Thorstein Veblen "Peace" "DIAL. A Fortnightly", (New York: The Dial Publishing Company, Inc.) Vol. LXVI (Dec., 28, 1918, to June, 28, 1919) May 17, 1919, pp. 485-487 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [485] Peace INTEMPERATE CRITICISM has diligently sought to find fault with the covenant which has been devised and underwritten by the deputies of the great powers. The criticism has been animated and voluble, but it has been singularly futile on the whole. At the same time the spokesmen of this covenant show a singular lack of assurance; they speak in a tone of doubtful hope rather than enthusiastic conviction. And the statesmen who set up this covenant do so with such an engaging air of modesty and furtive apprehension as should engender a spirit of good will and fellowship in the presentation of a doubtfully hopeful enterprise, rather than obstructive tactics and intemperate criticism. They are saying, in effect: We have done the best we could under the circumstances. It is a great pity that we have been able to do no better. Let us hope for the best, and God help us all! The best must always be good enough, and the Covenant is the best that the political wisdom of the three continents has been able to find in a five months' search for ways and means of avoiding war. But this best will always have the defects of its qualities. And such defects as still attach to the Covenant will best be understood, and may therefore best be condoned and allowed for, when seen in the light of its qualities. Now, as for its qualities, the Covenant is a political document, an instrument of real- politik, created in the image of nineteenth century imperialism. It has been set up by political statesmen, on political grounds, for political ends, and with political apparatus to be used with political effect. It brings to a focus the best and highest traditions of commercialized nationalism, but also it brings nothing else. The outcome is a political covenant which even its friends and advocates view with an acute sense of its inability, perhaps rather a sense of its total vacuity. Its defect is not that the Covenant falls short, but rather that it is quite beside the point. The point is the avoidance of war, at all costs; the war arose unavoidably out of the political status quo; the Covenant reestablishes the status quo, with some additional political apparatus supplied from the same shop. True to the political tradition, the Covenant provides for enforcing the peace by recourse to arms and commercial hostilities, but it contemplates no measures for avoiding war by avoiding the status quo out of which the great war arose. The status quo was a status of commercialized nationalism. The traditions which bind them will not permit anything beyond these political ends, ways, and means of commercialized nationalism to come within the cognizance of the competence of these elder statesmen who have had this work to do. So there is no help for it. But the Covenant is after all the best that was reasonably to be looked for. It embodies the best and highest traditions of nineteenth century statesmanship. That it does so, that it is conceived in the spirit of Mid- Victorian liberalism rather than in the spirit of Mid-European imperialism, is to be set down to the account of America and America's President. But that it remains standing as a left-over on that outworn ground, instead of coming up abreast of the twentieth century is also to be credited to the same power. It is in an eminent sense America's Covenant, made and provided by the paramount advice and consent of America's President, And this paramount advice and consent has gone to the making of the Covenant in the simple faith that commercialized nationalism answereth all things. The unfortunate, and unfortunately decisive, circumstance of the case is, therefore, that the President's outlook and ideals are in this way grounded in the political traditions of Mid-Victorian liberalism, and that his advisers have been animated with political traditions of a still narrower and more antiquated make. Hence the difficulties which arise out of a new industrial situation and a consequent new bias of the popular temper are sought to be adjusted by readjusting the political status quo ante. Now, it should be plain to anyone on slight reflection that this covenant has been forced upon the politicians by the present state of the industrial system. The great war has run its course within the confines of this industrial system, and it has become evident that no nation is competent henceforth [486] single-handed to take care of its own case within this system, in which all the civilized peoples are bound up together. And it should be similarly plain, on similarly slight reflection, that no readjustment of working arrangements among the peoples concerned can hope to touch the core of the difficulties unless its scope is the same as that of the industrial system and unless it is carried out with a single-handed regard to the industrial requirements of the case, and coupled with a thoroughgoing disallowance of those political and nationalist precedents and ambitions' that hinder the free working of this industrial system. The interval since Mid- Victorian time has been a period of unexampled change in the industrial arts and in the working arrangements necessary to industrial production. The productive industry of all the civilized peoples has been drawn together by the continued advance of the industrial arts into a single comprehensive, close-knit system, a network of mechanically balanced give and take, such that no nation and no community can now carry on its own industrial affairs in severally or at cross-purposes with the rest except at the cost of a disproportionate derangement and hardship to itself and to all the rest. All this is simple and obvious to those who are at all familiar with the technical requirements of production. To all such it is well known that for the purposes of productive industry, and therefore for the purposes of popular welfare and content, national divisions are nothing better than haphazard divisions of an indivisible whole, arbitrary and obstructive. And because of this state of things, any regulation or diversion of trade or industry within any one of these national units is of graver consequence to all the others than to itself. Yet the Covenant contemplates no abatement of that obstructive nationalist intrigue that makes the practical .substance of the "self-determination of nations." At the same time, that which chiefly hampers the everyday work of industrial production and chiefly tries the popular temper under this new order of things is the increasingly obstructive and increasingly irresponsible control of production by the vested interests of commerce and finance, seeking each their own profit at the cost of the underlying population. Yet the Covenant contemplates no abatement of these vested interests that are fast approaching the limit of popular tolerance; for the Covenant is a political instrument, made and provided for the rehabilitation of Mid-Victorian political intrigue and for the upkeep of the vested interests of commerce and finance. The cry of the common man has been: What shall we do to be saved from war abroad and dissension at home? And the answer given in the Covenant is the good old answer of the elder statesmen of the Old Order provision of armed force sufficient to curb any uneasy drift of sentiment among the underlying populace, with the due advice and consent of the dictatorship established by the elder statesmen. Now, the great war was precipitated by the malign growth of just such a commercialized nationalism within this industrial system, and was fought to a successful issue as a struggle of industrial forces and with the purpose of establishing an enduring peace of industrial prosperity and content; at least so they say. It should accordingly have seemed reasonable to entrust the settlement to those men who know something about the working and requirements of this industrial system on which the welfare of mankind finally turns. To any man whose perspective is not confined within the Mid-Victorian political traditions, it would seem that the first move toward an enduring peace would be abatement of the vested interests and national pretensions wherever they touch the conduct of industry; and the men to do this work should logically be those who know the needs of the industrial system and are not biased by commercial incentives. An enduring settlement should be entrusted to reasonably unbiased production engineers, rather than to the awestruck political lieutenants of the vested interests. These men, technical specialists, over-workmen, skilled foremen of the system, are expert in the ways and means of industry and know something of the material conditions of life that surround the common man, at the same time that they are familiar with the available resources and the uses to which they are to be turned. Of necessity in war and peace, it is for these workmen of the top line to take care of the industrial system and its working, so far as the obstructive tactics of the vested interests and the commercial statesmen will permit; for without their constant supervision and correction this highly technical system of production will not work at all. Logically it should be for these and their like to frame such a settlement as will bind the civilized peoples together on an amicable footing as a going concern, engaged on a joint industrial enterprise. However, it is not worth while to speculate on what they and their like might propose, since neither they nor their counsels have had any part in the Covenant. The Covenant is a covenant of commercialized nationalism, without afterthought. To return to the facts: The great war was fought out and peace was brought within sight by teamwork of the soldiers and workmen and the political personnel. The cost, the work, and hardship fell on [487] the soldiers and workmen, and it is also chiefly their fortune that is now in the balance. The political personnel have lost nothing, risked nothing, and have nothing at stake on the chance of further war or peace. But in these deliberations on peace the political personnel alone have had a voice. Neither those who have done the necessary righting at the front nor those who have done the necessary work at home have had any part in it all. The conference has been a conclave made up of the spokesmen of commercialized nationalism, in effect a conclave of the political lieutenants of the political lieutenants of the vested interests. In short, there have been no Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies included in this Soviet of the Elder Statesmen which has conferred the dictatorship on the political deputies of the vested interests. By and large, neither the wishes nor the welfare of the soldiers, the workmen, or the industrial system as a going concern, have visibly been consulted in the drafting of this Covenant. However, to avoid all appearance of graceless over-statement, it should perhaps be noted in qualification that the American workmen may be alleged to have been represented at this court of elder statesmen, informally, unofficially, and irresponsibly, by the sexton beadle of the A. F. of L., but it will be admitted that this qualification makes no serious inroad on the broader statement above. Neither the value nor the cost of this Covenant are fairly to be appreciated apart from its background and the purposes and interests which are moving in the background. As it now looms up against this murky background of covert agreements covertly arrived at during the past months, the" Covenant is beginning to look like a last desperate concert of crepuscular statesmanship for the preservation of the civilized world's kept classes and vested interests in the face of a menacing situation. Therefore, in case the Covenant should yet prove to be so lasting and serve this turn so well as materially to deflect the course of events, what is likely to be of material consequence to the fortunes of mankind is chiefly the outcome of this furtive traffic in other men's good between the deputies of the great powers, which underlies and conditions the stilted formalities of the instrument itself. Little is known, and perhaps less is intended to be known, of this furtive traffic in other men's goods. Hitherto the "High Contracting Parties" have been at pains to give out no "information which might be useful to the enemy." What and how many covert agreements have been covertly arrived at during these four or five months of diplomatic twilight will not be known for some time yet. A decent cover still hides what may be hidden, which is presumably just as well. And yet, even if one had best not see him face to face, one may still infer something as to the nature of the beast from the shape of his hoof. A little something in that way is coming in sight now in the shameful transaction by which the politicians and vested interests of Japan are given a burglarious free hand in northern China; and it would be both graceless and idle to speculate on what may be the grand total of gruesome enormities which the Oriental statesmen will have undertaken to perpetrate or overlook, for the benefit of the vested interests identified with the European powers, in consideration of that carte blanche of indecency. So also is the arrangement between the great powers for the suppression of Soviet Russia, for the profit of the vested interests identified with these Powers and at the cost of the underlying population; the due parceling out of concessions and natural resources in foreign parts, incident to that convention of smuggled warfare, will doubtless have consumed a formidable total of time, ingenuity, and effrontery. But the Covenant being an instrument of commercialized nationalism, all these things have had to be seen to. THORSTEIN VEBLEN. ------------------------------------------------------------------------