THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF KARATAY AND OTHERS v.
(Application no. 11468/02)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Karatay
and Others v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič, President,
Mr J. Hedigan,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 11468/02) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Turkish nationals, Mr Fırat Karatay,
Fesih Karatay and Mr Şeyhmus Karatay (“the applicants”), on 16 January
2002.
2. The applicants were
represented by Mr A. Terece, a lawyer practising in İzmir. The Turkish
Government (“the Government”) did not designate an Agent for the purposes of
the proceedings before the Court.
3. The applicants complained under
Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the length and the lawfulness of their
detention on remand. They complained that during their detention they were
never brought before a judge, which deprived them of the possibility of
effectively arguing for their release pending trial.
4. On
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicants were born
in 1975, 1973 and 1949 respectively and live in Mardin.
6. On
7. On
1. The applicants' arrest and
detention
8. On
9. On 14 May 2001, considering the state of the evidence and the nature of the offence, the Bornova Criminal Court ordered the continuation of the third applicant's detention on remand in his absence and demanded his presence for the following hearing.
10. In a letter dated
11. At the hearings of
12. In a letter dated
13. On
14. At the same hearing the applicants' lawyer requested the court not to transfer the third applicant from one prison to another due to his health problems. Subsequently, the court sent a letter rogatory to the Kızıltepe Criminal Court of First Instance in order to take the third applicant's statements.
15. At the hearings of
16. On
17. At the hearing of
18. On
2. The
proceedings against the first and third applicants, before the
Karşıyaka Criminal Court of First Instance
19. The textile company filed another complaint with the office of the Izmir Public Prosecutor, in relation to the first and the third applicants, regarding the same incident.
20. On
21. On
22. At the hearing of 9
October 2002 the Karşıyaka Criminal Court of First Instance acquitted
the third applicant due to lack of evidence and found the first applicant
guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years and four months'
imprisonment. Both the applicants and their lawyers were informed of the second
case when the decision of
23. On
24. On
25. When the case was resumed
before the first instance court, the applicants' lawyer requested to join this
case with the one pending before the Bornova Criminal Court, as they concerned
the same subject matter. Furthermore, he requested the first applicant's
release pending trial. The Karşıyaka Criminal Court refused the
lawyer's request to release the applicant in view of the state of the evidence and the nature of the offence.
3. Joined cases before the Bornova Criminal Court of First Instance
26. On
27. At
the hearings held on 2 July, 27 July and 27 August 2004 the court ordered the
continuation of the first applicant's detention on remand on account of the state of evidence and the seriousness of the
charges, and taking into account the date of his arrest.
28. On
29. On
30. Following
the first applicant's appeal, the case is pending before the Court of
Cassation.
THE LAW
31. The applicants complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about the length and unlawfulness of their detention on remand. They complained, in particular, that they were deprived of any possibility of effectively arguing in support of their release, as they were not brought promptly before a judge.
32. The Court considers that
the wording “brought promptly” in Article 5 § 3 implies that the right to
be brought before an appropriate officer relates to the time when a person is
first deprived of his liberty under Article 5 § 1 (c). The obligation on
Contracting States under Article 5 § 3 is therefore limited to bringing the
detainee promptly before an appropriate officer at that initial stage, although
Article 5 § 4 of the Convention may in certain cases require that the person be
subsequently brought before a judge for the purpose of effectively contesting
the lawfulness of his detention when it lasts for a long time (Ječius v.
33. Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 reads as follows:
“3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
I. ADMISSIBILITY
34. The Government submitted that the application should be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Government argued that the applicants could have, pursuant to Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenged the length of their detention in police custody.
35. The Court notes that the remedy invoked by the Government concerns the detention in police custody, while the subject matter of the present application is the length and lawfulness of the applicants' detention on remand. It therefore rejects the Government's preliminary objection.
36. The Court further
concludes that the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
II. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
37. The applicants complained
that their detention pending trial exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement
of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
38. The Government contested
that argument.
39. The Court reiterates that
it falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure
that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not
exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must, paying due regard to the
principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts arguing for or
against the existence of a public interest justifying a departure from the rule
in Article 5 of the Convention, and must set them out in their decisions on the
applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given
in these decisions and of the well-documented facts stated by the applicant in
his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has
been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (see Muller v. France, judgment of 17 March
1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1997‑II, p. 388, § 35).
40. The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also be satisfied that the national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (ibid.).
41. In the instant case, the
Court notes that the applicants were placed in detention on remand on
42. The Bornova Criminal Court considered the applicants' continued detention at the end of each hearing, either of its own motion or at the request of the applicants' lawyer. However, the Court notes from the material in the case file that the Bornova Criminal Court ordered the applicants' continued detention pending trial using identical, stereotyped terms, such as “having regard to the nature of the offence and the state of the evidence”. Although, in general, the expression “the state of the evidence” may be a relevant factor for the existence and persistence of serious indications of guilt, in the present case it nevertheless, alone, cannot justify the length of the detention of which the applicant complains (see Letellier v. France, judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A no. 207; Tomasi v. France, judgment of 27 August 1992, Series A no. 241‑A; Mansur v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319‑B, § 55, and Demirel v. Turkey, no. 39324/98, § 59, 28 January 2003).
43. In the light of these considerations, the Court finds that the length of the applicants' detention pending trial violated Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION
44. The applicants argued that the review proceedings were not truly adversarial. They maintained that as they were not brought before the court which ordered their continued detention on remand and they had not been given any access to the investigation files, they could not properly question the lawfulness of their continued detention on remand.
45. The Government did not submit any observations on the merits of this complaint.
46. In the Court's view, the
applicants' complaint under this heading concerns their detention which lasted
until
47. The Court recalls that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention entitles
arrested or detained persons to take proceedings bearing upon the procedural
and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in
Convention terms, of their deprivation of liberty (Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 29 November 1988,
Series A no. 145‑B, pp. 34‑35, § 65).
The domestic court dealing with such matters must provide the “guarantees of a
judicial procedure”. The proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure
equality of arms between the parties - the prosecutor and the detainee (Grauzinis v. Lithuania, no. 37975/97,
§ 31,
48. These requirements are derived from the right to an adversarial trial as laid down in Article 6 of the Convention, which means, in a criminal case, that both the prosecution and the defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party. According to the Court's case-law, it follows from the wording of Article 6 – and particularly from the autonomous meaning to be given to the notion of “criminal charge” – that this provision has some application to pre-trial proceedings (see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, p. 13, § 36). It thus follows that, in view of the dramatic impact of deprivation of liberty on the fundamental rights of the person concerned, proceedings conducted under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention should in principle also meet, to the largest extent possible under the circumstances of an ongoing investigation, the basic requirements of a fair trial, such as the right to an adversarial procedure. While national law may satisfy this requirement in various ways, whatever method is chosen should ensure that the other party is aware that observations have been filed and is given an opportunity to comment thereon (see, mutatis mutandis, Brandstetter v. Austria, judgment of 28 August 1991, Series A no. 211, pp. 27‑28, § 67).
49. In the instant case, the Bornova Criminal Court had jurisdiction to examine the applicants' case. However, following their arrest the applicants were brought before the Kızıltepe Criminal Court which subsequently ordered their detention on remand. The Court observes that, until they were released pending trial, this was the only occasion that the applicants were brought before a judicial authority. Yet, even on that occasion the Kızıltepe Criminal Court merely informed the applicants of the charges against them and noted their personal data (paragraph 8 above).
50. The Court notes that the Bornova Criminal Court ordered the prolongation of their detention in the applicants' absence, by examining the case file which did not contain their statements. It further notes that the Government did not explain why the applicants were not transported from the Kızıltepe Prison to the court house where the proceedings were pending.
51. The Court observes that even
at the hearing of
52. In view of the above, the
Court concludes that the applicants were not given the guarantees appropriate
to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question. Accordingly there has been a
breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
53. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
54. The applicants maintained
that their arrest and detention had a negative effect on their business. Thus, the
first applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage,
while the second and third applicants claimed EUR 10,000. Furthermore they
claimed EUR 10,000, EUR 15,000 and EUR 20,000 respectively, for
non-pecuniary damage.
55. The Government contended
that the claim for pecuniary damages was unsubstantiated. Moreover, they
claimed that the applicants' claim for non-pecuniary damage were excessive.
They submitted that, if the Court were to find a violation, the judgment would
in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the purposes of Article
41.
56. The Court considers that
the applicants' claim for pecuniary damages is not substantiated; it therefore
rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the first applicant EUR 2,000
and the second and third applicants each EUR 1,500 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
B. Costs and expenses
57. The applicants also
claimed EUR 7,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities
and the Court. In support of their claim, the applicants submitted the Istanbul
Bar Association's recommended minimum fees list for 2006. However, they did not
submit any receipt or invoice.
58. The Government disputed
the applicants' claim.
59. According to the Court's
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and was reasonable as to quantum. In the present case,
regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria,
the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants, jointly, the global sum
of EUR 1,500 covering costs under all heads.
C. Default interest
60. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application
admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the
Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the
Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following sums, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) to the first applicant for non‑pecuniary damage,
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five
hundred euros) each to the second and third applicants for non-pecuniary
damage,
(iii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five
hundred euros) jointly for costs and expenses,
(iv) plus
any tax that may be chargeable;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in
writing on
Registrar President