FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF ATKIN v.
(Application no. 39977/98)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Atkın
v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J. Casadevall, President,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr M. Pellonpää,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr K. Traja,
Ms L. Mijović,
Mr J. Šikuta,
judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The
case originated in an application (no. 39977/98) against the
2. The applicant was
represented by Mr M. A. Erol, a lawyer practising in İstanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”)
did not designate an Agent for the purposes of the proceedings before the
Court.
3. On 21 October 1998 the
European Commission of Human Rights declared the application partly
inadmissible and decided to communicate the applicant’s complaint under Article
6 § 1 of the Convention relating to the length of the criminal proceedings.
4. The application was
transmitted to the Court on
5. The application was
allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the
Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case
(Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
6. In a letter of
7. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).
8. On
9. On 7 June 2005 the Court
decided to invite the parties to submit further written observations on the
admissibility and merits of the applicant’s complaint that the written opinion
of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation had never been
served on him, thus depriving him of the opportunity to put forward his
counter-arguments.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The
applicant was born in 1951 and lives in İstanbul.
11. At
the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant worked as
a customs broker in a private company.
12. On
13. On
14. On
15. On
16. On
an undetermined date, the
17. On
18. On
19. On
20. Between
21. In
a hearing held on
22. On
23. On
24. On
25. On
26. On
6,158,746,372 Turkish Liras (TRL).
27. On
28. On
29. On
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
OF THE CONVENTION
30. The applicant complained that
the length of the criminal proceedings brought against him was excessive. He
further complained in his application form, dated 7 January 1998, that the
written observations of the principal public prosecutor at the Court of
Cassation on the merits of his appeal were not served on him, thus depriving
him of the opportunity to put forward his counter-arguments. The applicant
relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant reads as
follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable
time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Fairness of the criminal proceedings
31. The Government argued
under Article 35 of the Convention that the applicant’s complaint concerning
the non-communication of the written observations of the principal public
prosecutor at the Court of Cassation must be rejected for failure to comply
with the six-month rule. They maintained that the applicant should have lodged this
complaint to the Court within six-months following the dismissal of his request
for a rectification of the Court of Cassation’s decision whereas his complaint
was introduced to the Court on
32. The applicant did not
comment on this issue.
33. The Court notes that the
“final decision” within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention
was the judgment of the Court of Cassation on
34. The Court re-affirms its
practice, in cases where the domestic law does not provide for the service of a
written copy of a final domestic decision, that the six month period laid down
in Article 35 § 1 begins to run from the date when the decision was finalised,
i.e. when the parties were definitely able to be informed of its contents (see,
among many others, Seher Karataş v. Turkey, no. 33179/96, § 27,
9 July 2002, and Karatepe v. Turkey (dec.), no. 43924/98,
3 April 2003). In the instant case, the judgment of the Court of Cassation
was at the disposal of the applicant and his lawyers as of
35. Although the applicant’s
first letter to the Court was dated
36. In these circumstances,
the Court accepts the Government’s objection that
the applicant has failed to comply with the six-month rule. It follows
that this complaint must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of
the Convention as having been introduced out of time.
B. Length of the criminal proceedings
1. Admissibility
37. The Court notes that this
part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
38. There was no dispute over
the period to be taken into consideration. It was common ground between the
parties that the period to be taken into consideration began on
39. The
Government submitted that the case was
complicated as it concerned the smuggling of electronic goods through customs. In
this connection, they pointed out the organised nature of the crime and in
particular the difficulty in determining the level of involvement of the different
suspects. They stated that while some of the suspects were public officers,
others worked in private companies and that one of them was a German national.
They pointed out that the testimonies of the suspects had to be obtained
through rogatory courts. The Government recalled that while Article 6 required
that judicial proceedings be conducted promptly, it also laid emphasis on the
more general principle of the proper administration of justice. The Government
stated that the length of the proceedings could be considered to have been
prolonged due to the determination of the competent court to try the applicant.
However, they pointed out that during the proceedings before the
40. The
applicant disputed the Government’s arguments. He stated that there were delays
in between the hearings and that the proceedings could have been concluded in
half the time since two separate investigation reports had been submitted to
the court and that, therefore, the court did not spend time collecting
evidence.
41. The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be
assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to
the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the
applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many others, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no.
25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
42. The Court considers that,
even though the case was of some complexity, it cannot be said that this in
itself justified the entire length of the proceedings.
43. As regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court observes that it does
not appear that he contributed to the prolongation of the proceedings. The
Government have not argued to the contrary.
44. As to the conduct of the domestic
authorities, the Court accepts the exceptional situation in which the national
authorities found themselves following the amendment to Law no. 2845 which
adversely affected the length of the proceedings for one year and three months.
It also does not find that there were any excessive delays before the Court of
Cassation. However, the Court cannot overlook the fact
that a lengthy period - two years and three months - elapsed before the
45. Finally,
the Court considers that what was at stake for the applicant in the domestic
litigation was of considerable importance to him.
46. Having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the
length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement.
47. There has accordingly
been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
48. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
49. The
applicant claimed 39,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR
100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
50. The Government contested
these claims as being excessive.
51. The Court does not
discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage
alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it accepts that the
applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage, such as distress and
frustration, on account of the duration of the proceedings, which cannot be
sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Taking into
account the circumstances of the case and having regard to its case law, the
Court awards the applicant EUR 3,600 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
52. The
applicant also claimed 25,000 German marks (DEM) (approximately EUR 12,782)
for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 5,000 for
those incurred before the Court. He further claimed EUR 700 for translation and
stationery and requested the reimbursement of expenses, i.e. transportation,
incurred while he was attending the proceedings before the
53. The
Government contested the amounts requested by the applicant.
54. According to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to
quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and
expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the
sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
55. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning the length of the criminal proceedings
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention on account of the length of the criminal proceedings;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 3,600 (three thousand and
six hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand
euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii) any tax that may be
chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
Michael O’Boyle Josep
Casadevall
Registrar President