THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF HALİS TEKİN v.
(Application no. 64570/01)
JUDGMENT
This judgment will become final in the circumstances
set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to
editorial revision.
In the case of Halis Tekin v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič, President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 64570/01) against the
2. The applicant was
represented by Mr M. Beştaş, a lawyer practising in
3. The applicant alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal.
4. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in
1971 and lives in Batman.
6. On
7. On
8. On
9. On
10. On
11. At the hearing on 30 January 1995 before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, the applicant stated that he was a “guerrilla” of the ARGK and apologised to his people and party for not being worthy of the organisation since he had failed to carry out the acts that he had undertaken. He however denied the veracity of the statements which he had given to the police officers.
12. Between
13. On
14. Between
15. The applicant attended
the hearing of
16. The applicant and his
co-accused did not attend the hearing of
17. The
18. On
19. The applicant did not
attend the hearings of
20. The applicant did not
attend the hearing of
21. The applicant refused to
attend the hearings of
22. Meanwhile, on
23. The applicant attended
the hearing held on
24. On
25. On
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND
PRACTICE
26. The relevant domestic law
and practice in force at the material time are outlined in the following
judgments: Özel v. Turkey (no. 42739/98, §§ 20-21,
27. By Law no. 5190 of
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
§ 1 OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicant complained
that he had been denied a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal on account of the presence of the military
judge on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court.
He further alleged that he had been denied a fair hearing before the domestic
courts since his conviction was not based on concrete evidence. The applicant
relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
29. The Government contested
these allegations.
30. The applicant maintained
his complaints.
A. Admissibility
31. The Court notes that the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1.
32. The Government submitted
that the applicant had been convicted by a state security court which had been
composed of three civilian judges since the military judge had been replaced
before the end of the proceedings.
33. The applicant maintained
his allegations.
34. The Court has
consistently held that certain aspects of the status of military judges sitting
as members of the state security courts rendered their independence from the
executive questionable (see Incal v.
Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV,
§ 68; and Çıraklar v. Turkey,
judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998‑VII,
§ 39). The Court also found in Öcalan v. Turkey case (cited above,
§§ 114-115) that when a military judge
participated in one or more interlocutory decisions that continued to remain in
effect in the criminal proceedings concerned, the military judge's replacement
by a civilian judge in the course of those proceedings before the verdict was
delivered, failed to dissipate the applicant's reasonably held concern about
that trial court's independence and impartiality, unless it was established
that the procedure subsequently followed in the state security court
sufficiently allayed that concern.
35. In the instant case, the
Court observes that the military judge sitting on the bench of the
36. In these circumstances,
the Court considers that the replacement of the military judge before the end
of the proceedings failed to dispose of the applicant's reasonably held concern
about the trial court's independence and impartiality (see Aslan and Şancı v.
37. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
2. Alleged unfairness of the proceedings
38. Having regard to its
finding that the applicant's right to a fair hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal has been infringed, the Court considers that it is
unnecessary to examine the applicant's remaining complaint concerning the
alleged unfairness of the proceedings (Işık v. Turkey, no. 50102/99, § 38-39, 5 June 2003).
3. Alleged
excessive length of the proceedings
39. The applicant alleged
that the length of the proceedings at issue had contravened the “reasonable
time” requirement, provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. He claimed that the number of the accused did not render the
proceedings complex. He maintained that numerous changes in the composition of
the
40. The Government submitted
that the length of the proceedings had not exceeded a reasonable time. They
argued that the case was of a complex nature given that the national
authorities had to investigate very serious incidents involving numerous suspects.
In this connection, they noted that the proceedings against the applicant were
not of an individual nature but of a collective one since they had concerned
the establishment of guilt of members of a terrorist organisation. They further
averred that the applicant's refusal to attend a number of hearings in an
organised manner had compelled the
41. The Court notes that the proceedings
began on 22 May 1994 when the applicant was taken into police custody, and
ended on 2 May 2000, when the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of
the
42. The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the criteria established by its case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, amongst many others, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
43. The Court observes that the present case was of a complex nature owing in particular to the number of suspects and the difficulties faced by the domestic courts in establishing the facts of serious crimes and of the involvement of each suspect in each crime.
44. As to the conduct of the
national authorities, the Court reiterates that only delays for which the State
can be held responsible may justify a finding that a “reasonable time” has been
exceeded (Papachelas v.
45. As
regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court notes the applicant failed or
refused to attend a number of hearings, together with his co‑accused, latterly
in order to protest against the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan (see paragraphs 19-21
above). This collective refusal to attend the hearings caused a delay of more
than a year in the proceedings.
46. In the light of the foregoing, and in particular the significant
delay caused by the applicant, the proceedings before the
47. The Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this regard.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
48. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
49. The applicant claimed EUR
20,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. Without specifying any amount,
the applicant also asked the Court to make an award for pecuniary damage as a
result of his conviction following an unfair trial.
50. The Government submitted
that the amount claimed was excessive. They contended that no award should be
made in respect of pecuniary damage.
51. Regarding the question of pecuniary damage, the Court considers that it cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings before the State Security Court might have been had the violation of the Convention not occurred (see Findlay v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, § 85). Moreover, the applicant's claim in respect of pecuniary damage was not borne out by any evidence. It is therefore inappropriate to award the applicant compensation for pecuniary damage.
52. With regard to
non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers
that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient
compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the
applicant (see Çıraklar, cited above, § 49).
53. Furthermore, the Court
considers that where an individual, as in the instant case, has been convicted
by a court which did not meet the Convention requirements of independence and
impartiality, a retrial or a reopening of the case, if requested, represents in
principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see Öcalan, cited above, § 210, in fine).
B. Costs and expenses
54. The applicant also
claimed 9,800 New Turkish liras (EUR 5,200) for the costs and expenses incurred
before the Court.
55. The Government submitted
that no award should be made under this head since he failed to substantiate
his claims with relevant supporting documents.
56. According to the Court's
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria,
the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for costs and
expenses incurred for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
57. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention as regards the applicant's complaint concerning the alleged lack of
independence and impartiality of the
3. Holds that it is unnecessary to examine the applicant's complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention relating to the alleged unfairness of the proceedings;
4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as regards the length of the proceedings;
5. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the
applicant;
6. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses,
plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into new
Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on