Review of Veblen’s "The Nature of Peace", The Nation, (New York), Vol. 105, No. 2714, (Jul., 5, 1917), pp. 14-15. ['article: Terms of Peace'.] -------------------------------------------------------------------------- [14] Terms of Peace The Nature of Peace. By Thorstein Veblen. New York: The Macmillan Co. $2 net. The month of January, 1917, was an unfortunate time for the publication of a book whose aim is in part to indicate the probable outcome of international relations upon the basis of the contemporary situation. Yet it must said that the great events which have occurred since Mr. Veblen’s book went to press have been at least perfectly consistent with his point of view - a fact which, indeed, makes it the more regrettable that he did not have the Russian revolution and the entrance of America into the war as additional points of view for his prophetic eye. As the full wording of the title indicates, Mr. Veblen’s is inquiry into the nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation.” It is written in the author’s usual flowing and ironical style, always crisp though often wordy. The reader who has plenty of time will enjoy reading all that Mr. Veblen has lo say; the hurried reader will gather all that Mr. Veblen means by skipping the last half of nearly every paragraph. The modern state, in the author’s opinion, is the foe of perpetual peace as a natural result of its descent from the feudal establishments of the Middle Ages. The modern masses, on the other hand, are beginning to see that their real interests are endangered and destroyed by war. Long before this, in fact, they would have put an end to the madness of militarism and to the feudal type of state itself had not the ruling classes in all nations seen that their prestige was dependent upon the older views, and consequently used their enormous influence-to inculcate into each generation of the masses the old-time virtue of patriotism. “Patriotism may be defined as a sense of partisan solidarity in respect of prestige. ... It belongs under the [15] general caption of sportsmanship rather than of workmanship.” It is ever bent on an invidious success, its major purpose being the defeat and humiliation of some competitor. In its essence it has as little to do with solid human values as the flowers that bloom in the spring. But it is kept alive by the ruling classes, and the common man meekly nourishes it as his supreme duty and accepts “the immaterial goods of vicarious prestige” as the first article of faith. Veblen thus puts patriotism into the artificial category into which Mandeville, long before him, put all the virtues. Doubtless a certain kind of jingo sentiment which commonly goes under the name patriotism is quite artificial enough to belong under Veblen’s description; but it is hard to believe that patriotism means nothing more than this, or that the author’s eighteenth-century theory as to its inculcation will account for all the facts. It seems a bit unlikely that you can fool all the people all the time; and most of us have known a form of patriotism that meant something more than invidious prestige. We may all, however, agree with Mr. Veblen that patriotism of the “sportsmanship” order is the abiding source of most wars. Mr. Veblen, moreover, is willing in his turn to agree with the rest of us that not all patriotism is of the aggressive sort. The nations of the world he divides into two rather sharply contrasted groups: those which may safely be counted on spontaneously to take the offensive, and those which will fight only on provocation. To the former class belong Germany and her allies and Japan; to the latter the English and French-speaking peoples and most of the smaller nations. With Russia (which in January was still “Imperial Russia”). Mr. Veblen does not know what to do; and surely his hesitation was well grounded. The antiquated ideals of the dynastic state and the emulative type of patriotism are so ingrained in the mind of the German people through a thousand years of feudal custom that a lasting peace on any terms of equality with Imperial Germany is simply out of the question. A neutral peace compact may be practicable in the absence of Germany, but with Germany it would be quite impossible. Hence the pathway to peace is plainly twofold: complete submission to Germany, or the virtual elimination of Imperial Germany as a national power. In spite of our natural (patriotic) repugnance towards submission, it surely deserves serious consideration. German rule might be unpleasant, but, Veblen reminds us, our German rulers would probably be too wise to demand “more than the traffic-would bear.” The material interests of the common man might be better served by submission to an admittedly efficient government than by the terribly expensive war which would be necessary if the Fatherland had to be eliminated or revolutionized. However, Mr. Veblen recognizes that even if submission could be proved wise, it would almost certainly be rejected - even the Common man is still too idealistic too patriotic) to accept it. Hence, if we are to have anything more than a truce leading to new and greater wars, the present struggle must be continued until the collapse of Imperial Germany, after which a league .of the peace-loving nations may be formed with some hope of really putting an end to war. The success of such a league will depend on the willingness of the various peoples who make it up to do away with the causes of jealousy and invidious prestige and to neutralize as much of our common life as possible. Foremost among the things which Mr. Veblen would neutralize are trade and citizenship The peoples of the present German coalition, moreover, should be admitted to the league and treated “not as vanquished enemies, but as fellows in undeserved misfortune brought on by their culpable masters.” But the immediate need is to end the war on terms that shall make a lasting peace possible. Nor does the author leave us, as most writers do, with merely this very general statement. Perhaps the most interesting thing in his book is the very definite set of peace terms which he proposes, a list containing so much that is original and suggestive that it is worth quoting here entire: (1.) The definite elimination of the Imperial establishment, together with the monarchical establishments of the several states of the Empire and the privileged classes; (2.) Removal or destruction of all warlike equipment, military and naval, defensive and offensive; (3.) Cancelment of the public debt of the Empire and of its members - creditors of the Empire being accounted accessory to the culpable enterprise of the Imperial Government; (4.) Confiscation of such industrial equipment and resources as have contributed to the carrying on of the war, as being also accessory; (5.) Assumption by the League at large of all debts incurred, by the Entente belligerents or by neutrals, for the prosecution or by reason of the war, and distribution of the obligation so assumed, impartially among the members of the League, including the peoples of the defeated nations; (6.) Indemnification for all injury done to civilians in the invaded territories; the means for such indemnification to be procured by confiscation of all estates in the defeated countries exceeding a certain very Modest maximum, calculated on the average of property owned, say, by the poorer three- fourths of the population-the kept classes being properly accounted accessory to the Empire’s culpable enterprise. --------------------------------------------------------------------------