Thorstein Veblen: The Japanese Lose Hopes for Germany The New Republic, Vol. XI, (June 30, 1917), pp. 246-247. (There this letter appeared as a communication from Thorstein Veblen). ------------------------- Assuming that it is not a ruse designed to be carried out in collusion with the German high command and for the ultimate success of the German cause, the late move by which Japanese forces have been sent into European waters in support of the Entente is the most sinister and convincing episode of the warlike situation in Europe since the failure of the assault on Verdun. Sinister, that is to say, as seen from the German point of view. Assuming always, as has just been said, that it is not a ruse undertaken by oriental statecraft in collusion with the quasi-oriental statecraft of Berlin, it plainly signifies that the statesmen of the Far Eastern empire have cast up the account to date and have concluded that there is no gain to be had for imperial Japan by further playing fast and loose with the European belligerents and keeping open a chance of alliance with imperial Germany at the close of hostilities or at any opportune stage in their further prosecution. The statesmen of imperial Japan have evidently reached the conviction that the chances of ulterior gain for Japan by eventual use of an offensive alliance with Germany are no longer worth serious attention, as against the certainty of a hostile attitude on the part of the nations of the Entente toward any further schemes of Japanese aggrandisement. Seen in the long and dispassionate perspective afforded by the Far Eastern point of view, and rated quite unemotionally in terms of prospective profit and loss to the imperial establishment, the European war situation will necessarily present itself as a large question of "alternative uses." It has long been evident that the conservative, that is to say imperialistic and reactionary, statesmen who have controlled the policies of Japan have consistently taken thought to avoid any avoidable offense as against Germany. It is similarly evident that a shrewd imperial policy, whenever a propitious conjuncture may arise, should negotiate a close alliance with Germany and her following for the purpose of making whatever gains might be made during the period of weakness and disorganisation that is expected to take effect among the Entente nations on the close of the present hostilities. But such a policy presumes that the German Empire is to come out of its present difficulties substantially intact; intact, at least, to the extent of still doing business as a German Empire under the rule and policies of the Prussian statesmen. The present move of the Japanese forces would seem to signify that these shrewdest, most callous, and most watchful of all adepts in unashamed statecraft have decided that the chances of so fortunate an eventuality for the German imperial forces are now too slight to be worth serious consideration. It would signify, in other words, that in the apprehension of the Japanese imperial statesmen the German Empire is not to appear on the map of Europe as it is to be redrawn for the day after tomorrow; and it would signify also that in their apprehension there is no help for this sinister eventuality, even if the forces of imperial Japan were to be thrown in unreservedly on the side of the German Empire and its allies. The surmise also suggests itself that it may be America's entrance into the war that so has given the outcome in this Japanese computation of "alternative uses." --- End ---