"Review of Veblen's Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution", by The New York Times, July 18, 1915, p. BR258 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN GERMANY Mr. Veblen's Interesting Theory to Account for the Rapidity of Economic Growth in the Empire. IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. By Thorstein Veblen. The Macmillan Company. $1.50. Though Mr. Veblen’s essay on the sources of German efficiency was begun before the war, many of its points have been elaborated in the light of that event. It is, therefore, altogether timely in its interest, besides being an economic study of permanent value, fully up to the standard of this author’s “Theory of the Leisure Class” and “Instinct of Workmanship.” Its scope is defined in these words: "It aims to account for Germany’s industrial advance and high efficiency by natural causes, without drawing on the logic of manifest destiny. Providential nepotism, national genius, and the like. It is believed to be the first attempt yet made at an explanation, as distinct from description or eulogy of this episode in modern economic history." The underlying source of Germany’s great military development, and, therefore, of the war, is that nation’s wonderful industrial expansion in the brief space of half a century. Why this rapidity of economic growth? Mr. Veblen says it is due to the natural law that a borrowed idea or system, if it finds congenial soil, flourishes more luxuriantly in new surroundings than it could in its original habitat, because it is unhampered by the fallen underbrush from which it was evolved. Germany borrowed her industrial and economic system, her machines, factory methods, steamship models, &c. directly from England: and she did so at a moment when the new Prussianized empire, with its mediaeval ideas of royal power and popular service, furnished an especially rich soil for the exotic plant. Her backwardness was actually an advantage. The nation, with its feudal inheritance of obedience, did better team work in shop and factory and army than England could command with her more modern atmosphere of individual freedom; and the German ruling classes saw to it from the beginning that this expanding economic power should be securely hitched to their military machine. Mr. Veblen goes back to the stone age to show that the Teutonic tribes around the Baltic Sea were hybrids of three distinct race stocks, and that, probably because of their mixed composition, they have always been facile borrowers. Until late pagan times there was little difference between German and English development. Then England, protected by the sea, slowly forged ahead, and in due time was the first to develop the factory system to its fullest extent. It took her six times as long to do this as it has taken Germany to borrow it, and now she is suffering some of the disadvantages of being a pioneer. The author finds that the case of Germany is unique among Western nations as regards both the abruptness and the thoroughness with which it has adopted modern industrial methods, and as regards "the archaism of its cultural furniture at the date of this appropriation." Japan is a similar instance in the East. But the thing that counts most is the fact that the German people have been able to reap this heritage of the English without having paid for it in the social weaknesses which the evolving of such a system produces. Since the Elizabethan age Great Britain has gradually evolved its navy, its industries, its world commerce, its railroads, its mills – and its slums. There has been waste and loss, as in all evolutions. The English railway system, for instance, with its toy freight cars and narrow tracks, is not as efficient as the German system, which was built after better forms had been invented. This typifies a hundred other obsolescent survivals that ought to be "junked," but that are retained by characteristic British conservatism. "All this does not mean," says Mr. Veblen, "that the British have sinned against the canons of technology. It is only that they are paying the penalty for having been thrown into the lead and so having shown the way. At the same time it is not to be imagined that the lead has brought nothing but pains and penalties. The shortcomings of the British industrial situation are visible chiefly by contrast with what the British might be doing if it were not for the restraining dead hand of their past achievement, and by further contrast, latterly, with what the new-come German people are doing by use of the English technological lore." This pioneering has had its effect for good and ill upon the people and upon the nature of British loyalty. Long development in little shops and independent enterprises has created a spirit of individual freedom which, in a crisis like the present, may be a dynastic weakness. The author states it thus: "The English fall short in point of self-sacrifice and abnegation for the sake of dynastic politics, and the advancement of the reigning house and its patrician bureaucracy. By contrast with the naïve patriotic solidarity of the German people the allegiance of the English might even be called a mitigated insubordination rather than loyalty tempered with self-interest." More serious, however, is the penalty of human waste which England is paying for her industrial pioneering. Child labor and long factory hours in the early days of intense competition have left a large heritage of weakened physiques and defective wills, summarized in the slums of Manchester and London, Germany has had the fortune to acquire a modern factory system without – thus far – paying that penalty. In the same class of national waste Mr. Veblen places England’s idle gentry, and he is especially severe upon the waste of national strength in sports. He denounces the "elaborate futilities" and "superfluity of inanities" exemplified in British horse racing, shooting, polo, mountain climbing, as a colossal folly which no sane nation would tolerate unless habituated to it from infancy. His strictures on this point need a good deal of qualification, but on the whole one is inclined to grant his general contention that leisure-class ideas have had a deleterious effect on the whole nation. Here is his own summary: "It is not so much that this perversion of the British population by sportsmanlike preoccupations wastes the products and the energies of the industrial system as that it perverts the sources from which the efficiency of the industrial system is to come. Its high consequence as a means of destruction lies in its burning the candle at both ends." There is, of course, the German wastage of a great standing army, but Mr. Veblen shows that on the whole the German system, hateful as it is on the side of liberty, has helped rather than hindered industrial efficiency. The imperial statesmen have worked out their own ends with a "single-mindedness obstructed by no consideration of law, equity, or humanity – a dynastic State cannot be set afloat in the milk of human kindness" – but they have a perfect machine, and its dynamo is the nation’s flourishing industries. The net gain, however, is not as large as the Germans themselves have supposed. For one thing, there is the lively ill-will produced by their overbearing attitude toward other nationalities. More important, however, is the rapid industrial gain of neighboring nations, notably France, Russia, and Italy. Apparently the Kaiser and his party have waited a little too long to strike their blow. The author says: "Relatively to the situation at large, Germany has latterly been gaining, if at all, only at a lessened rate. It is perhaps safe to say that in this relative sense the empire has latterly begun to lose. The best guess of a shrewd outsider not unduly influenced by the clamorous laudation of the German achievements would probably be that the date at which Germany ceased to gain in industry and commerce, relatively to the situation at large, came some half a dozen years ago. *** In any case it would appear that the defensive offense has been delayed beyond the date at which the warlike force of the empire was at its best, relatively to the situation at large." Whether Germany wins or loses, says Mr. Veblen, a temporary impairment and arrest of Western civilization is inevitable. What the Prussian-Imperial State is contending for is "something in the nature of a reprieve for personal government;" but its situation has this curious anomaly, that if the empire could not get along without machine industry, neither can it ultimately get along with it, "since this industrial system in the long run undermines the foundation of the State." Though sometimes too wordy and often needlessly technical in its language, this book contains much vigorous, original thinking, and its main conclusions command assent. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------