Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 6. (Jun., 1920), pp. 518-520.
Book Review by: F[rank]. H. Knight.
The Place of Science in Modern Civilization. By THORSTEIN VEBLEN.
New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1919. Pp. 509. $3.00.
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This is a collection of papers published in "various periodicals, running over a 
period of about twenty years." No high degree of unity is, of course, to be 
expected in such a compendium. The arrangement of the essays, however, departing 
widely from the chronological order, shows a fairly successful effort to present 
a more or less sequential development of Mr. Veblen's economic philosophy. A 
publisher's note indicates that the author of the essays reprinted in this 
volume has had nothing to do with their appearance in book form. No editorial 
work appears to have been done on them - a crude blunder in mathematical 
reasoning, with a rather elaborate footnote thereon, is reproduced on page 212 - 
and no index has been prepared.
The first two essays deal with the theme of the title and develop a parallelism, 
along the lines of economic determinism, between the evolution of the scientific 
interest and of the general structure of society. This discussion may be viewed 
as introductory to the main theme of the book, which is presented in the next 
four essays, on economics as an evolutionary science and the philosophical 
preconceptions of economics (pp. 56-179). Various aspects of this theme are 
elaborated in the subsequent essays, which include discussions of the economic 
systems of Clark and Schmoller and of socialism. The last three papers are 
extraneous, dealing with racial and cultural history.
"Scientific satire" may be said to form the keynote of this book, as of most of 
what Mr. Veblen writes. And as the cynic trod on Plato's pride with another 
pride, the iconoclast breaks idols with other idols. If his opponents romance 
under the cloak of science, Mr. Veblen satirizes in the same guise. To say that 
there is as much pose and prepossession in Mr. Veblen's. attitude as in the work 
which he criticizes is to state the case mildly. The main concern of the author 
is to extirpate all moralizing from economics and reduce it to a "science." His 
scorn is heaped on "normality" in all its forms. In the sense of separating 
science from moralizing, it must be admitted that there is no worthier or more 
needful task. The two things have been mixed badly [519] and to the grave 
disadvantage of both in the past, and no one will gainsay the valuable work 
which Mr. Veblen has done, in spite of extremism and a malicious sense of humor, 
in bringing the discussion of economic principles down to the often stern and 
unlovely facts.
But there are serious difficulties in the way of a "scientific" treatment of 
economics, over which Mr. Veblen does not help us, and many of which he does not 
see. A keen critic, he is not a close or clear thinker; destructively valuable, 
we can hardly follow him as a constructive leader. Thus in case of his favorite 
philosophical idea, the distinction between Hegelian and Darwinian evolutionary 
categories, often one cannot tell just what he means or on which side he is. In 
the second and third essays of the volume, Darwinism is characterized as the 
replacement of a teleological interpretation of phenomena by a matter-of-fact 
view. But in the essay on Schmoller (especially pp. 262, 265) Darwinism 
represents insistence on real causes, while Hegelianism is identified with 
empiricism. Again in the third essay we are told (p. 77) that economics must be 
a "theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions, stated in terms of 
the process itself." This sounds much like the "self-realizing life process" 
which is disparaged on page 259, and the only visible alternative is the fatuous 
empiricism damned with ridicule on page 262. There is obscurity and confusion of 
issues here. The author does not seem to recognize the familiar fact that 
objective science knows nothing about causes in any other sense than empirical 
uniformity. The difference between a "fatuous empiricism" and science is that 
the latter is an analytic and quantitative empiricism; outside this realm we can 
appeal only to an unscientific immanent teleology or else to a wholly irrational 
"creative evolution." (It is noteworthy that even mechanistic biologists are 
compelled to use teleology, and that they are merely dogmatic, in the present 
state of science, in insisting that it is not final.) The author's treatment of 
human nature is also replete with obscurity and ambiguity. Man is now a 
constant, now a variable; now in the causal sequence, now outside of it; 
sometimes the reference seems to be to a free personality, sometimes to 
instincts, and sometimes (apparently oftenest) to mores.
The most serious defect of the Veblenian philosophy comes out in the contrast 
between pecuniary and industrial employments, of which so much is made. (See 
especially pp. 279-323). Again it is not clear just what is meant by the terms. 
The simplest and apparently the correct view is that industrial values mean 
those of which the author approves and pecuniary values those of which he 
disapproves. As to [520] the reasons, grounds, or standards of this approval and 
disapproval, he does not find it pertinent to make a statement. It may be 
suggested that the "industrial" values are those which have an "alimentary or 
nutritive" character (pp. 90, 91) or which represent satisfaction of man's 
"natural" wants (p. 128), while the "pecuniary" serve only to "keep up 
appearances" (p. 399). But in the first place even alimentation is heterogeneous 
and not susceptible of accurate measurement. And if by "keeping up appearances" 
is meant the aesthetic side of life, still greater difficulties supervene. Under 
this interpretation the estimate (p. 399) that half our productive effort goes 
into this field is far too small; nine-tenths would be nearer the truth. But we 
doubt if Mr. Veblen would abolish all these gratifications, which make up the 
difference between human and brute life. He doubtless means to disapprove only 
of keeping up appearances in "improper" ways, which is to say, in ways of which 
he disapproves. If he has an objective test for distinguishing between valid and 
false aesthetic values (and equating the innumerable kinds) he does the world 
grievous wrong in withholding it from publication.
It goes without saying that there is a great deal in this distinction between 
real value and trumpery, but we wish to remark that it is a canon very difficult 
to apply - in a democracy! Other leading ideas in the book invite criticism, but 
space limits forbid. The essays are all interesting and intellectually 
stimulating and well worth making available in this permanent, convenient form. 
It is a good piece of book-making and all thoughtful students of social 
problems, whether or not admirers of Mr. Veblen, will find it a handy 
compendium.
F. H. KNIGHT
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA