SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF ŞAHİN ÇAĞDAŞ[1] v.
(Application no. 28137/02)
JUDGMENT
This
version was rectified on
under Rule 81 of the Rules of the
Court
This judgment will become final in
the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may
be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Şahin Çağdaş[2]
v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 28137/02) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Şahin Çağdaş1 (“the applicant”), on 25 March 2002.
2. The applicant was
represented by Mr S. Çetinkaya, a lawyer practising in
3. The applicant alleged that
his detention for two months and twenty three-days contravened Article 5 §§ 1
and 5 of the Convention. He complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the
written opinions which the Principal Public Prosecutors submitted to the
4. The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
5. On
6. The applicant and the
Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. The applicant was born in
1966 and lives in İzmir.
8. On
9. On
10. On
11. On
12. On 2 November 2000 the
Izmir State Security Court discontinued the prosecution against the applicant,
holding that the five year statutory time-limit laid down in Articles 102 § 4
and 104 § 2 of the Criminal Code had expired. The court noted that the offence
in question had allegedly been committed in March 1995, whereas the indictment
had been filed on
13. On
14. On
15. On
16. The judge-rapporteur
submitted his report to the
17. On
18. On
19. On
20. On
21. This opinion was not
transmitted to the applicant.
22. On
II. RELEVANT
DOMESTIC LAW
23. A description of the relevant domestic law at
the material time can be found in Göç v. Turkey ([GC], no. 36590/97, § 34, ECHR
2002-V).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicant complained
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a fair hearing had been
breached since he had never been given an opportunity to reply to the written
opinions which the Principal Public Prosecutors submitted to the Izmir Assize
Court and to the Court of Cassation on the merits of his claim and appeal,
respectively. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention provides as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
25. The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes
that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
B. Merits
26. The applicant contended that
the failure of the national courts to serve on him the Principal Public
Prosecutors' observations deprived him of his rights to procedural equality and
his rights of defence, with the result that he had had an unfair trial.
27. The Government submitted
that, following the referral of the case to the Court of Cassation, it would
have been open to any party to the proceedings to obtain from the court's
registry any information regarding the state of proceedings. When the applicant
became aware of the advisory opinion of the principal public prosecutor, he
could have asked for all necessary information, filed additional observations
or responded to the prosecutor's opinion. Furthermore, the Principal Public
Prosecutor's observations merely consisted of his opinion whether he approved
or disapproved the first-instance court's judgment. Accordingly, non‑communication
to the applicant of the Principal Public Prosecutor's observations did not
infringe the “equality of arms” principle or the applicant's rights under
Article 6 of the Convention.
28. The
Court notes that it has already examined the same grievance in the past and has
found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in its Göç judgment (cited
above, § 58). In that judgment, the Court held that, having regard to the nature of the Principal
Public Prosecutor's submissions and to the fact that the applicant was not given
an opportunity to make written observations in reply, there had been an
infringement of the applicant's right to adversarial proceedings (loc. cit. § 55). It further considered that to require an applicant's lawyer to take the initiative and inform
himself periodically on whether any new elements have been included in the case
file would amount to imposing a disproportionate burden on her or him and would
not necessarily have guaranteed a real opportunity to comment on the opinion (loc. cit. § 57).
29. The Court has examined
the present case and finds no particular circumstances which would require it
to depart from its findings in the aforementioned case.
30. There has accordingly
been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the
non-communication to the applicant of the principal public prosecutors'
observations before the
II. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 AND 5 OF THE CONVENTION
31. The applicant complained under Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty for two months and twenty-three days and that the national authorities had failed to redress his Convention grievances.
Admissibility
32. The Government asserted
that the applicant's arrest had been based on the presence of a reasonable
suspicion that he had committed an offence. Furthermore, the
33. As regards the first limb
of the applicant's complaints, the Court notes that the applicant's custody ended on
34. With
regard to the second limb of the applicant's complaints, the Court recalls that under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention the
right to compensation for any material or moral damage sustained as a result of
detention is conditional upon a breach of one of the paragraphs of Article 5
(see Wassink v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 September 1990,
Series A no. 185-A, p. 14, § 38). Accordingly, the
Court cannot consider an applicant's claim exclusively based on Article 5 § 5
unless a breach of Article 5 §§ 1 to 4 has been established either directly or
in substance, and Article 5 § 5 of the Convention does not entitle the
applicant to a particular amount of compensation. It follows that this
complaint is manifestly ill‑founded
and must be rejected pursuant to Article
35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
35. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
36. The applicant claimed the
sum of 4,887 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage.
37. The Government contended
that the applicant had failed to submit any evidence in support of his claims.
38. The Court notes that the
applicant failed to substantiate that he suffered pecuniary damage as a result
of the breach of his Convention rights. Therefore, it disallows the claim under
this head.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
39. The applicant claimed the
sum of EUR 30,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
40. The Government disputed the
applicant's claim.
41. The Court considers that
the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient compensation for
any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant (see Parsıl v. Turkey,
no. 39465/98, § 38,
C. Costs and expenses
42. The applicant claimed a
total of EUR 7,500 for his costs and expenses. He did not produce any
supporting documents.
43. The Government submitted
that the claims were excessive and unsubstantiated given the absence of receipts
or other such documents.
44. Making its own estimate based on the
information available, the Court considers it
reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 under this head.
D. Default interest
45. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;
3. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the
applicant;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000
(one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the
national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
S. Dollé J.-P.
Costa
Registrar President
[1] Rectified on 21 August
2006. The name of Şahin Çağdaş read Çağdaş Şahin
in the former version of the judgment.
[2] Rectified on 21 August
2006. The name of Şahin Çağdaş read Çağdaş Şahin
in the former version of the judment.