Thorstein Veblen Between Bolshevism and War. The Freeman, Vol. III, May 25, 1921, pp. 238-251. -------------------------------------------------- Since the return of peace, the civilised nations have come to face a fateful choice between Bolshevism and war. Hitherto no official pronouncement has recognised this state of the case. Neither does the public press comment on this sinister fatality, nor do public speakers call attention to it; which is doubtless quite as it should be in the nature of things - in that nature of things that touches the public press and the public speakers. Of course it is a distasteful state of things, and one would like to overlook it, and it sets up such a dilemma as no aspiring politician can afford to make up his account with. Such a one would have to take sides, and there is small comfort on either horn of the dilemma for any one whose fortunes are to be kept afloat on professions of optimism. Yet the main fact should be evident to any reasonably well-informed person on slight reflection. It is, in effect, quite the largest and most obvious of the sinister fatalities contained in this twilight peace that has followed the armistice. And among these nations that now stand in the article of decision between Bolshevism and a bootless warfare, America, of course, comes into the case along with the rest of civilised mankind; not so precipitately as some of them, perhaps, but plainly nearer the edge than some others. That which so confronts the civilised nations is not precisely a question of free choice between two alternative lines of policy. It is rather a question of the drift of circumstances. just yet it looks like an open choice between alternative lines of conduct, because the ulterior drift of events is not plain, just yet. For the time being the drift visibly sets in the direction of war. But the visible drift is, in the main, the drift of statesmanlike maneuvers, as worked out by the constituted authorities in these various nations; rather then the long-term drift of sentiment among the underlying populations. The circumstance that these statesmen whose dutiful privilege it is to guide, or to follow, the drift of political maneuvers have made no public acknowledgment of the sinister choice which so faces them, should perhaps be set down to statesmanlike reticence. Statesmanship is necessarily furtive, in the nature of things. It will scarcely do to credit the statesmen with a comprehensive ignorance of the main facts in the situation with which they have to deal. Even the dim religious light of the censored press dispatches allows these main facts to be seen in outline. Whereas the sources of information are all at the disposal of the constituted authorities, and knowledge of the pertinent facts is prudently withheld within the official circle. Indeed, it is plain that the underlying population have ceased to enjoy the confidence of the officials who manage their affairs. So that even in the out-and-out democratic nations the statesmanlike officials find it wise to withhold knowledge of the pertinent facts from their constituencies. There is, accordingly, no reason to believe that the furtive reticence of the statesmanlike officials in this connection denotes any degree of ignorance on their part. And their various proposals and the measures already taken go to say that there are many pertinent facts which the statesmen do not find it expedient to divulge. Therefore it is particularly significant that the visible drift of statesmanlike maneuvers sets consistently in the direction of war as an offset to Bolshevism. "Bolshevism" is a loose, descriptive term; and it is so used here, without any effort to give it a more precise meaning than it has in popular usage. Popular usage has not yet given the word a well-defined meaning; but as it runs it is definite enough to be understood, in a loose and general way, among those who make use of it. In this popular usage the word has a definite meaning at least to the extent that it always denotes a revolutionary movement of such a kind as to displace the established economic scheme of things. Beyond this there is no reasonable agreement between those who speak for Bolshevism and those who speak against it. It may conceivably signify a peaceable substitution of a new economic order in place of the old, or it may involve a resort to violence; that would depend on circumstances. But in any case Bolshevism is outside the law and in violation of the law, in the sense that it involves a subversion of established law and custom at certain points. In any case, Bolshevism is not to be reconciled with the established order of things, and the points of conflict are of an economic nature. When reduced to their lowest terms it will be seen that these points of conflict may be drawn together under a single head: The disallowance of Absentee Ownership. On this main head the conflict between Bolshevism and the established order is irreconcilable, and it will be seen on reflection that any of the minor points of conflict follow from this main article of contention. just yet there is no conclusive ground for assuming that Bolshevism involves any other general principle of action than this one. Bolshevist experience has not yet had the chance to show or to find out if the spirit of it calls for any other principle of action that has anything like the same wide bearing as this one. It appears to be, in effect, a movement to discard this one large institution of Absentee Ownership, which now dominates the economic life of the civilised nations. It is therefore, in effect, a conflict between the absentee owners and the underlying population; in which the constituted authorities come into the case as guardians of the rights of absentee ownership. The constituted authorities are the guardians of the established law and order, which under existing conditions places them in the position of defenders of the legitimate rights of absentee ownership. So far, therefore, as regards its principles of action, any working definition of Bolshevism need for the present include only this one specification - that it aims to discard absentee ownership, with whatever consequences may follow. But it seems necessary to add that, in point of method, or ways and means, Bolshevism is committed to the Soviet. The Soviet form of organisation appears to be the appointed ways and means of working out this principle of action that inspires the spirit of Bolshevism. It is conceivable that absentee ownership might be superseded by some other form of organisation and control than the Soviet; but any such recourse to some other method of control would scarcely be called Bolshevism. And any disestablishment of absentee ownership by recourse to the Soviet form of administration could scarcely be called anything else than Bolshevism. In such a movement to dispossess the absentee owners the Soviet also displaces democracy and representative government, and necessarily so, because democracy and representative government have proved to be incompetent and irrelevant for any other purpose than the security and profitable regulation of absentee ownership. Democratic usage and legal interpretation have taken such a turn in recent times. Hence parliamentary government and democratic legality are due to go in the discard along with their reason for being, so soon as a Bolshevist régime is installed. In its elements, the Soviet appears to be very closely analogous to the town- meeting as known in New England history. The dictionary meaning of the word is "counsel" and "council." But to let a self-justified town-meeting take over all items of absentee ownership within its jurisdiction would plainly be a revolutionary innovation, a subversion of law and order. This characterisation of Bolshevism seems colorless and barren, and it will scarcely suit either its friends or its enemies. It has but a slight rhetorical value. Advocates and critics alike have use for terms which will irritate the human sensibilities of their audience. It is necessary for them to raise a sentimental issue; or, as it is also called, a moral issue. And for that use there is need of terms which lend themselves to praise and blame. But since the purpose here is neither praise nor blame, a colorless, descriptive characterisation is all that is wanted. And it is Bolshevism in this objective sense that is here set up as the alternative of war, in the choice of policies that now confronts the governments of the civilised nations. And in so speaking of Bolshevism as the sole alternative of continued warfare and warlike preparation it is by no means intended to claim that Bolshevism necessarily means peace. The choice between Bolshevism and war need not be a choice between peace and war. The reason for setting up this simple and objective definition of Bolshevism is partly to avoid unnecessary alarm, partly to avoid confusing Bolshevism with the familiar gestures of the anarchists, or the orthodox Socialists, or the out-and- out Communists. The difference between Bolshevism and an untempered Communism should be plain enough. But it is also not unusual for incautious and intemperate critics to confuse Bolshevism with Socialism and in doing so to disparage both together; and particularly to discredit the Socialists. But neither the Bolshevists nor the Socialists will admit that the two are alike in any substantial way. Indeed, the certified Socialists are among the staunchest enemies of Bolshevism, as is quite intelligible. The Socialists of the stricter observance have consistently spoken for an eventual obsolescence of all ownership, absentee or otherwise, by force of a natural law which governs the sequence of human affairs; and they have now come to an exasperated realisation that Bolshevism is putting that orthodox preconception out of joint and out of date. Socialism is a dead horse; whereas it appears that Bolshevism is not; and the chartered Socialists find themselves seized and possessed of a certain inalienable equity in the remains; all of which does not conduce to a neighborly frame of mind. The Socialists had hoped to preserve the established political organisation intact, and eventually to take it over for their own use; the Bolshevists appear to harbor no such fancy. This off-hand characterisation of Bolshevism as being no more and no less than a movement to discontinue absentee ownership is likely to be questioned by partisans, for and against; nor could it readily be made good with citations of chapter and verse from authentic sources. The Bolshevist documents which have come to hand do not commonly speak of absentee ownership as the particular object of their unfriendly attention; nor has Bolshevist practice been at all consistent on this head. Bolshevist practice, and perhaps also Bolshevist profession, has followed a wavering line of compromise and expediency, driven by extreme stress of necessity. And yet, on the whole, the drift of Bolshevist policy has after all visibly set that way, with so much consistency as the stress of shifting conditions would allow. On the one hand it has become increasingly evident that ownership of useful property by its immediate users is quite securely an integral part of Bolshevist policy as it is working out, and quite unavoidably so; and on the other hand it is likewise evident that the enemies of Bolshevism are its enemies because it denies the rights of absentee ownership, and indeed for no other cause. Bolshevism is a menace to absentee ownership. That is its unpardonable sin. But it is also a sufficiently mortal offense, inasmuch as it is the sin against the Holy Ghost of established Law and Order. The disallowance of absentee ownership would cut away the foundations of the established order of things economic and political. For good or ill, it would break up the established order of law and custom and so bring the current phase of European civilisation to a close. All of which violates all that the constituted authorities stand for in all the civilised nations. It would be a revolt against the constituted authorities on the part of the underlying populations. By virtue of their office the constituted authorities are the appointed guardians of absentee ownership. Any other interests which may still engage the care and attention of the national authorities in any of these civilised nations are quite subsidiary to this main issue; and any such minor interests can still effectually claim official protection or official tolerance only so long as they continue to be subservient to this main interest of the nation's substantial citizens. This follows necessarily from the nature of democratic government as it has taken shape during the recent past in all the democratic nations, and in the same degree as they are democratic within the accepted meaning of the term. A substantial citizen is an absentee owner of much property. In the historical present a democratic government is a government of the underlying population for the substantial citizens, by substantial citizens; whereas a Bolshevist government - if such there were - would, it is alleged, be a government of the underlying population for the insubstantial citizens, by insubstantial citizens - in violation of all current democratic usage. Therefore it has become the first duty of all those statesmen who guide the destinies of these democratic nations to suppress any popular movement of the nature of Bolshevism, far or near, by all means, fair or foul. Meantime the drift of circumstances following the war and the armistice has brought things to a critical pass in these democratic nations, such that the only practical line of policy still open to the safe and sane statesmen whose duty it is to avert the Bolshevist menace is further warlike enterprise, further continued preparation for war, and the sedulous fomenting of a warlike temper in the underlying population. This is the line of policy on which the civilised nations are now visibly embarked, though without openly avowing it. And this line of policy promises at least a substantial respite from Bolshevist alarms. The prospective cost is high, but the benefits of this policy should be worth the cost; particularly since the benefits inure to the substantial citizens, while the cost falls on the underlying population. Visibly, but with decently voluble disclaimers, the constituted authorities in all the civilised nations have chosen this way out of the dilemma. The peace which has followed the armistice is a peace of increased armaments, increased national jealousies, and unremitting nationalist propaganda. The practical corrective for all Bolshevist vagaries and illusions is patriotic animosity and a law-abiding submission to authority. Warlike enterprise and warlike preparation induce a patriotic temper in the underlying population, at the same time that they exact a servile obedience to the constituted authorities. These things, therefore, may be counted on to divert the underlying population from spending thought or sentiment on those economic grievances which make for a Bolshevistic frame of mind. And just now there is no other way to accomplish that purpose. Also, patriotism and warlike enterprise have ceased to have any other use. So long as the underlying populations of these civilised nations are sufficiently taken up with patriotic blare and national jealousy the division of interest and sentiment within these nations, between those who own more than they can use and those who have urgent use for more than they own, will be held in abeyance; a symphony of national hatred and suspicion will be heard in the land, and absentee ownership will be secure. But so soon as conditions of de facto peace are allowed to invade the community the underlying population will be due to take stock of their de facto disinheritance under the established system of law and order; and, for good or ill, there is then presently due to follow such a drift of sentiment as will eventually draw the underlying population together under something like the Red flag, and absentee ownership will no longer be secure - in the absence of unforeseen disturbing causes. That event is doubtless remote, so far as touches America; but America, too, seems to be headed that way. Any community will change its habits of thought only tardily and under pressure, but in case the pressure of new conditions is extreme, uniform, and persistent a wide-reaching dislocation of the traditional habits of thought is to be looked for even in the best regulated community. The appointed safeguard against this sinister eventuality is "Wars and rumors of wars." In all of this it is, of course, the spiritual benefits of warlike enterprise and military discipline that must be looked to to avert a disastrous spiritual break-down. It is a question of repairing and reinforcing such habits of thought in the community as will continue to favor the security of absentee ownership and the continued maintenance of that system of law and custom that is founded on absentee ownership. In the material respect, of course, warlike enterprise brings no net gain. In the material respect, of course, warlike expenditures are to be counted as net loss - said to amount to something like ninety percent of current Federal expenditures in this country. America is taking war by the forelock - with very decently voluble disclaimers, of course. But the immaterial, spiritual returns from warlike expenditure are quite a different matter and have quite a different value. Warlike enterprise nourishes a harmonious national hatred of all outsiders, and military discipline induces a virtuously servile temper and an unreasoning obedience to constituted authority: Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die. All of which makes for what is sometimes called sanity. The statesmen who guide the destinies of the civilised nations have reason to be apprehensive of what would be due to follow in case the attention of their underlying populations should be at all seriously diverted from the spiritual values of national prestige and patriotic jealousy, and turn to a consideration of their own material circumstances as determined by absentee ownership and control of their industrial system. As is already becoming evident in more than one of these nations, in such a case it would be very difficult to persuade the underlying populations that they have anything to lose in discarding the present system of ownership and control. It is not that a better scheme has been devised and is ready to be put in place of the existing system, but only that the existing system is proving itself patently unfit to take care of the country's industry and the material fortunes of its population. What still stands in the way of a free-swung Bolshevistic temper and a consequent bull-headed Bolshevist adventure in these civilised nations is the belated conservatism of the passing generation, in effect a spiritual holdover out of an obsolete past, in which absentee ownership had not yet taken over the nation's industrial system and in which national jealousy had not yet become patently imbecile. The established order, economic and political, rests on material circumstances which ceased to exist some little time ago; and it can be maintained only by artificially preserving the spiritual counterfoil of that materially obsolete past. The experience of the past few years has shown plainly enough that the established businesslike system of ownership and control will no longer work. Human nature being what it is, and the state of the industrial arts being such as it has now become, the established order of ownership and control is no longer fit to manage the country's industry in such a way as to yield a decent livelihood for the country's population. This is not saying that a better system is known and ready to be substituted for the obsolete existing system - there is no safe ground for that degree of optimism - but only that the existing system of businesslike control is obsolete. The present emergency has brought this matter to a test. The war and the armistice have made the world safe for absentee ownership and business as usual; all the civilised nations are in sore need of a full run of productive industry; there is ready and waiting the most efficient industrial equipment, the most abundant natural resources, and the most intelligent and skillful industrial man-power known to history; and for two and a half years the captains of industry and the great statesmen have labored together to turn these unexampled industrial resources to some account under the rules of absentee ownership and business as usual. The best result of their concerted efforts hitherto is an uneasy state of industrial "twilight sleep," hedged about with nightmares of famine, pestilence, and Red riots; and the most sanguine - and doubtful - hope of these civilised nations now is that this incredibly shameful state of things will not grow worse under the continued management of absentee ownership and business enterprise. Meantime the situation has been visibly growing worse during the two and a half years since the armistice, in spite of unusually abundant crops and favorable weather conditions. It is plain that absentee ownership and business as usual are at cross purposes with the country's industrial needs. All of which argues that it is wise for the statesmen to take repressive measures and keep the popular temper irritated about something else. --- End ---