SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF YILDIZ YILMAZ v.
(Application no. 66689/01)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Yıldız
Yılmaz v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
judges,
and Mr S.
Naismith, Deputy
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 66689/01) against the
2. The applicant was
represented by Mrs Z.S. Özdoğan, a lawyer
practising in İzmir. In the instant case, the
Turkish Government (“the Government”) did not designate an Agent for the
purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
3. On
4. On
5. On
6. The applicant and the
Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits (Rule 59 §
1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Uşak.
8. On
9. In her statement of
10. On
11. On
12. On
13. On
14. On
15. On
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
16. A full description of the
domestic law may be found in Özel
v. Turkey (no. 42739/98, §§ 20-21,
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
6 OF THE CONVENTION
17. The applicant complained
that she had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal
due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the
“1. In the determination of ... any
criminal charge against her, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
3. Everyone charged with a criminal
offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means
to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require;”
A. Admissibility
18. The Government argued
under Article 35 of the Convention that the application must be rejected as it
was not lodged with the Court within six months from the date of delivery of
the
19. The Court has previously
rejected the argument that the six-month period should run from the date of the
20. The Government further
maintained that the applicant’s complaint in respect of the independence and
impartiality of the
21. The Court reiterates that
it has already examined similar preliminary objections of the Government in
respect of the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Vural v. Turkey, no. 56007/00, § 22, 21 December 2004, Çolak, cited above, § 24, and Özel,
cited above, § 25). It finds no particular
circumstances in the instant case which would require it to depart from its
findings in the above-mentioned cases and rejects the Government’s objection.
22. In the light of its established case-law (see, amongst many authorities, Çıraklar v. Turkey, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VII) and in view of the materials submitted to it, the Court considers that the case raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court therefore concludes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
B. Merits
1. As to the
independence and impartiality of the
23. The Government maintained
that the State Security Courts had been established by law to deal with threats
to the security and integrity of the State. They submitted that in the instant
case there was no basis to find that the applicant could have any legitimate
doubts about the independence of the
24. The Court notes that it
has examined similar cases in the past and has concluded that there was a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Özel, cited above, §§
33-34, and Özdemir, cited above, §§ 35-36).
25. The Court sees no reason
to reach a different conclusion in this case. It is understandable that the
applicant who was prosecuted in a
26. In the light of the above the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this respect.
2. As to the
fairness of the proceedings before the
27. Having regard to its
finding that the applicant’s right to a fair hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal has been infringed, the Court considers that it is
unnecessary to examine her complaints under Article 6 §§ 2 and 3 (c)
of the Convention (see Incal, cited above, § 74, and Çıraklar, cited above, § 45).
II. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
28. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
29. The applicant requested the Court to award her 9,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 35,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
30. The Government submitted
that these claims were excessive and unacceptable.
31. On the question of
pecuniary damage, the Court considers in the first place that it cannot
speculate as to what the outcome of proceedings compatible with Article 6 § 1
would have been. Moreover, the applicant’s claims in respect of pecuniary
damage are not supported by any evidence. The Court cannot therefore allow
them.
32. The Court further
considers that the finding of a violation of Article 6 constitutes in
itself sufficient compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the
applicant in this respect (see Incal,
cited above, p. 1575, § 82, and Çıraklar, cited above, § 45).
33. The Court considers
that where an individual, as in the instant case, has been convicted by a court
which did not meet the Convention requirements of independence and
impartiality, a retrial or a reopening of the case, if requested, represents in
principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see Öcalan v.
B. Costs and expenses
34. The applicant claimed EUR
3,000 with respect to the reimbursement of any costs and expenses in connection
with the proceedings before the Court.
35. The Government contested
the claim.
36. The Court may make an
award in respect of costs and expenses in so far as these were actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Sawicka v.
37. Making its own estimate based on the information available, and having regard to the criteria laid down in its case-law (see Vural, cited above, § 45), the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses claimed.
C. Default interest
38. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application
admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention as regards the complaint relating to the independence and impartiality
of the
3. Holds that it is not necessary to consider the applicant’s
complaints under Article 6 §§ 2 and 3 (c) of the Convention;
4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000
(one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be
chargeable, such sum to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable
at the date of payment and to be paid into the bank account in Turkey indicated
by the applicant;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in
English, and notified in writing on
S. Naismith J.-P.
Costa
Deputy Registrar President