THIRD SECTION
CASE OF YÜKSEL ERDOĞAN AND OTHERS
v.
(Application no.
57049/00)
JUDGMENT
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Yüksel Erdoğan and Others v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr B.M.
Zupančič,
President,
Mr J.
Hedigan,
Mr R.
Türmen,
Mrs A.
Gyulumyan,
Mr E.
Myjer,
Mrs I.
Ziemele,
Mrs I.
Berro-Lefèvre,
judges,
and Mr S. Quesada,
Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 57049/00) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) by nine Turkish nationals, Mr Yüksel
Erdoğan, Mrs Meliha Erdoğan, Mr Sinan Erdoğan, Mrs Bahar Sağlam, Mr Şinasi Yalçın, Mr Hüsnü Yalçın, Mr
Ali Yalçın, Mr Ramazan Erdoğan and Mrs Raşidiye Erdoğan (the
applicants), on 25 February 2000.
2. The applicants were
represented by Mr B. Aşçı, Mr M. Narin and Mrs A.N. Çelik, Mr M. Köylüoğlu,
Mr C. Yücel and Mr H.İ. Türkyılmaz, lawyers practising in
3. The applicants alleged
under Article 2 of the Convention that their relatives, Fuat Erdoğan, Elmas
Yalçın and İsmet Erdoğan, had been unlawfully killed by the security forces and
that the authorities had failed to conduct an
effective investigation into the circumstances of the case. They further
maintained under Article 6 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings
brought against the police officers had not been concluded within a
reasonable time.
4. On
5. On
6. On
7. No response was received
by the Court to the letters of 16 May and
THE FACTS
I. THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicants' dates of birth and their relationship to the three persons who were killed are described as follows:
Yüksel Erdoğan (1943) and Meliha Erdoğan (1942) are the parents and Sinan Erdoğan (1962) and Bahar Sağlam (1970) are the siblings of the late İsmet Erdoğan. Şinasi Yalçın (1970), Hüsnü Yalçın (1952) and Ali Yalçın (1954) are the brothers of the late Elmas Yalçın. Ramazan Erdoğan and Raşidiye Erdoğan are the parents of the late Fuat Erdoğan.
A. The killing of İsmet Erdoğan, Elmas Yalçın and Fuat Erdoğan and the subsequent investigation into the circumstances of their death
9. On
10. On the same day, an arrest report (olaylı yakalama ve zaptetme tutanağı) was drawn up by eight police officers from the Anti-Terror Branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. According to this report, after having received the anonymous phone call, the police officers arrived at the Arzum café. They told the suspects, who were on the second floor of the café, that they were police officers and requested them to submit their identity cards. The suspects started shouting and opened fire. The officers then ordered the suspects to surrender and responded to their firing in order to protect themselves. When they realised that there was no more gunfire coming from the suspects they stopped the fire. They then saw that the three suspects were dead and informed the public prosecutor. The identity cards found on the deceased bore different names to those of the applicants' relatives. Furthermore, two firearms, three chargers, six cartridges of 7,65 mm calibre, five empty cartridges of 7,65 mm calibre, twenty empty cartridges of 9 mm calibre and five bullets were found next to two of the corpses. The police officers also found some documents on one of the male corpses.
11. On the same day, at
12. On the same day, two
police officers took statements from
13.
14. On
15. According to the report
concerning Fuat Erdoğan, he had received two bullets to his head and three
bullets to other parts of his body. Two bullet entry wounds were observed on the
right and left temples. The other
three bullets entered in the body from the upper parts of the left and right
femur and below the left scapula. The bullet exit wounds were observed
next to the xiphoid[1], above the scrotum and next to the
pubic bone. The cause of his death was stated as fracture of the skull,
internal bleeding and cerebral haemorrhage. The experts further noted that a
paraffin test, which was to be conducted to detect gunpowder in the hands of the
deceased, could not be carried out as there was ink on both of his hands due to
the taking of fingerprints by police officers at the scene of the
incident.
16. The report concerning
İsmet Erdoğan revealed that he had received two bullets to his body. The bullet
entry wounds were seen on the right of the parietal bone and on the scapular
line on the back.
17. According to the report regarding Elmas Yalçın, she had received one bullet to her head and one to her abdomen. The bullet entry wounds were seen on the right of the parietal bone and the right of the abdomen. The bullet exit wounds were observed in the middle of her lower lip and on the right gluteus. The cause of her death was also determined as fracture of the skull, cerebral haemorrhage and damage to the cerebral tissue. The experts further noted that there was ink on both of her hands due to the taking of fingerprints by police officers at the scene of the incident.
18. According to the autopsy reports, all of the shots were fired at long range.
19. By a letter dated 30 September 1994 the director of the anti-terror branch sent a Browning firearm, an Unique firearm, two chargers, twenty empty cartridges of 9 mm calibre, five empty cartridges of 7,65 mm calibre, six cartridges, four bullets of 9 mm calibre and one bullet of 7,65 mm calibre to the Istanbul Regional Criminal Police Laboratory for a ballistic examination. The director stated in his letter that these items had been found near the corpses and belonged to the deceased.
20. On
21. On
22.
23. On
24. On
25. On
26. On 21 November 1994 the
public prosecutor obtained statements from Ş.K and A.B. who contended that the
police officers had opened fire in order to frighten the suspects and that they
had not had the intention to kill them. A.B. further maintained that police
officers wearing bullet-proof vests had entered the café while he and some other
police officers had been outside, as they had taken security measures around the
café.
B. Criminal proceedings against the police officers
27. On
28. On
1. Hearing of
29. On 9 February 1995 one of the applicants, Yüksel Erdoğan, and Elmas Yalçın's father, Mustafa Yalçın intervened as a civil party (müdahil) to the criminal proceedings brought against the officers. On the same day, the first-instance court ordered the ballistic examination of the empty cartridges and decided that the defendants would not be detained on remand throughout the proceedings in accordance with Article 15 § 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The court further ordered that the firearms which had been given to A.B. be sent to the custody office (adliye emanet memurluğu) of the Istanbul Courts.
2. Hearings of 5 May and
30. On
31. During the hearing, the
intervening parties' lawyers requested the court to ask the defendants certain
questions concerning the trajectory of the bullets and the range of the
shootings. The
32. On the same day, the first-instance court ordered that the defendants' firearms be handed over for a ballistic examination. It further ordered that the bullets which had been found at the scene of the incident be subject to an examination with a view to determining which of these bullets and cartridges were discharged from the defendants' weapons.
33. At the end of the hearing
of
3. Hearings of 30 October and
34. On
35. On the same day, the first-instance court once again ordered that the firearms of the defendants be handed over for ballistic examination following receipt of a letter from the Istanbul Security Directorate refusing to give these firearms on the ground that the defendants would not be secure without their weapons.
36. During the same hearing,
the intervening parties requested the court to order the defendants' detention
on remand since they failed to attend the hearings without a justification. The
public prosecutor opined that the defendants should be requested to state their
reasons for not attending the hearings. The defendants' lawyer requested that
the defendants be exempted from attending the hearings. The
37. On an unspecified date,
the Istanbul Security Directorate sent to the
38. On 13 December 1995 the first-instance court decided to send the defendants' firearms as well as the bullets and the empty cartridges found at the scene of the incident and one bullet extracted from İsmet Erdoğan's body to the Forensic Medicine Institute for a ballistic examination with a view to determining which of these bullets and cartridges had been discharged from the defendants' weapons.
39. On
4. Hearing of
40. On
41. On the same day, the
Istanbul Assize Court decided that the defendants' firearms as well as the
firearms, bullets and cartridges, found near the deceased and extracted from one
of the corpses be sent for a new examination. Forensic experts were requested to
give information in order to determine whether the three 9 mm calibre bullets
matched the empty cartridges and whether the latter had been discharged from one
of the firearms belonging to the police officers or the deceased. The court
further decided to request the Istanbul Security Directorate to provide
information as to whether the barrels or the firing pins of the firearms had
been changed after
42. On 31 May and
43. On
5. Hearing of
44. On
45. On
46. On
47. On
48. On 11 October 1996 the
judges of the Istanbul Assize Court, an expert, one of the intervening parties,
Ali Yalçın, his representative, N.A., S.A. and two police officers who had been
heard as witnesses, E.M. and N.Ç. conducted an on-site inspection. During the
inspection, N.A. and
49. Following the on-site inspection, on
6. Hearings of 23 October and
50. On
51. On
52. On
53. On
7. Hearings of 10 July and
54. During the hearing which
was held on 10 July 1997 Şinasi Yalçın requested that the accused police
officers be ordered to attend the hearings as he wished to question them. He
further requested that the police officers be detained on remand as the
trajectories of the bullets in the deceased's bodies clearly demonstrated that
they had been executed. Another intervening party, Yüksel Erdoğan, requested the
court to hold a new on-site inspection in order to determine whether the
trajectories of the bullets matched the accused police officers' account of the
events. Ş.K.'s lawyer requested that a new ballistic examination be conducted,
claiming that Ş.K. had not opened fire. Finally, the
55. On
8. Hearing of 21 December 1998 and the
Forensic Medicine Institute's report of
56. On 21 December 1998, upon the requests of the intervening parties and the public prosecutor, the Istanbul Assize Court decided to request the Forensic Medicine Institute to conduct an examination of all firearms, bullets and cartridges in order to resolve the contradictions between the previous ballistic reports and determine whether the bullet entries on the corpses could have been formed as a result of a shooting from downstairs to the second floor and whether the deceased were targeted by the defendants. The court further requested information concerning the range of the shootings.
57. On
...It is a medically recognised fact that the entry and exit holes in corpses cannot be indicative of the place and the level of the exact place where the shots were fired from since persons are mobile and can change place and position. Therefore, it cannot be medically determined whether the bullets were fired from the ground floor or the stairs or the second floor. Likewise, it cannot be determined whether the deceased were targeted by the accused.
...It has been unanimously concluded that all of the shots were fired at long range and that the exact range of the shootings cannot be determined.
9. Hearings between 24 March 1999 and
5 December 2001 and the Forensic Institute's report of
58. On different dates, the
59. On
60. On
As was determined in the report of
1- Three of the 7,65 mm calibre bullets were discharged from the Browning make firearm numbered 241716. Two of the 7,65 mm calibre bullets were discharged from the Unique firearm numbered 855392.
2- Out of the twenty 9 mm empty cartridges:
a) Nine of them were discharged from the firearm numbered MP5-3793, eight of them were discharged from the Ceska firearm numbered T‑1192 and three of them were discharged from the Browning firearm numbered 245 PV 30170.
b) Furthermore, two 9 mm empty cartridges were not discharged from the firearms submitted. They were discharged from two different 9 mm calibre automatic or semi‑automatic firearms.
3- Out of the three 9 mm bullets:
a) the one which was sent in an envelope marked İbrahim Korkmaz was discharged from the Ceska 9 mm calibre firearm numbered T-1192;
b) one of the two bullets which were sent in an envelope marked ... Fuat Erdoğan was discharged from the Ceska 9 mm calibre firearm numbered T-1192 and the other was discharged from the Browning firearm numbered 245 PV 30170.
4- Three 9 mm calibre bullets may belong to the 9 mm empty cartridges sent. However, it cannot be determined with certainty whether they matched or not.
...
10. The
61. On
11. The Court of Cassation's decision
of 7 July 2003
62. On 7 July 2003 the Court
of Cassation upheld the judgment of the
II. RELEVANT
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
63. A
description of the relevant domestic law at the material time and the
international law can be found in Erdoğan and
Others v. Turkey
(no. 19807/92, §§ 51-58, 25 April 2006).
THE LAW
64. The Court notes that the applicants' representatives did not submit a power of attorney signed by Ramazan and Raşidiye Erdoğan while introducing the application on 25 February 2000. On 16 May and 7 June 2005 the Registry requested the applicants' representatives to submit such an authorisation which was essential to establish the validity of the application insofar as brought by these two applicants. On 7 June 2005 and 29 September 2006 the applicants' representatives were also warned that Ramazan and Raşidiye Erdoğan's application might be struck out of the list. No response was received to the letters of 7 June 2005 and 29 September 2006 (see paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above).
65. In these circumstances, taking into account the lack of diligence of the applicants' representatives and the absence of a serious indication that the applicants themselves wished to lodge or pursue the application, the Court concludes that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application brought on behalf of Ramazan Erdoğan and Raşidiye Erdoğan within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention. Furthermore, the Court finds no reasons of a general character, as defined in Article 37 § 1 in fine, which would require the examination of this part of the application by virtue of that Article.
66. The Court therefore decides to strike the application, insofar as it has been brought on behalf of Ramazan Erdoğan and Raşidiye Erdoğan in respect of the killing of Fuat Erdoğan, out of its list of cases under Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
ARTICLES 2 AND 6 OF THE CONVENTION BY YÜKSEL ERDOĞAN, MELİHA ERDOĞAN, SİNAN
ERDOĞAN, BAHAR SAĞLAM, ŞİNASİ YALÇIN, HÜSNÜ YALÇIN AND
ALİ YALÇIN
67. The applicants complained, under Article 2 of the Convention, that the use of force employed by the security forces against İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın was disproportionate and resulted in their unlawful killing. They further complained, under the same head, that the investigation and the subsequent criminal proceedings brought against the four police officers were fundamentally flawed and, as a result, were not capable of being effective, in violation of the procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. They further complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the proceedings in question were not concluded within a reasonable time.
68. The Court considers that
these complaints should be examined from the standpoint of Article 2 of the
Convention alone, which provides:
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
A. Admissibility
1. Submissions of the parties
69. The Government argued that Meliha Erdoğan, Sinan Erdoğan and Bahar Sağlam had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to them within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention as they had not joined the proceedings against the accused police officers as civil parties. Alternatively, they alleged that the application was submitted out of time as the applicants' relatives had been killed on 29 September 1994 whereas the application was introduced only on 25 February 2000. They argued that if the applicants considered the domestic remedies ineffective, they should have submitted their application to the Court within six months from 29 September 1994, the date on which the alleged violation took place.
70. The applicants contended
that Meliha Erdoğan, Sinan Erdoğan and Bahar Sağlam had not been required to
intervene in the criminal proceedings as the other applicants had already joined
the proceedings concerning the killing of İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın. They
further maintained that they had lodged their application with the Court when
they had become aware of the ineffectiveness of the criminal proceedings brought
against the police officers and that, therefore, they had complied with the
six-month rule.
2. The Court's assessment
71. As regards the Government's argument that Meliha Erdoğan, Sinan Erdoğan and Bahar Sağlam had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies, the Court reiterates at the outset that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged (see Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24746/94, 4 April 2000).
72. Nevertheless, the
application of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must make due
allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of machinery for
the protection of human rights that the Contracting States have agreed to set
up. The Court has recognised that Article 35 § 1 must be applied with some
degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. It has further recognised
that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied
automatically; for the purposes of reviewing whether it has been observed, it is
essential to have regard to the circumstances of the individual case. This
means, in particular, that the Court must take realistic account not only of the
existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting State
concerned but also of the general context in which they operate, as well as the
personal circumstances of the applicant. It must then examine whether, in all
the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could
reasonably be expected of him or her to exhaust domestic remedies (see
İlhan v.
73. Moreover, the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force. The essential purpose of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility. What form of investigation will achieve those purposes may vary in different circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion, once the matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next of kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 111, ECHR 2001‑III).
74. The Court further recalls
that in its decision of Erdoğan and
Others v. Turkey ((dec.), no. 19807/92, 16 January 1996), where the facts of
the case and the Government's arguments were similar to those in the present
case, the Commission considered that two applicants, who had not intervened in
the criminal proceedings brought against police officers who had been charged
with killing the applicants' relatives, were absolved from the need to join to
these proceedings since the other applicants had intervened in the proceedings
and were able to raise all the issues concerning their
killing.
75. In the present case, the Court observes that Meliha Erdoğan, Sinan Erdoğan and Bahar Sağlam, the family members of the late İsmet Erdoğan, did not join to the criminal proceedings as a civil party. Nor did they lodge a criminal complaint with the prosecuting authorities. However, in the light of the aforementioned principle that the prosecuting authorities are under the obligation to act on their own motion without waiting for a next of kin to lodge a complaint where an individual has been killed as a result of the use of force by members of the security forces and having regard to the fact that Yüksel Erdoğan, who was the father of İsmet Erdoğan, joined the proceedings in question and raised all the issues concerning his son's killing, the Court considers that Meliha Erdoğan, Sinan Erdoğan and Bahar Sağlam were not required to become intervening parties in the criminal proceedings in question.
76. As to the Government's alternative argument that the applicants failed to comply with the six-month's rule, the Court reiterates that where an applicant avails himself of, or relies on, an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it is appropriate to take as the start of the six month period the date when he or she first became aware or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Acar and Others and Akay and Others v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 38417/97 and 36088/97, 27 November 2001; and Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 46477/99, 7 June 2001).
77. In the present case, the Court considers that the criminal proceedings relating to the killing of the applicants' relatives afforded in principle a remedy which the applicants were required to exhaust (see Acar and Others and Akay and Others, cited above). It notes in this connection that a criminal investigation was opened into the killing of the applicants' relatives immediately after the incident and that, on 22 November 1994, criminal proceedings were instituted against the four police officers. However, these proceedings resulted in the acquittal of all the defendants on 7 July 2003, some eight years and nine months after the date of the killings. The Court considers, in view of the seriousness of the charges, that the substantial delays involved deprived the remedy of its effectiveness. The Court finds that the applicants acted reasonably in awaiting developments in the criminal proceedings before lodging their complaint with the Court and that the application was brought within six months of the date when the applicants became aware or ought to have become aware that the remedy would not be effective (see Acar and Others and Akay and Others, cited above).
78. Consequently, the application cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or for non-compliance with the six-month rule.
79. The Court notes that the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
80. The applicants submitted first that no real attempt had been made to capture their relatives alive. In this connection, they contended that the police officers had known the identity of the victims when they arrived at the café and that there was a premeditated plan to kill them rather than to effect their lawful arrest. They further maintained that there were several indications of this aim, such as the facts that the police officers had been wearing bullet-proof vests and that the bullets followed a downward trajectory within the victims' bodies. They further contended that the security forces' claim that there had been an armed clash was unsubstantiated as neither of the police officers had been injured. The applicants maintained that their relatives had been killed as a result of use of force which was not absolutely necessary.
81. As to the investigation
conducted in the present case, the applicants argued that there were serious
flaws both at the preliminary investigation stage and after the proceedings
brought against the police officers. They maintained, in that respect, that the
public prosecutor had not been present after the incident when the police
officers who had participated in the police operation collected the evidence and
that, therefore, there was no independent evidence. Furthermore, no photographs
of the scene of the incident had been taken. Nor were the premises filmed. The
applicants complained that the on-site inspection was conducted twenty-five
months after the killing of their relatives. They further contended that the
first‑instance court rejected their requests to broaden the scope of the
investigation and to put certain questions to the accused police officers. The
applicants finally maintained that the proceedings against the police officers
lasted an unreasonably long time and that the accused had not been suspended
from duty, even though criminal proceedings had been brought against
them.
82. The Government submitted,
in reply, that the death of the applicants' relatives resulted from a use of
force which was no more than absolutely necessary. They maintained that it was
established by the domestic courts that the police officers had started firing
only after the deceased had opened fire and in order to protect themselves. They
contended that, as was stated in the Istanbul Assize Court's judgment of 7
February 2002, the deaths had resulted from self-defence and in accordance with
Article 16 of Law no. 2559 on the duties and legal powers of
police.
83. The Government further
maintained that the investigation conducted into the killing of the applicants'
relatives and the subsequent criminal proceedings brought against the police
officers had been effective. They submitted, in this respect, that the
authorities had conducted autopsies, ballistic examinations and an on-site
inspection and that the trial court had taken into consideration all the
evidence, in particular, the ballistic reports, before rendering its
judgment. The Government finally made submissions as regards the length of
the criminal proceedings brought against the accused police officers and
maintained that the proceedings had been completed within a reasonable time in
view of the complexity of the case.
2. The Court's assessment
a. As to the alleged violation of the right to life of İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın
i. General principles
84. Article 2, which
safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances when deprivation of
life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the
Convention, from which no derogation is permitted (see Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, § 68,
ECHR 2000-VI). Together with Article 3, it also enshrines one of the basic
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The
circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified must therefore be
strictly construed (see Salman v.
Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 97, ECHR 2000‑VII). The object and
purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual
human beings also requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to
make its safeguards practical and effective (see McCann and Others v. the United
Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1995, Series A no. 324, pp. 45-46,
§§ 146-47).
85. The first sentence of
Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and
unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps within its internal
legal order to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see Kiliç v. Turkey, no. 22492/93, § 62,
ECHR 2000-III). This involves a primary duty on the State to secure the
right to life by putting in place an appropriate legal and administrative
framework to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by
law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of
breaches of such provisions.
86. The text of Article 2,
read as a whole, demonstrates that paragraph 2 does not primarily define
instances where it is permitted to intentionally kill an individual, but
describes situations where it is permitted to use force which may result, as
an unintended outcome in the deprivation of life. The use of force, however,
must be no more than absolutely necessary for the achievement of any of the
purposes set out in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c). In this respect the use of
the term absolutely necessary in Article 2 § 2 indicates that a stricter and
more compelling test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable
when determining whether State action is necessary in a democratic society
under paragraph 2 of Articles 8-11 of the Convention. In particular, the
force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out
in the subparagraphs of the Article (see McCann
and Others, cited
above, p. 46, §§ 148-9).
87. In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first instance tribunal of facts, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883/95, 4 April 2000). Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court's task to substitute its own assessment of facts for that of the domestic courts and as a general rule it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic authorities, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Klaas v. Germany, judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269, p. 18, §§ 29-30).
88. However, the central importance of the protection afforded under Article 2 is such that the Court is required to subject allegations of breach of this provision to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administered the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination even where domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see Erdoğan and Others, cited above, § 71).
ii. Establishment of the facts
89. In the present case, the Court notes firstly that it is undisputed between the parties that the applicants' relatives were shot and killed by the security forces. The Court is however confronted with fundamentally divergent accounts of how İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın were killed. The applicants alleged that the police officers arrived at the café with the aim of killing their relatives and that the alleged identity control had been a pretext. The Government, on the other hand, claimed that the applicants' relatives had refused to submit their identity cards and had opened fire. The Government contended that they had died during an armed clash during which the police officers acted within the scope of Law no. 2559 on the duties and legal powers of police.
90. The Court observes that a
judicial determination of the facts took place in the criminal proceedings
brought against four police officers before the
iii. Application of the general principles in the circumstances of the present case
91. The Court observes, on
the basis of the material before it, that İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın
were killed in the course of a police operation by officers from the anti-terror
branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. In this connection, as to the
applicants' allegation that there was a premeditated plan to kill their
relatives, the Court does not find it sufficiently established, in view of the
material provided, that there was such a plan.
92. As regards the legal framework defining the circumstances in which law enforcement officials may use force and firearms, the Court recalls that it has already held that the applicable legislation at the time of the incident, Law no. 2559, enacted in 1934, would not appear sufficient to provide the level of protection by law of the right to life that is required in present-day democratic societies in Europe (see Erdoğan and Others, cited above, § 77) but that the difference between the relevant national standard and the standard provided by the expression absolutely necessary in Article 2 § 2 of the Convention is not sufficiently great that a violation of Article 2 § 1 could be found on this ground alone (see Perk and Others, cited above, § 60).
93. In carrying out its
assessment of the planning and control phase of the operation from the
standpoint of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court must have particular
regard to the context in which the incident occurred as well as to the way in
which the situation developed (see Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus,
judgment of 9 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI,
§ 182).
94. The Court observes in
this connection that the police officers arrived at the scene of the incident
following a phone call received by the
police on 29 September 1994 according to which
the suspects were carrying at least one firearm in a public place in a central
area in
95. Similar to the
96. The Court should therefore determine whether the use of force in the instant case was no more than absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aforementioned aims.
97. It is important, in the
eyes of the Court, that the
98. The Court accepts, in the circumstances of the case, that when the police officers entered the café and were confronted with the shootings coming from the suspects, they believed that it was necessary to continue firing until the suspects stopped firing back (see Perk and Others, cited above, § 68). In this connection, the Court notes that, according to the ballistic examination reports, five of the bullets found at the scene of the incident had been discharged from the firearms found near to the suspects' corpses and that the police officers' shots had all been fired at long range (see paragraphs 18 and 57 above).
99. The Court further considers that it is not necessary to speculate on the question of the possibility to use non-lethal methods by the security forces in order to arrest the deceased. In this connection, the Court recalls that in the cases of Andronicou and Constantinou and Perk and Others, where the applicants' relatives had been killed as a result of use of force by the security forces, it held that it could not with detached reflection substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of the officers who were required to react in the heat of the moment. The Court further considered that to hold otherwise would be to impose an unrealistic burden on the States and their law‑enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and the lives of others (see Andronicou and Constantinou, cited above, § 192; and Perk and Others, cited above, § 72). The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case, where the police officers had to act rapidly when confronted with armed suspects in a public place.
100. The Court considers therefore that the use of lethal force in the circumstances, however regrettable it may have been, did not exceed what was absolutely necessary for the purposes of self-defence and effecting a lawful arrest and did not amount to a breach by the respondent State of their obligations under Article 2 § 2 (a) of the Convention.
101. It follows that there
has been no
violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the killing of İsmet
Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın.
b. As to the alleged inadequacy of the investigation
i. General principles
102. The Court has already held that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force, with the purpose of securing the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility (see paragraph 73 above).
103. For an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by State agents to be effective, it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events (see Güleç v. Turkey, judgment of 27 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, §§ 81-82; and Oğur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594/93, §§ 91-92, ECHR 1999-III). This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see, for example, Ergi v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, §§ 83-84).
104. The investigation must
also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination
of whether the force used in such cases was or was not justified in the
circumstances (see Kaya v. Turkey, judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998‑I, p. 324, § 87) and to the identification and punishment of those
responsible (Oğur, cited above, § 88). This is not an obligation of
result, but of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps
available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including
inter alia eye witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where
appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury
and an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death
(see, concerning autopsies, Salman,
cited above, § 106, concerning
witnesses, Tanrıkulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763/94, § 109, ECHR
1999-IV; concerning forensic evidence, Gül v. Turkey, no. 22676/93,
§ 89, 14 December 2000). Any deficiency in the investigation which
undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person or persons
responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.
105. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (see Yaşa v. Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998‑VI, pp. 2439-2440, §§ 102-104; Çakıcı v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, §§ 80-87 and 106, ECHR 1999-IV; Tanrıkulu, cited above, § 109; and Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535/93, §§ 106-107, ECHR 2000-III). It must be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation. However, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see Avşar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 395, ECHR 2001‑VII (extracts)).
ii. Application of the general principles in the circumstances of the present case
106. In the instant case, an
investigation into the incident was indeed carried out by the
107. Among these
deficiencies, the Court is particularly struck by the fact that the public
prosecutor who inspected the scene of the incident on 29 September 1994
failed to secure evidence which was essential in determining whether the
deceased had ever handled the firearms which were found at the scene of the
incident. It was in his presence that police officers took fingerprints of the
deceased, which subsequently prevented the forensic experts from conducting an
examination of the deceased's hands in this respect. Moreover, the firearms allegedly used by the deceased were never subjected to a
fingerprint analysis in order to establish whether or not these weapons had ever
been handled by the deceased.
108. Furthermore, the investigating authorities did not take photographs at the scene of the incident; nor did they make sketches of the interior or exterior of the premises or prepare a plan showing the position of each member of the security forces in the café at the time of the shootings. A sketch map of the scene of the incident was drawn up as late as 22 October 1996 by an expert following the Istanbul Assize Court's on-site inspection of the café, which had already been renovated after the incident. Moreover, one of the police officers who had participated in the operation, A.B., also participated in the first examination of the scene of the incident with the public prosecutor and was actually given the bullets, cartridges and the two firearms which had been found next to the deceased by the police officers who killed the deceased.
109. The Court is of the opinion that the above elements disclose a significant defect in the reliability and thoroughness of this part of the investigation. It has therefore examined whether this was remedied by the investigation conducted by the assize court during the criminal proceedings.
110. The Court recalls that, in the normal course of events, a criminal trial, with an adversarial procedure before an independent and impartial judge must be regarded as furnishing the strongest safeguards of an effective procedure for the finding of facts and the attribution of criminal responsibility (see McKerr, cited above, § 134). Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded, for example, that defects in an investigation may fundamentally undermine the ability of a court to determine responsibility for a death (see Salman, cited above, §§ 106-109 concerning inadequate autopsy procedures, and Kılıç v. Turkey, no. 22492/93, §§ 79-83, ECHR 2000-III where there was no evidence presented to the trial court linking the suspect to the killing).
111. In the present case, the Court considers that, the shortcomings described in paragraph 126 above were fundamental; that is to say, they had the effect of undermining the Istanbul Assize Court's ability to establish the accountability for the killing of İsmet Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın.
112. The Court nevertheless
observes other deficiencies in the proceedings before the
113. Secondly, the
114. Finally, there have been
substantial delays in the proceedings. The court postponed the hearings for
almost six months as the Istanbul Security Directorate failed to send the
accused police officers' weapons to the
115. Having regard, therefore, to the duration and serious shortcomings of the criminal investigation and trial proceedings in this case, the Court concludes that there has been a breach of the State's procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention.
116. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 2 in this respect.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
117. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
118. The applicants did not submit any claim for just satisfaction under
Article 41 of the Convention taken together with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
In these circumstances, the Court considers that there is no reason to award any
sum under Article 41 of the Convention (see Ciucci
v. Italy,
no. 68345/01, § 33, 1 June 2006).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Decides unanimously to strike the case out of the list insofar as it was brought on behalf of Ramazan Erdoğan and Raşidiye Erdoğan in respect of the killing of Fuat Erdoğan;
2. Declares
unanimously the application admissible insofar as it was brought by Yüksel
Erdoğan, Meliha Erdoğan, Sinan Erdoğan, Bahar Sağlam, Şinasi Yalçın, Hüsnü
Yalçın and Ali Yalçın;
3. Holds by 6 votes to 1 that there has
been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention as regards the death of İsmet
Erdoğan and Elmas Yalçın;
4. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention as regards the investigations carried out by the national authorities.
Done in English, and notified in writing on
15 February 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.
Registrar
President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the statement of dissent of Mrs I. Berro-Lefèvre is annexed to this judgment.
B.M.Z.
S.Q.
STATEMENT OF DISSENT BY JUDGE
BERRO-LEFÈVRE
I am unable to follow the finding of the
majority that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its
substantive aspect as I consider that there was a lack of
appropriate care in the control and organisation of the arrest
operation.
[1] A bone which is part of the sternum, located at the bottom of the sternum, close to the abdomen.