FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF NALBANT v.
(Application no. 61914/00)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the
circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Nalbant v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr P. Lorenzen, President,
Mrs S. Botoucharova,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Mrs M. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
Mr R. Maruste, judges,
and Mrs C. Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 61914/00) against the
2. By a letter of
3. The applicants were represented by the fourth applicant, Mrs Havva Nalbant Tekin, a lawyer practising in Tekirdağ. The Turkish Government did not designate an Agent for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court.
4. On
5. On
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6. The application was
initially introduced by Mahmut Nalbant who was born in 1936 and was living in
Kırklareli. Following his death on
7. In 1927 Mahmut Nalbant’s
father arrived as an immigrant from
8. On 13 September 1961 the
Land
9. On an unspecified date twenty-eight complainants objected to the results of the survey. It is to be noted that Mahmut Nalbant does not figure in the list of complainants. The applicants claimed that he was not notified of this decision.
10. On
11. In 1972 twenty-six
persons including Mahmut Nalbant (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) filed an
action with the
12. On
13. On
14. On
15. On
16. On
17. On
18. On
19. On
20. On
21. On
22. On
23. On
24. Between
25. On
26. On
27. On
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicants complained that the length of the civil proceedings exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The relevant part of Article 6 § 1 provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
29. The Government asked the Court to dismiss the application for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this regard, the Government maintained, in particular, that Mahmut Nalbant did not raise the substance of his complaint before the domestic courts and did not rely on the Convention.
30. The applicants disputed the allegations of the Government. In particular, they pointed out that during the proceedings Mahmut Nalbant had requested the domestic court to speed up the proceedings and had relied on the Convention.
31. The Court reiterates that
it has already examined and rejected the Government’s preliminary objections in
similar cases (see, in particular, Karakullukçu
v. Turkey, no. 49275/99, §§ 27-28,
32. Moreover, the Court notes
that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it
inadmissible has been established. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Period to be taken into
consideration
33. The Government requested
the Court to take into account solely the proceedings occurred after
34. The applicants refuted
the Government’s argument. In particular, they maintained that the domestic
proceedings began on 1961 and ended on
35. The Court considers that
the period to be taken into consideration in determining whether the
proceedings satisfied the “reasonable time” requirement laid down by Article 6
§ 1 began on 8 August 1972 when Mahmut Nalbant filed an action with the
Lüleburgaz Cadastre Court and ended on 29 April 2004, when the Court of
Cassation dismissed his request for a rectification of its decision. They
therefore lasted approximately thirty one years and nine months before the
36. The Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis permits it to only
consider the period of seventeen years and three months that elapsed after
2. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
37. The Government maintained
that the case was a complex one concerning a dispute over title to a large area
of land and involving a substantial number of plaintiffs, some of whom had died
in the course of the proceedings and had been replaced by their heirs. They submitted that there was no
delay attributable to the authorities and that the length of the proceedings was
caused by the number of adjournments sought by the plaintiffs concerning an onsite
inspection of the court. The Government noted that Mahmut Nalbant failed to
attend a number of hearings, that his representative requested several
extensions in order to submit documents and information and also to pay the
charges for an onsite inspection. Finally, they maintained that Mahmut Nalbant
did not object to the adjournment requests of the other plaintiffs.
38. The applicants maintained their allegations. In particular, they
pointed out that the first hearing was held in 1978, i.e. six years after
Mahmut Nalbant filed an action and that the first onsite inspection was
conducted in 1982. Moreover, they submitted that there was no fault attributable
to Mahmut Nalbant for the prolongation of the proceedings.
39. The Court reiterates that
the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light
of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria:
the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant
authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among
many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
40. The Court considers that even though the case was a complex one owing to the large number of plaintiffs and the nature of the dispute, it cannot be said that this in itself justified the entire length of the proceedings.
41. As regards the conduct of Mahmut Nalbant, while the Court notes that his
conduct was not beyond reproach due to his failure to attend few hearings and
onsite inspections, it does not find that Mahmut Nalbant contributed significantly
to the prolongation of the proceedings.
42. As to the conduct of the domestic
authorities, the Court does not find that there were
any excessive delays before the Court of Cassation when it upheld the judgment
of the first-instance court and dismissed the applicant’s request for a
rectification of its decision. However, the Court cannot overlook the fact that it took the court of first instance approximately twenty‑nine
years - fourteen years and six months of which fall within the Court’s
jurisdiction ratione temporis - to give a judgment on the merits. Admittedly, the Court notes that the proceedings were prolonged due
to a number of adjournments in particular for onsite inspections either due to adverse
weather conditions or the plaintiffs’ failure to attend them, the death of some
of the plaintiffs and collecting evidence from various authorities. However,
reiterating that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on the Contracting
States the duty to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts
can meet each of the requirements of that provision, including the obligation
to decide cases within a reasonable time (see Arvelakis
v. Greece, no. 41354/98, § 26, 12 April 2001), the Court
considers that the domestic court could have applied stricter measures to speed
up the proceedings. Neither the complexity of the case nor the conduct of the
plaintiffs is sufficient to explain the delay in which the case was processed by
the first‑instance court. Therefore, the Court considers the delay must
be considered to be attributable to the domestic court’s handling of the
proceedings.
43. Finally, the Court
considers that what was at stake for Mahmut Nalbant in the domestic
litigation was of considerable importance to him and to the applicants.
44. Having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court considers that, in the instant case, the
length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
45. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION
46. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
47. The applicants claimed 3,620
New Turkish Liras (YTL) (approximately 2,276 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage.
This sum included representation fees and expenses incurred both before the
domestic courts and before the Court. They also claimed YTL 15,000 (approximately
EUR 9,432) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
48. The Government contested
the amounts requested by the applicants considering them excessive and
unsubstantiated. In particular, they disputed the representation fees requested
by the applicants due to the fact that they were represented before the Court by
the fourth applicant.
49. The Court considers it appropriate to deal with the question of pecuniary damage under costs and expenses below.
50. The Court further
considers that the applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage, such as
distress and frustration, on account of the duration of the proceedings, which
cannot be sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Taking
into account the circumstances of the case and having regard to its case-law,
the Court awards the full amount claimed by the applicants.
B. Costs and expenses
51. According to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria,
the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs
under all heads.
C. Default interest
52. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the remainder of the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts to be converted into New Turkish Liras at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 9,432 (nine thousand
four hundred and thirty two euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros)
in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any tax that may be
chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
Claudia Westerdiek Peer
lorenzen
Registrar President