SECOND SECTION
CASE OF NEVRUZ KOÇ v.
(Application no.
18207/03)
JUDGMENT
This judgment will become final in the
circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Nevruz Koç v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mrs F.
Tulkens,
President,
Mr A.B.
Baka,
Mr I.
Cabral
Barreto,
Mr R.
Türmen,
Mr M.
Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A.
Mularoni,
Ms D.
Jočienė,
judges,
and Mrs S.
Dollé,
Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 18207/03) against the
2. The applicant, who had
been granted legal aid, was represented by Ms K. Doğru, a lawyer
practising in
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and that there had been no effective remedy in respect of his complaints. He relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention.
4. On
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CASE
5. The applicant was born in
1954 and lives in
6. On
7. On the same day, a deputy superintendent and H.Ö drew up a police report. It stated that the applicant had insulted H.Ö, and had pushed and head-butted him in the face, when he had intervened in the incident. It also noted that the applicant had continued to behave aggressively towards police officers at the station and had insulted them.
8. Furthermore, the police
took statements from three persons who had been at the scene of the incident.
They all confirmed that the applicant had got into an argument with the minibus
driver at the bus stop. H.Ö had been trying to calm everyone down, when the
applicant started swearing at him. H.Ö then tried to handcuff the applicant but
he pushed the officer away and head-butted him in the face. The doctor who
examined H.Ö on that day recommended that H.Ö be seen by a specialist at
9. On
10. On
11. On
12. On
13. On
14. On
15. On
16. On
17. On
18. On
19. On
20. On
21. On
22. On
23. In an indictment lodged
on
24. On
25. On
26. On
27. On
28. On
29. On
THE LAW
I. ADMISSIBILITY
30. The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him, within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection, they submitted that there were various kinds of civil, criminal and administrative remedies provided by domestic law in respect of persons claiming to be the victims of ill-treatment in police custody, and that the applicant could have sought reparation for the harm he had allegedly suffered.
31. The Court reiterates that
it has already examined and rejected the Government's preliminary objections in
similar cases (see, in particular, Karayiğit v.
Turkey
(dec.), no. 63181/00,
32. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
3 OF THE CONVENTION
33. The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
A. Submissions of the parties
1. The applicant
34. The applicant alleged that he had been blindfolded and severely beaten, punched, kicked and struck with truncheons and batons on the legs by police officers while he was in their custody. He maintained that officers had stamped on his feet and crushed them. He maintained that because of this and the blows to his left leg, he had been unable to walk for a considerable time. He referred to the findings of the medical reports in support of his allegations.
2. The Government
35. The Government contested these claims. They maintained that the applicant had been arrested because he had been extremely inebriated, cursing, shouting and behaving aggressively towards the people around him. They alleged that the applicant had also started swearing at the police officer who had prevented him from attacking an individual. The officer had tried to calm him down and told him that he had to accompany him to the police station. On their way to the police car, the applicant had taken the officer by the collar and pushed him roughly. In response, the officer had twisted the applicant's right arm backwards and handcuffed his right hand. While he was handcuffing the applicant's left hand, the applicant swore and butted the officer in the face. The officer had forced the applicant into the car with help of other people at the scene of the incident, and had taken him to the police station. The Government pointed out that, later that day, the police officer had been the subject of a medical report which noted injuries on and around his nose, rendering him unfit for work for four days. They added that the witness statements taken from the people at the scene confirmed their submissions (paragraph 8 above).
36. The Government accepted
the findings of the applicant's medical reports. They highlighted the fact that,
according to the medical report dated
37. The Government also drew
attention to the applicant's conduct at the police station. They recounted that
the symptoms had first appeared in the report of
38. They maintained that the
applicant should have informed the public prosecutor or the investigating judge
of the alleged ill-treatment because they were the first authorities he had
encountered after the custody period. However, he had failed to do so. Instead,
he had filed a petition with the Sarıyer public prosecutor's office on
39. Lastly, they submitted
that, in the same petition, the applicant had also mentioned that his left foot
had been disabled when the officers had hit and kicked him. However, anyone who
had experienced such serious injury would not have waited for ten days (until
B. The Court's assessment
40. The Court reiterates that where an individual is taken into custody in good health but is found to be injured by the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused and to produce evidence casting doubt on the victim's allegations, particularly if those allegations were corroborated by medical reports. Otherwise, a clear issue will arise under Article 3 of the Convention (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999‑V; Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑VI, p. 2278, § 62; Tomasi v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241-A, pp. 40‑41, §§ 108‑111; Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, p. 26, § 34).
41. In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt (see Avşar v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 282, ECHR 2001‑VII). Such proof may, however, follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp. 64‑65, § 161). Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000‑VII).
42. In the instant case, the
Court notes that the applicant was not medically examined at the beginning of
his detention before he was taken into police custody. After the end of his
police custody, on
43. The Court notes that the
information contained in the reports of 1 December and
44. The Court reiterates
that, in respect of a person deprived of liberty, recourse to physical force
which has not been made strictly necessary by the individual's own conduct
diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set
forth in Article 3 (see Ribitsch, cited above,
§ 38). However, the use of force in the context of
an arrest, even if it entails injury, may fall outside Article 3, particularly
in circumstances resulting from an applicant's own conduct (see Berliński v.
In this regard, the Court takes note of the applicant's reckless, drunken and aggressive behaviour on the day of the incident. It observes that he resisted the policeman during the arrest, injuring the officer, who was reported to be unfit for duty for four days. However, the applicant was not examined medically upon his arrest. In the Court's view, such an examination would have been the appropriate step for the authorities to have taken, especially as one of their agents, in the Government's submission, had to resort to force during the arrest. Such a report could also have provided clarification of the acts of third parties which might have contributed to the applicant's condition.
Furthermore, considering the gravity and nature
of the injuries (particularly the injury to the applicant's left foot which
required an operation and rendered him unfit for work for 15 days), the Court
does not deem it likely that they were self-inflicted. Therefore, the Court
attaches no weight to the findings of the first medical report of
45. In these circumstances, and in the absence of a plausible explanation by the Government, the Court considers that the symptoms noted in the prison doctor's report of 9 December 1997, confirmed by further medical reports, were the result of treatment for which the State bore responsibility.
46. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
47. The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his complaints of ill-treatment, and that the criminal proceedings against the police officers were later suspended by virtue of Law no. 4616 (the Law on conditional release, suspension of proceedings or execution of sentences). He relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.
48. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined solely from the standpoint of Article 13, which provides:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.
49. The Government contested
this claim. They submitted that, in the present case, the domestic authorities
had carried out an effective investigation into the applicant's allegation of
ill-treatment. The Sarıyer public prosecutor had immediately initiated a
preliminary investigation and had taken all necessary steps to shed light on the
matter. He had heard statements from the applicant, the accused persons and the
witnesses, and had examined the applicant's medical reports. Subsequently, he
had lodged an indictment with the Sarıyer Criminal Court, accusing five
policemen of having ill-treated the applicant, under Article 245 of the Criminal
Code. The Government maintained that the fact that the proceedings against these
officers had been suspended owing to the application of Law no. 4616 did not
suggest that the applicant had not had an effective remedy, as the domestic
court had conducted a through, adequate trial.
50. The Court reiterates that the nature of the right safeguarded by Article 3 has implications for Article 13. Where an individual has an arguable claim of having been subjected to serious ill-treatment by agents of the State, the notion of an effective remedy entails, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible, including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure (see Aksoy, cited above, § 98).
51. On the basis of the
evidence adduced in the present case, the Court has found that the respondent
State is responsible under Article 3 of the Convention for the ill-treatment
suffered by the applicant while in custody. The applicant's complaints in this
regard are therefore arguable for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention
in connection with Article 3 (see McGlinchey and Others v. the United
Kingdom, no. 50390/99, § 64, 29 April 2003; Yaşa v. Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998‑VI, § 112).
52. The Court notes that the
applicant complained of ill-treatment to the Sarıyer public prosecutor.
Initially, the public prosecutor filed an indictment against the accused police
officers with the
53. The Court reiterates that
the rights enshrined in the Convention are practical and effective, and not
theoretical and illusory. Therefore, investigations of the present kind must be
able to lead to the identification and punishment of those responsible. However,
the proceedings in
question did not produce any result due to the application of the Law no. 4616,
which created virtual impunity for the perpetrators of the acts of violence,
despite the evidence against them (see, mutatis mutandis, Batı and Others
v. Turkey,
nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 147, ECHR 2004‑IV; Abdülsamet Yaman
v. Turkey, no. 32446/96,
§ 59, 2 November 2004).
54. Consequently, the Court
considers that the criminal-law system, as applied in the applicant's case, has
proved to be far from rigorous and has had no dissuasive effect capable of
ensuring the effective prevention of unlawful acts such as those complained of
by the applicant (see, mutatis
mutandis, Okkalı v. Turkey, no. 52067/99, § 78, ECHR
2006‑...).
55. In the light of the foregoing, the Court does not consider that the
above proceedings can be described as thorough and effective so as to meet the
requirements of Article 13 of the Convention.
56. There has consequently
been a violation of this provision.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION
57. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention
or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
A. Damage
58. The applicant claimed
10,000 new Turkish liras (YTL), approximately 5,429 euros (EUR), in respect of
pecuniary damage and YTL 50,000 (EUR 27,146) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
59. The Government contested these claims. They contended that the applicant had failed to substantiate the former and that the latter was excessive and unacceptable.
60. The Court does not
discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage
alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, having regard to the
violations found and ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR
10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and
expenses
61. The applicant also claimed YTL 7,500 (EUR 4,086) for his representation costs. In support of his claim, he submitted the Istanbul Bar Association's recommended fees for 2006. He did not claim any other costs and expenses.
62. The Government contested that amount.
63. According to the Court's
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of costs and expenses only
in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily
incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being
had to the information in its possession and to the above criteria, the Court
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 for legal expenses, less
the sum of EUR 850 received in legal aid from the Council of Europe.
C. Default
interest
64. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application
admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of the settlement:
(i) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, less the EUR 850 (eight hundred and fifty euros) granted by way of legal aid;
(iii) any tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage
points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the
applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 June 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
S. Dollé
F. Tulkens
Registrar
President