FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF ÖZÇELİK v.
(Application no. 56497/00)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the
circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Özçelik v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
President,
Mr J. Casadevall,
Mr G. Bonello,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K. Traja,
Mr S. Pavlovschi,
Mrs P. Hirvelä,
judges,
and Mr T.L. Early,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 56497/00) against the
2. The applicant was
represented by Mr M.N. Özmen, a lawyer practising in
3. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in
1952 and lives in
5. On
6. On
7. The public prosecutor
referred the security directorate’s request to the
8. On
9. On
10. On the same day, the
single judge at the
11. On
12. On
13. On
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
14. A description of the
relevant domestic law at the material time can be found in Daş v. Turkey
(no. 74411/01, § 18,
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
15. The applicant complained
under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention that he had been unlawfully deprived
of his liberty as there had been no reasonable suspicion for his arrest. Article
5 § 1 (c) provides as follows:
“1. Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
...
(c) the
lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent
his committing an offence or fleeing after having
16. The Government did not
comment on this complaint.
17. The Court reiterates that having a
“reasonable suspicion” presupposes the existence of facts or information which
would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned might have
committed the offence (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 30 August 1990, Series A no. 182, p. 16, § 32). However, facts
which raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to
justify a conviction or even the bringing of a charge, which comes at a later
stage of the process of criminal investigation (Murray v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 28 October 1994, Series A no. 300-A, p. 27 § 55).
18. The Court observes that the applicant was arrested during the course of a police operation carried out against the PKK. According to the arrest protocol, which was signed by the applicant, a search warrant had been issued against him and the applicant had attempted to escape when the police officers asked him to show his identity card.
19. The
Court considers that the aforementioned elements are sufficient to support the
conclusion that there was “reasonable suspicion” for the applicant’s arrest. The
fact that the proceedings against him were subsequently suspended does not of itself call into question the existence of a reasonable suspicion within
the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c).
20. It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 §§
3 AND 4 OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicant complained
that he had been held in police custody for seven days without being brought
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power.
He further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no remedy
in domestic law to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in police custody.
The Court considers that the applicant’s
complaint under Article 13 should be examined from the standpoint of Article 5
§ 4 of the Convention. Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention read as follows:
“3. Everyone arrested or detained in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear
for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
A. Admissibility
22. The Government submitted
that the application should be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued that the
applicant had failed to invoke Article 5 of the Convention before the domestic
authorities and to challenge the decision to extend his custody period. The
Government further maintained that the applicant could have sought compensation
under Law no. 466 on the Payment of Compensation to Persons Unlawfully Arrested
or Detained.
23. The Court notes that it has already examined and rejected the Government’s preliminary objections in similar cases (see, for example, Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221/99, §§ 66-71, ECHR 2005‑... and Daş, cited above, § 18). The Court finds no particular circumstances in the instant case, which would require it to depart from this jurisprudence.
24. Consequently, the Court
rejects the Government’s preliminary objections.
25. The Court notes that the
application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3
of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 3
of the Convention
26. The Government argued
that the length of the applicant’s detention in police custody was in
conformity with the legislation in force at the material time. They further
maintained that the relevant domestic law had been amended in accordance with
the Court’s jurisprudence.
27. The applicant reiterated
his allegations.
28. The Court has already
accepted on a number of occasions that the investigation of terrorist offences
undoubtedly presents the authorities with special problems (see Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom,
judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B, pp. 33-34, § 61; Murray, cited
above, § 58; Demir and
Others v. Turkey, judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998-VI, p. 2653, § 41). This does not
mean, however, that the authorities have carte
blanche under Article 5 to arrest suspects and detain them in police
custody, free from effective control by the domestic courts and, in the final
instance, by the Convention’s supervisory institutions, whenever they consider
that there has been a terrorist offence (see, among others, Murray, cited above, § 58).
29. The Court notes that the
applicant was taken into police custody on
30. Even supposing that the
activities of which the applicant stood accused were linked to a terrorist
threat, the Court cannot accept that it was
necessary to detain him for six days without being brought before a judge.
31. There
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
2. The applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4
of the Convention
32. The Government contended
that Article 128 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, which was in force at the material time, provided an
effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of detention in police custody.
33. The applicant reiterated
his allegations.
34. The Court reiterates that
in several cases raising similar questions to those in the present case, it
rejected the Government’s aforementioned submission and found a violation of
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see, among
others, Öcalan, cited above, § 76
and, Sakık and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 26 November 1997, Reports 1997‑VII, § 54). The Court finds no particular circumstances in the instant case,
which would require it to depart from its findings in the aforementioned cases.
35. In conclusion, the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 2 OF THE CONVENTION
36. The applicant complained under
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that his right to the presumption of innocence
had been violated since, subsequent to his arrest, there had been news reports
in newspapers, on radio stations and on television channels, in which he had
been presented as a criminal.
37. The Government did not
comment on this complaint.
38. The Court observes that
the applicant did not submit any materials in support of his complaint. Nor did
he allege that the authorities had presented him to the media as a criminal. It
therefore considers that the applicant has failed to substantiate his complaint
under this head.
39. It follows that this part of the application
is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED
VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 14 AND 18 OF THE CONVENTION
40. The applicant complained
under Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 5 and 6 of the
Convention, that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his ethnic
origin. He further alleged under Article 18 of the Convention that the
respondent State had applied restrictions on the exercise of his rights in
violation of the Convention.
41. The Government did not
address these issues.
42. The Court notes that the
applicant has not substantiated his complaints under these provisions.
43. It follows that these complaints are
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION
44. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
45. The applicant claimed 3,000
euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
46. The Government contested
these claims.
47. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged. It therefore rejects this claim.
48. On the other hand, it
accepts that the applicant suffered non‑pecuniary damage such as distress
resulting from his detention for six days without the opportunity to challenge
its lawfulness, which cannot be sufficiently compensated by the finding of a
violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the
applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
49. The applicant also claimed
EUR 6,837 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
50. The Government submitted
that these claims were unsubstantiated. They argued that no documents had been
provided by the applicant to prove his claims.
51. According to the Court’s
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see Sawicka v. Poland, no. 37645/97, § 54, 1 October 2002). In the present
case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above
criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 for the
proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
52. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaints concerning
the failure of the authorities to bring the applicant promptly before a judge
and his inability to challenge the lawfulness of his detention admissible and
the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, the following amounts plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be
converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement:
(i) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five
hundred euros) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five
hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the
abovementioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on 20 February 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
T.L. Early Nicolas
Bratza
Registrar President