THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF TANYOLAÇ v.
(Application no. 63964/00)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will
become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Tanyolaç v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič, President,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr V. Zagrebelsky,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson,
Mrs I. Ziemele,
judges,
and Mr V. Berger,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 63964/00) against the
2. The
applicant was represented by Mr A. Koyuncu, a lawyer
practising in
3. On
4. On
THE FACTS
5. The applicant was born in
1960 and lives in
6. On
7. On
8. On
9. The
trial resumed on
10. On
11. On
12. Shortly
after the judicial recess, the court held a hearing in which it obtained the
prosecutor's observations. The defendants were granted a further period of time
for their defence submissions.
13. On
14. Upon
the appeal by the Ministry of Health, however, the Court of Cassation quashed
this ruling on
15. On
16. On
17. At
the hearing dated
18. The
court denied these requests, holding that they were unwarranted under the
circumstances and could only be intended to prolong the proceedings.
Nonetheless, it granted the motion for a new expert examination restricted to the
amounts of bribery and the transactional connections among the defendants.
19. The
applicant's legal representative did not attend the next hearing.
20. The
new expert report was submitted on
21. Following
the judicial recess, the court held a hearing on
22. Neither
the applicant, nor his representatives attended seven consecutive hearings held
between
23. At
the next hearing held on
24. In
addition, some of the applicants reiterated their request for the expansion of
the factual examination. Once again, the court denied it, holding that it was
aimed at prolonging the proceedings.
25. The
applicant and his representative did not attend the next hearing held on
26. The
applicant and his representative also failed to attend four of the subsequent
hearings held between
27. On
28. On
29. On
an unspecified date the applicant appealed.
30. Upon
the applicant's specific request, the Court of Cassation scheduled a hearing
for
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
31. The applicant complained
that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable
time” requirement, provided in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable
time by [a] ... tribunal...”
32. The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the case was rather complex, both from a factual and legal point of view. The proceedings involved multiple defendants, the preparation of expert reports, the hearing and cross-examining of witnesses, and the review of numerous procedural motions. Notably, at several hearings, no taking of evidence was possible due to the absence of one or more of the defendants and/or their representatives.
33. Accordingly, the Government were of the view that there had not been a delay attributable to the State authorities.
34. The applicant did not specifically address the Government's arguments. He maintained instead that the Court of Cassation's final decision – i.e. upholding with amendment – had resulted from the excessive length of the proceedings at the first instance level.
35. He submitted that “upholding with amendment” was an unusual ruling. He argued that the normal practice for the Court of Cassation would be to quash the judgment with instructions on the determination of the sentence. In such a case, he claimed, the assize court could have persuaded the Court of Cassation by insisting on its previous sentencing.
36. The Court recalls that the complaint about the Court of Cassation's divergence from the initial sentence had already been declared inadmissible at an earlier stage. The Court therefore focuses on the length of the proceedings only.
37. In that connection, the period
to be taken into account began on
A. Admissibility
38. The Court notes that given
the overall length of the proceedings, this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared
admissible.
B. Merits
39. The Court reiterates that
the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light
of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria:
the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant
authorities (see, among many other authorities, Cesarini v. Italy, judgment of 12 October 1992,
Series A no. 245‑B, p. 26, § 17).
40. The Court considers that the subject matter of the case before the domestic courts was undoubtedly complex, as shown, inter alia, by the number of defendants, the economic nature of the crime, the technical expertise needed for its investigation, and the examination of financial records and books of various polyclinics and the bank accounts of the parties involved. Moreover, throughout the proceedings, a number of witnesses were heard and two expert examinations were conducted.
41. The applicant failed to point to any period during which the authorities were inactive or could have acted differently so as to avoid any delays. To the contrary, the case file demonstrates that the judicial authorities acted with due diligence.
42. The assize court, for instance, rejected a number of procedural motions, inter alia, for an appointment of new experts, expansion of the factual examination or stay of proceedings, with an eye to avoid any unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings.
43. The same court scheduled hearings at reasonably short intervals; mostly once in every month or two. Similarly, it promptly held hearings upon the submission of expert reports and after each judicial recess.
44. Whenever evidence or statements could not be taken due to the absence of one or more of the defendants, the court ordered their presence at the next hearing.
45. In addition, it specifically instructed the experts to observe the statutory time limits for their submissions.
46. Thus, the Court finds nothing in the case file that suggests that the judicial authorities failed to proceed with the requisite diligence or that there was any time of inactivity attributable to them.
47. The conduct of the applicant, on the other hand, was far from exemplary. He and/or his representative failed to attend at least thirteen hearings, some of which were consecutive. On many occasions, his representative requested additional time for his submissions, which resulted in the further prolongation of the proceedings.
48. Finally, neither the applicant
nor his representative has objected to the granting of additional time to the
experts, which factor seemingly delayed the examination of the merits at an
earlier stage of the trial.
49. In the light of the foregoing
discussion, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the remainder of the
application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
Vincent Berger Boštjan
M. Zupančič
Registrar President