FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF HIDIR DURMAZ v.
(Application no. 55913/00)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Hıdır
Durmaz v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 55913/00) against the
2. The applicant was
represented by Mr E. L. Yavuzer, a lawyer practising
in
3. On
THE FACTS
I. THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in
1954 and was serving his prison sentence in Ceyhan prison at the time of his
application to the Court.
5. On
6. On
7. On
8. The public prosecutor at
the
9. In the meantime, on
10. On
11. On
12. On
13. The prosecutor took the
statements of two police officers who had interrogated the applicant on
14. In the meantime, at
the hearing held on
15. On
16. On 4 December 1997 the
prosecutor, taking into account the contents of the medical reports dated 11
and 23 August 1995 and the fact that it was not possible to determine whether
the physical findings noted in the medical report of 15 November 1995 - three
months after the applicant’s stay in custody - were the result of
ill-treatment, decided that no prosecution should be brought against the two
police officers who had interrogated the applicant. The prosecutor found in
this connection that there was insufficient evidence in support of the
allegations. This decision was not served on the applicant.
17. Between
18. On
19. On
20. On
II. THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
21. The
relevant domestic law and practice in force at the material time are outlined
in the following judgments and decision: Batı
and others v. Turkey (nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, §§ 96‑100,
ECHR 2004‑IV
(extracts)), Özel v. Turkey (no. 42739/98,
§§ 20-21, 7 November 2002), Gençel v. Turkey (no. 53431/99, §§ 11-12,
23 October 2003) and Nuray Şen
v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 41478/98, 30 April 2002).
22. Law
no. 5190 of
23. According
to Article 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code a complainant may file an appeal
against the decision of a public prosecutor not to institute criminal
proceedings. This appeal must be lodged, within fifteen days from the day of
notification of the decision to the complainant, with the president of the
assize court in whose jurisdiction the public prosecutor works.
24. Under
Article 102 of the Criminal Code, taken in conjunction with Articles 243 and
245, a prosecution for an offence of ill-treatment or torture by a public
official must be brought within five years.
25. According to Article 32 of Law no. 7201 concerning notification, a notification which was not served in accordance with law is valid if the person concerned learns of its existence. The date of notification is the date relied on by the concerned person.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3
OF THE CONVENTION
26. The applicant complained
that he had been subjected to torture while held in police custody, in breach
of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
27. The Government asked the
Court to dismiss this part of the application as being inadmissible for failure
to comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued that the applicant
failed to object to the decision of non‑prosecution of the public
prosecutor and that he could have also sought reparation for the harm he
allegedly suffered by instituting an action in the civil or administrative
courts.
28. The applicant claimed
that he was never served with the public prosecutor’s decision. He maintained
that, in any event, lodging an objection against it would have been unsuccessful
since perpetrators of torture were never prosecuted in
29. The Court reiterates that
an appeal against decisions of public prosecutors not to prosecute constitutes,
in principle, an effective and accessible remedy within the meaning of Article
35 § 1 of the Convention (see, in particular, Saraç v. Turkey (dec.), no. 35841/97, 2 September 2004; and Nuray Şen v. Turkey (dec.), no.
41478/98, 30 April 2002).
30. In the present case, the
applicant did not contest the prosecutor’s decision. Even though the decision not
to prosecute was not formally served on the applicant, the Court considers that
the applicant and/or his representative, had they behaved more diligently,
could have apprised themselves of the decision much sooner. It notes in this
connection that, under the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 24 above), the
applicant had a period of five years in which to contest the prosecutor’s decision.
In the particular circumstances of the case, the Court does not find any
special circumstances which would dispense the applicant from the obligation to
object to the public prosecutor’s decision of non-prosecution in order to
exhaust domestic remedies.
31. In
these circumstances, the Court accepts
the Government’s objection that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic
remedies. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected
under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
32. The applicant complained
that his detention on remand exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement as
provided in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which reads insofar as relevant as
follows:
“Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ...
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
33. The Government argued
that the applicant was no longer a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of
the Convention since the period he had spent in remand had been deducted from
the sentence eventually imposed by the domestic court.
34. The Court reiterates that
the taking into account of detention on remand as part of a later sentence
cannot eliminate a violation of Article 5 § 3, but may have repercussions
only under Article 41 on the basis that it limits the loss occasioned (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, judgment
of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, § 69; and Kimran
v. Turkey, no. 61440/00, § 41, 5 April 2005).
Accordingly, the Government’s objection that the applicant could not be
considered a “victim” should be rejected.
35. However,
the Court observes that the applicant’s remand in custody ended when he was
convicted by the State Security Court on 14 July 1998, whereas this complaint was lodged with the Court on 18 October 1999, i.e.
more than six months later (see, in particular, Wemhoff
v. Germany, judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, p. 23, §
9; and Turan v. Turkey (dec.), no.
879/02, 27 January 2005). It follows that this part of the application must be
rejected for non-compliance with the six‑month rule in accordance with
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
36. The applicant complained
that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal
on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the State
Security Courts which tried and convicted him. He further complained that he
had not been informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him
and that he did not have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
his defence. Finally, he claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings
brought against him was excessive. The applicant relied on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3
(a) and (b) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
3. Everyone charged with a
criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to
be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. ”
A. Admissibility
37. The Court, in the light
of its established case-law (see, among many other authorities, Çıraklar v. Turkey,
judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII) and in view of the materials
submitted to it, considers that these complaints raise complex issues of law
and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an
examination of the merits. The Court therefore concludes that this part of the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35
§ 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have
been established.
B. Merits
1.
38. The Court has examined a
large number of cases raising similar issues to those in the present case and
found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Özel, cited
above, §§ 33-34; and Özdemir v. Turkey, no. 59659/00, §§ 35-36, 6 February
2003).
39. The Court finds no reason
to reach a different conclusion in the instant case. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 under this
head.
2. Fairness of the proceedings
40. Having regard to its
finding of a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, the Court considers that it is not
necessary to examine the remaining complaints under Article 6 of the Convention
relating to the fairness of the proceedings before the domestic courts
(see, among other authorities, İncal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998‑IV, § 74).
3. Length of the proceedings
41. The Court observes that
the period to be taken into consideration began on
42. After examining the overall
duration of the proceedings, and taking into account that the case was of some
complexity, the number of the accused and the fact that the case was dealt with
at two levels of jurisdiction, the Court does not consider that the length of
the proceedings in the present case was excessive even if it had been somewhat
prolonged by the decisions of the first-instance court to join the applicant’s
case to other related criminal proceedings. The Court further finds that no
significant delay resulted from the transfer of the case to the
43. Having regard to the
particular circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the “reasonable
time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was complied with
in the present case. Consequently, the Court concludes that there has been no
violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the length of the proceedings.
IV. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
44. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has
been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
45. The applicant claimed
7,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.
46. The Government contested
the amount.
47. The Court considers that
the finding of a violation of Article 6 constitutes in itself sufficient
compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant in this
respect (see İncal, cited above,
p. 1575, § 82; and Çıraklar,
cited above, § 45).
B. Costs and expenses
48. The
applicant also claimed, in total, EUR 7,863 for costs and expenses incurred
both before the domestic courts and before the Court. The applicant submitted a
schedule of costs prepared by his representative and relied on the Konya Bar
Association’s recommended minimum fees list. However, he did not submit any
receipt or invoice in support of his claims.
49. The Government contested
the amount.
50. According to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and
expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the
sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
51. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints concerning the applicant’s right to a fair
trial within a reasonable time and by an independent and impartial tribunal
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention as regards the complaint relating to the independence and
impartiality of the
3. Holds
that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
as regards the length of the criminal proceedings;
4. Holds that it is not necessary to
consider the applicant’s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention relating
to fairness of the proceedings;
5. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the
applicant;
6. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of costs and
expenses, to be converted into New Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the
day of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
T.L. Early Nicolas
Bratza
Registrar President