FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF BORAK v.
(Application no. 60132/00)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Borak v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mr L. Garlicki,
Ms L. Mijović,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 60132/00) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr İdris Borak (“the applicant”), on 5 April 1999.
2. The applicant was
represented by Mrs Z.S. Özdoğan, a lawyer
practising in
3. On 3 November 2005 the
Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to communicate to
the Government the complaint concerning the applicant’s right to a fair hearing
before an independent and impartial tribunal and the interference with his
right to respect for private life and home on account of the alleged unlawful
search of his house. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention,
it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in
1978 and was serving his prison sentence in the Sakarya
Prison at the time of his application to the Court.
5. On
6. According to the search protocol
drafted on
7. According to the search
and seizure protocol drafted on the same day by the police officers and signed
by the applicant, the police searched the applicant’s flat and had found inside
a book a paper with coded inscriptions and numbers on it. Following the search
the applicant was taken back to the police station. However, three police
officers remained in the applicant’s flat, until
8. On
9. Also the same day, the applicant was examined by a doctor at the Izmir Forensic Medicine Institute. The applicant complained that he had been beaten. However, the doctor found no physical evidence of ill‑treatment.
10. On
11. On the same day the
applicant was brought, together with two other suspects, before the
12. On
13. On an unspecified date
the
14. At a hearing held on
15. At a hearing held on
16. On
17. On
18. On
19. On
20. On
21. The applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant had been released from prison after having served his sentence.
II. THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
22. The relevant domestic law
and practice in force at the material time are outlined in the following
judgments: Özel v. Turkey (no.
42739/98, §§ 20-21,
23. By Law no. 5190 of 16
June 2004, published in the Official Journal on 30 June 2004, the State
Security Courts were abolished.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicant complained
that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal
on account of the presence of a military judge sitting on the bench of the
Izmir State Security Court which tried and convicted him. He submitted that his
statements in police custody which had been extracted under torture were
admitted in evidence and that he had been denied the assistance of a lawyer at
the initial stages of the proceedings. He argued that the court did not take
into account his objections to the admissibility of the document and the findings
of the unlawful search. He claimed that the unlawfully obtained evidence and
other documents prepared by the police and the prosecution had been prejudicial
to his defence rights. He claimed that the court did not hear Ms S.D. and
despite the fact that her testimony was admitted to the case file at the appeal
stage, the Court of Cassation did not take it into account. The applicant
maintained that the court did not give any reasons as to why it had not taken
into account the testimony of his witnesses. He complained that the testimony
of two convicted persons had been included in the case file. Finally, he argued
that his defence rights had been infringed as he was detained in a prison far
from
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free
when the interests of justice so require.”
A. Admissibility
25. The Government maintained under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month rule. In this regard, they submitted that the applicant should have lodged his application with the Court within six months following the date of the pronouncement of the Court of Cassation’s judgment.
26. The applicant denied the Government’s arguments.
27. The Court reiterates that
where an applicant is entitled to be served ex
officio with a written copy of the final domestic decision the object and
purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are best served by counting the
six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment.
Where, as in the present case, the domestic law does not provide for service,
it considers it appropriate to take the date on which the final domestic
decision was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court as the
starting-point, the latest date on which the applicant was definitively able to
find out about the content of the final decision (see, among others, Esmer v. Turkey (dec.), no.
57888/00, 30 June 2005). The Court also reiterates that the six-month period
runs from the date on which the applicant’s lawyer became aware of the decision
completing the exhaustion of the domestic remedies, notwithstanding the fact
that the applicant only became aware of the decision later (see, in particular,
Bölükbaş and Others v. Turkey
(dec.), no. 37793/97, 12 October 1999).
28. The Court observes that
the applicant’s lawyer obtained a copy of the decision of the Court of
Cassation on
29. In the light of its established
case-law (see, among many other authorities, Çıraklar v. Turkey,
judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports
of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII) and in view of the materials
submitted to it, the Court considers that the applicant’s complaints raise
complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which
should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court therefore concludes
that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it
inadmissible have been established.
B. Merits
1.
30. The Court has examined a large number of cases raising similar issues to those in the present case and found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Özel, cited above, §§ 33-34, and Özdemir v. Turkey, no. 59659/00, §§ 35-36, 6 February 2003).
31. The Court finds no reason to reach a different conclusion in the instant case. Accordingly, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1.
2. Fairness of the proceedings
32. Having regard to its
finding of a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, the Court considers that it is not
necessary to examine the remaining complaints under Article 6 of the Convention
relating to the fairness of the proceedings before the domestic courts
(see, among other authorities, Incal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998‑IV, p. 1568, § 74).
II. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
33. The applicant complained that the search conducted in his house was unlawful and in breach of Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
34. The Government argued
under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention that this part of the application must
be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They maintained that the
applicant had neither raised this complaint during the proceedings nor lodged
an official complaint with the public prosecutor.
35. The applicant maintained that during the criminal proceedings he had complained about the search conducted in his house. He also suggested that there were no effective domestic remedies at the time of the events.
36. The Court reiterates
that, under the terms of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal
with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the
generally recognised rules of international law. This condition is not met by
the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his case to the various competent
courts. It is also necessary for the complaint brought before the Court to have
been raised, at least in substance, during the proceedings in question (see,
among other authorities, Çakar v. Turkey,
no. 42741/98, § 30,
37. In the instant case, the
Court observes that at no time, did the applicant allege, rely on or raise any
arguments that his house had been unlawfully searched in breach of his right to
respect for his private and family life. The Court notes that, before the
domestic courts, the applicant challenged solely the admission in evidence of the
paper allegedly found during the search in support of his general argument that
he had not been involved in any illegal organisation. Accordingly, the Court
considers that the applicant has failed to raise the substance of his complaints
under this head before the domestic instances (see, in particular, Rüzgar v. Turkey (dec.),
no. 59246/00,
38. In these circumstances,
the Court accepts the Government’s objection that the applicant has failed to
exhaust domestic remedies. It follows that this part of the application must be
rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
39. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
40. The applicant claimed, in
total, 36,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
41. The Government contested
the amount.
42. On the question of pecuniary damage, the Court considers in the first place that it cannot speculate as to what the outcome of proceedings compatible with Article 6 § 1 would have been. The Court therefore makes no award in respect of pecuniary damage.
43. The Court further
considers that the finding of a violation of Article 6 constitutes in
itself sufficient compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the
applicant (see Incal, cited above, §
82).
B. Costs and expenses
44. The applicant also
claimed EUR 4,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
45. The Government contested
the amount.
46. According to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award
the sum of EUR 1,000.
C. Default interest
47. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares the complaints concerning the applicant’s right to a fair
trial by an independent and impartial tribunal admissible and the remainder of
the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention as regards the lack of independence and impartiality of the
3. Holds that it is not necessary to consider the applicant’s other
complaints under Article 6 of the Convention;
4. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant;
5. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to
pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) to be converted into New Turkish
Liras at the rate applicable at the date of the settlement and free of any
taxes or charges that may be payable;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
T.L. Early Nicolas
Bratza Registrar President