SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF BEKİR YILDIZ v.
(Application no. 49156/99)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Bekir Yıldız v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Mr I. Cabral Barreto,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr V. Butkevych,
Ms D. Jočienė,
Mr D. Popović,
judges,
and Mr S. Naismith,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 49156/99) against the
2. The applicant was
represented by Mr Çiçek, a lawyer practising in
3. On
4. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in
1964 and lives in
6. The applicant was the
mayor of the Sincan District in
7. One of the events, which
had been foreseen for
8. The event was announced
months in advance and representatives of several embassies as well as important
personalities living in the district were invited. The meeting hall was
decorated with posters of martyrs who had given their lives for the liberation
of
9. On
10. In his statement taken at
the police station, the applicant stated that the Jerusalem Night was
organised as part of a thirty-day programme during the month of Ramadan and it
was an activity of the Sincan District Council. He
explained that the posters portrayed Muslim leaders who had given their lives
for the liberation of
11. On
12. On the same day the
applicant was brought before the investigating judge attached to the
13. In an indictment dated
14. Before the
15. On
16. Before delivering its
judgment, the
17. On
18. The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation. In his submissions to the Court of Cassation, the applicant defended himself against the charge of incitement to hatred and enmity, contrary to Article 312 of the Criminal Code, and argued that he had called for unity and solidarity in his speech.
19. On
II. THE RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
20. A full description of the
domestic law may be found in Özel
v. Turkey (no. 42739/98, §§ 20-21,
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicant complained
that he had not received a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal
due to the presence of a military judge on the bench of the
A. Admissibility
22. The Government argued
under Article 35 of the Convention that the applicant's complaint in respect of
the independence and impartiality of the
23. The Court reiterates that
it has already examined similar preliminary objections of the Government in
respect of non-compliance with the six-month rule in the past and has rejected
them (see Özdemir v.
24. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government's preliminary objection.
25. In the light of its established case law (see amongst many authorities, Çıraklar v. Turkey, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII), and in view of the materials submitted to it, the Court considers that the case raises complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court therefore concludes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring it inadmissible have been established.
B. Merits
26. The Government submitted that after the constitutional amendment of 1999 military judges could no longer sit on such courts. They also stated that the State Security Courts had been abolished as of June 2004 by Law No. 5190.
27. The Court notes that it has
examined similar cases in the past and has concluded that there was a violation
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Özel, cited above, §§ 33-34, and
Özdemir, cited above, §§ 35-36).
28. The Court sees no reason
to reach a different conclusion in this case. It is understandable that the
applicant who was prosecuted in a
29. In the light of the
foregoing the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention in this respect.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
30. The applicant submitted under Article 10 of the Convention that his conviction following his speech had constituted an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression.
31. The Government raised a
preliminary objection on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
They contended that the applicant had failed to raise his complaint before the
national courts.
32. The Court reiterates that
under the terms of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with a
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the
generally recognised rules of international law. This condition is not met by
the mere fact that an applicant has submitted his case to the various competent
courts. It is also necessary for the complaint brought before the Court to have
been raised, at least in substance, during the proceedings in question (see,
among others, Çakar v. Turkey,
no. 42741/98, § 30, 23 October 2003,and Karakaya
v. Turkey (dec.), no. 62619/00, 4 May 2004).
33. In the instant case, the Court observes that at no time did the applicant rely on or raise any arguments in respect of his right to freedom of expression. The Court notes that throughout the criminal proceedings, the applicant only denied the allegations against him, claiming that he had had no intention to incite people to hatred and enmity, and put forward arguments which were based solely on domestic law and did not raise the matter of freedom of expression.
34. Even assuming that the
national courts were able, or even obliged, to examine the case of their own
motion under the Convention, this could not dispense the applicant from relying
on the Convention in those courts or from advancing arguments to the same or
like effect before them, thus drawing their attention to the problem he
intended to submit subsequently, if need be, to the Court (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, judgment of
6 November 1980, Series A no. 40, p. 19 § 39, Ahmet Sadık v. Greece, judgment
of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V,
§ 33, and Aydar v. Turkey (dec.), no. 32207/96, 1
July 2003).
35. In view of the above considerations,
the Court holds that this part of the application must be rejected under
Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies.
III. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
36. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
A. Damage
37. The applicant requested the Court to award him 158,932 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 150,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government submitted that these claims
were excessive and unacceptable.
38. On the question of
pecuniary damage, the Court considers in the first place that it cannot
speculate as to what the outcome of proceedings compatible with Article 6 § 1
would have been. The Court cannot therefore allow the applicant's claims in
this respect.
39. The Court further
considers that the finding of a violation of Article 6 constitutes in
itself sufficient compensation for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the
applicant in this respect (see Incal,
cited above, p. 1575, § 82, and Çıraklar, cited above, § 45).
40. Where the Court finds
that an applicant has been convicted by a tribunal which is not independent and
impartial within the meaning of Article 6 § 1, it considers that, in
principle, the most appropriate form of relief would be to ensure that the
applicant is granted in due course a retrial by an independent and impartial
tribunal (Gençel v. Turkey,
no. 53431/99, § 27, 23 October 2003).
B. Costs and expenses
41. The applicant also claimed EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court, without producing any supporting documents.
42. The Government did not
make any comments on this point.
43. The Court may make an
award in respect of costs and expenses in so far as these were actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Sawicka v.
44. Making its own estimate based on the information available, and having regard to the criteria laid down in its case-law (see, among other authorities, Vural v. Turkey, no. 56007/00, § 45, 21 December 2004), the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses claimed.
C. Default interest
45. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning
the independence and impartiality of the
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) free of any tax that may chargeable in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in
English, and notified in writing on
S. Naismith J.-P.
Costa
Deputy Registrar President