Thorstein Veblen
Suggestions Touching the Working Program of an Inquiry into the Prospective 
Terms of Peace
(Memorandum, originally written 1917)

The Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLVII, (Jun., 1932), pp. 186-189.
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I.
The contemplated settlement will take one or another of two contrasted 
lines of approach: a peace of diplomatic compromise, to include primarily 
the eight greater Powers, on a footing of parity; or, a league (federation) 
of the pacific Peoples on a footing of national disclaimer, to include 
primarily the democratic peoples of the Entente. The part logically to be 
taken by the United States in such a coalition of peoples will be very 
materially different according as the one or the other of these two lines 
of settlement is held in prospect. In the former case - a peace compact of 
diplomatic compromise America's part logically becomes that of an 
interested outsider, since the settlement in that case will be primarily an 
arrangement between the European Powers; whereas in the latter case-a 
League of the pacific Peoples-America will necessarily come in as an 
integral factor, perhaps the central and decisive factor in the settlement.
Evidently the range of inquiry with a view to feasible terms of peace will 
differ notably according to the part which will prospectively be taken by 
America. In the former case - a diplomatic settlement - America has little 
interest in what may be called the internal policies of Europe, whether 
international or intranational; and the range and purpose of this Inquiry 
would therefore, in that case, be chiefly confined to questions of domestic 
policy and of maritime trade. In the latter case - a neutral League of 
Peoples - the range of this Inquiry would necessarily extend to all 
countries and peoples concerned, but its scope would at the same time be 
narrowed by neglect of many things which the constitution of such a neutral 
league would take notice of only to disallow them, e.g., trade 
discriminations and the commercial engrossing of natural resources. In the 
former case, America's chief interest should logically be the realignment 
of its own internal forces, with a view to keeping the peace at home, and 
to provide against the assured event of its being presently broken abroad. 
The stipulations of a "diplomatic peace" are of relatively slight interest 
to America, since they would in any case be observed only so far as the 
Powers might find it convenient to observe them in the course of 
preparation for the eventually ensuing war, whereas the measures to be 
taken in domestic policy in this case, with a view to a solidarity of 
sentiment and resources under all contingencies, will be of paramount 
consequence and should claim the chief attention of the Inquiry.
II.
To reach a tenable settlement on anything like a democratic footing the 
support of popular sentiment must be had for all substantial points that 
are to be agreed on or argued for. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to 
keep in touch with current opinion and sentiment, to inform all men of what 
is under advisement as being desirable to be done or possible to be 
accomplished, and to guide public attention so far as may be in respect of 
the purposes that are aimed at, and the ways and means and adjustments 
necessary to their accomplishment. Therefore it becomes incumbent on the 
Inquiry not only to turn unreservedly to that method of "open diplomacy" 
that has latterly been made much of, but also deliberately to enter on a 
campaign of publicity designed to cover all moot questions.
By way of parenthesis it may be suggested that this work of publicity might 
advantageously take the following forms: - Men associated in the Inquiry 
should put into the form of written bulletins a detailed presentation of 
particular questions that are to be taken under advisement, to be published 
and circulated as bulletins of the Inquiry or of the State Department, but 
with a specific avowal that the views set out in these bulletins have been 
submitted to and are taken under advisement by the Inquiry and inviting 
free discussion and suggestions. Preferably, these bulletins should carry 
the signatures of their writers, rather than the informal endorsement of 
the Inquiry, so that their publication should not commit the Inquiry in any 
official way to the views embodied in the bulletins.
It is hoped that the outcome of such publicity would be of appreciable use 
in the way of ascertainment, standardisation, and guidance of popular 
sentiment touching the ways and means of keeping the peace, as well as the 
adaptations of policy and administration necessary to be accepted to that 
end.
III.
Any degree of reflection will show that deliberation or debate on these 
matters must result directly in a two-sided division of opinion and 
endeavor, in such a way that spokesmen of the vested interests and of the 
unqualified maintenance of the established order, on the one hand, will be 
found opposed to the spokesmen of a resolute maintenance of the peace at 
the cost of any necessary revision or adjustment within this established 
order, on the other hand; and it should be equally evident that the Inquiry 
will find itself taking sides and will presently be committed to a 
position, either favoring the vested interests at some risk to the 
maintenance of peace at home and abroad, or favoring a workable realignment 
of the country's available resources designed to keep the peace even at the 
cost of some appreciable derangements to these vested interests.
What is involved in the logic of the situation is apparently a question of 
bias, a matter of inclination for or against the vested rights on the one 
hand, and the domestic and international tranquillity on the other hand; 
and it would appear that the Inquiry, following the apparent inclination of 
the Administration, should presently, by force of the logical situation, 
find itself searching for feasible ways and means of assuring the domestic 
tranquillity even at the cost of any contingent derangement of the 
established scheme of vested rights, whether private or national.
IV.
Assuming that the settlement will result in a League of the pacific 
Peoples, drawn on a plan of neutralisation and a pooling of issues, rather 
than a negotiated compact of diplomatic compromises between rival Powers, 
then it logically follows that the French and English-speaking Peoples will 
make up the substantial core of the League, and also that initiative and 
discretion will continue to vest in these Peoples primarily. But it follows 
likewise that in such a case, the United States will be thrown into the 
center, and the initiative and discretion in the formation, structure, and 
carrying on of the League will in effect come to vest primarily in the 
American Administration; which so will be put on its honor, and will at the 
same time be enabled to give effect to its unselfish profession.
At the same time, the sooner the American Administration takes initial 
measures toward this end the better the chance of its effectually realising 
its professed ideals, and the better the chance of maturing these ideal 
aims and progressively embodying them in definitively tenable concrete 
working arrangements. It is also apparent that a League designed eventually 
to keep the peace had best be such a League as would now expediently be 
contrived for achieving an advantageous settlement, from which it follows: 
(a) that an enduring coalition of these chief Entente belligerents (the 
French and English-speaking Peoples) for the conduct of the war should be 
arrived at as expeditiously as may be done, and should be an organisation 
drawn with a view to its continuation as the core of the eventual Pacific 
League; and (b) that this Inquiry, as being an organ of the Administration, 
should therefore turn its present and continued attention to discovering 
and presenting the lowest terms and the most neutral claims on which such a 
working coalition can be made sufficiently compact for this purpose and can 
be held together as a going concern.
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