Identity work - moving the 'theory of the subject' from 'division' to 'depth' in critical organizational analysis

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Introduction

The politics of identity and identity representation may be the deepest and most suppressed struggle in the work place and hence the 'site' where domination and responsive agency are most difficult to unravel. (Deetz, 1992:59)

Much recent critical discussion of the character of work organizations focuses directly on processes of identity formation (Baack and Prasch, 1997; Casey, 1995; Deetz, 1992; Du Gay, 1996; Du Gay et al, 1996; Ezzy, 1997; Knights, 1997; Knights and Willmott, 1989; Kondo, 1990; Miller and Rose, 1990 & 1995; Newton1996a:b; Townley, 1994; Tavares, 1996; Van Krieken, 1996). Miller and Rose, for instance, argue that 'the workplace is a principal site for the formation of identity' and a 'pre- eminent site for the contestation about the nature of human identity' (1995:427-428). Much of the work noted here suggests, as Deetz notes above, that the problematics, tensions and struggles of work organisations involve fluid, subtle and complex processes of identification with or constitution of various conflicting identities. An underpinning assumption in this work is the claim that compliance, commitment or effort in organizations is neither forced from 'us' through domination, nor collected from 'us' through a simple exchange relation (e.g. work effort or skill for money). It is, to a large and constantly varying extent, 'extracted' through practices which seek, but do not always succeed in, producing 'us' and progressively tying 'us' to particular identities - that is, particular ways of being a 'self' or selves (Grey, 1994).

How best though might we deal with the ‘identity/subjectivity’? By taking up Marsden and Townley’s suggested metaphor of ‘depth’ (Marsden, 1993; Townley, 1998; Marsden and Townley, 1996), the paper suggests that both mainstream and some ‘critical’ works in organization studies tend to understand ‘identity’ as ‘entity’ rather than a relational project or process. The confusing and unsatisfactory work on identity undertaken by Thompson and McHugh in their textbook Work Organization (1990; 1995) highlights this in relation to critical works. Such work tends to rest on the assumption of an 'ontological duality of social practice' (Reed, 1996:37), rather than regard identity as an outcome of relations between
recursive knowledges and practices which organize human materials (Marcus, 1992, Law, 1994; Calas and Smirich, 1992, 1996). To 'escape' this, the paper explores the possibilities of approaches that might be identified with the labels: 'discourse theory', critical theory and psychodynamics. The core approach understands the self as a series of variably dispersed but potentially mutually supporting subject positions embedded in discursive practices. However the subject’s ‘(re)insertion’ into such positions is conditioned by existential and psychodynamic processes. The paper illustrates its discussion with materials from critical accounts of the reconstruction of educational work and organizations, and concludes with a brief account of how these conceptual resources might be drawn on to discuss the construction of the ‘manager’ in further education.

Educators labouring for Capital?

If we take labour process analysis to be an exemplary form of critical organization study, then its literature on educational work provides a site for discussing 'identity', identification and the shift from 'division' to 'depth'. Labour process informed studies, which draw a lineage from Marxian economics and argue that the key issue at stake is the increased commodification of education as a 'good'. This leads to the introduction of managerial strategies of substitution, intensification and control to these sectors. Recent Government policy programmes have thus worked to more explicitly define educators as public sector workers whose efforts are now more directly and intensively tied through quasi-market processes to the dominant dynamics of capitalist society. Of particular concern is the effect which the disciplines of the market and management have had on the previously dominant bureau-professional regime (Clarke and Newman, 1997). While schools, colleges and universities have not been directly privatised, Government programmes, drawing on capitalist priorities and disciplines, have simulated and stimulated the reproduction of such priorities and disciplines. Colleges, universities and schools have in varying ways and at different speeds, been forced to work as if they were businesses.

Sinclair and Ironside et al’s work in relation to schools (1996), Longhurst (1996) and Randle and Brady's (1997) accounts of the reconstruction in further education, and Dearlove (1997) and Willmott’s (1995) work on universities epitomise the powerful way labour process forms of analysis can provide in relation to the organization of educational work and workers. In relation to Universities Willmott (1995) asserts that

the key to understanding change in the organization and control of academic work lies in an analysis of the trajectory of the distinctive organization and dynamics of the capitalist society in which it is embedded and not in the impersonal force of rationalization or the capacity of individuals to collaborate in, or resist, its seemingly relentless advance (1995:12).

He goes on to argue that

academics in the UK now find themselves exposed to a demanding regime in which external monitors have them surrounded, and have been moving in to colonise remaining areas of autonomy. (1995: 33)

Dearlove meanwhile produces a more mediated account. Like Miller (1995), he argues that the 'process of proletarianisation' is uneven' and in relation to research, particularly, both the 'work and workers defy the easy reach of management' (1997:65).
While he agrees that teaching has been transformed from 'a pre-fordist artisan craft process into a Fordist organized mass-production organization' (1997:68), he suggests that the inability of managers to separate the control of research work from actually doing it, means that research work continues to embody craft elements. As a result university managers are forced to strike a delicate balance between trust and control in order to achieve institutional research priorities. At the same time deeply embedded traditions of collegiality and professionalism require the ‘new managers’ of higher education to draw on strategies which enhance the researchers responsible use of relative autonomy. Through this discussion of ‘trust’ and his emphasis on traditions and professionalism, Dearlove reveals the need to read academic workers as not simply the targets and effect of new regimes, but as variably recalcitrant and subversive of its practices. While his discussion of trust is a-theoretical and managerial in flavour, the need for the paper to step outside an orthodox treatment given to a particular field also signals the limits of this approach in attempting to explore the effects of the application or intensification of capitalist relations in education work sites.

In relation to the schools sector Sinclair and Ironside et al's work is emblematic. Of particular concern is the introduction of 'increasingly oppressive working practices' at school level. They argue that these are

fuelled by financial incentives and penalties, popularist views of standards in education, and the greater pressures on school managers to hit government targets. This is carried out by means of old-fashioned, though wrongly and frequently called 'new' management techniques (sometimes under the heading of HRM) such as staff lay offs, increased workload, and deskilling through substitution and diversification. (1996:646)

Yet the orthodox nature of their approach tends to limit discussion of what they note is the ‘variable and patchy’ response to the new initiatives. To address this they return to explanations of high levels unionisation in schools, or to ignorance among teachers of the links between new initiative like appraisal and school management and their feeling of demoralisation and attacks on their professionalism (1996:658)

In relation to further education, Longhurst makes similar but more elaborate points (1996). His core thesis is that the introduction of the unitised learning activity based funding methodology, introduced by the State via the Further Education Funding Council (FEFC) and the simultaneous ‘independence’ of colleges on April 1 1993 has transformed further education into a commodity. Longhurst argues that

a complete inversion of the aim of colleges has occurred . . . the new system means that the dominant preoccupation of college senior management must be to maximise income and minimise costs. (1996:55)

The funding methodology, which directly links teaching work to college income, means that its exchange value comes to dominate its use value which, according to Longhurst, is the historical basis of funding further education. While these claims are difficult to support empirically given the diversity of the sector's provision and the funding formulas used by local authorities, particularly after the 1988 Education Reform Act (which required LEA's to devolve greater financial decision making to colleges), the argument nevertheless provides a useful basis for Longhurst's broader analysis of the changing nature of work in further
education. Particularly, he argues that commodification has the inevitable effect of producing the new 'breed' of further education managers who have had to become agents of the monopoly purchaser of educational labour (FEFCE). As a result antagonism is inevitable between these managers and the educational labour force - the teachers in this case. Longhurst then moves on to outline how commodification of further education and 'independence' inevitably leads to moves to intensify, substitute or deskill teachers' work. This is attempted:

- through new teaching contracts that increase teaching time,
- through increased class sizes,
- through reduced class contact time,
- through the substitution of teaching labour with 'cheaper' part-time employment agency teachers and 'instructor' grades who supervise workshop projects,
- or resource and computer based learning programmes for classroom sessions.

While technological substitution, Longhurst argues, is unlikely to significantly increase the 'amount of surplus value [managers] extract from teaching staff' (1996:61), managerial interest will, he predicts, be largely confined to the intensification of teaching labour or its substitution with cheaper forms (1996:61). This will be particularly important, Longhurst argues, if senior management go on increasing the level of their own salaries and the number of non-teaching administrative workers both of which rely on 'the surplus value obtained from paying teachers less than the value of the educational commodity that they produce' (1996:62).

Thus for Longhurst the managerialisation of FE has its material basis in the commodification of FE as units of activity which are now 'produced' for a managed market and 'sold' to a monopolistic purchaser. For Longhurst, senior postholders are positioned in these new relations as the agents of the purchaser. While they 'do not want to see themselves as exploiters', Longhurst notes,

> to be able to carry out their oppressive and exploitative role adequately then their ideological outlook has to undergo some transformation. (1996:63)

Like other authors who address this issue of the transformation of FE 'managers', the actual mechanisms and extent of this 'ideological' transformation is left unclear. Senior managers are for Longhurst simply 'under pressure to oppress and exploit their staff' (1996:65) and are motivated by their own survival. If they do not oppress and exploit they risk bankrupting the college and/or their own dismissal. The extent to which teaching staff will be oppressed and exploited will be decided, however, through industrial and political struggle. A struggle whose lines must be drawn between staff and senior management because of the commodification of further education.

Randle and Brady (1997) meanwhile argue that this bitter dispute has served to underline the limitations of traditional professional practices, and the 'degree to which lecturers are coming to terms with their changing position' (1997:239) - proletarianised labour and not professional artisan. Nevertheless, but moving on to discuss the conflict between lecturers and managers in terms of conflict between managerial and professional 'paradigms', they at the same time highlight, in the same way that Dearlove does (1997) in relation to higher education, the bounds of orthodox labour process analysis, as represented here by Longhurst work, to deal with the problematics and particularly the 'depth' of this reconstruction.
The limits of orthodoxy

These papers are in various ways all exemplary accounts of the changing labour process in schools, colleges and universities. They encourage readers to link the changing character of the work of teachers and educators to broad politico-economic reconstruction.

Nevertheless at the same time they bring with them many of the problems associated with labour process analysis (Kitay, 1997; Marsden and Townley, 1995; Knights and Willmott, 1990). On the one hand they give a limited sense of *how* this reconstruction is done, and as a consequence provide only a limited sense of problematics of such a shift. On the other there is a tendency to read off the nature of 'human being' from the economic categories in a seemingly objective and linear fashion. This leaves open the possibility of offering accounts of the way 'human being' is mobilized and embedded in the reproduction of these relations. In this vain such accounts tend to militate against exploring the point where the dualistic entities of capital and labour begins to unravel, fragment and resemble a ‘field’ of conflicts and tensions, or a ‘river’ of various currents and of variable depths.

In relation to the first point such papers do not fail to identify the various elements of the new funding, planning, audit processes of the new regimes. But they struggle in my view to adequately address *how* in detail these disciplines work to produce certain effects e.g. intensification of work. They fail to adequately address how these practices 'reach-in' and colonise 'human being' in the service of imperialising formations. The argument here is that it is impossible to adequately account for the effectivity of new disciplines and techniques drawn into public sector education without a sophisticated way of conceptualisation of 'human being' or human subjectivity. It is this which potentially illuminates also the limits and variable effectivities of the translations and suffusion of the new work regimes in a reconstructing public sector.

I am not attempting to deny the potency and importance of the employment relation, the broad disciplining character of labour market relations. But in and of themselves they do not explain the commitment or even the compliance of workers¹ to the new demands and practices which make up their work. Of course employment relations and the broad disciplines of the labour market produce the core sediment, or strata, or ‘flow’ over which or under which or through which subjectivities and identities are mapped - discursively, psychodynamically, existentially. Contracts have been changed. Conditions have worsened and new intensified management regimes have been introduced.

As Hardy and Clegg (1996) note

The employment relationship of economic domination and subordination is the underlying sediment over which the organization practices are stratified and overlaid, often in quite complex ways.

¹Willmott notes that like other groups of workers academics’ relative inability to earn a living elsewhere makes them susceptible as targets for such ‘reforms’. Their ‘professionalism’ further inhibits their ability to respond through direct industrial action (1995).
Yet as they go on to note

This complexity of organizational locales renders them subject to multi-varient powers rather than monadic sites of total control: contested terrains, rather than total institutions' (1996:633).

But what then are the conditions which give rise to this 'complexity': to what should we look for insights into this contested terrain? While the employment relation, and the changing conditions and relations between, for instance, teachers and their employers broadly shapes and underpins the terrain upon which these reconstructions are enacted, this does little to explain the limits and variable effect of such reconstructions. What is required is a discussion of the way such processes construct and reconstruct the identities or subjectivity of those who are brought to work in these sites. The dull compulsion of wage labour relations and the inequitable distribution of productive property is simply inadequate the construction of variably efficient relations of production. Relatively efficient relations require to a varying degree the mobilisation of human subjectivity to the point where, rather than being directed or compelled to do so, we come to initiate and enact the correct ‘scripts’ ourselves (Thompson and McHugh, 1990:321).

It is this process of constituting the self-initiating and enacting worker which is regarded by many at least as ‘essential’ to the labour process as the work practices, labour and machinery through which they are played out’ (Thompson and McHugh, 1990:320-32, Marchington, 1992). The move here then is away from the linear relations between changing capitalist relations of production and their targets, and toward the exploration of the constitution of the self-initiating worker. However this move, which must conceptualise in some fashion human subjectivity, leads back to a questioning of the seeming duality of ‘objective structural conditions’ on the one hand and human agency on the other. These strong divisions seemingly hamper the development of an engaging account of human subjectivity in the context of capitalist relations of production. Strong dualities inhibit for instance the development of more engaging questions in relation to the diffusion of the logic of ‘capital’ in the education sector for example.

Just how does the DNA-like (Marsden and Townley, 1996) logic of capital become embodied and embedded in the micro-perceptions we use, the stories we tell each other, the pleasures we have, the parts and characters we perform, the narratives which structure our lives, the dreams which haunt us and the micro-practices of dress, space and physicality we draw on to organise our conduct and relations with others at work in these sectors? The evident multiplicity evoked by this kind of approach need not however blunt our scrutiny of the way imperialising knowledges and practices, of for instance ‘management’, seek to station our

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2 In all three education sectors the employment relation has been a key site of conflict. In further education particularly employment conditions have changed radically since the incorporation of colleges five years ago. The national agreement for lecturers was 'torn up' at the incorporation of colleges and staff offered more 'flexible' contracts. Just under half colleges negotiated local deals with union branches which increased hours, decreased holidays and in some cases has tied lecturers incomes to college performance. Since incorporation union collated figures show that a fifth the total 1993 work force has been made redundant - 15000 lecturers. With a large proportion of these taking early retirement. More than half of all the 452 colleges in England and Wales have 'sacked' part-time staff and signed contracts with temporary lecturer employment agencies. The hourly rate for agency lecturers is significantly less than the rate paid to permanent staff. At the same time college principal salaries have steadily increased and a new cadre of further education 'managers' appeared, involved mainly in reducing costs or securing and attempting to increase college incomes.
bodies, infuse our talk, constitute our consciousness, and format our social relations with particular directionalities - as self initiating workers for instance - but it does potentially enrich our account of the depth and problematics of these ‘productions’.

Before I trace out some of conceptual material which might be drawn into the discussion of human subjectivity, I shall briefly show how the discipline of organization behaviour retains this strongly dualistic approach to the nature of 'work'.

**Identity as entity**

In broad terms mainstream organization behaviour approaches its topic through a 'staircase' of entities moving from 'individual' to 'group' to 'organization' and on to the broader political economic 'environment' (Mullins, 1996; Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991). Each 'level' is described through various typologies of characteristics. Accounts at the first level, the individual at work, tend to draw initially on the 'subject' developed in psychology. Such a subject is regarded to have characteristics such as perception, categorisation, reflexivity, interpretation, self-awareness and motivation. Such notions tend to be drawn from the range of phenomenological, cognitive and behavioural approaches. The broad aim in this approach is to explore self-hood as locatable in sets of individual processes. For example cognitive approaches understand self-hood as 'hardwired' into human beings through the ability to categorise, remember, think and feel. Phenomenological writings tend toward an understanding of self-hood as the sum of human biological and cognitive capabilities put to work to produce interpretations of conscious experience. Social identity theory which combines elements of these approaches reads identities as the result of individuals engaged in classifying themselves and others (Tajfel, 1982). Yet as Nkomo and Cox (1996) note, there is some ambiguity over whether the evaluations and classifications used by others are relevant in this theory to one's identity at all. In other words by taking the ‘individual’ as the source of such evaluations, the approach intensifies the divisions between individual and society. These approaches thus overemphasise a pre-social human or make the ‘individual’ the agent in identity construction. The approaches tend also to address elements of 'form', rather than 'content', so that questions concerned with the historical and contextual production of subjectivity tend to be ignored. Such approaches are thus largely unseeing to reflections on how they themselves are engaged in broad political and economic processes. The whose discussion of the construction of the ‘individual’ as a ‘regulatory fiction’ (Rose, 1996) is therefore ruled out of such approaches.

**Identity as roles and scripts**

The move away from locating identity or self or personality 'in' the individual and toward a reading which understands the individual as emerging out of or as constituted by the social, can be achieved through recourse to George Herbert Mead's formulations which derived from earlier work by Cooley, but also from the sociologists Durkheim and Simmel. This work forms a key resource for relational or interactionist discussion of identity and self-hood.

For Mead the self does not categorise, interpret or evaluate the social, but such processes, which form the basis of self-hood, are social in character and learned through interaction with significant others. The self is relational in a dual sense: it is born out of social relations, and made up of relations between an acting mobile 'I', and a generalised other - 'me'. This 'me' is understood as the combined symbolic memory of roles that others have performed. As Mead wrote,
What goes to make up the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person is a personality because he [sic] belongs to a community . . . he take its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the attitude of the members of the community (quoted in Clark et al, 1994:105)

This represents the refined Mead. Elsewhere Mead wrote that a self is a fusion of the remembered actor and his accompanying chorus [which] is somewhat loosely organized and very clearly social. (1913:377)

For Mead then the self is created and sustained through social activities. Self consciousness is formed from the particular kinds of relations between the actor found in social activities and the symbolic memory of past social interactions. Particularly Mead argued that social self consciousness appears when

we find ourselves acting in the same way with reference to ourselves as we do to others (1913:375)

Mead's self consciousness then can be read as an internal gaze which coheres individual and group relations. It is a monitoring, evaluating, scrutinising component which is constantly judging and realigning the acting 'I' interaction on the basis of dialogue, rules, practices found etched across its socialised memory. Self consciousness then can be read as the techniques and practices by which the 'me' (of language, practices, rules etc.) acts on or relates to the acting 'I'.

Of course there are problems with a broader reading of Mead's approach, particularly given its bias toward small group relations, and its broad conservative functionalism. Burkitt (1991), in attempting to 'rescue' Meadian interactionalism from this conservatism and from the onslaught of poststructural analysis, suggests that Mead's work be complemented by reading it alongside a Marxist account of social production. Yet this would seem to reproduce and heighten the problems of a dualistic analysis whose effect is to set the individual apart from the social and assume such entities to be agents.

Identity as subject position

While Burkitt's work (1991) is exemplary in its attempt to 'rescue' Mead's valuable insights, in the wider field of recent sociology, cultural and political studies, a veritable explosion of debate around the concept of identity brought on in part by postmodernism critique of the self-aware subject and the shift from mass-movement to nomadic 'identity politics' (e.g. Hall and du Gay, 1996; Rutherford, 1990; Lash and Friedman, 1992; Giddens, 1991). It is not my intention to review that literature here; more to illustrate a particular crucial element of the debate relevant to the topic at hand.

3 Mead's work typifies and underpins much theorising of identity in contemporary social psychology and sociology. It leads particularly to symbolic interactionists, represented in management by, for instance, Ian Mangham but it also links, through Mead's interest in language to the constructivism of Harre, Shotter and Gergen. It also links to Law's work (1994) and resonates with Foucault's discussion of subjectification as the dominant form of control in contemporary political formations.
At the core of social science theorising is the debate over how to address human agency in the context of structuring processes. Discussion of identity is constantly returning to this issue (Giddens, 1979, 1984). I want to illustrate work in this field with reference to recent papers by Stuart Hall and Nikolas Rose whom I see as exemplars of the tensions between a post-marxist and Foucaultian reading of identity/subjectivity which is at the centre of debates on agency. Their work also contains links to Mead’s formulation. However a few quick pointers to the debate are required to begin with. Firstly, as a rule of thumb, conceptual discussion which takes up the term ‘identity’, have a tendency to assume an agentic subject. Discussion which draws on the term ‘subjectivity’ tends to understand the subject as inscribed by historical and political processes. Secondly, theorists in this field are less interested in directly challenging the approaches of others, and more in distinguishing their work from others through the development of questions that draw attention away from other approaches. For example, Rose’s genealogical approach seeks to address processes of subjectification which he argues requires only a minimal, weak or thin conception of the human material on which history writes’ (1996:142). Following Foucault he thus rejects any approach that might assume some ‘interiority’.

The human being, here, is not an entity with a history, but the target of a multiplicity of types of work, more like a latitude and longitude at which different vectors of different speeds intersect. The interiority which some may feel compelled to diagnose is not that of a psychological system, but of a discontinuous surface, a kind of infolding of exteriority. (1996:143)

The fundamental point for Rose and other Governmentalists is that the way in which human beings give meaning to experience has its own history. For Deleuze ‘thought thinks its own history’ (1988:119). More specifically, as Rose argues, giving meaning to experience involves practical, technical devices of meaning production. This include grids of visualisation, vocabularies, norms and systems of judgement. For Rose these produce experience; experience does not produce them (1996:130). Such devices, with their embedded power relations, can be described as making up the means by which ‘human beings come to relate to themselves and others as subjects of a certain type’ (1996:130-131). Rose suggests that if a history of these heterogeneous processes and practices were to be written, then it might focus on for example the mundane practices that make problems intelligible and manageable. It might also look at the various technologies - offices, work stations, computers etc - which allow individuals to ‘conduct their own conduct’. It might also look at strategies which produce particular kinds of populations.

The key point is that subjectivity is understood as made up of ensembles of practices that produce particular relations to ‘the self’. The ‘self’ is understood as a ‘regulatory ideal’ (1996:129). There are of course, as there has been throughout, obvious links with Mead’s construction of the acting ‘I’ and its relation to the socially inscribed ‘me’.

Stuart Hall meanwhile argues that such a position broadly fails to address processes of identification and resistance. He admits that Foucault’s work had gone further than any other in showing how power operates through discursive practices, self regulation and technologies

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4 This term (used by Hall, 1996) refers to a number of authors who draw Foucault’s term ‘Governmentality’ in their work (Rose, Miller, Burchell, Gordon, Owen, Dean). It also refers to the moderated computer-based discussion list, formerly known as the ‘governmentality list and now entitled the ‘History of the Present list’. 

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of the self but suggests that what transpires is an account of the subject as 'entirely self-policing whose smooth insertion into the subject positions of discourses is largely untroubled' (1996:11). What is required, he argues, is a theory of what the mechanisms are by which individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the 'positions' to which they are summoned; as well as how they fashion, stylise, produce and 'perform' these positionings (1996:14).

Such a theory requires an account of the processes of articulation, understood as the contingent and non-intentional suturing of the unconscious and discursive positionings. Hall asserts that Foucault's 'flat' or 'thin' ontology, his rejection of interiority or the unconscious, leaves little space upon which to address this relation without recourse to some notion of intentionality. He further suggests that Foucault's latter works, dealing with the relations we have with ourselves, were moving toward a theorisation of psychic mechanisms. In short, Hall assumes human materials to be relatively 'thick' (as opposed to Rose's reading of human material as 'thin'). His argument concerning identity constructs a space for the extra-discursive, for example the psycho-dynamic, or one's existential angst when confronted with the problem of world-openness. His approach is aimed at exploring how, as noted above, subjects identify (or do not identify) with the various subject positions (1996:14).

As will be apparent, Rose's trajectory is rather different. Again he is concerned not with the person, self-identity or individuality, but with the 'diversity of strategies and tactics of subjectification'. In other words he distinguishes his work from that concerned with identity or processes of identification (e.g. Hall, 1996; Casey, 1995; Burkitt, 1991). He rejects the assumption of some form of interiority whether that be psychic or ontological. Subjective interiority, who we feel we are, is imagined as a discontinuous surface made up of numerous folds or 'pleats'. Rose here draws on the Deleuzian metaphor of subjectivity [developed from his research into the Baroque (1992), and account of Foucault's work (1988)]. Deleuze argued that

The subject is the individual who through practice and discipline has become the site of the bent force, that is the folding inside of the outside. (Deleuze, 1992:115)

The analytic of the fold provides a way of visualising the construction of a self as the development of a relation to self using material previously of the outside. For Rose folds incorporate without totalizing, internalize without unifying, collect together discontinuously in the form of pleats making surfaces, spaces, flows and relations. (1996:143)

Rose asserts that the discontinuity and multiplicity of such infoldings are partially stabilised through the practices and vocabularies of biographical story-telling and associated 'arts of memory'. Yet there are limits to this metaphor of the fold. Rose argues that it is important to go beyond the body. Human being is dispersed. It is emplaced, enacted through a regime of devices, gazes, techniques which extend beyond the limits of the flesh and into spaces, assemblages' (1996:143). For example, Rose suggests that regimes of passion,
are not merely affective folds in the soul, but enacted in certain secluded and valorized spaces, through sensualised equipment of beds, drapes and silks, routines of dressing and undressing, aestheticized devices for providing music and light, regimes of partitioning of time and so forth. (1996:143)

However in this paper (unlike some of his earlier work, 1989) Rose's argument seems to admit some formation of agency (although I sense some irritation in the text at having to address this). Certain phrasings in the piece, while working to shake off suggestions of determinism, at the same time allow a formulation of resistance, intentionality and agency. Again subjectivity for Rose, drawing on Foucault, is found in the multiplicity of discontinuous folds that form particular relations to the self. Rose argues that from this stand point it is 'no longer surprising that human beings often find themselves resisting the forms of personhood that they are enjoined to adopt' (1996:140). This requires no theory of agency, he claims, as we simply 'live lives in a constant movement across different practices that address us in different ways' (1996:140). He offers a pertinent organizational example here. Techniques of relating to oneself as a subject of unique capacities runs up against the practices of relating to oneself as a target of discipline, duty and docility (1996:141). It is conflict between these ways of being oneself that produce contestation and opposition and political struggle. However Rose then claims, in a sharp shift in sentence forms which make the human being the subject of an active rather than passive phrase (which dominate the piece), that

in any one site or locale, humans turn programmes intended for one end to the service of others. (1996:141, my emphasis)

With this Rose suggests a 'theory' of agency that assumes human beings have the ability to translate the practices or part practices of one locale/site and apply these to others. This, it seems to me, is more than a 'theory' of conflict between regimes of practices. In general Rose's statement suggest that 'resistance' is pervasive, and that there is a constant interplay of tactical and strategic practices and knowledges which may form variable alliances with each other which in turn produce dominating and subordinating forms of subjectification (of relating to oneself).

**Summary: Agency, resistance and ways of living**

Governmentalists (e.g. Rose, Miller, Burchell, Owen, Dean), according to post-marxist scholars such as Hall and Clarke, largely fail to address the problems of agency and resistance. By reading human material as 'thin', human subjects appear to slide across the complex texture of social life briefly moving in and out of the tiny folds and markings that allow 'I's' to become 'me's'. This resonates with assumptions of periodic postmodernism where we have supposedly entered a sign-saturated postmodern world. Post-marxists, however, read human material as endowed with greater sedimented depth. Human material is living history and might also be said to have psychodynamic depth. Human material is assumed to be rather more immobile and recalcitrant. Taking up a new relation to the self, constructing identities or learning to be a particular kind of subject, requires time [Deleuze suggested that time is subjectivity (1992)] and is a relatively slow and expensive process. In other words, forming a new 'me', that is giving 'depth' to the socially situated and spoken 'I' made from discursive 'blocks', requires effort, repetition and 'care' before its enfleshment, to use McLaren's term (1994), can be assumed, if at all. According to the post-marxists (e.g. Hall, Harvey, Clarke) governmentalists overstate the ease by which we become 'subjects-of' a particular discourse. For the most part
the relative 'depth' (i.e. the stratified patterning of previous ways of being/doing) more often than not positions us as 'subject-to' discourse and therefore relatively resistant.

The Governmentalists (e.g. Rose, Miller, Burchell, Gordon and Owen) meanwhile reject part of this. They might suggest that the post-marxist hankers after a unified subject that is just not available. 'Human beings are not the unified subjects of some coherent regime of domination that produces persons in the form in which it dreams,' Rose fires back at his critics (1996:140).

On the contrary they live their lives in constant movement across different practices that address them in different ways. . . contestation, conflict and opposition in practices which conduct the conduct of persons is no surprise and requires no appeal to the particular qualities of human agency (1996:141)

But Rose does assume some minimal 'theory' of agency where actual 'human being' exceeds systems of thought. Rose's work admits, perhaps reluctantly, that 'human being' involves turning programmes intended for one end to the service of others. It involves inventing, refining and stabilising particular practices. It involves occupying spaces, challenging dominant practices, and potentially founding new alliances and power-blocs. While Rose rejects romantic agency, the agency he accepts is more technical and pragmatic. When 'forced', as Hall predicted, he takes up a limited explanation of human intentionality.

For his part, Hall accepts that 'selves' are potentially regulatory ideals, but that this does not diminish the potency of political and psychodynamic struggle over our insertion into particular subject positions. There is however a suspicion that what has been lost is 'depth', of anxiety, desire, emotionality, psychodynamic depth of 'experience', but also some sense of the link to long-standing and deeply embedded inequality and social interest (Frankel, 1996). As Potter and Wetherell suggest for instance in their account of racism (1992), racist discourse is not simply produced through discursive positionings available in particular narratives, but more importantly is reproductive of oppressive political and economic relations. They stress the need to combine a broadly Foucauldian understanding of discourse (which understands discourse as constitutive of particular identities which we take to be our own constructions) and a Marxist analysis of the reproduction of unequal economic relations. Broadly, they suggest that in a Foucauldian point of view

too much seems to be lost when the subjects of history are replaced with the rituals of power. One kind of essentialism seems to have been replaced by another. (1992:86)

Particularly, they argue that any satisfactory account of discourse must move between what they call the 'established' and 'constitutive' aspects of discourse. By the latter they mean exploring how social subjects are formed via discourse, and by the former how these discourses gain their plausibility 'in terms of what is already there' (1992:86) - particularly the historical configuration of the social landscape which always already contains material interests, alliances and directions of domination. This is broadly the trajectory that I seek to present for this study below.

Yet while this would be a useful move in the current piece of work, I retain this concern with identity and depth here and explore issues of ontological and psychodynamic security/insecurity. A number of authors, drawing variably from a Freudian and Marxist tradition, address identity as in part produced and a consequence of ontological or
psychodynamic 'lack' or anxiety - whose flip side can be read as desire - arguing that it is anxiety/desire which infuses our positioning in particular discursive orders.

Identity as id-entity - ontological defence forces

Knights and Willmott (1989) write that this predicament of anxiety or lack is a dominant human experience in contemporary western society and that this is fundamental to the reproduction of organizations. The broad question they ask relates to their positioning within debates surrounding the reproduction of capitalist work organizations. Broadly they explore how and why asymmetric power relations at work are reproduced.

In relation to anxiety, Knights and Willmott draw on, at different points in their writings, a number of differing conceptual notions to address this. Their earlier work (1985) understands anxiety as the result of the existential problem of 'world-openness' linked to Berger and Luckman's phenomenology (1967). They argue that our ontological precariousness forces subjects to act defensively to reduce the anxiety by pursuing 'identity-securing strategies of control' (1985:27). These have the unintended consequence of reproducing power relations. Knights and Willmott argue however that individualised and instrumental 'identity work' heightens rather than diminishes the experience of anxiety. Identities offer illusions of independence and lead away from what Knights and Willmott call 'fully interdependent social relations' (1985:27). This is broadly an emancipatory project which commends people's full engagement in political processes and not in politically neutralising 'alternative' meaning systems (1985:40).

Their later work (Willmott, 1989; Knights, 1989; Willmott, 1997) combined some of these insights with the discussion of Foucault's genealogical works. Particularly these authors are seeking to explain how identity is centrally implicated in the reproduction of exploitative organizations. They argue that disciplinary practices of work organizations provide ways of constituting one's self, which are broadly in the interests of managerial objectives. Through such practices

Individuals have been split off (through disciplinary mechanisms, techniques of surveillance and power knowledge strategies) from one another. This is experienced as a vulnerability to the judgements of 'significant others' and as a recurrent anxiety about whether external social evaluations will continue in a favourable direction (Knights and Willmott, 1989:549).

Thus anxiety, individuating practices and particular constructed identities are mutually implicated in the construction of both the 'individual' and the individual subject at work. Moving back to a political agenda they add that in order to escape from the double bind of the contradictory desire for individual independence against a background of a fear of social isolation or rejection, what is needed is a 'deconstructing of the solidity of self' (1989: 554). They have thus moved away from an emphasis on ontological insecurity per se to locating anxiety as produced in part by the technologies of modern power regimes. They argue that this draws on Foucault's analysis of such regimes which revises and elaborates more fully the missing 'subjective' aspects of work relations.

The problem of ontological insecurity, however, is also grounded to some extent in the conceptualisation of anxiety drawn from 'Contra' organization studies' Marxist roots, as
theorised forcefully in the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School e.g. Fromm and Marcuse. Willmott particularly (1989;1994) notes how capitalist social relations 'under-determine' the identity of the typical modern worker (1994:102). He or she is socially constituted as 'free' and sovereign and is 'subjugated by individualising pressures to 'make' something of him/herself' (1994:102); something that proves problematic given the erratic nature of business cycles. Our constitution by capitalism as 'free' sovereign workers extracts a heavy burden, Willmott argues, for it forces us to engage in a sometimes fruitless, largely conservative, search for security in the consumption of fetishised identities, rather than to explore the relational basis of identities. Thus, the argument is grounded on the assumption that 'identity' is historically and politically produced in part by capitalist relations the effect of which is enhanced by disciplinary processes. Identity in all respects then is historically and politically constituted and not an ontological given.

Identity as id-entity - psychic defence forces


For Hollway anxiety is constituted psychodynamically, rather than through disciplinary mechanisms or the conditions of a capitalist labour market. While her approach draws various elements together to address the construction of the subject, its underpinning argument is that it is our unconscious' history of desire/anxiety which pre-figures and conditions our insertion into particular discursive positionings. Particularly, anxiety is produced through our earliest learning about the world.

The absence or vulnerability of the infant's boundaries, the dependence on the breast (the first object from which the infant must attempt to separate) and the imperative to reduce anxiety, lead to defences which operate across the boundaries of self and other, notably projection, introjection, projective identification and idealization . . these defences all involve splitting, that is the splitting up of parts of the self, based on primitive experiences of what is good and bad in order to separate them from each other and protect the good on which the infant depends - or so it feels - for its survival (Hollway, 1996:29).

These early learning processes, particularly splitting and object identification propel, but do not determine, our insertion into, for instance, gendered discursive positionings. Hollway argues that these processes, which in their earliest manifestations are involved in constituting gender identity, provide the basis upon which an individual's biographical insertion into discourse is organised. Hollway argues that men, particularly, in attempting to distance themselves from vulnerable gendered identities, routinely and unconsciously split off unwanted aspects of themselves and project them through discourse onto an inferiorized 'other' - in most cases women. This provides the basis for Hollway's explanations of gendered divisions of labour and power relations.
Hollway's work employs Lacanian and Kleinian explanations of anxiety/desire. For Lacan, desire/anxiety is formed out of the separation in infancy from the mother and the simultaneous insertion into the 'imaginary' or symbolic world of language. It is through language that the anxiety and constant search for satisfaction from and desire for the mother is articulated and language, infused with this history of desire, which constitutes the unconscious.

Conceptually, the crucial aspect in Hollway's work is the rejection of the essentialism of the Lacanian and Kleinian approaches and the reading of the psycho-dynamic through a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as historically and politically implicated in force relations. She argues that discourses provide historical and political sites through which sometimes repressed uncomfortable feelings of insecurity, weakness, powerlessness, are split off and located within the objectified 'Other' in discourse. However, it is a mark of the precariousness of such formations, and the precariousness of such identities, that they require this 'Other', to enact such an identity. The object of a discourse, women or the managed, for instance, is not always complicit. The 'Other' does not necessarily position itself as in need of security, strength, power as in paternalist management discourse. This potentially produces further anxiety and defensiveness.

Hollway also shows how our insertion into gendered positions, and I would suggest all discursive positionings, is mobile and changeable. Foucault argued for example that 'we must conceive discourse as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable' (1990:100).

The resulting understanding of subjectivity, however, while drawn from these approaches, is not reducible to them. Hollway shows from research into heterosexual gender relations that men in their attempt to distance themselves from contradictory and unwanted feelings of vulnerability, particularly in close intimate relations with women, often split off and project these feelings through discourse onto women. Yet for this to 'work' it requires complementary positionings. Hollway argues that the reproduction of gender difference and gendered power relations requires two people whose historical positioning, and investments and powers this has inserted into subjectivity, complementing each other (1984:259).

Broadly the argument runs that subjectivity is a complex outcome of individual histories of insertion into discourse, and their engagement with currently available discourses. Such positionings are engaged by our attempts to defer and defend ourselves against potential anxiety and insecurity in the midst of the problematics of attempting to maintain, through discourse particular positionings, 'complicity' or favourable evaluations of ourselves by others, which stabilise particular identities (Jefferson, 1994). This is not then a conception of a choosing self-aware individual, but nevertheless some sense of choice is involved, albeit complex and unconscious (Hollway, 1984:23). Nor is this a conception that relies on a notion of the subject that has disappeared into discourse. It is an approach that attempts to put power-infused public discourses with embedded subject positions, such as that of the manager (which are variably socially and historically available), in the midst of the unique biographies of investments in other discourses found in sedimented individual subjectivity. The subject is then 'caught' between sedimented and current relations of power, and processes of splitting and projection which are engaged in the attempt to reduce unwanted anxiety and insecurity.
In sum, subjectivity could from this position be said to be fundamentally relational and organised through stratified collections of inscribed (i.e. embodied) discursive positions which nevertheless require, to a variable extent, ‘complementary’ positionings by others, and thus are variably unstable and precarious. These ‘identities/discursive positionings’ are defended through psychic processes. Political change in Hollway's account is read as produced by this instability. Feminism’s challenge to male sex-drive and have/hold discourses, for instance, is understood as produced by the weakening of the investment in gender identities in these discourses. Two further points need to be put, firstly in relation to desire, and secondly in relation to patriarchal society.

There is perhaps some disagreement between Hollway and the collective author, Henriques et al (1984), of which she was a part, in relation to desire. While Hollway tends to read anxiety and desire as engaged in negatively protecting identities, Henriques et al (1984) stress that anxiety/desire is interdependent with and produced by discursive positionings.

Desire is not an energising process onto which specific content is grafted. Cultural practices, forms and positions are not simply overlaid upon a pre-existing desire but actually help to produce the fixing and channelling of desires by virtue of their production of power-knowledge relations (1984:222-223).

They suggest then a three term correction to Foucault’s power-knowledge couplet of power-desire-knowledge. Here desire is read not as some kind of motive force, but as unstable and productive in the way that Deleuze and Guattari suggest (in opposition to Lacan) above. While Henriques et al do not go as far as to privilege desire as a political force, they do move in this direction. ‘We need to explore how discursive relations enter into the very production of desire in the first place’ (1984:222). Thus desire is produced by discursive relations, and interdependent, rather than simply fuelling their reproduction.

In relation to the second point (patriarchy), Jefferson (1994) suggests that it is difficult in the midst of the framework presented above to get a sense of how the systemic reproduction of dominance of men over women is maintained. There is, he suggests, a tendency to read the investment of desire as the 'idiosyncratic personal histories of anxiety' (1994:24). Hollway's analysis needs to be placed within particular institutional and society contexts. Jefferson thus suggests that Connell's notion of 'gender regime' in relation to organizational/institutional setting and 'gender order', in relation to societal practices, be taken up.

In her most recent work Hollway has moved to link her writing on the development of 20th century management discourses (1991) - scientific management and human relations - with work on the psychodynamics of masculinities (1984, 1989). She argues (1996) that a psychodynamic approach is crucial to understanding the dynamics of managerial power, authority and socialisation. Particularly, Hollway argues that relations between men in organizations are not directly about power and control, but about the ability to rehearse and reproduce particular defensive masculinities.

Men to a greater or lesser extent project parts of themselves onto others of different categories in order to experience living a masculine ideal. (1996:29)

For Hollway these processes of defending particular masculine identities are deeply embedded in masculine attempts at mastery over nature, others and, particularly over self.
Science, technology and management discourses are thus implicated in and productive of gender identity. In relation to technology, Hollway argues that technology and masculinity derive their status from each other in a mutual process which depends on the feminine other, who stand as the antithesis of science and technology. She stands for nature (1996:31).

In relation to management discourses, Hollway argues that these are infused with gendered investments. Thus the relative salience of particular discourses (scientific or human relations) depend upon their relations with masculine identities. Yet she also shows how conflicts between masculinities come to be articulated in management discourse. The masculine investment in management’s control of labour processes through a scientific rationality, of the ‘mind’, inevitably conflicts with masculinities grounded in men’s bodies that seek control over their own labour (see Collinson, 1992). Furthermore, Hollway argues that the strong interlinkages between a rational unemotional masculinity and scientific management means that human relations discourse, where managers are required to see themselves as sentimental beings, has been relatively unsuccessful as a means of reorienting forms of work regulation. Despite more than 50 years of investment, such discourse remains marginal to the dominant rationalisms of accounting and scientific management.

**Identity as Id-entity - summary**

As is apparent, Hollway’s gendered-subject, whose subjectivity is bound up in the interlinkages between unconscious object relations and historically located discourses, is at odds with Knights’ and Willmott’s worker-subject for whom subjectivity is premised upon the ‘under-determination’ of the self in the midst of subjugating and subjectifying capitalist societies. While both might argue that subjectivity is culturally produced, Knights and Willmott prefer an ontological insecurity of social being, to one based on the introjections of infant relations. Recently Knights with co-author Kerfoot (1993, 1996) have suggested that tracing the origin of anxiety/desire is less important than how it is reinforced by management and other practices in organizations and workplaces (1996:81). They seem to suggest that the search for origins draws attention away from analysis of the construction of gendered managerial subjectivity in actual organizational settings. Hollway’s work and that of others who look to psychodynamics to found a critique of gendered social relations, needs to be read more as symbolically informing actual social relations. Hollway agrees with this to a significant extent, arguing that it is important to theorise the difference between women doing actual jobs and ‘woman’ as other; that is as a series of defensive projections of masculine psyches (1996:40).

The issue is how relatively insecure masculine identities attempt to reproduce themselves through particular knowledges and practices. Yet despite this assertion, Hollway’s psychodynamic analysis of management and masculinity (1996) has yet to receive the empirical ‘treatment’ found in her earlier work. While it opens up numerous potential lines of analysis, and its initial proposition – that power relations between men at work are based on protecting particular masculine identities - is potentially a productive way of addressing forms of organizational self-regulation, its exclusive adherence to an understanding of subjectivity as defensive investment against anxiety, downplays perhaps the seductive and desirous elements involved in the reproduction of power relations.
Yet it is not necessary to choose between these explanations (ontological insecurity, capitalist under-determination, psychodynamic insecurity, power-desire-knowledge). The broad argument is that each of these processes is engaged in forming human subjectivity as a dynamic, multi-layered biographically infused depth from which various 'I's can be spoken. Also subjectivity is not simply produced by new discourses. It is formed through the interdependence of discourses as they connect and overlap with biographically located gendered subjectivity. This forms a kind of grid upon which the plausibility of new discourses depend. Broadly the argument here is, as Hall suggests, that 'identity is formed at the unstable point where the 'unspeakable' stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history' (quoted in Potter and Wetherell, 1992:78). These 'unspeakable' stories are in this approach the dynamics of biographically infused psychodynamic, ontological and individuated anxiety, the defences against it and the production of desire through power-knowledge practices. This dynamic forms the grid through which social identities are variably taken up and articulated or challenged and rejected.

**Identities and organizations in ‘depth’**

How then, with this understanding of identity as 'depth', might the reconstruction of public sector education be read? Before concluding this paper I want to briefly suggest how this might be achieved. The first stage is not to deny the potency and purchase of traditional critical approaches, labour process analysis for example. What is suggested is that these be extended and that identity be understood as a concept by which knowledge about the 'depth' of power relations can be articulated. So if we take public sector education as an example, then a key field of analysis would be how particular practices could be said to ignite labour market insecurity or generalised ontological insecurity, or productive desire, or threaten existing psychodynamic structures and relations, or fuse power-knowledge through desire, in ways which aid the suffusion of new work practices and identities e.g. of the 'manager'.

New contracts are clearly important in this process as are new conditions of work, threats of redundancy and casualisation. But it is the way these threaten or enhance 'who we are', and 'who we might become', which might be said to 'sew' us into such changing relations. In such cases we might say that we 'collude' with these relations because they may either directly or indirectly enhance particular aspects of the 'deep' structures of desire/anxiety which are overlaid on and which speak through new discourses.

For example, for people to take the 'step' from white collar professional lecturer to education manager (as many hundreds have done from teaching to 'third' and 'fourth' tier management posts in UK Further Education) clearly engages existential, psycho-dynamic, and labour market processes. Such posts have demanded huge increase in workloads, often only token increases in wages, and much intensified surveillance (Prichard and Deem, 1999). To understand why and how people take up such positions (given that in most cases their teaching jobs could be retained), must involve addressing how such posts could be said to 'work' in relation to security/desire - very often through 'career', 'authority relations' or as a way of generating a sense of purpose (Willmott, 1997). It is often rationalised or presented as something that is part of who 'we' are, or to use Watson's phrase, 'the kind of person I am' (1994). Of course this is likely to conflict with the inevitable intensification of effort, a loss of control, and heightened insecurity once in the post itself. However one's re-positioning as a 'manager' might in tandem with this work productively to stem labour market insecurity or
address ontological insecurity (the question of how and who to be in the newly corporatised colleges). To follow Hollway's analysis the re-positioning may also engage psycho-dynamic investment in 'career' - for both men and women - or through the establishment of particular authority relations (with other more senior managers or the 'managed' for instance) - which might also demand 'complimentary' subject positions. To answer why people take on and then invest themselves in managerial work, requires that we address these issues and enquire into the delicate but 'deep' structures of identification (see Prichard, in press).

I shall just briefly illustrate this. One of the programme managers interviewed as part of a broader study (Prichard, 1997) of the 'new managers' in post-compulsory education, evoked this in the following comments.

I joined the college in 1990 and I acted as a team leader in psychology in 1993... so I had some experience in terms of managing resources for that and then the programme co-ordinator thing came up and it seemed like a natural progression. (emphasis added)

CP: Obviously you did it for the money (ha) what are the other things, are there other people in the team who were interested in it as well.

As it turned out no, but that was just the case for this programme area, in others there were more competition. Not in your life for the money, as that is not much more. I think I need personally to move forward. I don't like standing still for too long. And it seemed like a natural progression. I think institutionally you have to show that you have some ambition and for those reasons it seems like a good thing to do. I don't like doing the same thing for too long. (emphasis added)

Here the discourse of 'career' is drawn upon and located as a set of naturalised desires and needs in 'me' which speak of the need to 'keep moving', 'doing something new', 'moving on', or 'showing ambition'. This 'desire', from the analytical position suggested above, might also be said to be engaged in protecting particular identities - a masculine independent self - or avoiding the threat of 'world open-ness' by projecting itself into various managerial strategies and processes. The desire to present an 'active self’ also allows unwanted aspects of the self to be psycho-dynamically split off and projected onto an imaginary or real 'inactive self' which might be identified with others (the 'non-managerial' professional perhaps). An 'active self' (one that is not 'standing still') might be said to prove a highly seductive and powerful formation in its own right, which collects together, to achieve such a narrative project, aspects of work (managerial promotion and skills), leisure and family.

Conclusions

To conclude this paper has reviewed a number of sources of conceptual material which provide ways of moving beyond dualistic or narrowly conceptualised understanding of the 'self'
and 'identity' at work and in organisations. In relation to the managerialisation of the UK's public sector, it suggests that such processes as ontological, psycho-dynamic, labour market insecurities (which might be seen as part of the 'commodification' of labour) are drawn into the suffusion of managerial regimes, for example in further education. It is these processes which primarily aid, but might also in some cases 'un-hinge', the dispersal of the managerial subject position. The key point though is that managerial knowledges and practices work with and through these 'deep' structures. By addressing ontological insecurity or object relations for instance the intensification of work and its control, for instance, is understood as achieved through aspects of people's insecurities and investments in their work. We might even be said to welcome such processes as satisfaction might be said to come from the dispersal of unwanted feelings, through productive desire, or because such knowledges work to stem (briefly perhaps) our insecurities or address capitalism's under-determination of 'identity'.

From an analytical position the discussion highlights the difficulties of maintaining that organizations are 'relational structures into which people enter and pre-exist' (Reed: 1996:33). Clearly the above highlights how 'organizations' are made up of 'relational structures' but they work through people as we embrace, or at least reluctantly reproduce, the identities 'demanded' of us or seductively positioned for us. Furthermore to separate - analytically - 'people' from this 'structure' is not only unhelpful but extremely difficult. What this suggests is a form of analysis which is capable of highlighting the various 'strata' and the variable 'depths' of identities which are organized in organizations.

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