SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF DOĞRUSÖZ AND ASLAN v.
(Application no. 1262/02)
JUDGMENT
30 May 2006
FINAL
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Doğrusöz and Aslan v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 1262/02) against the
2. The applicants were
represented by Mr Z. Kadayıfçı and Mr T. Gürsel, lawyers practising in Hatay
and
3. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicants were born
in 1931 and 1930 and live in
5. In 1965 the applicants
bought a plot of land in Hatay from the
6. On
7. On
8. On
9. On
10. On
11. The court decided to
obtain the opinion of another group of experts. On 28 October
1997, following a second inspection, the experts confirmed the first report.
The summary of the report is as follows:
“The first cadastral survey was carried out in
the area on
The inspection carried out
in the surrounding area reveals that the land is situated on the beach which is
considered as the prolongation of the sea. The soil has a sandy texture. There
is no vegetation on the land, as the soil is not suitable for cultivation.
The land is located within
the coastline. Thus the plot of land in question has to be under the authority
of the State. It cannot be the subject of private property.”
12. On
The summary of the court’s reasoning in its
final decision is as follows:
“At the time when the coastline had been
determined, Law no. 6785 on urbanism (
In the light of the above, the court decides
to annul the record in the title deed registry, which was in the name of the
applicants. Furthermore it decides to prolong the interim measure, until the
court’s decision becomes final.”
13. The applicants appealed
against this decision, arguing that they had a vested interest on this property
that had to be respected by the authorities. Furthermore, they maintained that,
according to the cadastral survey which was carried out in 1938, the plot of
land was designated as an unrestricted, public area. Since the cadastral
planning of a location can only be carried out once,
there cannot be any dispute concerning their property rights over the plot of
land in question. Additionally, they claimed that the experts had erred in
their establishment of the coastline.
14. On
15. On
II. THE
RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
16. Article 43 of the
Constitution provides:
“The coasts are under the control and at the
disposal of the State.
Public interest has priority with regard to
the exploitation of the sea coasts, lake shores or river banks and the coastal
strip along the sea and lakes.
Taking into consideration the purpose of their
use, the width of coasts and coastal strips and the conditions in which
individuals can make use of these locations shall be determined by law.”
THE LAW
17. The applicants complained
that the authorities’ deprived them of their land without payment of
compensation, in violation of Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1, which reads as
follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however,
in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”
A. Admissibility
18. The Government asked the
Court, firstly, to dismiss the application for failure to comply with the
six-month time-limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They alleged that,
for the purposes of that provision, time had started to run on
19. The Court notes that, by
lodging their application with the Court on 21 November 2001, the applicants
complied with the requirement set out in Article 35 § 1of the Convention, as
the final decision of the domestic authorities was notified on them on 5 June
2001. This preliminary objection must therefore be dismissed.
20. Secondly, the Government
maintained that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies, as required
by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as they had failed to make proper use of
the administrative and civil law remedies available to them in domestic law.
21. The applicants contended
that there were no effective remedies in domestic law concerning their property
right.
22. The Court observes that the
civil and administrative remedies indicated by the Government could have provided
the applicants with compensation only if the record in the title deed registry,
which was in their name, was annulled illegally. However, the
23. The Court therefore
rejects the Government’s preliminary objection regarding the exhaustion of
domestic remedies. It further notes that the application is not inadmissible on
any other grounds and must, therefore, be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Arguments before the Court
24. The Government maintained
that, according to the Constitution, coasts belong to the State and can never
be the subject of private property. They maintained that, by cancelling the
applicants’ title, the Samandağ Court of First
Instance has actually corrected an illegal situation. Moreover, they alleged
that since it would not be possible to expropriate property which already
belonged to the State, the applicants cannot be awarded compensation concerning
the annulment of their title deed. They have submitted in this regard a
decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation for Civil Law Matters,
dated
The Government also maintained that Law on
Civil Procedure provides that the costs and expenses incurred in litigation
shall be born by the losing party. They claimed that this complaint does not
concern a right guaranteed by the Convention.
25. The applicants alleged
that in 1965, when they purchased the property, there was no indication in the
title registration that it was within the coastline area. Until 1995, when the
2. The Court’s assessment
26. In determining whether
there has been a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1, it is necessary not only to consider whether there has been a
formal taking or expropriation of property but also to look behind the
appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. Since
the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are “practical and
effective”, it has to be ascertained whether the situation amounted to a de facto expropriation (see the Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment
of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, pp. 24-25, § 63).
27. In this connection, the
Court recalls that not only must a measure depriving a person of his or her
property pursue, on the facts as well as in principle, a legitimate aim “in the
public interest”, but there must also be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (ibidem, § 69). The
requisite balance will not be found if the person concerned has had to bear
"an individual and excessive burden" (ibidem, § 73).
28. It reiterates that under
the legal systems of the Contracting States, the taking of property in the public
interest without payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in
exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes. The protection of
the right to property afforded by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 would be largely
illusory and ineffective in the absence of any equivalent principle (Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102,
§ 128).
29. In the present case, the
Court observes that the applicants purchased the land in dispute from the
30. The Court notes that Samandağ Civil Court’s decision to register the land
in the name of the Treasury was prescribed by law, as it was based on the
provisions of the Coastal Law, Article 43 of the Constitution, Article 33 of
the Land Registry Law and Article 16 of the Cadastral Law, as well as being in
line with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. It further notes that
the parties did not dispute the fact that the deprivation of property was in
the public interest. This fact is also noted in the decision of the domestic
courts. However, the applicants did not receive any compensation in exchange
for the transfer of their title to the Treasury and the Government did not
invoke any convincing elements which might justify that policy.
31. The Court considers that,
in the absence of adequate compensation in exchange for their property, the
interference in question, although prescribed by law, has not struck a fair balance between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights (see, mutatis
mutandis, N.A. and Others v.
Turkey, no. 37451/97, §§ 41-42, ECHR 2005‑...).
32. Consequently, it
concludes that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
33. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
34. The applicants claimed 50,000
US dollars in respect of their pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. They based
their claim for pecuniary damages on an experts’ report, dated
35. The Government refuted
the findings of the experts’ report dated
They further contended that the applicants’
claim for non-pecuniary damages was excessive.
36. The Court reiterates that
when the basis of the violation found is the lack of any compensation, rather
than the inherent illegality of the taking, the compensation need not
necessarily reflect the full value of the property (I.R.S and Others v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no.
26338/95, §§ 23‑24, 31 May 2005). It therefore deems it appropriate to fix a lump sum that would correspond to the applicants’
legitimate expectations to obtain compensation.
37. In view of the above, the Court awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 26,000 for pecuniary damage.
38. As regards the applicants’
claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damages, the Court finds that, in the
circumstances of the present case, the finding of a violation constitutes
sufficient just satisfaction (ibidem, § 28).
B. Costs and expenses
39. The applicants did not
make any claim for the reimbursement of their costs and expenses. The Court,
therefore, makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
40. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application
admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicants, jointly, within three months from the date on which the
judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 26,000 (twenty six thousand euros) in respect of pecuniary
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable, which total sum is to be converted
into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable on the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
S. Dollé J.-P.
Costa
Registrar President