SECOND SECTION
CASE OF İLETMİŞ v.
(Application no. 29871/96)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
In the case of İletmiş v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 29871/96) against the
2. The applicant, who had
been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr S. Çınar, a lawyer
practising in
3. The application was
allocated to the First Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules
of Court). On
4. On
5. The applicant and the Government
each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The parties then replied in writing to each other’s observations.
6. On
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
7. The applicant was born in
1953. At the time he lodged his application he was living in İzmir.
8. In 1975 he went to
9. In 1979 he married a
Turkish national. The applicant and his wife both held residence permits and
were employed as social workers. They had two children, one born in 1981 and
one in 1986, who attended school in
10. In a secret message dated
11. On
12. On
13. On
14. On
15. On
16. Following the applicant’s
arrest his family left
17. On
18. On
19. On 2 June 1992, noting
that it had not received the information requested, the Assize Court set
14 July 1992 as the date of the hearing. On that date, however, it simply
had the case records read out in order to familiarise a substitute judge with
the case file. It adjourned the hearing until
20. During his trial the
applicant applied several times to the provincial governor’s office for his
passport to be returned, to no avail. He was told that his passport could be
handed over to him only if he produced a certificate from the court in which he
was standing trial stating that there was no reason why he should not be
permitted to leave
21. At the hearing on
22. According to the record
of the hearing on
23. On 18 January 1995 the
applicant’s lawyer submitted supplementary written pleadings in which, invoking
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, he complained of the excessive length of the
proceedings and asked for judgment to be pronounced without waiting any longer
for a reply from the German authorities. He contended that although his client
was free, he could neither return to
24. On 17 October 1995 the
applicant obtained a certificate from the provincial governor’s office, signed
by a police officer, stating that the refusal to return the passport was based
on a measure which had been ordered by the Ankara Security Directorate and was
still valid. The date of and reasons for the measure concerned were not stated
in the certificate.
25. The
26. At its 5 June 1998
session the
27. On 14 September 1998 the
28. On 22 March 1999 the
applicant’s lawyer sought the annulment of the warrant for lack of evidence.
29. On 23 March 1999 the
30. On 1 July 1999 the
31. Subsequently, on an
unspecified date, the applicant was issued with a passport and returned to
II. Relevant domestic law
32. The following were the
provisions of the Criminal Code as they applied at the material time:
1. The Criminal Code
Section 140
“It shall be an offence, punishable by not less
than five years’ imprisonment, for any citizen to disseminate and publish
exaggeratedly untruthful information in a foreign country for a subversive
purpose, or to engage in any activity contrary to the national interest in such
a way that the activity in question diminishes the regard or respect in which
Turkey is held abroad.”
Section 125
“It shall be an offence punishable by death to commit any act aimed at
subjecting the State or part of the State to domination by a foreign State,
diminishing the State’s independence, breaking its unity or removing part of
the national territory from the State’s control.”
Section 168
“It shall be an offence punishable by at least fifteen years’
imprisonment to form an armed gang or organisation or to assume control or
special responsibility within such a gang or organisation with the intention of
committing any of the offences referred to in Articles 125 ...
It shall be an offence punishable by five to fifteen years’ imprisonment
to belong to such an organisation.”
2. Law no. 5682, on passports
Section 22
“(...) no passport or other travel document shall be issued to any
person prohibited from leaving the national territory by virtue of a judicial
decision, or to any person the Ministry of the Interior considers a potential
threat to general security if allowed to leave the country (...)”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF
THE CONVENTION
33. The applicant alleged
that the length of the criminal proceedings had infringed the reasonable time
principle embodied in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:
“In the determination of... any criminal charge against him, everyone is
entitled to a... hearing within a reasonable time by [a]... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
34. The Court finds that this
complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. It notes, moreover, that this complaint is not
inadmissible on any other grounds.
B. The merits
35. The period to be taken
into consideration began on 3 April 1984, the date on which the preliminary
investigation was opened by the Military Prosecutor’s Office (see paragraph 11
above) and ended on 1 July 1999, when the
36. The Court has dealt on
many occasions with cases raising issues similar to those raised in this case,
and found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see,
for example, Frydlender v. France
[GC], no. 30979/96, ECHR 2000‑VII).
37. Having examined all the
evidence brought to its attention, the Court considers that the Government have
adduced no convincing facts or arguments that might lead to a different
conclusion in this case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the
Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was
excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8
OF THE CONVENTION
38. The applicant complained
that the measure which had allegedly prevented him from leaving the country
amounted to a violation of his right to respect for his private and family life
under Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life...
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of ... public safety or ... for the
prevention of disorder or crime ...”
A. Admissibility
39. The Government argued
that the applicant’s complaint was manifestly ill-founded, alleging that no
order prohibiting him from leaving the country had been issued by the judicial
authorities.
40. The applicant submitted
that the subject of his complaint was not a judicial measure but an
administrative measure, the existence of which had been established.
41. The Court finds that this
complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of
the Convention. The Court notes, moreover, that it is not inadmissible on any
other grounds.
B. The merits
42. The
Court considers that the confiscation by the administrative authorities of the
applicant’s passport and their failure to return it to him for a number of
years amount to an interference with the applicant’s exercise of his right to
respect for his private life. Sufficiently close personal ties existed for
there to have been a risk that they would be seriously affected by the
confiscation measure (see, mutatis
mutandis, Moustaquim v. Belgium,
judgment of 18 February 1991, series A no. 193, p. 18, § 36, Dalia v. France, judgment of
19 February 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I, p. 91, § 52, and Amrollahi v. Denmark, no. 56811/00,
§ 33, 11 July 2002). It observes in this connection that the applicant had
been living in
43. Such interference
breaches Article 8 unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues one or
more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and appears
“necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims.
44. First of all, on the
question of “lawfulness” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the
Convention, the Court recognises that the interference was “in accordance with
the law” (specifically, Article 22 of the Passports Act; see paragraph 32
above).
45. The Court also accepts
that the withdrawal of the passport in 1992, at the time of the applicant’s
arrest, pursued at least one of the “legitimate aims” set out in Article 8,
namely preserving “national security” and/or “the prevention of crime”.
46. As to whether the measure
was “necessary in a democratic society”, i.e. whether it corresponded to a
“pressing social need” and was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the
Court notes at the outset that the Convention finds no fault with preventive
measures of this type (see, mutatis
mutandis, M. v. Italy
no. 12386/86, Commission decision of 15 April 1991, Decisions and Reports (DR) 70, p. 59).
47. The Court considers,
however, that the longer the proceedings went on without any progress being
made and without any evidence against the applicant being produced, the less
compelling the legitimate aim became. Likewise, with the passing of time the
applicant’s right to freedom of movement, considered here as an aspect of his
right to respect for his private life, increasingly outweighed the imperatives
of national security and the prevention of crime.
48. On this point the Court
observes that in the fifteen years of proceedings during which the applicant
was prohibited from leaving the country, no evidence of any threat to national
security or any risk of crime was adduced. That no such threat existed is confirmed
by the fact that the
49. Finally, the Court must
consider the applicant’s personal and family situation when he lived in
50. At a time when freedom of
movement, particularly across borders, is considered essential to the full
development of a person’s private life, especially when, like the applicant,
the person has family, professional and economic ties in several countries, for
a State to deprive a person under its jurisdiction of that freedom for no
reason is a serious breach of its obligations.
The fact that "freedom of movement" is guaranteed as such
under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4, which Turkey has signed but not
ratified, is irrelevant given that one and the same fact may fall foul of more
than one provision of the Convention and its Protocols (see Poiss v. Austria, judgment of 23 April 1987, series A no. 117, p.
108, § 66).
The Court comes to the conclusion that, after a time (see paragraph 47
above), continuing to prohibit the applicant from leaving the country no longer
answered a “pressing social need” and was therefore disproportionate in
relation to the aims pursued, legitimate though they were under Article 8 of
the Convention.
Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
51. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
52. The applicant claimed
153,000 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage and EUR 50,000 for non-pecuniary
damage.
53. The Government disputed
these claims.
54. Making its assessment on
an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court
awards the applicant EUR 25,000 in respect of all damage.
B. Costs and expenses
55. The applicant also sought
EUR 6,670 for costs and expenses incurred before the Turkish courts and the Court.
56. The Government disputed
these claims.
57. According to the Court’s
case-law, an award can be made in respect of costs and expenses only in so far
as they have been actually and necessarily incurred by the applicant and are
reasonable as to quantum. In the instant case, having regard to the evidence
before it, the aforementioned criteria and the sums already paid in legal aid,
the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,350
for all costs and expenses.
C. Default interest
58. The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the
marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added
three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the
application admissible;
2. Holds that there
has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there
has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros)
in damages and EUR 1,350 (one thousand three hundred and fifty euros) in
respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into new Turkish liras at the
rate applicable at the date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months
until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the
remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in French, and notified in writing on 6 December
2005, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé J.-P.
Costa
Registrar President