol. 3: 293-294) the Taehan mMaeil sSinbo editorial writer apparently was a person grounded in and personally attached to Confucianism: he explained the meaning of a newly-coined word, “religion” (chonggyo) through Confucian classics and did not disagree with the view that Confucius was a “sage” and his teaching did contribute into the “civilization” of Korea’s customs. Generally, the Taehan maeil sinbo’s editorial line was to engage the reform-oriented parts of the “Confucian circles” (yurim) in the cause of “reform” and “national salvation”, while harshly attacking the passivity and “stubbornness” of the traditionalists. (Schmid 2002: 124). As it was the case even with much stronger anti-Confucian Sŏ ChJaepChaep’il, theis author of the above-cited editorial also used an ample variety of traditional Confucian terms (“transformation by virtuous influence”, etc.) to drive home his rather anti-traditionalist point – among other reasons, apparently also on account of the readers’ ready understanding of familiar Confucian terms, among other reasons. At the same time, he passed an unconditioned verdict of guilt against the Confucian teaching as a whole from the public point of view: it was proclaimed to be “totally unfit” for the tough times when the “national essence” (kuksu) was threatened, and national independence almost always(=already??) gone. Just as it was the case with China’s early nationalists of the 1900s, (Fitzgerald 1995: 84-85) Confucianism was rejected in this editorial not as a metaphysical ethical system, but as a “state religion”, or a state’s ideology that proved not to be up to the task of “saving the state” through “importation of new knowledge” and various other reforms. Religion or ideology, in this early nationalist discourse, were strictly public affairs of national importance: – the “inner force” that determined “efflorescence or downfall” of a state, or, in newly coined Social Darwinist terms, the “survival of the nation”. Both “acceptance of Christianity” and “rejection of Confucianism” were ultimately treated just as simple “details” of the main totalising discourse of state, “nation”, its “essence” and its “survival”. - Of course, This it diddoes not mean that  individual Christian converts necessarily lacked personal religious sincerity necessarily lacked in individual Christian converts; but it that were exactly those aspects of religion which could be subjected to the all-important state/“national”/Social Darwinist discourse that came to occupy an unravelled superior position in the public discussion on religious matters.  

It is also important to remember that, aside from the “religious utilitarianism” of Korea’s early nationalists, “overwhelmed” by the ostensible “wealth and power” of the “West” and desirous to save themselves from ruin by imitating things Western in all possible ways, the “civilization”/“nation”-determined views on both Confucianism and Christianity were strongly influenced by the attitudes of Protestant missionaries, who tended to identify Christianity with “civilization” as well. Of course, unlike Korea’s nationalistic ideologues and politicians of the 1900s, who rather tended to subject religious matters to the overriding “civilizational” and “national” concerns, the missionaries viewed the Christianisation of Korea as their ultimate goal, “civilization” of the hitherto “heathen” country being just a desirable by-effect. However, the role of schools and hospitals as symbols of “Western civilization” and its “superiority” was were also duly emphasized: the missionaries realized that “if we prove that Western civilization and science are the gift of Protestantism and its material benefit, we shall have an opportunity to tell about Christ.”(“Editorial Department”, Korean Repository, December 1895: 479)[13] Eager to get rid of the label of a “foreign”, “alien” religion, the missionaries were also keen to demonstrate the patriotic zeal of their converts in the ways Western precedents and customary usages suggested to them: Korean national flags were usually hoisted over the churches on Sundays from the mid-1890s (Min KGyŏngbae 1982: 216), (sometimes together with what was presumed to be a “universal” symbol of “civilization” – American “stars and stripes”) (Han’guk kidokkyo-ŭi yŏksa 1989, vol. 1: 256), and the Korean king was solemnly congratulated on his birthdays by the missionaries and converts altogether. (Kang TDon’gu 1992: 177-179)

At the same time, in real politics the missionaries’ actions did not necessarily confirm to the image of a “nation-saving religion” they strove to create. From September 1901 onwards, “strict neutrality” and the “separation between religion and politics” becamewere the principles the missionaries of the American, Canadian and Australian Presbyterian congregations officially decided to follow, mainly dueowing mostly to their governments’ generally sympathetic attitudes towards Japanese penetration of the country. Some notable personal exceptions (notably, H. B. Hulbert, 1863-1949, an American United Methodist missionary known for his anti-Japanese diplomatic activity in the USA and Europe on behalf of the Korean court, is a good example) notwithstanding, the missionary community as a whole was visibly was striving hard to draw a fine line between its promises of “Christian salvation” and “dignified future” for the “Korean race” in prospective, and radical anti-Japanese activities of some of its Korean followers at in present. (Kim Sŭngt’ae 1997: 65-101)

On the whole, the image of a “patriotic” religion highly useful for “saving the country” seems to have been studiously created. Total rejection of Confucianism as an “outdated political philosophy” by early Christian nationalists also owed much to the missionary attitudes: missionary writings reduced Confucianism, “too cold and materialistic”, to “simply a political system” (Hulbert 1906: 404), and pronounced that “there has never been a time that so strongly proves this system (Confucianism, - V.T.) a failure (…) as the present.” (Gale 1896: 220) In a way, the radical Christian nationalists of the 1900s appropriated in their own way, “kKoreanized” and internalised these concepts of Christian “civilizational mission” and “civilizational hierarchy” of various religions brought by the Protestant missionaries to the Korean shores.

Amidst the general crisis of the traditional society, the identification of “Christianity” and “Confucianism” with “civilization”/“fitness for survival” and “barbarism”/“unfitness for survival” respectively spread not only amongApart from Christian converts of mostly yangban or richer commoners’ background (Yi Sŭngman, Yi Sangjae, An Ch’angho, etc.), but the identification of “Christianity” and “Confucianism” with “civilization”/“fitness for survival” and “barbarism”/“unfitness for survival” respectively spread, amidst the general crisis of the traditional society, even to some non-Christians with strong Confucian backgrounds. Typically, Sin Ch’aeho (1880-1936) was entirely in favour of the enhancement of Western education for the sake of “self-strengthening” and ultimate “victory” in the “struggle for survival”. Very much like Yun Ch’iho, who considered “demilitarising of public spirit” “the worst crime” of Confucian Chosŏn Dynasty, Sin Ch’aeho insisted on both crucial importance of “military spirit” for the “fate of the nation”, and deleterious effects of Confucian literary education onto Koreans’ military prowess. In an article entitled “Culture and Military Force” (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1910, February 19^th), while acknowledging the importance of “culture” for “maintaining the spirit of the state” (kukka chŏngsin-ŭi yuji), he proclaimed the military might to be the most essential for maintaining the state as such, and excoriated Korean Confucian legacy in the following way:

“Korea has venerated letters and neglected the military already for several centuries. People have been enjoying long peace, and literati, infatuated with poetry and belles-lettres, were(??) and totally uninterested in military preparations. Therefore, [the defences of Korea’s] eight provinces completely broke down when the Imjin year [Japanese invasion] came, and even the profound humiliation of the Pyŏngja year [Manchurian invasion] did not lead to any awakening. In recent years, with the giant demon of 20^th Century imperialism overrunning the Six Continents, we still did not awake: the scions of the literati continue to stick to their irrelevant books, and the court ended with today’s debacle while preaching extraneous texts(??) and unnecessary rituals.” (Taehan maeil sinbo, vol. 6: 6283 REF. TO EDITION )

Then, Sin Ch’aeho went on arguing that, while war-like spirit had to be nourished, culture should not be ignored, either too: not the “extraneous” culture of the Confucian past, of course, but that of “Western European powers”, distinguished by its “ethical progress”, “scientific development”, and “adventure-loving freedom”. (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 200-201) In another article, “Italy of the Orient” (Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1909, January 28-29^th) he poignantly scolded a traditional Confucian primer for children, Tongmong sŏnsŭp, as an “evil textbook”, for it “slavishly” viewed Korea as So Chunghwa sojunghwa – “little China”. (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 185-187) Rather than the “empty books” that led Chosŏn dynasty’s “civilization” into “decay”, after illustrious pre-Confucian periods of Silla and Early Koryŏ (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 208-209), Sin maintained, Korea would need plain physical fitness nurtured by Western-style “physical education” (ch’eyuk):

“Generally, all of us,(??) humans, as the first among all animals, are engaged in the struggle for existence. (…) On the arena of natural selection (ch’ŏnyŏn), the survival of persons, families, states and societies is being contested; if a freedom-seeking person is physically weak, what can he accomplish? (…) If physical strength is inferior, intellectual and ethical developments are hard to expect as well. Consider: a chronically ill weakling, albeit he may have Darwin’s brains, would never discover any new theory, and - albeit he may possess Aristotle’s teaching skills, – would never accomplish any successful teaching. The only obligatory thing in life is exactly the physical strength.” (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 208-209REF.TO EDITION- 208-9?? )

After describing pitiful physical conditions of Korea’s (presumably, educated) youth, “pale-faced already in their young years, speaking with coughing voices” and unable to stay a day without a solid intake of Chinese herbal medicines, Sin concluded that such state of affairs was by no means natural for Korea’s “innately vigorous stock”. It was, rather, a consequence of the exclusion of physical education from the Confucian curriculum for theamong higher classes and lack of hygiene among their lower brethren. All Koreans, Sin wrote, “might not be able to imitate [bodily] strong nations of the civilized states in a instant”, but, at least, reading of (presumably, translated) books on physical education and hygiene could help them a lot (“Among Intellectual, Ethical, and Physical Educations, the Physical Education is the Most Urgent Task”, - Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1908, February 9^{th). (}, Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip 1998: 129-130) It seems plausible that, together with “Western culture” and “physical/military education”, Sin Ch’aeho in the 1900s considered Christianity a positive (albeit certainly not the crucial) force in Korea’s “self-strengthening”. “The Dialogue on the Western Lake” (serialized in Taehan mMaeil sSinbo between March 5^th and March 18^th, 1908; its ascription to Sin Ch’aeho is generally accepted, but was recently questioned) mentioned that conversion into Christianity might help the Korean compatriots “to atone for the sin of losing the country’s sovereignty” and “practice the love to the fellow Koreans”. Christianity, says one of the interlocutors, “is practiced in Britain, America, Germany and France, and how strong and glorious all these countries are! If our compatriots wish to emulate that, they should follow the religion of these countries.” (Sin Ch’aeho  1998, pyŏljip: 138-139)

At the same time, all the similarities between Sin Ch’aeho’s ideas and the “Occidentalist” nationalism of his radical – and mostly christianizsed – contemporaries notwithstanding, the differences were still salient. Sin Ch’aeho, in a manner rather resembling Liang QichaoCh’i-ch’ao, tried hard to “modernize” Confucianism instead of jettisoning it altogether, picturing Confucius as a prototypical “patriot” of his Lu “motherland” (“Address My Confucian Countrymen With A Warning”, - Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1908, January 16^{th) (}, Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 106), considering “the force of sincerity of great ancient Confucians” a part of Korea’s all-important “national essence” (“On Preserving The National Essence”, - Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1908, August 12^th) (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 116), and reformulating the Confucian idea of “loyalty” from that to a personal ruler into a state-centred “patriotism”. (“On Loyal Vassals”, - Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1909, August 13^th) (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 179-180) The practical motivation for a more interested and considerate approach to the Confucian culture, as Sin explained himself (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 106-107), was the influence Confucians still wielded over the opinion in the country: unless persuaded to “modernize” their ways and compromise the original beliefs with the demands of “national survival”, Confucians could effectively block any “invigoration of the nation” on the grass-roots level. From the longer-term prospective, Sin was also afraid that unavoidable imitation of Western and Japanese patterns would lead to Korea being completely culturally absorbed by its “advanced” “models” (“Deplorable Picture of Assimilation”, - Taehan mMaeil sSinbo, 1909, March 23^{rd) (}, Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 150-152), and was seemingly interested in Confucianism as an instrument of nationalist cultural self-identification/self-preservation (Ch’oe Honggyu 1986: 78). Consequently, while not throwing his lot together with Pak Ŭnsik's (1859-1925)’s “reformist Confucian” movement, Sin showed clear indication of his positive interest in Pak’s undertaking (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 109-110) and ultimately suggested that, while Confucianism was to be further reformed and developed, Christianity was simultaneously to become Korea’s “civil religion” (“New People of the 20^th Century”, - Taehan Mmaeil Ssinbo, February 22^nd – March 3^{rd). (}, Sin Ch’aeho 1998, pyŏljip: 228) The mMore inclusive attitude towards Confucianism in its reformed version was one among the most salient differences between Sin Ch’aeho and Christianity-inspired successors to the Tongnip Ssinmun’s radical modernization project, a basic set of shared and strongly emphasized Social Darwinist beliefs being the most important commonality.

This radical group’s views on the international situation were rather complicated, if not deeply self-contradictory. Most radicals hardly doubted that China, strongly associated with “Confucianism”, was nothing more than an “unfit”, “reactionary” “weakling” and no good for Korea’s development. Not without some iInfluenced by of Sŏ JaepChaep’il and Yun Ch’iho’s ideas on Chinese “racial inferiority”, Korean nationalists of the 1900s speculated on the “innate conservatism” of Chinese “national character”. Typically, Pak Sŏnghŭm, a member of progressive nationalistic “Western Friends Academic Society” (Sŏu hakhoewe; founded in October, 1906), compared in the Society's “Society…”’s organ, the popular journal Sŏu, the “national characters” of various peoples in the following fashion:

“The strong points(??) of the British areis(??) respect for to the experience in every matter, and practical spirit. Even if they lose, they are not ashamed of it, and just work for the ultimate victory and final success, without paying attention to the praises and criticisms of the others. (…) Americans are the descendants of British, but they are even more practical than British. While British are aristocratic and constrained by the formalities, Americans disregard formalities and are not interested in the roundabout ways to their aims. They like to pioneer new ways in order to achieve their aims by a direct way. That is why, although they had been(??)were backward in science, philosophy, literature, and art in comparison with other European nations before, they outdid all European states in the application of sciences. (…). Chinese, although they are both practical and optimistic and had been(??)were rather advanced(??)developed in practical [matters aspects](??)ly, went too far in their pragmatism and became utterly materialistic. They have no ideals, and their optimism has grown into conservatism. Their social development stopped as a result. (…) Both Chinese and Indians are proud of their original civilizations and disinterested in enriching themselves with the results of other countries’ progress. They developed a stubbornly conservative spirit. (…)” (Sŏu, Iissue 11, (October 1907)) (xxxx xxxx: : 67-71)[14]   

“Stubbornness” and “conservatism” on the side of the Chinese meant that any progress in China could be stimulated only from outside. Yun Hyojŏng (1860-?), one of the leading members of the “Korean Self-Strengthening Society” (Taehan Chaganghwehoe; founded in April, 1906) who lived in exile in Japan in 1898-1902 and was known after 1906 to be notoriously pro-Japanese, argued in his article entitled “China’s Awakening” (published in the “Society”’s monthly organ, Taehan Chaganghwehoe wWŏlbo, iIssue 10, April, 1907), that only Japan could “awaken” the Chinese from their “millennia of sleep”. After enumerating the “insults” suffered by China on account of various “Western predations”, he noted the following:

“Thus, China had to swallow the insults, affronts, and encroachments from various states, barely managing to maintain the state of temporary peace. Foreign states became increasingly aware about how to use its weaknesses, and hardly there was any right or interest they did not encroach upon. But, due to Japan’s victory in the Japan-Russian War, Chinese began to believe in the prospects of Asian race and understood that the Whites should not be feared. They obtained the spirit of activity and energy, and, aware now about the history of Japan’s observance of the treaties, began to reflect critically on the matter that(??) they have swallowed the insults from abroad before. They started to think that the rights should be no longer ceded to foreigners and those that were ceded should be recovered. A sort of public opinion on the question of the recovery of concessions began to be formed. (…)” (Taehan Chaganghoe wŏlbo, issue 10 (April 1907)(xxxx xxxx: : 170))[15]    

While the West represented ““the highest “heights” of the “civilization” ever achievable, Japan was contracted to China (??) served(??) as an example of independent, internally-driven “civilization” of a previously “uncivilized” country. Admiration of Meiji reforms and high esteem towards the “heroes of Meiji Restoration”, and “makers of modern Japan”, expressed – in different degrees and dissimilar ways – by both Yun Ch’iho and Sŏ JaepChaep’il, was a commonplace in the 1900s progressive journals. Typically, Yi GKyuyŏng, a member of “T’aegŭk Academic Society” (formed by Korean students in Japan in September, 1905), in his article entitled “Weakness and Strength of Humans and Rise and Decay of States Depend on Action and Inaction” (published in the “Society...”’s organ, T’aegŭk hHakpo, iIssue 8, April 1907), described Japan’s “way to progress” – as an example for Korea’s own “young heroes” – in the following way:

“The Ten heroes of the Rrestoration in Japan abolished the old feudal laws, enabled the Imperial House to grip the wholeabsolute power over the country, and put into effect the Constitution based on the precedents of the civilized countries of Europe and America. If not for their actions, how could Japan achieve its progress today? (…) I would wish you to know that in our Korea too, the rank of heroes to follow this example would not yield to any other country. The problem lies in our chronic disease of preferring to depend on others (…).” (T’aegŭk hakpo, issue 8xxxx xxxx: 18-19)[16]        

The prevailing views on Japan in its relations to Korea’s own prospects for “progress” encompassed a wide spectrum of often-contradictory opinions. On the one hand, Japan was often viewed as both an “example” for Korea and a “racially close” ally in the Darwinist “struggle for existence”. Japan’s unexpected victories over the giant continental rivals, China and Russia, drew close attention of Korea’s younger intellectuals, the unspoken back thought being both astonishment about the achievements of the erstwhile “barbarians from the Eastern Islands”, and desire to somehow emulate their exploits. One commentator, who wrote an article with the pretentiously  entitled “The Research on the Oriental History” for the 19^th iIssue of T’aegŭk hHakpo (March 1908)  under the pseudonym “Manch’ŏnsaeng” (“The oOne wWho dDraws Heaven cCloser”), explained Korea’s “failures”, against the backdrop of Japan’s “successes”, in the following way:

“Now, the race of Yamato (Japan calls itself ‘the race of Yamato’, and also uses it as a generic name for the whole Mongol race), based on these three Eastern islands, defeated Ch’ing, fought off Russia, obtained the hegemony over East Asia, and plays a strong role in the world. (…) Both in ancient and modern times, Chinese and other nations of East Asia rose to prominence by the military force, and declined due to the literary effeminacy [in neglect of the military art] (munyak). (…). The source of all the evils in our country is the worship of literature and disregard for the military. That is why our popular opinion is so feeble-minded, that is why chivalrous spirit is so much thwarted. When we meet a stronger one, we lack ability to resist, and when we look at a bigger one, we cower, and, in accordance with traditional evil practice, resort to the makeshift measures in order to avoid a fight. We need to deterge the deleterious customs, change our beliefs, encourage the military bravery, make the military discipline the state’s ideology, worship the simplicity, and strengthen feelings of loyalty in the masses, (…) in order to become like the Mongols or the Yamato race of the EastOrient.” (T’aegŭk hakpo, issue 19xxxx xxxx: 316-317)[17]

Together with the “military spirit of Yamato”, Japan’s “modernization” achievements, exemplified by the Meiji Constitution, were viewed as a guiding light for Korea’s own race to “progress”. For example, in his article, entitled  “The World of Constitutionalism”, and contributed to issue 4 (June 1909) of the Taehan Hhŭnghakpo (Issue 4, June 1909), the mouthpiece of the “Korean Society for the Encouragement of Learning” (Taehan Hhŭnghakhwehoe – the unified organization of Korean students in Japan, founded in January 1909), Kim Jinsŏng claimed that only peaceful, non-revolutionary progress to constitutionalism along Meiji lines can bring real “civilization” and independence to Korea:

“Present time is the epoch when the world is dominated by two political systems, autocracy (chŏnje) and constitutionalism (iphŏn). As I will try to establish, these two systems presently compete with each other, and the newer one will necessarily win, while the older one will be necessarily be destroyed. In the result, all countries in the world will inevitably end adopting the constitutional system. (…)

Let us turn to Japan’s example. We all know that its distinctive feature is the so-called importation of Western European civilization, but the essence of that process was exactly nothing more than emulation of the constitutional system. Constitution was promulgated in Japan twenty years ago, and what is the difference between the state of the country and popular sentiments before that and now? That this bullet-shaped small island could fight off two strong states, China and Russia, is, we may say, only due to the popular patriotism generated by the respect ofto the people’s rights and protection of the individuals’ freedom under the constitutional government. Thus, constitutionalism is the root of civilization, wealth, and strength, and civilization, wealth, and strength are just the fruits of constitutionalism. (…).

Alas! It is difficult to maintain independence for a state where, in 20^th Century, people lack constitutional ideas, it is difficult to recover lost sovereignty for such a state, and it will be difficult for it to play a role on the international scene in future!

Alas! Although the great aim of the recovery of independence is what the people of our peninsula think about day and night, it is hard to recover independence without constitutional ideas, and, even in the case independence will be recovered it will not last for long, anyway. (…).” (Taehan hŭnghakpo, issue 4 (June 1909)xxxx xxxx: 326-328)[18]  

On the other hand, it was considered by some of the early radical nationalists to be still an “inferior”, “half-civilized” country, and a “threat” for Korea’s independence. For example, Kim Gihwan, Kim Kihwan, (no dates dates??), in his ambitious contribution to Taehan hHŭnghakpo (iIssue 6, October 1909) entitled “Today’s Ttask of Korean Yyouth”, argued in no uncertain terms that Japan’s modern “civilization” was still inferior to its Western prototypes and the West, not Japan, could be the best place for Korean students aspiring to learn “civilization” first-hand:

“Oh, how beautiful, how beautiful they are, the mountains of America and rivers of Europe! The universe of freedom, the world of civilization! Alas, I feel as if shut in a cage, as if imprisoned in a jail. Oh, the youth of Korea, let us quickly import the freedom and civilization of American and European mountains and waters, so that we can break down the cages and prisons and Korea’s waters and mountains ideally beautiful and gorgeous! Of course, Europe and America are generally more than ten times richer economically than we, and, in fact, in Korea’s present conditions (that of extreme poverty) it is tremendously difficult to go there to breathe the air of civilization and freedom and import knowledge. (…) Instead of speaking about Europe or America, how about going to Japan, very close to Korea and a very moderate-priced place? Today’s Japanese civilization can rival [that of](??) the West, of course, and the number of Korean students here is, commendably, to be counted in thousands. Still, as the East is not the West, there remains a feeling of indirectness [in the transmission of civilization] and discontent. (…). I wish you, young people, to go to America’s mountains and rivers, to use English, once used by Washington’s independence fighters, and master English writing employed in the politics all over the world! Here, in Japan, higher schools are also schools of English, and high-level literature is also English and European literature. (…).” (Taehan hŭnghakpo, issue 6, October 1909xxxx xxxx: 26-30)[19]

A witty pun helped to emphasize the point of this emotional text: as the ideograph mi, “beautiful”, was customarily used for designating “America” as well, “the mountains of America” (misan) could simultaneously mean “beautiful mountains”. The danger of Japan’s aggression, masked by the talks of “Asian unity” and “learning from the most advanced state of the Yellow race”, was stressed by several Taehan Maeil Sinbo polemists. Notably, Sin Ch’aeho speared no efforts persuading the readers that the Pan-Asianist rhetoric employed by the Japanese and their Korean adherents was just a disguise for “enslaving our country”. In his article entitled “Criticism of Asianism (tTongyangjuŭi)” (August 8-10^th, 1909), he forcefully argued:

“What is Asianism? That means to check Western expansion in the East by the united efforts of various Eastern countries.

Who are those who advocate it?

First, those who destroy our state (ogukcha). Those who are going to yield their four(??)4 thousand years-old fatherland to the others, to forcibly include 20 millions of our brothers into other’s slave registers. As they can in no other way legitimise what they are doing, they mask their deeds under those phrases, cheating the Heaven above and people below. They say that now it is the epoch of competition between East and West, the Whites and the Yellow race. They say that the rise of East means the downfall of the West, and the rise of the West – the downfall of the East, and that these two forces cannot coexist. They say that all the Easterners, states and individuals, should unite to resist the Westerners. They say that it is a sin to sell one’s state to the others, but now, as both sellers and buyers are the Easterners (…), what sin can it be? (…)

When they advocate Asianism, Japanese sing the same song together. (…) Gradually, the number of those who consider even the hostile Eastern state identical with us, and the enemy Eastern race our kin, increases. (…)

Today, when the competition between states is so fierce, even temporary retreat may throw us down to the tiger’s jaws. If our weaknesses will(??) pile up, we will find ourselves in the eagle’s claws. (…) To follow the venomous gangsters and plot together with them is a slave-like derangement. (…). Today, the state is the primary thing, and the Eeast is a secondary one. (…) If the Korean state will eternally disappear, the Korean race will vanish forever too, and can we solace ourselves with the fact that our land will be taken by the fellow Yellow race? (…)” (Sin Ch’aeho 1998, vol. 3: 88-91)

However, Sin’s astute criticism of the dangerous political implication of Asianist phraseology seemed to be a rather isolated phenomenon. Even among these progressives radicals that were politically opposed to Japanese behaviour in Korea, belief in the importance of “racial kinship” between the East Asian nations and in the possibility of “racial wars” between “Yellow and White races” in future remained strong – and, doubtlessly, was only enforced by the racist currents in the contemporary Western thought. As a good example, a middle-of-the road editorial line of the Hwangsŏng sinmun, which principally advocated Korea’s independence, but also remained a tenacious defender of “Asian unity” up to the end, may be taken (Schmid 2002: 96-100). 

In a way, radical nationalist group inherited both Yun Ch’iho’s racialist commitment to the “Yellow unity” and Sŏ JaepChaep’il’s critical view of Japan’s “lacking” “degree of development”. However, Sŏ JaepChaep’il’s interest into the individual rights did not seem to exert much influence: individualism was emphatically rejected in favour of patriotism, and “people’s rights” mainly were understood as a tool for better social cohesion. Constitutionalism was favoured largely on the ground of its presumed usefulness for strengthening social cohesion. For more pro-Japanese segments of the radical groups, the victory of Meiji constitutional monarchy over Russian autocracy – and the fact that the laetter ended up with the social upheavals of the 1905 revolution – was a good prove of both “usefulness” of constitutionalism for the all-important “wealth and strength” of the state, and the superiority of the “patriotism and constitutionalism-based” Meiji model as a whole. (Kim TDohyŏng 2000: 119-120) Patriotic fervour seemingly was to substitute the Confucian hierarchies the radicals tended to totally reject. And education, the way to “strengthen the nation” and enhanceget better chances to survive in the Darwinian jungles of the “evolutionary warfare”, was taken as the primary “patriotic duty.” (Kim TDohyŏng 2000: 131-144)

 

b) Darwin for the Present, Confucius for the Future: Reformist Confucians

On the other hand, reformist Confucians, who were deeply influenced by Liang QichaoCh’i-ch’ao’s views and inherited Yu GiljunKiljun’s commitment to a cConfucianized, “moral” version of “modern ideas”, tended to criticize the “corruption” of the contemporary Confucians, but not the Way of the Master itself. As, typically, Pak Ŭnsik and Chang ChJiyŏn (1864-1921) argued quite typically, the Way was to be “purified”, “reformed” and used as a source of “strength” – the “moral cohesion” of the state. Confucian “virtues” (tŏgŏp) and “righteousness” (ŭiri), termed “the pillars of Korean Sspirit”, were, in Pak Ŭnsik’s view, the most important guarantee of Korea’s ability “to fend off the insults and oppression from the outside in the time of the world-wide struggle for survival” (“Korean Spirit”, - Taehan Chaganghwehoe wWŏlbo, iIssue 1:). (xxxx xxxx: 61)[20] Social Darwinist “rules of the game” in the world of imperialist predations were understood as just a “first” step of the evolution, while the essence of Confucianism was to lead the toto(??) humanity to much more moral forms of existence. Pak Ŭnsik, for example, finished his treatise on the reformation of Confucianism (Yugyo Kkusin nNon), with the following statement: 

“The previous, 19^th Century, and the present 20^th Century are the period of great development of Western civilization. But the future, 21^st Century, will be the time of great development of Eastern civilization; so, how can the Way of our Confucius demise? The time will come when it will shine all over the world! Oh, the Confucians of our Korea! Think about the future, and spare no efforts!” (Pak  ŪnsikTan’guk Taehakkyo Tongyanghak yŏn’guso 1975, vol. 3: 48)

Confucianism, albeit unsuitable in its entirety to the present time of “survival struggles”, could, according to Pak Ŭnsik, serve the humanity in the future as a teaching of world peace able to rival Christianity:

“Confucianism of our Orient has world peace as one of its main principles, comparable to compassion in Buddhism and universal love in Christianity. ‘Loyalty‘ and ‘clemency‘ of The Analects, ‘harmony of the Middle’ of The Mean, and ‘great unity’ of The Record of Rites are all the basic sources of and the main contributions to the peace. (…). These principles may not suit the present epoch of competition, but afterwards, when society will turn to peace, great development of our Confucian ideas is certain. (…) Our Korean Confucians! Don’t be scrupulous about forms, and emphasize the spirit of Confucianism, so that all the brothers in this world may enjoy the happiness of ‘great unity’ and peace” (“Development of Confucianism is the Biggest Fundament of Peace”, - Hwangsŏng sinmun, Issueissue 3224, November 16^th, 1909)[21] 

The basis for building a nation-state was, for this group, the Confucianism-influenced “national character” (kuksŏng) rather than Christianity. While Western “enlightenment” was considered just a transitory form, Japan’s successes in the “preservation of national essence” (kuksu pojon) – as well as its educational system, combining Western science and gymnastics with Confucianism-based teaching of civics, - were highly praised. A rReformist element was emphasized by substitution of the traditional principle of “respecting China” (chonhwa) by bold assertion of the “principle of self-respect” (chonajuŭi). (Sin Yongha 1982: 223) Reformist Confucianism of the times when “struggle for existence” required “self-strengthening of the state”, was no longer a broadly “regional” or “China-centred” ideology: modernizing the Korean state emerged as the paramount object of interest, respect, and anxieties. Traditional Confucians tended to view state as a “vehicle” for “realizing the teaching of the sages”; by contrast, Pak Ŭnsik and likely minded “Darwinian Confucians” made the “teaching of sages” into, first and foremost, a tool of strengthening aof state engulfed inby the Darwinian “jungles” (and a tool of world peace, in prospective). A Confucian façade notwithstanding, this variant of modernization ideology was in essence no less “this-worldly” and pragmatic than the more Western-looking varieties preferred by the successors of Sŏ JaepChaep’il. For all those who belonged to the reformist camp, regardless of the differences between Christians (Yi Sŭngman), non-religious Social Darwinist nationalists (Sin Ch’aeho), or Confucians (Pak Ŭnsik), the old world revolting around the unchangeable principles, territorially centred on China, and spatially – on the sacred antiquity, had already lost its relevance. The new world of all-encompassing global “struggle for existence” took its place.

In the end, the group split politically: Chang ChJiyŏn, fascinated with the ideas of “struggle between Yellow and White races” (Kim TDohyŏng 2000: 101-103) agreed – like Yun Ch’iho – to collaborate with Japanese colonial authorities, but Pak Ŭnsik preferred emigration to China, where he became one of the central actors in the émigré independence struggle and broadly experimented with Tan’gun worship-based nationalistic religions. (Kim TDohyŏng 1994: 398-425)

 

III. Concluding Remarks

In a sum, we may say that both the predominantly Christian radicals and the Confucian moderates contributing to of the 1900s  writing for progressive journals and newspapers during the 1900s contributed in their own way toin the formation of distinctively Korean forms of modern nationalism. In post-colonial South Korea, Christianity grew on prodigiously, being identified with “modernity” and “progress”, but traditional legacy was actively used as well when various versions of nationalist ideas where shaped. It may be said that, rather than Yun Ch’iho’s absolute and unconditioned rejection of Confucianism on both practical and philosophical grounds, a “median point” between conditioned validation of Confucianism’s philosophic worth and its past contributions to the “national cause” found in some of Taehan mMaeil sSinbo’s editorials, and the reformist Confucianists` view ofn the Master’s teaching as the essence of “national spirit” (uri chŏngsin) or “national wisdom” (minjok sŭlgi), became the “mainstream line of thought” in assessing the role of Confucianism’s role: “loyalty and filial piety” were re-made into “essential”, “national” values.[22] While the idea that “national education” (kukchŏk innŭn kyoyuk) presupposed the “inheritance of tradition” (chŏnt’ong kyesŭng) was a commonsense part of the educational policies in South Korea after 1948, the last years of Pak Chŏnghŭi’s (Park Chung Hee) dictatorial rule were particularly characterized by reliance on “loyalty and filial piety” dogmas in education and government-controlled mass culture. After Pak Chŏnghŭi personally instructed the Ministry of Culture and Education (Mun’gyobu) “to strengthen the ethical education in the spirit of loyalty and filial piety” on February 4, 1977, the school programs were revised accordingly, and special guidebooks on “theory and practice of loyalty and filial piety” – distributed to every Seoul teacher. Obliged to keep pace with governmental line, the state-controlled broadcasting stations immediately revised their programs too, giving more prime-time exposure to “patriotic” historical films (Chŏn Chaeho 2000: 103-106). As political and cultural liberalizations progressed, the government-led campaigns for “enhancing the spirit of loyalty and filial piety” mostly stopped in the early 1990s, but the emphasis upon the importance of “traditional values” for “national education” remained distinctive. The pronounced “Confucianization” of the official nationalist ideology was arguably necessary for the dominant elites, who wished to ensure that the cult of “hegemonic masculinity” centred upon the sacrosanct obligatory military service, would acquire hegemonic (in Gramscian sense) positions in still Confucianism-influenced society (Moon Seungsook 2002: 79-115). Once represented in “traditional” terms, as “the central duty of a male subject to the state and ancestral legacy”, “the centrepiece of loyalty and filial spirit”, the military service – and general militarization of the society” – became virtually unassailable “sacred cows” of social life.

  USA and Western Europe remained came to be perceived, just like in Yun Ch’iho and Sŏ JaepChaep’il’s cases, as the “heights” of “progress” (Kim Yŏngmo 1985: 175-177), while pre-war Japanese experience of using conservative ideologies for the sakes of building “national cohesion” was also actively utilized by the military dictatorships. (Kim Sejung 1996) The racialized beliefs in “superiority” of Korea’s “stock” (hHanminjokanminjok ususŏng) and its ability to “catch up with the powers”, dating back to Sŏ JaepChaep’il’s “optimistic racism”, as well as reformist Confucians’ assertiveness about the value of “traditional culture” and its potential to “contribute to the world peace”, were both utilized for the purposes of building more inclusive and persuasive nationalist ideology (Sŏ Ūisik 2001). At the same time, the fact that dominant ideologies of South Korean elites up to the mid-1990s had the tendency to sideline the issueissue of human rights – which largely remained in the domain of various anti-establishmentarian movements, but often was sidelined as “secondary” to the “national” issues even by the oppositionary critics of the successive authoritarian regimes (Im Chihyŏn 2000) – may also be partly explained by also reminds us about the conspicuous lack of attention towards this topic in the very beginning of formation of Korea’s modernity discourse.

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