SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF KİŞMİR v.
(Application no. 27306/95)
JUDGMENT
31 May
2005
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Kişmir v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P. Costa,
President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
judges,
Mr F. Gölcüklü,
ad hoc judge,
and Mrs S. Dollé,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 27306/95) against the
2. The applicant was initially
represented by Professors Kevin Boyle and Françoise Hampson and subsequently by
Mr Mark Muller, all lawyers practising in the
3. The applicant alleged, in
particular, that her son Aydın Kişmir had been taken into police
custody in
4. The application was
transmitted to the Court on
5. The application was
allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules
of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case
(Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
Mr Rıza Türmen, the judge elected in respect of
6. By a decision of
7. The applicant, but not the
Government, filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
8. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
9. The applicant, a Turkish
citizen of Kurdish origin, was born in 1948 and lives in
A. Introduction
10. The facts of the case,
particularly concerning events which took place between 6 and
11. The facts as presented by
the applicant are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 12-25). The Government’s
submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 26-35).
Documentary evidence submitted by the Government and the applicant are
summarised in Sections D (paragraphs 36-57) and E (paragraphs 58-62) respectively.
B. The applicant’s submissions on the
facts
12. On
13. The police officers also
questioned the applicant’s two other sons, İrfan and Turan, who, like the
applicant, stated that their brother Aydın had gone to İstanbul. The
officers conducted a search of the house and took a certain amount of German
marks. Five of the police officers left, taking İrfan and Turan with them.
The remaining two police officers stayed in the applicant’s house and continued
questioning the applicant and her daughter, Saniye, until the following
morning.
14. In the morning the
applicant’s husband
15. The police officers took
İrfan and Turan to the Police Headquarters where they were questioned
about Aydın for an hour and a half. Thereafter, İrfan and Turan were
taken to the
16. The police asked
İrfan about his relative Barış. İrfan informed them that he
knew Barış, who was both a childhood friend of Aydın’s and a
relative, and gave the police his address. The police officers then went to
Barış’s house, taking İrfan with them.
17. On the morning of
18. The police officers put
Barış and Yılmaz in one vehicle and Aydın in another. They
were then taken to the Police Headquarters. After ten minutes, they were taken
to the
19. Barış and
Yılmaz were put into different cells. Yılmaz was in cell no. 13, from
where he could hear Aydın screaming. Yılmaz was later moved into cell
no. 8, from where he could hear most of the conversations between the police
officers and Aydın. He heard the police officers threaten Aydın by
telling him that death would not be easy. Aydın was saying that he was
innocent, and that he could neither walk nor clap his hands. The torture lasted
about one hour. Yılmaz, looking through the grill in the door, saw that
Aydın was being taken away by the policemen, who were holding him from his
arms and dragging him along the floor.
20. On
21. On
22. When İrfan and
Yılmaz returned home they told the applicant that Aydın was in
custody and that he was being very badly tortured. The applicant went to the
23. On
24. On the morning of
25. Aydın’s burial
certificate stated that he had died on
C. The Government’s submissions on the facts
26. On
27. When the policemen
entered Barış Kalkan’s flat to arrest Aydın, he tried to escape
but lost his balance and fell, hitting a wall in the process. He was arrested at
the entrance to the building. A false identity card was found on him. This
version of events was confirmed by Barış Kalkan in a statement given
by him to the Prosecutor at the
28. Immediately after his
arrest, Aydın was taken to the
29. Later in the day
Aydın Kişmir was again taken to the
30. After having his head
wound stitched, Aydın Kişmir was again taken to the Police
Headquarters and put in a cell, without having been interrogated. According to
the statement of Ramazan Kutlu, a detainee who was in the same cell as
Aydın Kişmir, the police gave Aydın his medication regularly. In
the early hours of
31. On
32. On
33. On
34. On
35. On
D. Documentary evidence submitted by
the Government
1. The body examination and autopsy report
36. This was a verbatim
record, drawn up by Ahmet Başaran, the Prosecutor at the
37. The report began by
stating that Aydın Kişmir had lost his life at the detention facility
of the Diyarbakır Police Headquarters at
38. The report described the
deceased as being 175 cm tall and weighing 70-75 kgs. Rigor mortis and post
mortem hypostasis had set in. The Prosecutor and the doctor observed the
following injuries: a 2 cm sutured wound on the top of the head; a 1 cm wound
over the right eyebrow; purple bruising around the right eye; purple bruising
on the outer surface of the right hand between the thumb and the wrist; a
scabbed wound, measuring 2 x 2 cm, over the coccyx; purple
bruising on the outside of the right arm measuring 2x 2 cm and finally a graze,
measuring 2 x 2 cm, on the big toe of the right foot.
39. Other external findings
noted were a slight deformation on the right side of the chest. The nailbeds,
lips and ears were described as being cyanosed. There was widespread bleeding
under the skin of the back. The external genitalia were normal. The epidermis
was described as separating from the dermis.
40. The body was photographed
both before and during the internal examination of the body.
41. The internal examination
found that there was bruising and haematoma under the sutured injury. The skull
was intact. There was no bleeding on either the outside or the inside of the
brain membranes. The brain was described as being slightly oedematous. The sections
taken of the brain and the cerebellum were normal. The bones of the skull base
were not fractured.
42. The mouth, throat and
neck structures were described as being normal. The chest deformation was noted
to be structural and not due to trauma. There were several bleeding spots on
the lung surfaces. The lungs were extensively oedematous and congested. The
heart was described as being normal on external examination. Sectioning
revealed a thick, narrow, mitral valve.
43. Stress ulcers seen in the
stomach were associated with a little bleeding. The other organs in the abdomen
were normal.
44. During the autopsy the Prosecutor
and the doctor had regard to a medical report which had been drawn up at the
45. The Prosecutor and the
doctor had regard to an arrest report drawn up at
46. A decision was made to
send the samples taken from internal organs for histology and toxicology
examinations.
47. The doctor concluded that
the death was due to asphyxiation and added that it would be possible to
establish the cause of the asphyxiation after the examination of the body
samples at the Forensic Medicine Directorate in
2. Report of the Forensic Medicine
Directorate, drawn up on
48. According to this report,
the body samples taken from Aydın Kişmir’s body during the autopsy which
were subjected to a toxicological examination did not disclose any poisons.
3. Report of the Forensic Medicine
Directorate, drawn up on
49. This was a report drawn
up and signed by a number of doctors. The report referred to the conclusions
set out in the above mentioned autopsy and toxicology reports. In this report
there was also a reference to a histology report, which had apparently been drawn
up on
4. Report of the Specialist Council
of the Forensic Medicine Directorate, drawn up on
50. This report was drawn up
and signed by eight doctors, each a specialist in different areas of medicine.
They based their opinions on the reports referred to above and on the
photographs of the body which had been taken during the autopsy (see paragraph 40 above). The doctors
also had regard to two statements taken from Ramazan Kutlu and Dr Zafer
Özdağ on
51. Dr Zafer Özdağ was
reported as having said in his statement of 13 October 1994 that
Aydın Kişmir had been brought to him by officials on 6 October 1994
and that, apart from the findings he had previously observed, he had now also observed
a wound, measuring 6 x 6 cm, on the top part of the head which did not require
hospitalisation.
52. The Specialist Council
concluded that death was due to respiratory failure related to lung oedema. The
Council commented that, apart from the wounds on the top part of the head,
above the right eyebrow and the big toe of the right foot, there were no other
symptoms of an assault or traumatic change, which excluded the possibility of
an external trauma being the cause of death.
53. The Specialist Council
further commented that, although there was evidence of asphyxiation, no change was
observed in the neck area under the skin and there was no evidence of any
compression of the chest or abdomen to indicate that death had occurred as the
result of mechanical asphyxiation. There was oedema of the lungs and brain, and
ulcers in the stomach with bleeding from them, indicating general anoxia and
asphyxiation findings related to extreme lung oedema.
5. Decision not to prosecute, taken
on
54. This decision was taken
by the Prosecutor at the
55. The Prosecutor stated
that Aydın Kişmir “who is a member of the terrorist organisation”,
had fallen down the stairs in an attempt to avoid arrest by police officers and
injured himself. He had then been taken by police officers to the
56. A copy of the subsequent report
of the First Specialist Council of the Forensic Medicine Directorate (date
unknown) was not made available to the Commission or to the Court. However,
according to the decision not to prosecute, it was stated in that medical report
that there was no evidence to suggest that the oedema in the lungs had been due
to a technical or traumatic reason. The First Specialist Council had apparently
concluded that the cause of the oedema could not be established because the
body samples sent for microscopic examination had become autolysed[1].
The Prosecutor concluded therefore that there was no evidence that the officer
had committed the offence in question and he decided not to prosecute the
accused.
57. This decision, which was
communicated to the applicant on
E. Documentary evidence submitted by
the applicant
1. The applicant’s petition submitted
to the Prosecutor’s Office at the
58. In her petition the
applicant submitted that her two sons, Aydın and Turan, had been arrested
in their home by the police on
59. On
2. Expert
report of Dr Christopher Milroy
60. This
report was prepared on behalf of the applicant by Dr Christopher Milroy, a Reader in Forensic Pathology
at the
61. The
report recounted the findings of the autopsy and of the other reports referred
to above. Dr Milroy observed, inter alia,
the following shortcomings:
(a) no organ weights, in particular
the weight of the lungs, were recorded. Furthermore, no description of the
presence or absence of petechiae[2]
was made, despite the diagnosis of asphyxiation;
(b) the 6 cm laceration described
by Dr Zafer Özdağ is not described in any of the autopsy reports, even
though a 6 cm wound, or a scar from such wound, should have been noticed. It
seems unlikely that a 2 cm wound seen at autopsy could have been mistaken for a
6 cm wound; in any event they were described in different positions;
(c) a 6 cm wound is a large wound
to be caused by a fall; this wound appears to have occurred whilst in custody,
and not in the fall during the arrest;
(d) there is one area of the
original autopsy report which does not appear to have been commented on, and
that is the presence of diffuse bleeding under the skin of the back. Diffuse
bleeding strongly suggests that blows have been delivered to the back;
(e) the post mortem findings in
this case with lung oedema and congestion, some brain oedema and stress ulcers,
and the absence of any natural cause of death, raise strong concerns that death
has been caused by mechanical asphyxiation. In positional asphyxia, the pinning
of the body and restraint may prevent proper breathing. This could, for
example, be caused by the person being laid on the floor and somebody
compressing his back. Bleeding into the back would support this scenario.
3. Statements
taken from eyewitnesses
62. The applicant submitted
to the Commission and to the Court a number of statements taken by lawyers at
the
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND
PRACTICE
63. A
full description of the relevant domestic law and practice, as well as relevant
international reports, may be found in Salman
v. Turkey ([GC], no. 21986/93, §§ 59-74, ECHR 2000-VII).
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTION
64. The Government, not having
submitted any observations on the merits (see paragraph 7 above), have not made
any preliminary objections as such. However, in their observations which were
submitted to the Commission prior to the application being declared admissible,
the Government argued that the applicant had failed to file an objection
against the Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute (see paragraph 57 above). The
Government further referred to Article 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pursuant
to which such an objection must be accompanied by proof and facts which justify
the institution of a prosecution.
65. In its decision on admissibility of 14 December 1999 the Court, observing that the Government’s preliminary objection raised issues that were closely linked to those raised by the applicant’s complaints under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, decided to join the objection to the merits.
66. The Court considers it
appropriate to address this point in its examination of the substance of the
applicant’s complaint under Article 2 of the Convention below.
II. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT OF
THE EVIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Arguments of the parties
1. The applicant
67. The applicant alleged
that her son had been killed in custody in circumstances suggesting that he had
died under, or as a result of, torture.
68.
The applicant submitted that, according to the well-established case- law of
the Court, there is a positive obligation on a respondent State plausibly to
account for injuries caused to detainees who were taken into custody in good
health. In support of her submission, the applicant referred to the judgments
in the cases of Tomasi v.
France (judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A), Ribitsch v. Austria (judgment of
4 December 1995, Series A no. 336), Selmouni v. France, ([GC], no. 25803/94, ECHR 1999-V) and,
finally, Tanlı v. Turkey (no. 26129/95, ECHR 2001-III (extracts)).
69. Furthermore, the
applicant, referring to the judgment in the above mentioned Salman case, submitted that where the
events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of
the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody,
strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death
occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as
resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing
explanation.
70. Referring to the
shortcomings in the autopsy identified by Dr Milroy (see paragraph 61 above),
the applicant argued that the circumstances of the death of her son were never
established by the authorities.
2. The
Government
71. The Government have not
submitted observations on the merits and the following submissions are taken
from the observations they submitted to the Commission on
72. The Government claimed
that the applicant’s son was already in a poor condition when he was placed in
his cell due to the injuries which he had sustained during his efforts to
escape from the police. It was clear from the statement of Ramazan Kutlu that, when
Aydın was placed in his cell, he was receiving treatment for his wounds.
Contrary to what was claimed by the applicant, Aydın had not been questioned
by the authorities since there was already sufficient evidence to charge him
with terrorist-related offences.
73. Aydın’s health
started to deteriorate very fast. The personnel at the detention facility
informed their superiors and it was decided that Aydın be taken to the
hospital but he died on the way there.
74. The Government stressed
that the medical history of the deceased was unknown. Several factors might
have contributed to his death, such as childhood illnesses, malfunctioning of
the lungs, etc.
75. The Government further emphasised
that a highly specialised forensic organisation had found no evidence of any
external factors, such as ill-treatment or torture, being the cause of death.
76. According to the
Government, the illegal PKK organisation used young and able militants until
they became ill. The sick and disabled militants were kept without any
medication for recovery and continued to be used in terrorist activity.
Militants, living in unhygienic places such as caves, under extreme weather
conditions and constantly moving from one place to the next, were bound to fall
ill. Most of the sick militants lost their lives due to the complications of
long-lasting illnesses. The Government put forward that this was what might
have happened to Aydın as well.
B. Article
38 § 1 (a) and consequent inferences drawn by the Court
77. Before proceeding to
assess the evidence, the Court would stress, as it has done previously, that it
is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of
individual petition instituted under Article 34 of the Convention that States
should furnish all necessary facilities to make possible a proper and effective
examination of applications (see Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94,
§ 70, ECHR 1999-IV). It is inherent in proceedings relating to cases of this
nature, where an individual applicant accuses State agents of violating his
rights under the Convention, that in certain instances solely the respondent
Government have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting
these allegations. The failure by a Government to submit such information which
is in their hands without a satisfactory explanation may not only give rise to
the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant’s
allegations, but may also reflect negatively on the level of compliance by a
respondent State with its obligations under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the
Convention (see Timurtaş v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, §§ 66 and
70, ECHR 2000-VI). The same applies to delays by the State in submitting
information which prejudices the establishment of the facts in a case.
78. In this context, the
Court has noted with concern a number of matters regarding the Government’s
response to the Court’s requests for documents. Thus the Government were
requested on
79. The Court further observes
that a number of documents which were submitted by the Government make
reference to other, potentially important documents pertaining to the investigation.
These documents however, have not been made available to the Convention
institutions. They include:
(a) the arrest report of
(b) the report, drawn up by Dr
Kinyas Öztürk on
(c) the report, drawn up by Dr
Zafer Özdağ on
(d) the custody records of the
applicant’s son;
(e) the statement taken from
Ramazan Kutlu who was allegedly detained in the same cell as the applicant’s
son (see paragraph 30 above);
(f) the statement taken from Dr
Zafer Özdağ (see paragraph 29 above);
(g) the statement taken from Dr
Kinyas Öztürk (see paragraph 29 above);
(h) the statement taken from
Barış Kalkan on
(i) the decision not to prosecute
taken on
(j) the histology report of
(k) the report of the First
Specialist Council of the Forensic Medicine Directorate, which was drawn up at
some stage between 26 February 1996 and 19 December 1996 (see paragraph 56 above).
80. The Government have not
advanced any explanation to account for their failure to submit the documents
referred to above or to respond to the Court’s request for the photographs.
Accordingly, the Court finds that it can draw inferences from the Government’s
conduct in this respect. Furthermore, the Court, referring to the importance of
a respondent Government’s cooperation in Convention proceedings as outlined
above (see paragraph 77 above), finds that in the present case the respondent
State fell short of its obligation under Article 38 § 1 (a) of the
Convention to furnish all necessary facilities to the Court in is task of
establishing the facts.
C. The Court’s evaluation of the
facts
81. According to the
applicant, her son Aydın Kişmir was tortured and killed while in the
custody of police on
82. The Court notes that it
is not in dispute between the parties that Aydın Kişmir was arrested
and placed in detention on
83. In support of her
allegations the applicant submitted to the Convention bodies written statements
provided to her by a number of persons – who had either witnessed the arrest of
her son or who had themselves been detained together with her son – according to
whom the applicant’s son had been subjected to ill-treatment.
84. The Court is of the
opinion that the injury on Aydın’s head must have been caused while Aydın
was in the custody of the police. The explanation put forward by the
Government, namely that the applicant’s son had not informed Dr Kinyas Öztürk
about the injury on his head during his first medical examination (see
paragraph 28 above) strikes the Court as extremely unlikely. Such an injury –
measuring 6 centimetres and requiring stitches (see paragraph 29 above) – must have been readily apparent to a
trained person like a doctor. However, in the absence of medical evidence
linking this head injury to Aydın Kişmir’s death, and having regard
to the fact that the Court did not have first-hand access to the medical report
in which this injury was described (see
paragraph 79 above), it cannot conclude that the head injury contributed
to Aydın Kişmir’s death.
85. As regards the autopsy
carried out on the body of Aydın Kişmir, the Court agrees with the
shortcomings identified by Dr Milroy. It finds, in particular, that the
description of the 6 centimetre long sutured injury on the top of the head as a
2 centimetre long sutured injury (see
paragraph 38 above) illustrates that due care was not accorded by the
doctor who carried out the autopsy. To the extent that it could be argued that
the injury had been 2 centimetres long but had been wrongly described in Dr
Öztürk’s report as 6 centimetres, the Court notes that the Dr Eğilmez, who
carried out the autopsy on Aydın’s body, stated that the injuries recorded
in report no. 4381 were consistent with the injuries described in the
arrest report.
86. Furthermore, the Court is
struck by the Forensic Medicine Directorate’s failure to comment on the
widespread bleeding under the skin on the back of Aydın’s body (see paragraph 39 above).
87. The Court finally
observes that a certain Birol Yaman, apparently a police officer at the
Diyarbakır Police Headquarters, was referred to as the defendant in the
decision not to prosecute taken on
88. In the light of the foregoing, the Court observes that there is circumstantial evidence supporting the applicant’s allegation that her son was deliberately killed in custody. However, the Court finds that that evidence is insufficient to reach the conclusion suggested by the applicant.
89. The Court is unable, due
to the Government’s failure to submit the documents referred to above, to
establish the circumstances relating to the death of the applicant’s son. This
inability does not, however, mean that the respondent State are absolved from
their responsibility for Aydın Kişmir’s death which occurred while he
was in the custody of the police. In this connection the Court reiterates that
persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a
duty to protect them. It has previously held that, where an individual is taken
into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is
incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries
were caused (see, among other authorities, Selmouni, cited above, § 87). The obligation on
the authorities to account for the treatment of an individual in custody is
particularly stringent where that individual dies (see, Salman, cited above, § 99).
90. In assessing evidence,
the Court has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”
(see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series
A no. 25, pp. 64-65, § 161). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted
presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part,
within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons
within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in
respect of injuries and death occurring during such detention. Indeed, the
burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman, cited above, § 100).
91. The Government submitted
that, when he was placed in his cell, the applicant’s son was already in a poor
state due to his attempts to escape from the police (see paragraph 72 above).
They further submitted that the medical history of the applicant’s son was not
known and that a number of factors, such as a childhood illness or a
malfunction of the lungs, could have contributed to his death.
92. Furthermore, according to
the Government, the medical report of
93. Finally, the Government
submitted that Aydın Kişmir’s health could have been damaged due to
his activities within the PKK (see paragraph 76 above).
94. Concerning this latter
submission, the Court would stress that the Government have not submitted any
evidence to indicate that Aydın was a member of the PKK. In any event, in
the absence of a domestic court decision on which such an allegation could be
based, the Court deems it wholly inappropriate, as well as incompatible with the
respect for the rule of law, to attach any value to this submission. It
therefore disregards this submission in its entirety.
95. Furthermore, although the
Government submitted that Aydın’s death could have been due to a childhood
illness, the Court observes that they failed, once more, to submit any evidence
in support of their submission. There is no indication in the documents
submitted by the Government that Aydın had any previous health problems.
96. As regards the Government’s
submission that the medical report of
97. Finally, concerning the
cause of the oedema in the lungs, the Court observes at the outset that the
Government have not specifically dealt with this issue in their observations.
However, the Court notes that it was stated in the decision not to prosecute,
taken on 19 December 1996, that the report of 25 January 1995 (see paragraph 55
above) had been submitted to the First Specialist Council of the Forensic
Medicine Directorate on 26 February 1996 “to establish how the oedema in the
lungs, which had caused the respiratory failure, had been caused”. It was then
stated in that decision that the cause of the oedema could not be established
because the body samples which were sent to be microscopically examined had
become autolysed.
98. The Court finds,
therefore, that the Government have not adequately accounted for the death of
Aydın Kişmir during his detention at the Diyarbakır Police
Headquarters and that the respondent State’s responsibility for his death is
engaged.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 2
OF THE CONVENTION
99. Article 2 of the
Convention provides as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall
be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be
regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the
use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from
unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful
arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for
the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
A. The death of Aydın
Kişmir
1. Submissions of the parties
100. The applicant submitted
that her son had been killed by agents of the State, in violation of Article 2
of the Convention.
101. The Government denied
the factual basis of the applicant’s allegations
and maintained that Aydın Kişmir had died of natural causes.
2. The
Court’s assessment
102. Article 2, which
safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances when deprivation of
life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the
Convention, of which no derogation is permitted. Together with Article 3, it
also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up
the Council of Europe. The circumstances in which deprivation of life may be
justified must therefore be strictly construed. The object and purpose of the
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings also
requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards
practical and effective (see McCann and
Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no.
324, pp. 45-46, §§ 146-147).
103. The text of Article 2,
read as a whole, demonstrates that it covers not only intentional killing but
also situations where it is permitted to “use force” which may result, as an
unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. The deliberate or intended use
of lethal force is only one factor, however, to be taken into account in
assessing its necessity. Any use of force must be no more than “absolutely
necessary” for the achievement of one or more of the purposes set out in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (c). This term indicates that a stricter and more
compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable
when determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society”
under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. Consequently,
the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the
permitted aims (ibid., p. 46,
§§ 148‑149).
104. In the light of the
importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject
deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration
not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding
circumstances. The use of force by State agents in pursuit of one of the aims
delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 may be justified where it is based on an
honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but
which subsequently turns out to be mistaken (ibid., pp. 58-59, § 200).
105. Turning to the
circumstances of the present case, the Court has already established that the
Government have failed to account for the death of Aydın Kişmir while
he was in the custody of police officers (see paragraph 98 above). It follows that there has been a
violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the death of Aydın
Kişmir.
B. Alleged failure to protect the
right to life of Aydın Kişmir
106. The applicant submitted
that the respondent Government were under an obligation to protect the life of
her son, who was in their custody, and had failed to do so. Had Aydın
required medical treatment, it was their responsibility to provide it.
According to the applicant, the Government had not afforded her son such
protection, in violation of their obligation to protect an individual from a
real and specific threat.
107. The Government did not
address this issue specifically.
108. The Court, having regard
to its above finding of a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, does not
find it necessary in the circumstances of this case to reach any separate
finding on this issue.
C. Alleged
inadequacy of the investigation
109. The applicant asked the
Court to find a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on the ground that the
investigation into the death of her son had not been effective.
110. The Government
maintained that the Prosecutor at the
111. The Court reiterates
that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the
Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1
of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights
and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there
should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have
been killed as a result of the use of force (see, mutatis mutandis, McCann and Others, cited above, p. 49,
§ 161, and the Kaya v. Turkey,
judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I,
p. 329, § 105). In that connection, the Court points out that this obligation
is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the killing was caused by an
agent of the State (see Salman, cited above, § 105).
112. For an investigation
into an alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it may
generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying
out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events (Güleç
v. Turkey judgment of 27 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, §§ 81-82, and Oğur
v. Turkey [GC], no. 21954/93, §§ 91‑92, ECHR 1999-III). The
investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading
to a determination of whether the force used in such cases was or was not
justified in the circumstances (see for example, Kaya, cited above, §
87) and to the identification and punishment of those responsible (Oğur,
cited above, § 88). This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The
authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure
the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eye-witness
testimony (Tanrıkulu, cited above, § 109). Any deficiency in the
investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or
the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.
113. There is also a
requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition implicit in this context (Yaşa
v. Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-IV, § 102-104,
Çakıcı v. Turkey, judgment of 8 July 1999, Reports
1999-IV, §§ 80, 87, 106, and Tanrıkulu, cited above, § 109). It
must be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent
progress in an investigation in a particular situation. However, a prompt
response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may
generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their
maintenance of the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in
or tolerance of unlawful acts (McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no.
28883/95, §§ 108-115, ECHR 2001-III, and Avşar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94,
§§ 390-395, ECHR-2001).
114. Turning to the
particular circumstances of the case, the Court reiterates that a large number
of important documents pertaining to the investigation into the death of the applicant’s
son were not made available to the Convention bodies (see paragraphs 78-79 above). Although it appears from the
documents submitted by the Government that a number of steps were taken at the
domestic level, the Court is unable to assess from these documents the
effectiveness of those steps. For example, and as already pointed out above
(see paragraph 87 above), although a police officer was referred to as the
defendant in the decision not to prosecute (see paragraph 54 above), no information was provided by the
Government showing the connection of that police officer to Aydın’s death.
Furthermore, no information was provided by the Government showing that this
particular defendant had been questioned.
115. As regards the requirement
to question eye-witnesses, the Court finds it incomprehensible that there is no
information to suggest that the police officers, who were on duty at the time
of Aydın’s arrest and detention and also at the time of his subsequent
death, have ever been questioned by the domestic authorities. Finally, the
Government have not submitted any information to indicate that family members
of Aydın were questioned.
116. As regards the
promptness of the investigation, the Court observes that the investigating Prosecutor
waited for more than a year before forwarding, on
117. Furthermore, in the
absence of any information showing that steps were taken between the first
decision not to prosecute, allegedly taken on 7 November 1995 (see paragraph 34 above), and the
second decision taken on 19 December 1996 (see paragraphs 35 and 54 above), the Court concludes that the
authorities failed to comply with the requirement of promptness. In this
connection, the Court would also stress that it has not been provided with
information as to why two decisions not to prosecute were necessary.
118. The Court reiterates
that for an investigation into a death to be regarded as effective within the
meaning of the case-law of the Court, it is imperative that the next-of-kin of
the victim be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their
legitimate interests (Güleç, cited above, § 82, Oğur, cited above, § 92, and, finally, Gül v. Turkey, 22676/93,
§ 89, 14 December 2000).
119. In this connection the
Court notes that the Government have not submitted any information to show that
the family of Aydın Kişmir have ever been informed of the
developments in the investigation. Neither is there any information in the case
file to suggest that the documents concerning the investigation have been made
available to the applicant. The Court finds that these failures effectively
prevented the applicant from being involved in the procedure to safeguards her
legitimate interests. In these circumstances, and having particular regard to
the Government’s own submission that an objection must be supported by proof
and facts which justify the opening of a prosecution (see paragraph 64 above),
the Court finds that a possible objection by the applicant against the decision
not to prosecute, without first having regard to the documents in the
investigation file, would have had no chance of success.
120. The Court rejects,
therefore, the Government’s preliminary objection based on exhaustion of
domestic remedies (see paragraphs 64-66 above) and concludes that the
authorities have failed to carry out an effective investigation into the death
of the applicant’s son as required by Article 2 of the Convention.
121. The Court finds,
therefore, that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention
under its procedural limb.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF
THE CONVENTION
122. The applicant submitted
that her son was subjected to treatment which amounted to torture.
123. The Government denied
that the applicant’s son had been ill-treated in custody and submitted that,
according to the medical reports prepared by the Forensic Medicine Directorate,
there was no evidence of ill-treatment or torture on the body of the applicant’s
son. The Government added that, contrary to the applicant’s claims, her son had
never been questioned as there was already sufficient evidence in the hands of
the police to charge him with terrorist-related charges.
124. The Court reiterates
that, according to its well-established case-law, the burden to provide a
plausible explanation for the injuries found on an individual, who was taken
into police custody in good health, falls to the Government (see, among other
authorities, Selmouni, cited
above, § 87).
125. According to the autopsy
report of
126. The Court notes that the
injury over the right eyebrow and the injury on the big toe of the right foot
were caused during his attempts to escape and were allegedly recorded in the
medical report prepared by Dr Öztürk (see paragraph 28 above). The Court also notes that it has already
found that the injury on Aydın’s head had been caused while he was in
custody (see paragraph 84 above).
127. No information has been
submitted by the Government to explain other injuries on Aydın’s body. In
this context, the Court observes the Government’s reference to the First
Specialist Council’s medical report of 25 January 1995 in which it was
stated that “apart from the wounds on the top part of the head, above the right
eyebrow and the big toe, there were no other symptoms of an assault or
traumatic change which meant that an external trauma could not be the cause of
death” (see paragraph 52 above).
However, the Court finds that the Specialist Council have failed to take note
of a number of other injuries detailed in the autopsy report of
128. In
the light of the above, the Court concludes that the Government have failed to
account for the injuries found on Aydın’s body.
129. In determining whether a
particular form of ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, consideration
must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion
and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it was
the intention that the Convention should attach a special stigma to deliberate
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see Ireland v.
the United Kingdom, cited above, pp. 66-67, § 167). In addition to the
severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element, as recognised in the
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, which came into force on 26 June 1987, which defines
torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with
the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or
intimidating (Article 1 of the United Nations Convention) (see Salman, cited above, at § 114).
130. The Court cannot exclude
that the injuries on Aydın’s body were the result of ill-treatment to
which he was subjected in order to extract information from him. In this
connection the Court, noting that no explanation has been given by the
Government to justify the detention of Aydın from 6 October 1994 until his
death on 12 October 1994, is not convinced by the Government’s submission that
it was not necessary to question Aydın since there was already sufficient
evidence to link him and his friends to terrorism.
131. Having regard to its
findings above, the Court concludes that the injuries on Aydın’s body were
caused by ill-treatment which could, at least, be qualified as inhuman, within
the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
132. The Court finds,
therefore, that there has been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention on
account of the inhuman treatment to which the applicant’s son was subjected
prior to his death.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 6
AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
133. The applicant submitted
that the absence of a prosecution of those responsible for the death of her son
prevented her from initiating civil proceedings. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal...”
134. The applicant further
complained of a lack of any independent national authority before which her
complaints could have been brought with any prospect of success. In respect of
this complaint she relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as
set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
135. The Government
reaffirmed that effective domestic remedies were available to the applicant but
that she had chosen not to avail herself of them.
136. As regards the applicant’s
complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, the Court notes that the applicant
did not bring an action before the civil courts. It is therefore impossible to
determine whether the national courts would have been able to adjudicate on the
applicant’s claims had she initiated proceedings. In the Court’s view, however,
the applicant’s complaints pertain mainly to the lack of an effective
investigation into the death of her son which would have enabled her to resort
to compensation-based remedies. It will therefore examine this complaint from
the standpoint of Article 13, which imposes a more general obligation on States
to provide an effective remedy in respect of alleged violations of the
Convention (see Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, judgment of 24 April 1998, Reports
1998-II, § 92).
137. The Court reiterates
that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national
level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and
freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal
order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic
remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the
Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are
afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their
Convention obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under
Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under
the Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be
“effective” in practice as well as in
law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably
hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State
(see Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18
December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, p. 2286,
§ 95; Aydın v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports 1997-VI, pp. 1895-96,
§ 103; and Kaya, cited above, § 106).
138. Given the fundamental
importance of the right to the protection of life, Article 13 requires, in
addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and
effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment
of those responsible for the deprivation of life, including effective access
for the complainant to the investigation procedure (see Kaya, cited above, § 107).
139. On the basis of the
evidence adduced in the present case, the Court has found that the respondent
State is responsible under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention for the death of
the applicant’s son and also for the inhuman treatment suffered by him
beforehand. The applicant’s complaint in this regard is therefore “arguable”
for the purposes of Article 13 (see Salman,
cited above, § 122, and the authorities cited therein).
140. The authorities thus had
an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of
the death of the applicant’s son and the inhuman treatment inflicted on him.
For the reasons set out above (see
paragraphs 114-121), no effective criminal investigation can be
considered to have been conducted in accordance with Article 13, the
requirements of which may be broader than the obligation to investigate imposed
by Article 2 (see Kaya, cited
above, § 107). The Court finds, therefore, that the applicant has been denied
an effective remedy in respect of the inhuman treatment and death of her son,
and has thereby been denied access to any other available remedies at her
disposal, including a claim for compensation.
141. Consequently, there has
been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF
THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 13
142. The applicant claimed
that the rights of her son under Article 2 and 13 were violated, in conjunction
with Article 14, on grounds of ethnic origin. Article 14 provides as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.”
143. The Government have not
specifically dealt with this complaint.
144. The Court recalls its
findings of a violation of Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention and does not
consider that it is necessary also to consider these complaints in conjunction
with Article 14 of the Convention.
VII. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41
OF THE CONVENTION
145. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary damage
146. The applicant submitted
that her son had been born in 1970 and was 24 years old at the time of his
death. He was not married and did not have any children. At the time of his
death, Aydın had been accepted at the Faculty of Education to study
physical education and teacher training. Had Aydın been able to continue
in this career, he was expected to have graduated in 1998 and to have started
teaching that year. The average annual salary for a teacher was approximately
2000 pounds sterling (GBP).
147. The applicant further
submitted that she and her husband lived on a very limited income as her
husband had already retired before the death of Aydın Kişmir.
Consequently, when Aydın would have started working as a teacher, he would
have supported his parents with his teaching salary. In December 2000 her
husband had died, since when she has had very little income. Consequently the
applicant would have been dependent upon her son to supplement her income.
148. Taking into account the
average life expectancy in
149. The applicant alleged
that at the time Aydın was arrested, she and her husband had sold their
house and half the proceeds of the sale, 30,000 German marks (DM), were kept in
the house. The security forces who came to arrest Aydın took this money.
She converted the sum of DM 30,000 into GBP 14,922.48.
150. She asked the Court to
award her the sums of GBP 45,151.28 in respect of the estimated loss of her son’s
earnings as well as GBP 14,922.48, in respect of the money allegedly taken
from her house by the security forces.
151. The Government pointed
to the applicant’s failure to submit to the Court documents showing that her
son had indeed been accepted at the university. They further submitted that,
even assuming that the applicant’s son had had a university place, there was no
guarantee that he would have graduated and then financially provided for his
family. They finally disputed the applicability of the actuarial tables used by the applicant and submitted that this method of calculation
was speculative and highly susceptible to abuse by those who seek unjust
enrichment.
152. As regards the applicant’s
claim concerning the DM 30,000, the Government pointed to the applicant’s
failure to submit any evidence in support of her allegation. They submitted
that the taking of the money – if true – irrespective of the identity of the
perpetrator, would amount to the offence of theft, and that the applicant
should have brought a criminal case at the domestic level rather than claiming
that amount before the Court.
153. As regards the applicant’s
claim concerning the alleged removal of DM 30,000 the Court, like the
Government, observes that the applicant has failed to support her allegation
with adequate evidence. It also observes that the applicant has not brought
that allegation to the attention of the domestic authorities. In these
circumstances the Court rejects the applicant’s claim.
154. Concerning the applicant’s claim for the alleged loss of earnings of her deceased son, the Court, like the Government, notes the applicant’s failure to submit to the Court adequate evidence. However, the Court is of the opinion that the applicant’s deceased son – regardless of his future career as a teacher or otherwise – would have provided financial assistance to his parents who were living on a limited income. In these circumstances, there is a direct causal link between the violation of Article 2 and the loss suffered by Aydın Kişmir`s family of the financial support to be provided by him. The Court, on an equitable basis, awards the applicant 16,500 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
155. The applicant claimed
compensation on her own behalf for the pain and suffering that she continued to
suffer as a result of the knowledge that her son had been tortured and that he had
died as a result. She also claimed that the death of her husband was brought on
by the stress, pain and suffering caused by the death of Aydın. Furthermore,
the applicant’s other son Turan, who had been taken into custody and tortured
at the same time as Aydın, continued to suffer psychologically. Turan had
been able to hear his brother being tortured and had seen his brother lying unconscious
as a result.
156. The applicant invited the Court to take into account the severity of the violations of the Convention in this case and asked the Court to award her the sum of GBP 15,000 by way of non-pecuniary damages for herself.
157. She also claimed the sum
of GBP 25,000 on behalf of her deceased son Aydın Kişmir. In this
connection the applicant referred to the awards made by the Court in the cases
of Tanlı and Avşar (both cited above) in which
the Court had awarded the applicants GBP 20,000 for non-pecuniary damage to be
held by them for the widows and the children of their deceased relatives and
also the sums of GBP 10,000 and GBP 2,500 respectively for non-pecuniary damage
suffered by the applicants in their personal capacities.
158. The Government submitted that the amounts claimed by the applicant were excessive and clearly showed that the applicant was seeking to make a profit through the Convention organs.
159. The Court considers that
there are two separate branches to the possible award of non-pecuniary damage:
one award to the deceased victim, and the other award to the applicant who has
sought to discover the truth about the fate of her son. As the probable heir to
her unmarried son, the applicant would be the holder and beneficiary of both
awards.
160. The Court observes that it has found that the authorities were accountable for the death of the applicant’s son and the ill-treatment to which he was subjected prior to his death. In addition to the violation of Articles 2 and 3 in this respect, it has further found that the authorities failed to provide an effective investigation or remedy for those violations, contrary to the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention and in breach of Article 13 of the Convention. In these circumstances, it considers that an award of compensation should be made in favour of Aydın Kişmir, given the gravity of the breaches in question. Having regard to the awards made in comparable cases, the Court, on an equitable basis, awards the deceased the sum of EUR 30,000 for non-pecuniary damage, to be held by the applicant on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estate of Aydın Kişmir.
161. Furthermore, the distress and anguish suffered by the applicant on account of the disappearance of her son and the manner in which the authorities dealt with her complaints has been found to constitute a violation of Article 13 in respect of the applicant. In this connection, the Court considers that an award of compensation in her favour is also justified. Accordingly, it awards the applicant the sum of EUR 3,500 in her personal capacity.
C. Costs and expenses
162. The applicant claimed a
total of GBP 17,471.27 for the fees and costs incurred in bringing the
application. Her claim comprised:
(a) GBP 3,967.91 for the fees of her current lawyers working for the
Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) in the
(b) GBP 2,840 for the fees of her
previous lawyer Professor Françoise Hampson;
(c) GBP
5,909.36 for the fees of her lawyers based in
(d) GBP 965 for the administrative
costs incurred by the United Kingdom-based lawyers; and
(e) GBP 3,789 for the administrative
costs incurred by the lawyers based in
163. In support of her claims
for the fees of her lawyers, the applicant submitted a detailed schedule of
costs.
164. The Government submitted
that only expenses which have been actually incurred could be reimbursed, and
that the applicant and her representatives should have documented all their
costs and expenses, but failed to do so. The Government also invited the Court
not to award the KHRP any compensation in respect of the costs and expenses
incurred it.
165. The Court observes that
the fees claimed by the applicant for her lawyers based in the
166. Making its own assessment
based on the information available, the Court awards the applicant EUR 15,000
in respect of costs and expenses – exclusive of any value-added tax that may be
chargeable – less EUR 880 already received in legal aid from the Council of
Europe, the net award to be paid in pounds sterling into her representatives’
bank account in the United Kingdom, as identified and requested by the
applicant.
D. Default interest
167. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Dismisses unanimously the Government’s preliminary objection;
2. Holds unanimously that the respondent State has failed to fulfil
its obligation under Article 38 of the Convention to furnish all necessary
facilities to the Court in its task of establishing the facts
3. Holds
unanimously that the Government are liable for the death of the applicant’s son
in violation of Article 2 of the Convention;
4. Holds unanimously that it is unnecessary to determine whether there
has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the alleged
failure to protect the life of the applicant’s son;
5. Holds
unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention
on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct
an effective investigation into the circumstances of the killing of the
applicant’s son;
6. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the
Convention in respect of the treatment to which the applicant’s son was
subjected prior to his death;
7. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the
Convention;
8. Holds by six votes to one that it is unnecessary to determine whether
there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with
Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention;
9. Holds
(a) by six votes to one, that the
respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on
which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of
the Convention, the sum of EUR 16,500 (sixteen thousand five hundred euros) in
respect of pecuniary damage, to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) unanimously, that the
respondent State is to pay the applicant, within the same three month period,
the following sums to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable:
(i) EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros)
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, [淀˩(1] to be held by the applicant for the beneficiaries of the estate of
Aydın Kişmir;
(ii) EUR 3,500 (three thousand
five hundred euros) in respect of the applicant’s personal, non-pecuniary
damage;
(c) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within the same three month period, and into the bank
account identified by her in the United Kingdom, EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand
euros) in respect of costs and expenses, together with any value-added tax that
may be chargeable, less EUR 880 (eight hundred and eighty euros) granted as
legal aid, to be converted into pounds sterling at the exchange rate applicable
at the date of delivery of this judgment;
(d) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
10. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim for
just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in
writing on
S. Dollé J.-P.
Costa
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the
Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions
are annexed to this judgment:
(a) partly dissenting opinion of Mrs
Mularoni;
(b) partly dissenting opinion of Mr Gölcüklü.
PARTLY
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MULARONI
Unlike the majority, I believe that it is
necessary for the Court to examine separately the applicant’s complaint under
Article 14 of the Convention.
After examining tens and tens of similar applications,
all lodged, without exception, by Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, and very
often concluding that there was a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention, the Court should, to my mind, at least consider that there could be
a serious problem under Article 14 of the Convention as well.
This does not mean, of course, that in the
end the Court will invariably find that there has been a violation of Article
14. However, I cannot agree with the majority approach, which to me is
tantamount to considering that the prohibition on discrimination in this type
of case is not an important issue.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GÖLCÜKLÜ
(Translation)
To my great regret, I cannot agree with the
majority’s opinion and, consequently, its conclusion with regard to the
application of Article 41, especially the award of compensation for pecuniary
damage (point 9 of the operative provisions).
The applicant claims that her son had been
offered a place at university. Thus, had he lived, he would have completed his
studies; he would have had a profession or trade, would have received a salary
and, subsequently, would have supported his mother, who did not have sufficient
income of her own. All this places the “loss of earnings” in a hypothetical
future (see paragraphs 146–147 of the judgment).
It goes without saying that compensation for
pecuniary damage (loss of earnings) must be assessed in the light of the real
factual situation at the material time, and not on the basis of supposition and
speculation. It is for that reason that I cannot share the Court’s conclusion
on this point.