陛撿蟾晦措陛撩董

On the Problem of International Status and Stage of Socio-

Political Development of Taegaya in Late 5th - Early 6th C.

(on "Nihon shoki" materials)

Vladimir Tikhonov (KyungHee University)

1) The 1970th-80th were the time when South Korean academical historical community became engaged in active and fruitful discussion on such basic theoretical problems of ancient history as the origins of the "ancient state" (kodae kukka; 肵衴玿坅), stages of socio-political development leading to the state-formation, exact definition of the term "ancient state", and, last but not least, the dating of the state-formation on the Korean Peninsula. As a part of those theoretical efforts, traditional scheme of the process of state-formation, established largely by Japanese colonial scholars and Japanese-trained first generation of Korean historians (Lee Byŏng-do 麆黹唭, Lee Hong-jik 麆㯂臕, Son Jin-t'a 摴藚鷙, and others), which, in its most generalized form, divided the process of the creation of statehood into the stages of "tribal state" (pujok kukka; 搎謮玿坅), "tribal league" (pujok yŏnmaeng; 搎謮糌崶), and "ancient state" (kodae kukka), was sharply criticized and revised. New concepts of "chiefdom society" (kunjang sahwe; 珋薞碇𨗴), "walled-town state" (sŏngŭp kukka; 僗錁玿坅), "proto-state" (chun-kukka; 麎玿坅), and "early state" (ch'ogi kukka; 鐖悢玿坅), largely inspired by the achievements of Western cultural anthropology, were gradually introduced, and, as a result, the term "state" - with certain attributes - started to be regarded as applicable to such societies as Ancient Chosŏn (肵蟭雸) in the period of the rule of Wiman (縍婸; B.C. 194-108) and Samhan (葀粧) principalities of the first centuries A.D. As is generally known, Japanese colonial scholars, as well as the first generation of Korean historians, refrained from using the chronologically earlier parts of <Samguk sagi> (葀玿瘏挴; <Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms>; 1145) as historical source, based their research mostly on "The Account of Western Outlanders" (娵鴩闇; "Tung-i chuan") of "San-guo chih" (葀玿礞), and considered the degree of state centralization, active external conquests, promulgation of written laws (yullyŏng 觕硉), official recognition of Confucianism and Buddhism as state ideology and religion respectively, and official-level contacts with China as main criteria of the existence of "real" ancient statehood. On the contrary, younger generation of South Korean historians and archeologists of 1970th-80th was mostly in favour of acceptance, albeit critical, of earlier records of <Samguk sagi> as historical source, and, paying more attention to the underlying structures of the society, put forward such socio-political shifts as an increases in agricultural productivity and population density, existence of standing army, sophistication of government organs, changes in the character of the rulers (from the rule based on largely informal authority to that based on institutionalized power), as main landmarks of the process of state-building. In a word, simpler historical theories largely based on the 19th C. works of L.H.Morgan (1818-1881) as they were interpreted in Imperial Japan had to give up its place to more modern schemes of socio-political development mostly inspired by the development in American cultural and political anthropology (works of E.R.Service, K.V.Flannery, M.H.Fried, etc.).

2) In connection with general developments in historical and archeological theory, the direction of Kaya (吽憒) studies is also undergoing serious changes. As is well known, Kaya is a general term referring to the polities which existed mostly in the Naktong River (栜娵阭) valley in 1st-6th C. A.D. and shared many common features in material and spiritual culture (cists with vertical entrance, long-necked lidded pottery, "propped" earthenware, etc.). Known also as Imna (曒栖; Jap.: Mimana), those principalities first appear in the historical records pertaining to the 1st-2nd C. A.D. (in <Samguk yusa>, 葀玿賱瓿, and <Samguk sagi>), and are known to have been annexed by Silla (蜪崏) in 532-562. Traditionally, from the times of sirhak (裺鱹; "practical learning") historical scholarship up to the colonial period and first post-colonial decades, Kaya was mostly studied, by Korean and Japanese historians alike, on the basis of scarce literary sources, with attention mostly focused on the location of ancient toponyms and external relationship of Kaya political entities with Paekche (詄藄), Silla, and proto-Japanese polities. Beginning from the 1970th, with the advent of new anthropological theories and remarkable progress achieved in archeological excavations in former Kaya lands, the focus of attention shifted to the problems of socio-political development of Kaya itself, while, methodologically, simultaneous complex use of narrative and archeological materials became the prerequisite for any serious research. Due to the increasing methodological maturity of the researchers and growing interest to the universal schemes of the development of stratified society put forward by the anthropologists, it became hardly possible to simply characterize Kaya societies as "minor states" (soguk; 幙玿) or "tribal states" (pujok kukka; 搎謮玿坅), as it was customary in earlier works. Instead, new terms with more precise and well-defined meaning, such as "hierarchical society" (wigye sahwe; 糔肣碇𨗴), "territorial state" (yŏngyŏk kukka; 秸瘣玿坅), "city state" (tosi kukka; 埭蒱玿坅), or "complex chiefdom society" (pokhap kunjang sahwe; 嗈╪ 珋薞碇𨗴), etc., were applied to Kaya history by Kwŏn Hak-su, Ch'ŏn Gwan-u, Lee Yŏng-sik, and Kim T'ae-sik respectively.

3) Typically, Lee Yŏng-sik attempted to find materials necessary for appraising the degree of social maturity of Kaya polities, in the chronologically earlier records of <Samguk sagi> concerning border disputes and diplomatic contacts between Silla and Kaya principalities - records, hitherto usually considered "unauthentic" and disregarded by the mainstream historiography. Using as main arguments the scale and methods of Kaya political entities' wars with neighbouring states, forms of diplomatic contacts between Kaya principalities and Silla, facts of existence of hereditary monarchies and social stratification in Kaya lands, and so on, he came to the conclusion that after late 4th C. at latest the mightiest of Kaya societies had already achieved the level of "city states" ("city state" being one of the various forms of early statehood).

4) The present paper is strongly influenced by the methodology and conclusions of Lee Yŏng-sik's works. Using the same approach, Lee Yŏng-sik successfully applied to the Kaya-related records of <Samguk sagi>, I attempted to analyse the content of <Nihon shoki> pertaining to the social stratification, monarchical power, military organization, wars and diplomacy, and religion of one of the strongest of Kaya polities, Taegaya (豇吤摮; today's Koryŏng County, 邴秺畈, in Northern Kyŏngsang Province, 杬葅暕堀; also was known as Panp'a, 筀纕, and, later, Kara, 吤崏). Through this analysis, I want to shed light on the levels of development of social and military organization, scale and methods of warfare, character of diplomacy, and strength of monarchy in Taegaya, with the purpose of defining - at least, approximately - the stage of Taegaya's socio-political development.

5) Admittedly, most Korea-related records of <Nihon shoki> (compiled in 720) not only in many cases dated largely arbitrarily, but also include serious legendary element and many later literary and ideological embellishments in their content. Moreover, the suppliers of Kaya- and Silla-related materials to the compilers of <Nihon shoki> were, besides the descendants of Yamato or Kyushu aristocrats once involved in peninsular affairs, mostly noble families of Paekche origins having emigrated to Japan after the conquest of Paekche by Silla. If the scions of Yamato or Kyushu notables, striving to glorify the past of their clans to earn better positions in the present, spared no efforts to portray their ancestors as no less than plenipotentiary deciders of Kaya's fate, the offsprings of Paekche aristocracy, striving to "realize" on paper post factum the long-cherished dream of their greatfathers, depicted Kaya, in their turn, as a kind of Paekche's "vassal" territory, sometimes "rebellious", but never completely lost for its "legitimate" Paekche "masters" - until the time of Silla's "villainous" annexions of 532-562, of course. On the top of all those manifold "hidden agendas", the compilers of <Nihon shoki>, inspired by the post-Taika new vision of Japan as T'ang (衄)-level world "empire" ruled from the very beginning on the basis of Chou (騍)-like feudal laws (with the mikado 芟狀罔/藂 playing the role of the Chinese "son of Heaven" 蘢磾, of course) and Confucian principles, did their job in full accordance with the rules on which Confucius based his <Annals> (<Ch'un-ch'iu>, 臝灊), with only one difference: Chou and its dynasty was substituted by Japan and Yamato's rulers who claimed their descent from the Sun Goddess (蘢蠁芷疚豇樧蜺). Accordingly, even the earliest relationship between Japan (actually, various proto-Japanese polities) and neighbouring Korean states (and sometimes even some of Chinese principalities) are described in <Nihon shoki> in terms borrowed from traditional Chinese notion of China-centered hierarchical world order: neighbouring "vassals" pay "tribute" to Japanese (Yamato) "Emperor", and, if fail to do this "regularly", are "chastised" by Imperial "governmental troops". The fact that there was no unified government in Japan until approximately mid-5th C., and even the simplest Chinese characters, not to mention sophisticated philosopho-political notions of "culture" and "barbarism", were not in wide use until early 7 C., did not embarrass <Nihon shoki> compilers in their "crusade" for "politically correct" antiquity befitting the present "grandeur" of "law-governed state" (ritsuryo kokka; 觕硉玿坅) of early 8 C.

It is clear that character of primary materials used in the process of compilation of <Nihon shoki>, as well as the biased attitudes of the compilers, limit the credibility of this earliest extant Japanese official historical chronicle. It is also evident that the picture of Korean antiquity in <Samguk sagi> (compiled in 1145), which represents much higher stage of development of Confucianist historiographic tradition, although distorted in its own way too, is much closer, at least factually, to what we consider a "truthful reconstruction" of the ancient reality, than whatever Korea-related content we find in <Nihon shoki>. Kim Busik (旄搟蜡; 1075-1151), chief of the committee for <Samguk sagi> compilation, had the subjectivity of his own and seems to have had a tendency to predate some later facts to support his own views on the dating of the origin of the Three Kingdoms, but, unlike his colleagues from 8th C. Japan, he would rather just omit the undesirable information or "modernize" and "Confucianize" some earlier autochthonous institutions than indulge in "creative writing" of flowery pseudo-historical passages. Nevertheless, the dearth of Kaya-related materials in <Samguk sagi> and lack of authenticity of Kaya-related chapters of other Korean history, <Samguk yusa> (葀玿賱瓿; <Affairs remained from [the time of] the Three Kingdoms>; compiled in 1285 by monk Iryŏn (擩窴) mostly on the basis of Korean folklore, epigraphs, and narrative tradition) force us to resort to <Nihon shoki> in our quest for data pertaining to socio-political development of Taegaya. In the course of our work with <Nihon shoki> texts, self-evident distortions (mutual trade on official inter-state level through envoys being called "the offering of tribute"; military clashes characterized as "chastisement", etc.) will be adequately corrected, and problems of reliability caused by the character of primary materials and general attitude of the compilers will also be paid due attention. Still, I hope to show that Taegaya-related articles of <Nihon shoki> do contain the "nuclei" of authentic material usable for historical research.

1) The article on the "subjugating of the seven [Kaya] states" (齎玿讔攄) found under 3rd lunar month of the 49th year of Empress Jingu's (蜺俀) reign ("revised" dating is cr. 369) is hardly can be trusted literally both in its dating and content; still, it seems to have reflected certain historical facts. According to the article, the "Japanese expeditionary troops", led by "Paekche general" Mongna Kŭnja (椋崏陓簎), using T'aksun (瓕睯; Kaya polity, presumably located in today's Ch'angwŏn County, 鵽磭畈, of Southern Kyŏngsang Province, 杬葅欬堀) as their springboard, "subjugated" (Sino-Jap.: 讔攄) "seven lands" of Pijabal (楑簏懡/楑簏菑), Nam-Kara (欬吤崏), T'akkuk (瞨玿), Alla (颭崏), Tara (竘崏), T'aksun (瓕睯), and Kara (吤崏). After this, son of Paekche king Ch'ogo (鶣肵), named Kwisu (窀瑢), at the head of Paekche troops, came, and four lands, named Piri (楑跂; Chŏnju, 闀騅, or Naju, 崏騅, in Northern Chŏlla, 闀崏暕堀), Pyŏkchung (抗齌; Kimje, 旄藃 in Northern Chŏlla), P'omiji (鱣痧簳; Yuhŭng Village, 嶸⻗襟, in Kongju County 俖騅畈, Southern Ch'ungch'ŏng, 蘙鐓欬堀), and Pan'go (筌肵; Pannam, 絘欬, in Naju County, or, according to other version, T'aein, 鷙嬬, in Chŏngũp 懪錁 County, Northern Chŏlla) surrendered on their own. Finally, king of Paekche twice made an oath of "loyalty" and "vassalage" to "Japanese Emperor".

Views of modern scholars on this tale can be very roughly classified into "negativist" and "revisionist", with tiny minority of those who still accept this content at its face value. "Negativists" (Tsuda Shōkichi 藸鵃韺橔敆, Ikeuchi Hiroshi 糪珖拹, Yŏn Minsu 磎睌滫, etc.) regard the article as pure falsification by the <Nihon shoki> compilers meant to "explain" the "emergence" of the so-called "Japanese Government of Mimana" (曒栖擨塓搕) in the reign of Keidai (糽鐎) and mostly composed of the distorted fragments of later records "projected" into the past. "Revisionists" (Lee Byŏng-do, his disciple Ch'ŏn Gwan-u, Kim Hyŏn-gu 旄㪫牊, etc.) whose views truly revolutionized the <Nihon shoki>-based research on Kaya history suppose that the article is nothing but Paekche materials on subjugating of Mahan (堜粧) and, partly, Kaya communities by Paekche troops and concluding Paekche-Japanese alliance which were seriously distorted by the compilers ("alliance" was remade into Paekche "vassalage" to "Japan", etc.) Then, "moderate revisionists" (Lee Yŏng-sik) argue, with solid archaeological evidences used, that the factual "nucleus" of this lengthy article can be reduced to a single military action by Paekche against minor independent polities in what today is Southern Ch'ungch'ŏng and Northern Chŏlla Provinces, and possible Pakche campaign against Kaya forces of modern Imsil (曒裺) area (Northern Chŏlla) which could also influence Kara (later days' Taegaya), relatively close to Imsil geographically, but certainly not other Kaya entities. Lee Yŏng-sik maintains that several polities targeted by the Paekche campaign of 369 basically retained their independence, although may have been forced to enter into some kind of relationship with the new hegemon of the south-west of the Korean Peninsula, Paekche.

In accordance with the common point of all those "revisionist" theories - that the real subject of the "subjugation" (if "a military campaign" is not a more correct term) was rather Paekche that any of proto-Japanese polities, - I also start with the assumption that, in reality, the "subjugation" was that of a sector of today's Northern Chŏlla and Southern Ch'ungch'ŏng Provinces by Paekche and (probably, but not necessarily) Paekche-employed proto-Japanese subsidiary troops (曊亄), with the subsequent attack against some of the Naktong Valley-based Kaya principalities and, probably, Silla (the part concerning the "subjugation" of Silla is the least reliable here, for most of the <Nihon shoki> earlier records on Silla-Japanese relationship are mainly based on folk historic memory, anti-Silla prejudices of early 8th C. Japan, and anti-Silla spirit of emigre Paekche historical writings). As we could see, in this record of <Nihon shoki>, the sequence of enumeration of various Kaya polities is as follows: Pijabal (a.k.a. Pihwa-Kaya, 猼廴吤摮; today's Ch'angnyŏng County, 鵽珨畈, of Southern Kyŏngsang Province) and Nam-Kara (a.k.a. Kŭmgwan 倎巹, or Pon-Kaya 塓吽憒, i.e. "Main Kaya"; today's Kimhae County, 旄椾畈, of Southern Kyŏngsang Province) are listed among the first, and Kara (believed to be the matrix of future Taegaya) - is among the last. Therefore, it can be surmised that, rather that to target relatively weak Kara, Paekche, having attracted the Japanese sympathies by demonstrating the excellence of its goods and its readiness to trade them, strived to destabilize Nam-Kara's profitable trade with Japanese Archipelago and to include as many proto-Japanese polities as possible into its own trading network largely based on contacts with advanced Southern Chinese dynasties. Nam-Kara, Paekche's traditional rival in the trade with the proto-Japanese, is thought to have been dealt certain blow by this Paekche-led military operation, but Kara which still was not strong enough to actively participate in the regional rivalries, seems to have remained relatively undamaged. On the contrary, the partial weakening of Nam-Kara's positions which resulted from the Paekche-led military onslaught could provide Kara with the much-needed opportunity to increase its influence in Kaya region.

According to Ch'ŏn Gwan-u, the "subjugation" of Kaya territories by Paekche-led forces ushered the Kaya region in new era of "dependence" on Paekche and "subordinate relationship" with the latter. Still, the position of younger scholars, Kim Hyŏn-gu and Lee Mun-gi (麆湞哢), who maintain that the relationship between Paekche and Kaya region were "subordinate" rather in form than in essence, and that Paekche's military and trade predominance did not mean Kaya's complete political "dependence" on Paekche, seems to be closer to the historical realities. At any case, being somewhat included into Paekche's sphere of influence and forced to maintain various contacts with Paekche court, Kara's rulers were likely to have been seriously impressed by the military strength and cultural blossoming of Paekche's centralized aristocratical monarchy. Admittedly, the most reliable proof of Paekche influence on Kara's socio-cultural development would have been the discoveries of Paekche or Paekche-influenced relics in Kara graves of the relevant period. Unfortunately, the burials of 4th C. Koryŏng region are still relatively poorly known. On the other hand, among 6th C. Koryŏng burial mounds there are three ("Fresco mound" of Koa-dong, neighbouring "stone-chamber mound", and "Chŏlsang ch'ŏnjŏng" mound of Chisan-dong) built in the style of "cist with horizontal entrance" (hwaenghyŏl-sik sŏksil-myo) which was wider used in Paekche and Silla that in Kaya. One of those "heterogeneous" graves ("Fresco mound" of Koa-dong) was decorated with Buddhism-inspired mural painting of lotuses closely resembling that found in the Paekche grave Ｒ 6 of Songsan-ni, Kongju County, and "Fresco mound" of Nŭngsan-ni, Puyŏ County. If certain Paekche cultural influence on Kara in 6 C. can be proven, we can also suggest that such influence - or, at least, cultural contacts between Koryŏng region and Paekche - could have deeper historical roots. Moreover, Paekche diplomatical materials included into <Nihon shoki> portray Kaya territories as having become, culturally, ritually, and politically, nothing short of Paekche dependencies in late 4th C. Certainly, there is some grain of exaggeration in Paekche king's pompous statements about "time-honoured relations of subordination" between his kingdom and Kaya lands, but, on the whole, it seems to have reflected historical reality. Paekche king hardly could completely falsify the history of his country's relations with Kaya in the letter sent to Kaya rulers who, as it was very well understood in Paekche, were quite knowledgeable about their own history themselves - although certain rhetorical overstatement could take place. In a word, I suppose that from late 4th C. onward the process of socio-political and cultural development in Kara was, to some degree, influenced by Paekche, which succeeded in wining the position of predominance in the region. So, in M.Fried's terminology, Kara can be, to certain extent, referred to as "secondary state", socio-political and cultural development of which was "catalyzed" by a more advanced neighbouring society.

2) The records about Silla-instigated Japanese raid upon Kara (Taegaya), flight of Kara's "king" to Paekche, and ultimate "restoration" of Kara by the help of "Japanese Imperial Government" which originated from Paekche sources can be found under 62nd year of Jingu reign in <Nihon shoki> ("revised" date - ca. 382 or 442). According to this article, "Japanese court" was infuriated by Silla's failure to offer "tribute" to the "Esteemed Country" [of Japan] on time and sent "general" Sachihiko to "chastise" Silla. Silla sent a beautiful woman to seduce him, and, as a result of successful seduction, Sachihiko "chastised" Kara instead of Silla. King (wang) of Kara, hanki Kibon, with his sons Paekkuji, Asuji, Kuksari, Iramaju, and Imunji, had to flee to Paekche at the head of his subjects. King's younger sister, Kijŏnji, petitioned the Japanese, revealing to them the fact that Sachihiko, bribed by Silla, had "chastised" the wrong country. Irritated, the "Heavenly Emperor" [of Japan] sent Mongna Kŭnja (who was earlier described, as we remember, as a Paekche general) to restore Kara. As Paekche materials, those records are thought to be basically authentic, although they were visibly embellished and partially altered by the compilers of <Nihon shoki>. Japanese "general" Sochihiko, or Sachihiko (Kor. Sŭpchinŏn, or Sajibigwe respectively) who is said to have "raided" Kara, was probably a pro-Silla proto-Japanese chieftain married to a Silla woman, or a Paekche official of Japanese ancestry. Mongna Kŭnja (Jap. Mokura Konichi) who is said to have "restored" Kara was, according to <Nihon shoki> record under 3rd lunar month of Jingo's 49th year of reign, a "Paekche general"; so, the "savior" of Kara was Paekche - where Kara "king" fled to - rather than any of proto-Japanese chiefdoms. In a nutshell, those records initially should have described a conflict between Paekche and Silla over supremacy in Kaya region, in which Japanese subsidiary troops were somehow hired and used by Silla. Later, in mid-6th C., some of the officials of Japanese mission to Ara-Kaya (which was blown into "Japanese Government of Mimana" by the compilers of <Nihon shoki>) were hired and used by Silla in a very similar way, the only difference being the lack of military power on the part of Ara-Kaya-stationed Japanese mission.

One detail of this story germane to our subject is the title of "king" (Kor. wang) which was purportedly used by Kara's ruler, hanki Kibon. As No Jung-guk maintains, this title could be a later interpolation, but it hardly was possible that Paekche historians, who usually considered all Kaya lands Paekche's "natural dependencies" and later never called Kara by its proud native cognomen of Taegaya ("Great [among] Kaya [territories]") thus refusing to recognize the latter's hegemony among Kaya principalities, would have consciously elevated Kara ruler's position. Then, we should remember that in Paekche materials included into <Nihon shoki> all ancient Korean official titles are usually treated extremely carefully. For example, in the accounts on Paekche-chaired "Meetings for the restoration of Imna" (Kor. Imna puhŭng hweŭi) found under 4th lunar month of Kimmei's 2nd year (541) and 11th lunar month of Kimmei's 5th year (544) many original Kaya titles including that of hanki ("chieftain", descendant of the rulers of previously independent regional or consanguineous community afterwards included into a bigger principality, or a ruler of smaller independent semi-state), ch'ahanki ("junior hanki", descendant of the rulers of a weaker community afterwards annexed by a bigger one), sangsuwi (hanki's high-ranked retainer), etc, are meticulously listed. Among all Kaya rulers, only that of the two strongest principalities, Kara and Alla (Ara-Kaya, today's Haman County of Southern Kyŏngsang Province), are ever called "kings" (wang) in <Nihon shoki>, with all others routinely mentioned as hanki only, hanki being the most widely used title for the rulers of smaller independent Kaya polities. The fact that in the record in question Kara's Kibon was mentioned as both hanki and "king" suggests that at that period Kara grew in strength and raised its international status to the degree enabling its hanki to lay claim to "king"'s title which would equate him with the then hegemon of the southern part of the Peninsula, the king of Paekche. And, judging by the fact that this title, as we can see here, appears in a Paekche source later included into a Japanese history, both Paekche and its proto-Japanese allies must have acknowledged the rise of Kara's position implied by the use of this title. We can also suggest that such elevation of a country's international status must have been backed by certain strengthening of centralized governing structure and consequent military build-up, and it is very probable that in pursuit of higher degree of power consolidation Kara rulers did emulate, consciously or unconsciously, Paekche's powerful autocrats whose reputed military machine demonstrated its superiority to Kaya people during the raid of 369. Other noteworthy fact is that in the record in question not only the name of Kara's "king" hanki Kibon, but also the cognomina of his sons and younger sister were also carefully listed. It would hardly have happened unless the children and relatives of Kibon had played prominent role in Kara politics. Thus, one can suggest that the process of the concentration of power in the hands of one hereditary ruling clan, typical for the "chiefdom societies" at the stage of the building of early statehood, did take place in Kara of late 4th - early 5th C. too. It is also surmisable that Kibon's younger sister's reported negotiations with "Japanese Emperor" about military assistance against Sochihiko/Sachihiko's raid meant that, encouraged by the example of Paekche's successful alliance with proto-Japanese polities, Kara, on strengthening its administrative and military structure, also attempted to enter the stage of international diplomacy of the period.

As we could see above, the main role in establishing Paekche hegemony in Kaya region (ca. 369) and repulsing the Silla-sponsored attack against Kara (ca. 382 or 442) was played by Paekche general Mongna Kŭnja, who is thought to have belonged to the family of Mok (椋, also known as Mongna, 椋栲, or Mokhyŏp, 椋竲), one of the famed "eight aristocratic clans" of Paekche known from Chinese sources (<Pei Shih>, fascicle 90, "Account of Paekche"; <Sui Shu>, fascicle 81, "Account of Paekche", etc.). It seems possible that Mongna Kŭnja-led military and diplomatic actions in Kaya region have increased his clan's influence on the affaires of that region. This supposition is backed by the content of interlinear comments to <Nihon shoki> article under 25th year of Ojin ("revised" date is ca. 414). Supposedly, the political and military influence of Mok clan limited, to some degree, the independence of Kaya polities. Still, it does not mean that Kara, as well as other Kaya territories, was completely incorporated into Paekche's sphere of influence. <Nihon shoki> shows that Kaya peoples retained their right to maintain independent diplomatic relationship with foreign lands (prominently, proto-Japanese polities) and their ability to wage external wars. It is recorded, for instance, in <Nihon shoki> under the 9th lunar month of Ojin's 7th year ("revised" date is ca. 396) that Kaya envoys participated in diplomatic contacts with the proto-Japanese on equal footing with the missions of the three main ancient Korean kingdoms. No less than Paekche kings, Kaya rulers succeeded in winning over various proto-Japanese chieftains to their side and using the latter in their interests. Typical example of such kind of relationship is the story of Kungwŏl-gun (眃篘珋; Jap.: Yumitsuki-no kimi) told in <Nihon shoki> under the 14th year and 8th lunar month of 16th year of Ojin ("revised" dates - ca. 403-405). According to the tale, a large group of supposedly Paekche and Kaya migrants wishing to move to Japanese Archipelago, was blocked in Kara by Silla forces. Their leader, Kungwŏl-gun, successfully solicited the military assistance of "Japanese Imperial Court", but even the representatives of the latter could not raise the blockade for three years. We should remember that at that period the decisive element of the political situation on the Peninsula was the sharp confrontation between Paekche, allied with the proto-Japanese and Kaya, on one side, and Koguryŏ, in league with its junior partner, Silla, on the other side. Koguryŏ's belligerent king, famed Kwanggaet'o (319-413), dealt Paekche a series of crushing blows in the great battles of 395 and 396, and then, in 400, wiped out the latter's proto-Japanese allies who, using Kaya as their military springboard, attempted to invade Silla. During this operation, Koguryŏ's armies (and, probably, the troops of their Silla allies too) are thought to have occupied, at least, partly, Kaya lands for some time. Further Japanese attempt to invade Koguryŏ itself (404) was also successfully repulsed. Still, weaker partner, Silla, remained a target for Paekche (403) and Japanese (407) attacks, and even had to establish friendly relationship with a proto-Japanese polity (402). Devastating war with mightier Koguryŏ, consequent military drafts and requisitions of property increased the number of refugees in Paekche (399), and, probably, in Kaya too. It seems only natural that, under such circumstances, a group of Paekche and Kaya refugees tried to reach friendly Japanese lands. It is noteworthy that, being besieged by Silla forces in Kara, the group of Paekche and Kaya migrants artfully used their diplomatic relationship with the proto-Japanese to secure their emigration to the Japanese Archipelago.

3) Afterwards, in mid-5th C., Silla managed to break out of its unequal alliance with Koguryŏ (450-455) and forged anti-Koguryŏ alliance with its erstwhile rival, Paekche. Kara (Taegaya), being still under certain political influence of Paekche, had to adopt friendlier course towards Silla too. Basically, the emergence of tripartite anti-Koguryŏ alliance of Paekche, Silla, and Kaya lands (of them, Kara is thought to play the most prominent part) served also the best interests of Kara itself, for southward expansion of Koguryŏ threatened its stability and trade ties with the Japanese Islands. That was the reason Kara actively helped Silla to solicit military help of proto-Japanese troops when Silla was attacked by large Koguryŏ army some time after the Silla-Koguryŏ schism. This fact shows active diplomatic role of Kara (Taegaya) within the tripartite anti-Koguryŏ alliance of southern Korean states and close connections between Kara and proto-Japanese forces.

4) As is widely known, in 475 Koguryŏ once again scored a big victory in its epochal struggle against arch-rival Paekche, sacking the latter's capital, Hansŏng, and killing Paekche's king Kaero (r. 455-475). Forced to move its capital to Ŭngjin (today's Kongju in Southern Ch'ungch'ŏng Province) - for Hansŏng and surrounding lands of River Han valley were now lost to the "Northern Enemy" - Paekche for some time had its central government extremely weakened, with powerful noble families (Hae, Paek, etc.) establishing their powerbases in provinces and repeatedly revolting against monarchical authority. On the other hand, the Mok (a.k.a. Mokhyŏp, or Mongna) clan which owed its strong positions in Kaya region to its proximity to successive Paekche monarchs (Mokhyŏp Manch'i, known as Mok Manch'i from <Nihon shoki>, is said to have escorted short-lived King Munju after the great defeat of 475. See <Samguk sagi>, fascicle 25, 9th lunar month of 21st year of King Kaero), was heavily affected by the upheaval and seems to have lost part of its influence, at least temporarily. Kim Hyŏn-gu, who summarized the theories of some of Japanese and Korean scholars of the past, maintains that at some time between 475 and 478 large part of the members of Mok family had to emigrate to the Japanese Archipelago, were former Paekche noblemen gradually gained strength and eventually became the ancestors of mighty Soga clan which virtually ruled Japan in 587-645. Due to the temporary weakening of Paekche and territorial shift in Mok's powerbase, Kaya political entities - Kara (future Taegaya) being the foremost among them - which had already reached certain level of social and political maturity, could almost completely free themselves from traditional bonds of subordination to Paekche. Other Kaya's neighbour, Silla, was at the time all too busy with checking Koguryŏ's southward expansion to pay serious attantion to Kaya affairs. Due to such a favourable turn in international situation, Kara, with relatively strong monarchical power already being quite firmly established, could raise to the position of Kaya's regional leader and adopted new official name, Taegaya ("Great Kaya"), which fully displayed the seriousness of its ambitions. As the hegemon and representative of Kaya regional league, which is thought to have taken shape after Kaya's erstwhile dominant power, Paekche, sustained an overwhelming defeat in 475, Taegaya (still known to the Chinese as Kara) offered its tribute to the Southern Ch'i (479-502) in 479, Taegaya king Haji (known as Kasil from Korean sources) being granted honorary Chinese title in reward. After this meaningful "legitimization" of Taegaya's newly raised international status by what was perceived as the "civilizational centre" at that time, <Samguk sagi> (fascicle 3) records show how active Taegaya foreign policy became: in 481 (3rd year of Soji-maripkan's reign) Taegaya, along with Paekche, rendered military assistance to Silla, attacked by Koguryŏ and malgal troops, and in 496 (18th year of the same ruler) it approached Silla with presents, in obvious attempt to guarantee itself from possible future encroachment by Paekche. As we can see, for approximately two decades after 475, Taegaya acted on the international scene as an equal member of anti-Koguryŏ alliance of southern Korean states, and displayed remarkable mastery of diplomatic technique of the epoch.

5) However, in the beginning of 6th C. political situation in the southern part of the Peninsula again began to undergo significant changes. In last years of the reign of king Tongsŏng (479-501) and during the reign of king Muryŏng (501-523) Paekche monarchy, on reconfirming its close relationship with Southern Ch'i (in early 490th), reinforcing its control over the provinces and stabilizing general political conditions, assumed the offensive in the ceaseless war against Koguryŏ and won some important victories. With the power apparatus of the centralized monarchy restored by Muryŏng's decisive and balanced measures, Paekche could resume its eastward expansion into Kaya lands. Main objectives of this offensive against Kaya entities were, first, to seize the fertile lands of Naktong River valley and thus secure new sources of tax revenue; second, to take possession of Taegaya's famed iron mines (in today's Yaro district of Koryŏng County) needed to provide raw materials for weapon-making; third, and very important, to capture strategically important Kaya fortresses near Silla border (for example, Kuryemora Fortress on T'aksun territory) and prepare a military springboard for possible future conflict with Silla. In fact, some Paekche diplomatical documents quoted in <Nihon shoki> give grounds to suggest that, by mobilizing Kaya populace and building partly locally staffed fortresses in Kaya territories bordering on Silla, Paekche wished to concentrate its own resources on the struggle with its main rival, mighty Koguryŏ; Paekche kings did not want to see their crack troops diverted to what they perceived as negligible border clashes until in 554 Silla unexpectedly dealt its one-time ally first serious blow. Also, Paekche kings could be interested in monopolizing burgeoning Korea-Japanese trade and various contacts with the Islands, which traditionally used to have been conducted equally by Paekche and Kaya entities.

6) According to <Nihon shoki> (2nd lunar month of the 3rd year of Keidai), in 509 Paekche forcibly returned the descendants of its refugees who lived in Kaya lands, in some cases, in 2nd or 3rd generation. This action, aimed at re-populating the provinces devastated by wars, revolts, and famines, meant also the resumption of Paekche's eastward expansion once suspended by the defeat of 475. At the same time, the mention of Paekche migrants who lived in Kaya lands for generations tells us about the scale and depth of Paekche influences on Kaya culture of 5th C.

7) After this, probably, partly due to lack of any effective immediate counter-measures from Taegaya side, Paekche continued its advance into Kaya lands. Around 512, Paekche forcibly seized (according to <Nihon shoki>, "received" as a "grant" from "Japanese Government") four Kaya territories, known from <Nihon shoki> (12th lunar month of 6th year of Keidai's reign) as Sang-Dari (葞竘跁, "Upper" Tari), Ha-Dari (欞竘跁, "Lower" Tari), Sat'a (瘐爟), and Moru (楰蚰). Their exact location hardly will ever be known; hypotheses are abundant (Suematsu Yasukazu maintained that the territories were located in today's Southern Chŏlla Province; Ch'ŏn Gwan-u was in favour of the theory that Paekche's eastward expansion in early 6th C. had the valleys of Naktong River's mid-stream and downstream as its primary object, etc.), the most reliable among them being the supposition that the four territories were located in Sŏmjin River basin. If this theory is to be believed, the main objective of Paekche's easterly advance must have been to intercept the Sŏmjin Kaya-Japan trading route so that the brisk export of Korean handicrafts to the Japanese Islands could be monopolized by Paekche court. Threatened by Koguryŏ incursions from the north and constantly on the alert for potential encroachments by Silla on the east, Paekche sometimes needed military assistance of Japanese chieftains and was willing to repay by providing them with exquisite prestigious goods and other items related to the advanced Sino-Korean culture. Thus, Kaya entities, proud with their own active and dynamic contacts with proto-Japanese kinglets, were viewed by Paekche court as dangerous rivals. It is also quite clear that Kaya's (and Paekche's) trading partners on the other side of Korea Strait must have been aware about the changes in Peninsular conditions and have reacted positively to them - otherwise, Paekche, fully conscious of potential aftermath of its actions for international trading networks, would not have been so audacious. Such ex post facto positive reaction of interested proto-Japanese chieftains, very probably bought by generous gifts of Paekche's king, was later renamed in <Nihon shoki> into "granting" of the four territories to Paekche by "Japanese Government".

8) Its vital trading interests being seriously affected, Taegaya had to respond to the aggression with a mighty counteroffensive. Around 513, Taegaya attacked and seized old Kaya territories of Kimun (most historians locate it in today's Namwŏn, Koksŏng, or Imsil Counties of Chŏlla Province; Ch'ŏn Gwan-u favours Kaeryŏng in Kŭmnŭng County, Northern Kyŏngsang Province, as possible location), thus securing the valleys of Sŏmjin mid-stream and important part of the trading route to the Japanese Islands (<Nihon shoki>, 6th month of Keidai's 7th year; interestingly, informing their Japanese partners of those events, Paekche envoys contemptuously referred to Taegaya by its old 4th C. name, Panp'a, thus refusing to recognize Taegaya's current leading position in the region).

9) Struck by Taegaya's counterattack, Paekche acted promptly: at the end of 513, Kimun region was recaptured, and "scholar of Five Classics" (i.e. specialist in Confucianist scriptures), Tan Yang-i, was sent to the Japanese partners in attempt to buy their consent to the Paekche-imposed changes in the regime of the trade between the Peninsula and the Islands. As we can see from many of <Nihon shoki> records, Paekche scholars, skilled craftsmen, divinators, healers, and, later, Buddhist monks and nuns were greatly valued in the Japanese Archipelago where at that time native specialists of such kind were totally lacking; so Paekche's attempt in "culture-exporting diplomacy" proved successful, and necessary consent was given. Taegaya's envoy, Chipchi, tried to overbid Paekche, enticing his hosts with "rare treasures" ("藟傸"; probably, luxurious handiwork), but unsuccessfully: for the haut monde of early Japanese proto-states, which needed to import classical Chinese culture, but had only very scarce contacts with China proper at that period, Paekche-supplied Confucian scholars fully knowledgeable about Chinese writing system were much more valuable than Kaya handicrafts. <Nihon shoki>, as usual, refers to this competition between two potential suppliers of advanced culture as "offering of tribute", and states that Kimun was "granted" to Paekche by the "Japanese imperial court", but it is quite obvious that the latter - if the entity under such title existed at that time at all - hardly had any military power on the Peninsula able to influence the course of Paekche-Taegaya confrontation (11th month of Keidai's 7th year). Archaeologically, it is interesting to note that in Namwŏn region (presumable location of ancient Kimun) 5th-6th C. burials (Wŏlsan-ni, Kŏnji-ri, and Turang-ni mounds) still dominant Kaya material culture (represented by typically Kaya-style stone cist-tombs with vertical entrance, big sabers with inlaid hilts, long-necked lidded pottery, horse armours, etc.), sometimes suggestive of Taegaya influence, co-existed with characteristically Paekche elements (serpent head-like long iron arrow-heads, neckless or short-necked pottery, etc.; those elements were gradually gaining more and more important position, especially from early 6th C. onwards), giving vivid impression of the border region disputed by mightier neighbours.

10) Defeated in diplomatic competition, Taegaya had to resort to military means. According to <Nihon shoki> (3rd lunar month of Keidai's 8th year), in 514 Taegaya (still contemptuously referred to as Panp'a, in display of obvious Paekche origins of the record) built fortresses and beacon-towers in Chat'an (Kim T'ae-sik places it in Kŏch'ang; there are also Chinju and Ch'irwŏn theories) and Taesa (a.k.a. Tasa), the latter being an important port (in the vicinity of today's Hadong in Southern Kyŏngsang Province) through which much of the trade with Japanese Archipelago was conducted. The purpose of those preparations must have been to guarantee the continuation of Kaya trade with the Japanese Islands, as well as to beef up the defence of Kaya League's western border where incursions of Paekche army or Japanese bands under its banner could be expected. At the same time, on having built fortresses on Kaya's border with Silla, in places known from <Nihon shoki> as Iryŏlbi (usually thought to have been located in today's Ŭiryŏng of Southern Kyŏngsang Province, also Suematsu pointed to Chain Township of Kyŏngsan County, Northern Kyŏngsang Province as other possible location) and Masubi (probably, Samga Township of Hapch'ŏn County, Southern Kyŏngsang Province), Taegaya troops made several raids against that time Paekche ally, Silla, enriching Taegaya coffers through plundering of Silla inhabitants' valuables and enslaving of prisoners. Probably, it were the Taegaya incursions that forced Silla to build a "lesser capital" (sogyŏng) in Asich'on (thought to have been located too somewhere near today's Ŭiryŏng, close to Kaya borders) and resettle the populace of central districts there in the same year, thus strengthening the defence of its western periphery (<Samguk sagi>, fascicle 4, 1st lunar month, 15th year of king Chijŭng's reign). Bearing in mind that at that time Silla was still weaker than Paekche, did not possess sophisticated military administration (its Ministry of War, Pyŏngbu, was established only in 517), and until 500 was a victim of permanent Japanese plundering raids, it is easy to understand why it was easier for Taegaya aristocracy to amass their fortunes by looting Silla villages than to risk their lives in battles with well-trained and well-equipped Paekche army. 11) Using their ability to provide their Japanese partners with advanced Sino-Korean logographs-based culture as their main bargaining chip, Paekche in 515 succeeded, through the good offices of its envoy, Chŏmi Mun'gwi, in employing a Japanese mercenary band, led by certain Mononobe-no Muraji, for the sake of attacking Taegaya's newly fortified positions in the port of Taesa. As usual, <Nihon shoki> (2nd lunar month of 9th year of Keidai's reign) tells us, that Mononobe went to Korea "on Imperial rescript", but we have all grounds to assume that Paekche had its own separate connections with mighty house of Mononobe and the latter hardly needed even the formal confirmation from its Yamato sovereign (whose power still was rather titularly at that period) to help its continental friends. A later <Nihon shoki> record (3rd month of the 5th year of Kimmei) where certain Mononobe naesol (Paekche's 6th official rank) Kibi is mentioned as Paekche official dispatched to Kaya shows that alliance between Paekche kings and Mononobe clan went to the extent of promoting the members of the latter into Paekche officialdom. Therefore, phrases like "Imperial rescript", obviously interpolated by the post-Taika zealots of "tenno-centered order" should not be taken seriously.

Expedition of Mononobe was extremely important symbolically for the development of relationship in the "triangle" Paekche-Kaya-Japanese Islands, for it showed that Japanese partners now favoured Paekche over Kaya and disapprove of Taegaya efforts to retain the Sŏmjin trading route. However, militarily, it was disastrous for the attacking side - according to <Nihon shoki>, Mononobe's band was completely defeated by Taegaya troops, even its clothes being taken by victorious Taegaya warriors as their trophy. Panic-stricken, Mononobe and his men fled upstream by Sŏmjin River up to the Paekche-held territory of Kimun, where they were met by Paekche envoy, Mokhyŏp Pulma Kappae (as we remember, Mok/Mokhyŏp's clan historically had close connections with the proto-Japanese), who rewarded the hapless warriors with Paekche's traditional export items: silk and iron weapons (5th month of 10th year of Keidai's reign). Generous payment received by Mononobe band, despite the failure of its expedition, is thought to have made the ruling strata of Japanese Islands even more pro-Paekche and estranged from Kaya than before. To perpetuate this favourable attitude, in 516 Paekche sent to the Islands one more "Scholar of Five Classics", a naturalized Chinese (齾) named Kao An-wu (Kor. Ko An-mu), who probably was meant to alternate with Tan Yang-i, sent 3 years before (9th month of 10th year of Keidai). With the establishment of the system of permanent residence of alternating Paekche-sent scholars in the Islands, Paekche's cultural influence on the Islanders has remarkably risen. After some time, Paekche at last seized the port of Tasa, which subsequently became an important gateway on the route connecting Paekche with the Islands. Eventually, it was Paekche influence that, through exporting Buddhism, Chinese literacy, and various advanced knowledge and techniques, made decisive contribution in development of 6th C. Japanese culture. And the prelude to this monumental series of the dissemination of advanced culture was the victory over Taegaya which paved the way for progress in Paekche-Japanese contacts.

12) On the other side, defeated in the fight for control over the trade with the Japanese Islands, Taegaya felt much isolated. It also viewed possible further advances of Paekche into neighbouring Kaya territories as major potential danger for its leadership among Kaya communities, and, in future, for its very independent existence. As a countermeasure to Paekche assault upon Kaya's western borders, Taegaya chose alliance with Silla, in hope of using imminent conflict of interests between two biggest states of southern Korea to its advantage. According to <Samguk sagi> (fascicle 4, the 3rd lunar month of king Pŏphŭng's 9th year), in 522, on Taegaya's request, Silla, once a victim of Taegaya looting raids, agreed to conclude a marriage alliance with the latter, and permitted Taegaya king's marriage with the daughter of a Silla aristocrat, Pijobu (very similar record can be found in <Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam>, fascicle 29, article on Koryŏng County; in <Nihon shoki>, this marriage is mentioned, but the date is different, and explanations of the circumstances are rather far-fetched). The obvious objective of Taegaya's new politics of alliance with Silla was to balance Paekche's growing influence in Kaya region and, thus, guarantee its independence from possible future Paekche encroaching. We should admit that this kind of the policy of the "balance of forces" when Taegaya checked Paekche advance through alliance with Silla and, if necessary, allied with Paekche in cases Silla became too troublesome, worked well to preserve Taegaya's independence for more than four decades. Also, the alliance with Silla meant the acknowledgement by Silla of Taegaya's leading role inside the Kaya league, and such kind of recognition on the part of one of the two major states of southern Korea must have raised Taegaya's status inside the wider Kaya community. On the other hand, on having secured the neutrality of Taegaya, Silla could activize its advance into southern Kaya lands which culminated in the annexion of Nam-Kara in 532. Both alliance between Taegaya and Silla and Silla's expansion into southern Kaya territories were anathema to Paekche which regarded it as serious danger for its eastern borders, and, in the result, the Paekche-Silla relationship were damaged beyond repair. The worsening of the relationship between two main southern Korean states resulted in the war of 554 where Paekche's king Sŏng was killed; after this, more than 100 years-long rivalry between the two which resulted in the annihilation of Paekche by allied Silla-T'ang forces began. The fact that, being fully conscious about the possible grim consequences of the alliance with Taegaya for its relationship with Paekche, Silla still did decide on this course of action bespeaks the importance of Taegaya for Silla policies. As a result of its alliance with Silla, Taegaya succeeded in protecting Kaya region from further Paekche expansion, but, on the other hand, made itself defenceless in the face of Silla aggression which began with annexion of weaker southern Kaya communities but then gradually became the major threat for Taegaya too. The struggle for independence against both Paekche and Silla expansionist drives (522-562) undeniably made Kaya social and political structures more sophisticated, but the socio-political developments of this period should be the theme of separate paper and will not be discussed here.

III.

1) Now I will attempt to discuss the stages of Taegaya socio-economic and political development from mid-4th to early 6th C. (up to 522), mainly on the basis of <Nihon shoki> materials cited above. The general conclusion we can draw from the above-quoted sources is that Taegaya's development was greatly catalyzed by external factors, such as its diplomatic and trading relationship (especially with the Japanese Islands) and the hegemony among Kaya principalities it eventually achieved. Up to mid-4th C. Kaya (especially southern Kaya) entities were led by then strongest polity of Nam-Kara (a.k.a. Pon-Kaya, or Kŭmgwan) which almost monopolized trading and diplomatic relationship with the Japanese Islands, and Panp'a (future Kara, then renamed into Taegaya) was relatively small and weak. Due to almost complete lack of any relevant narrative evidences, we can not reach any conclusion about Panp'a's degree of socio-political development before mid-4th C., but it is surmisable that Panp'a, as well as other Pyŏnjin communities described in the "Account of Eastern Outlanders" of <San-Guo Chih> was a "chiefdom society" where the process of class stratification has just begun.

2) Ca. 369, on having established first contacts with the proto-Japanese, Paekche is thought to have attacked Nam-Kara and wrested the virtual monopoly on the trade with the Islands from the latter. The final blow to Nam-Kara being dealt by the southerly expedition of Koguryŏ's king Kwanggaet'o in 400, the emerging vacuum of political and military strength in Kaya region was gradually filled by the growth of Panp'a (which started to use the new name of Kara around this time). As we could see from <Nihon shoki> records cited above, already in 382 (or 442) the hanki, chief of Kara, has started the use of Chinese title of wang, "king", and could delegate some part of his power to his sons and relatives, who conducted diplomatical negotiations on his behalf. It means that hanki's political and administrative power has already been institutionalized as that of the clan of hereditary rulers and was duly respected by Kara's larger neighbours, especially by Paekche which is thought to have been the main counterpart in the negotiations. Taking into consideration that Paekche wielded certain influence over the Kaya region at the time, we can suppose that Kara could consciously imitate some elements of Paekche monarchical system and that the success of this mimicry was acknowledged by Paekche authorities who found it possible and necessary to lend a helping hand to Kara rulers. Certainly, the external stimuli to the development of more sophisticated institutions of government in Kara must have been matched by a corresponding degree of internal maturity (social stratification, formation of the separate stratum of military aristocracy topped by the ruling clan, certain amount of wealth and political influence accumulated by this stratum, etc.). On the other hand, the fact that indigenous and less prestigious title of hanki was used in parallel with "newly imported" (obviously, from Paekche) and more "exalted" title of wang shows the limitation placed on fledgling monarchical system by the tradition of collective rule of the group of hanki, chiefs of the main territorial communities Kara consisted of. Then, the fact that without Paekche assistance Kara could not drive back a band of Silla-employed proto-Japanese warriors bespeaks the weakness of Kara's military (which probably, still consisted of separate detachments formed by the men of constituent communities and headed by their traditional chiefs, and did not have regular officer corps) and its consequent dependence on Paekche "protection". In a nutshell, in late 4th C. Kara still was a "chiefdom society", although social stratification and the formation of institutionalized power structures made certain progress.

3) In 369-475, Kaya region is thought to have been under the influence of Paekche Mok (a.k.a. Mokhyŏp, or Mongna) clan; collateral effect of its domination was the stimulus to emulate Paekche centralized monarchical system it gave to Kara's ruling stratum. The latter could not but recognize that only monarchy with regular standing army and sophisticated administrative systems (regular taxation, corvee labour, etc.) needed to support the strong military can dominate the neighbouring regions and conduct active expansionist policy. In first half and middle part of 5th C. Kara also learns from Paekche how to use military force and economic strength for the sake of diplomatic gains: like Paekche, it maintains diplomatic and trading contacts with the proto-Japanese, use its influence on the latter to help Silla to repulse Koguryŏ invasion, and participates in Paekche and Silla's battles with invading Koguryŏ troops on its own. Such trading, military and diplomatic activity shows the increased degree of Kara's socio-political maturity and consequent enhancement of its international prestige. On the other hand, the fact that Kara sometimes had to resort to its contacts with proto-Japanese chieftains instead of providing its own troops shows that, militarily, Kara still was weaker than its larger neighbours and did not possess regular and bureaucratized professional military organization needed for conquests and external expansion. Society where institutionalized power of hereditary rulers still is not supported by supra-tribal, formalized and professionalized tool of violence and where, consequently, the ruling stratum can not expand its power externally (by conquests) and internally (by violent destroying of pre-state forms of social organization), should be referred to as "advanced chiefdom", or "semi-state", rather than as "state". Still, if not for its comparatively high level of institutional development, Kara would probably have been simply annexed by its stronger and domineering neighbour, Paekche. In a word, Kara was not strong enough to get rid of Paekche interference, and at the same time was not too weak, otherwise it would have been completely swallowed by Paekche.

4) After the great defeat Paekche suffered in 475, the weakened monarchy became absorbed in restoring its power and bringing province-based aristocracy back under its control; so, Kara seized the opportunity to redefine its relationship with its one-time suzerain and recover its independence. Such changes of international order in southern Korea was expedited by Paekche's crushing defeat, but, first of all, basically brought about by Kaya's own economical growth and socio-political development. It is interesting to compare, for example, the success of Kara-led league of Kaya polities in breaking from Paekche's sphere of influence with the spectacular failure of Yubigi (presumably a Paekche provincial nobleman, who, after his flight to the Japanese Islands, adopted the name and title of Ki-no Ohiha-no Sukune) and his chief lieutenant, Chwaro Nagit'a Kappae (presumably a Kaya aristocrat with very close Paekche connections), who attempted in 487 to establish their own independent state on the territory of Irim which is thought to have been located in Paekche-dominated border area strongly influenced also by Koguryŏ and Kaya (Taehŭng Township of Yesan County, Southern Ch'ungch'ŏng Province, and Imsil County of Northern Chŏlla Province are the most influential of all existing surmises on Irim location). As we know from <Nihon shoki> (the 3rd year of Kenjo), Yubigi's rebellion was successfully quelled by Paekche army, with its leaders - many of them of Kaya descent - either being killed or forced to seek asylum in Japanese Islands. As we can see, the attempt to seize the opportunity and get out of Paekche orbit could lead to grave consequences for a community lacking resources and political consolidation, but that was not Kara's case. Utilizing the approximate 15 years of Paekche's comparative weakness after the catastrophe of 475, Kara succeeded in tying majority of Kaya polities into one political and military league under its leadership. Kara's new name, Taegaya ("Great Kaya"), adopted at this period, symbolized, among other things, the relation of succession between Pon-Kaya, or "Main Kaya" (a.k.a. Nam-Kara), the former leader of Kaya polities' confederation, and the new hegemon of Kaya League. Taegaya's diplomatic contacts with Silla (which were that of the equals) and, most importantly, Southern Ch'i (of which Taegaya, on a par with Paekche, became a formal "tributary"), meant that, as the representative of Kaya league, Taegaya - at least, in its foreign relationship - became an equal of its former suzerain, Paekche. On the basis of <Nihon shoki> materials and other narrative evidences cited above we can suggest that to the end of 5th C. Taegaya developed to the level of "early state" capable of sustaining sophisticated diplomatic and military operations of its rulers.

5) As we could see from <Nihon shoki> records, Taegaya maintained close trading and diplomatic relationship with the Japanese Islands through the Sŏmjin route. Judging from records that Taegaya provided its Japanese partners with "precious goods" - silk, iron-made weapons, etc. - we can assume that separate social stratum of professional craftsmen and artisans did exist in Taegaya, and that is were those professionals of the crafts who created artistically excellent pottery, weaponry, and personal ornaments found in Taegaya noblemen's burials of Chisan-dong and Pon'gwan-dong in Koryŏng. Such separation of farming and handicraft meant that the process of social stratification went quite far. Highly developed handicraft was the basis of Taegaya's brisk trade with the Japanese Islands which greatly expedited the accumulation of wealth by Taegaya's ruling class and its further separation from the rest of society, and which, after 512, was constantly endangered by Paekche's attempts to forcibly monopolize it. Those attempts faced Taegaya's persistent resistance, for Taegaya's growing ruling class hardly wished to be deprived of the main source of its wealth and prestige. As it could be expected, Paekche's attacks on Kaya trading routes provoked a series of armed conflicts between Paekche and Taegaya-led Kaya league. In the process of this "trade war", Taegaya successfully attacked Paekche and Silla lands, and repulsed the attack of a band of proto-Japanese warriors on Paekche service. Taegaya's ultimate defeat was, in fact, more of the shift of the Japanese attention toward Paekche than of simple military failure. The inhabitants of the Islands were lured by Paekche's ability to supply them with the Chinese logographs-based advanced continental culture shown by sending the "Scholars of Five Classics" (Tan Yang-i, Kao An-wu) to the land where even indigenous specialists in Chinese writing, not to speak of high-level professionals of Confucian Classics, were in great shortage at that time. This pro-Paekche attitude of the nascent ruling stratum of the Japanese Island, and not only the military superiority of Paekche over Taegaya-led Kaya troops - in fact, in <Nihon shoki>, which is based largely on Paekche materials, no definite victories of Paekche armies over Kaya people are recorded - was the main reason forcing Taegaya-headed Kaya coalition to evacuate main Kaya strongholds on Sŏmjin route, namely Kimun and port Tasa.

The strength shown by Kaya troops in the confrontation with Paekche, and Taegaya's victories over Silla and proto-Japanese bands known from <Nihon shoki> records demonstrates that professional and well-organized army has already come into existence in Taegaya in early 6th C. The existence of professionalized groups of soldiers and craftsmen bespeaks, in its turn, comparatively high level of social stratification and division of labour in Taegaya. Then, the fact that, during the confrontation with Paekche, Taegaya built fortresses and beacon-towers on the territories of other Kaya polities show the degree of consolidation between the members of Kaya league, as well as the existence of the system of corvee labour mobilization in Kaya communities. The existence of such system implies also the availability of reasonably developed administrative institutions which can guarantee the organized requisition of workforce, control over the process of construction, supply of materials, etc. Therefore, we can conjecture that, in some form, certain variant of supra-communal, ranked, and centrally controlled administrative system capable of extraction of surplus value from the ruled (at least, in form of corvee labour) did exist in Taegaya. And basically aristocratic society ruled by hereditary monarchs and capable of sustaining specialized groups of craftsmen, soldiers, and administrators can be viewed as typical "early state". In fact, if Silla court had not perceived its Taegaya counterparts as the rulers of a state equal to their own, the marriage of Taegaya's king to the daughter of Silla aristocrat would hardly have been possible.

Finishing this paper, I feel obliged to note three of its serious limitations. First, materials of <Nihon shoki> are sometimes distorted and embellished to the point rational research is almost impossible, although many of them are based on reliable Paekche sources. Second, I almost did not use archaeological sources, although new findings in Koryŏng give the rare chance to observe the process of development of Panp'a-Kara-Taegaya material culture from mid-4th C. up to the annexion of Taegaya by Silla in 562. Third, to develop and further prove the thesis of existence of "early statehood" in Taegaya before Silla conquest, <Nihon shoki> records for 522-562 I deliberately did not deal with (on account of space considerations) in this paper should be also used. I hope I will be able to analyze those later records in next work which will be a continuation of the present paper.

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