FORMER SECOND SECTION
CASE OF KEMAL KAHRAMAN AND ALİ
KAHRAMAN v.
(Application no.
42104/02)
JUDGMENT
This judgment will become
final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Kemal
Kahraman and Ali Kahraman v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Former
Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa,
President,
Mr I.
Cabral Barreto,
Mr R.
Türmen,
Mr M.
Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A.
Mularoni,
Mrs E.
Fura-Sandström,
Mr D.
Popović,
judges,
and Mrs S.
Dollé,
Section
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 42104/02) against the
2. The applicants were
represented by Mr H. Tuna, Mr S. Kar, and Mr M.E.
Kaya, lawyers practising in
3. On
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CASE
4. The applicants were born
in 1967 and 1972 respectively. They are serving sentences in Eskişehir Prison,
5. On
6. On
7. On
8. On 18 and
9. On
10. On
11. On
12. At the second hearing on
13. On
14. On
15. On 2 November 2000 the Bandırma Criminal Court, acting under powers delegated to it by the Niğde Criminal Court, pursuant to Article 226 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, took statements from the applicants. According to the minutes of the Bandırma Criminal Court, the applicants were reminded of their rights in accordance with Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also included the right to a lawyer. The applicants stated that they were aware of their rights and would defend themselves.
16. The Niğde Criminal Court held six further hearings in the absence of the applicants.
17. On
18. On
19. On
20. On
21. On
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
§§ 1 and 3(c) OF THE CONVENTION
22. The applicants complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention of a breach of the principle of a fair trial as they had been unable to appear at the hearings before the Niğde Criminal Court, and that they had not had legal representation. Article 6 reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the
determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a
fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ...
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; ....”
A. Admissibility
23. The Government asked the Court to reject these complaints for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained that the applicants had not raised the substance of their complaints before the domestic courts at any stage. They further alleged that, in any case, the applicants should have applied to the Court within six months from the date on which the Bandırma Criminal Court took their statements on behalf of the Niğde Criminal Court.
24. The applicants stated that it was unrealistic to expect them to raise their complaints before the Niğde Criminal Court as they had never been presented before that court. They further maintained that they had put the substance of their complaints in their petitions to the Court of Cassation.
25. The Court observes that
the applicants had indeed raised the substance of their complaints in their
appeal petition to the Court of Cassation (paragraph 19 above), and had lodged
their application with the Court within six months of the Court of Cassation's
decision on
26. The Court notes that
these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35
§ 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any
other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
a) Failure to bring the applicants
before the trial court
27. The Government observed that the applicants had given their statements to the public prosecutor in the presence of a lawyer. Furthermore, they were reminded of their rights under Article 135 of the Code of Criminal Code by the Bandırma Criminal Court. However, the applicants had opted to defend themselves and had not requested a lawyer before the Bandırma Criminal Court, which had taken their statements under delegated powers, pursuant to Article 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They submitted that the applicants had thus enjoyed their rights of defence. They further alleged that the applicants' statements were not the only evidence on which the Niğde Criminal Court had based its finding.
28. The applicants disputed this argument.
29. The Court reiterates that the object and purpose of Article 6 of the Convention, taken as a whole, implies that a person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to take part in the hearing. Moreover, sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 3 guarantees to “everyone charged with a criminal offence” the right “to defend himself in person” and it is difficult to see how these rights could be exercised without the person concerned being present at the actual trial (see the Colozza v. Italy judgment of 12 February 1985, Series A no. 89, p. 14, § 27; Monnell and Morris v. the United Kingdom judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 115, p. 22, § 58).
30. The Court observes that in the instant case the applicants were not invited to attend the hearings before the Niğde Criminal Court which sentenced them to four years' imprisonment. In accordance with Article 226 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Bandırma Criminal Court had been asked to take evidence from them in their defence, under the powers delegated to it by the former (paragraph 15 above).
31. The Court finds that,
contrary to the Government's contention, the fact that the applicants raised no
objections when the Bandirma Criminal Court took their
statements does not signify that they implicitly waived their right to defend
themselves or to appear before the Niğde Criminal
Court, since the waiver of the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Convention
must be established in an unequivocal manner (see the Colozza judgment cited above,
p. 14, § 28, and Zana v. Turkey, judgment of 25 November 1997,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997‑VII, § 70).
32. Consequently, the Court considers that such an interference with the rights of the defence cannot be justified, regard being had to the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair hearing within the meaning of the Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
b) Lack of legal assistance during the trial
33. The Government noted that
the applicants had requested legal assistance during the proceedings before the
Niğde Criminal Court at the hearing on
34. The applicants maintained their allegation.
35. The Court reiterates that
the appointment of defence counsel in itself does not necessarily settle the
issue of compliance with the requirements of Article 6 § 3 (c). The Convention
is intended to guarantee not rights which are theoretical or illusory, but
rights which are practical and effective. Thus, mere nomination does not ensure
effective assistance since a lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes may be
prevented from performing, or shirk his or her duties. If they are notified of
the situation, the authorities must either replace or oblige the lawyer to
fulfil those duties (see the Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9 October
1979, Series A no. 32, pp. 12-13, § 24; Artico v. Italy, judgment of
Nevertheless, a State cannot be held
responsible for every shortcoming of a lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes.
It follows from the independence of the legal profession that the conduct of the
defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and his counsel, whether
counsel be appointed under a legal aid scheme or be privately financed. The
Court considers that the competent national authorities are required under
Article 6 § 3 (c) to intervene only if a failure by legal aid counsel to provide
effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention
in some other way (Kamasinski v. Austria, judgment of
36. Turning to the
circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that, upon the request of the
Niğde Criminal Court, the Niğde Bar Association appointed two lawyers on
37. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the proceedings before the Niğde Criminal Court did not comply with the requirement of fairness.
There has consequently been a breach of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3(c) of the Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
38. The applicants further alleged violations of Articles 10 and 14 of the Convention without specifying any reasons.
39. An examination by the Court of the material as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of these provisions. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly-ill founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
40. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention
or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
41. The applicants claimed a
total of 11,256 new Turkish liras (YTL), equivalent to 6,082 euros (EUR), in
respect of pecuniary damage. They also claimed non-pecuniary damage, but left
the assessment of the amount to the discretion of the
Court.
42. The Government contested
these claims as excessive.
43. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it accepts that the applicants must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage as a consequence of their absence from the trial and the lack of effective legal representation, which cannot be sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation. Ruling on equitable basis, it awards each of the applicants EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
44. Furthermore, the Court
considers that, where an individual, as in the instant case, has been convicted
by a court in proceedings which did not meet the Convention requirement of
fairness, a retrial or a reopening of the case, if requested, represents in
principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see Öcalan v. Turkey, no.
46221/99 [GC], § 210, in fine, ECHR 2005
- IV). In this connection, it notes that thhe domestic court has scheduled a
hearing for
B. Costs and
expenses
45. The applicants also
claimed EUR 5,000 for their costs and expenses.
46. The Government contested
the claim.
47. On the basis of the
material in its possession and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards
the applicants, jointly, EUR 1,000 in respect of cost and expenses, less the EUR
850 received in legal aid from the Council of Europe.
C. Default
interest
48. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the complaint concerning
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to
pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), each, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage and EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), jointly, in respect of costs and
expenses, less the EUR 850 (eight hundred and fifty euros) received in legal aid
from the Council of Europe, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted
into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable of the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the
abovementioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on
the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage
points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the
applicants' claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on
S. Dollé
J.-P. Costa
Registrar
President