THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF HACI ÖZEN v.
(Application no. 46286/99)
JUDGMENT
This judgment will become final in the
circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Hacı Özen v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič, President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson,
Mrs I. Berro-Lefèvre,
judges,
and Mr S. Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an
application (no. 46286/99) against the
2. The applicant, who was
granted legal aid, was represented by Mr M. Batı, a lawyer
practising in
3. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Şırnak.
A. The arrest and detention of the applicant in the custody of the gendarmerie
5. The facts surrounding the arrest and detention of the applicant are disputed between the parties.
1. Facts as presented by the applicant
6. On an unspecified date, the
applicant was contacted by two persons in the centre of Şırnak who
asked him either to give them money or to help them. They did not specify what
they wished the applicant to do. The applicant refused their request. On
7. During
his detention in the custody of the gendarmerie the applicant was subjected to
ill-treatment. In particular he was stripped
naked and beaten. He was also
deprived of food and water and was prevented from going to the toilet. The
applicant was kept in a small and dark cell, threatened with death and
insulted. Furthermore, the gendarmerie officers attempted to rape him.
8. In
the evening of
9. On
10. On
11. On 23 June 1998 the
gendarmerie officers drafted a document allegedly containing the applicant's
statements, according to which the applicant admitted to have willingly acted as a courier for the PKK and have fallen
and sustained other injuries while trying to escape from the gendarmerie
officers on 15 June 1998, the day of his arrest. The applicant was forced to
apply his thumbprint to this document.
12. On
13. On
the same day the applicant was brought before the Şırnak public prosecutor.
He denied the accusations against him. The statements that he had allegedly
made at the gendarmerie command were read to him. The applicant denied that he
had made these statements and maintained that he had been forced to sign them.
He claimed that he had been threatened with death by two men unless he
delivered a bag to some people whose identity was not known to him.
14. After being questioned by
the public prosecutor he was brought before the Şırnak Magistrates'
Court (Sulh Ceza Mahkemesi), where he
denied the charges against him. He further pleaded not guilty and reiterated
his statement that he had made before the Chief Public Prosecutor. The
Şırnak Magistrates' Court ordered the applicant's detention on
remand. The court also took note of the applicant's
allegation that he was threatened with death and decided to refer his complaint
to the public prosecutor's office.
15. On
16. On
2. Facts as presented by the Government
17. On
18. According
to the arrest report signed by four gendarmerie officers, on 15 June 1998,
at around 8.30 a.m., following information received by the gendarmerie officers
the applicant was captured in a rural area while carrying a bag containing
clothes that he was taking to members of the PKK. The applicant was told twice
to stop by the officers but he tried to escape. While running, he fell, hit his head and sustained injuries to various parts of his body.
19. On
the same day, three officers further drafted a scene of the incident report.
According to this report, the applicant was captured at around
20. Following
his arrest, the applicant was examined by a doctor (see paragraph 10
above) and, subsequently, taken to the Şırnak gendarmerie command
where he made statements admitting that he had aided the members of the PKK. The
applicant was kept in custody until
B. Criminal proceedings against the applicant
21. On
22. The first hearing, held before the
23. On
It has been decided that the representative of the accused be
authorised to lodge a complaint with the public prosecutor's office where the
act took place and that the copy of the hearing minutes be provided if needed.
24. On
the same day, the first-instance court decided to request the Şırnak
25. At
the beginning of the hearing of
26. On the same day, the applicant made statements before the court with the assistance of the interpreter. He maintained, inter alia, that he was at his farm on the day of his arrest when two persons arrived and asked him to give them money. When he refused their request, they beat him. Subsequently, they tied his hands and covered his mouth and took him to a place, where there were supplies. They then asked him to accept that the supplies belonged to him but he refused. The applicant further denied the accuracy of the arrest and scene of the incident reports. The first-instance court decided to postpone the hearing as the statements of the gendarmerie officers had not been taken. It further ordered the applicant's release pending trial.
27. On
28. On
29. On
an unspecified date, the statements of the two officers were sent to the
30. On
31. At the hearing held on
32. At
the hearing held on
33. On
an unspecified date the applicant made statements before the Şırnak
34. At
the hearing of
35. On
the same day, the
36. The
military judge sitting on the bench of the
37. On
38. On
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND
PRACTICE
39. The relevant domestic law
and practice in force at the material time are outlined in the following
judgments: Batı and
Others v. Turkey
(nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, §§ 95-100, ECHR 2004-... (extracts)); Özel v. Turkey
(no. 42739/98, §§ 20-21,
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
40. The applicant complained under Articles 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in detention in the Şırnak provincial gendarmerie command. Article 3 reads as follows:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
A. Admissibility
41. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
42. The applicant submitted
that he had been ill-treated during his arrest on
43. The Government contended
that the applicant had been taken into custody on
2. The Court's assessment
a. General principles
44. The
Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention ranks as one of the most
fundamental provisions in the Convention, from which no derogation is
permitted. It also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic
societies making up the Council of Europe. The object and purpose of the
Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human rights
requires that these provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its
safeguards practical and effective (see Avşar
v. Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 390, ECHR 2001-VII (extracts)).
Where allegations are made under Article 3 of the
Convention, the Court must conduct a particularly thorough scrutiny (see Ülkü Ekinci v.
Turkey, no.
27602/95, § 135,
45. The Court further reiterates that, where an individual is taken into custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused and to produce evidence casting doubt on the veracity of the victim's allegations, particularly if those allegations are backed up by medical reports. Failing this, a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see Çolak and Filizer v. Turkey, nos. 32578/96 and 32579/96, § 30, 8 January 2004; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 87, ECHR 1999-V; Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2278, § 61; and Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, p. 26, § 34).
46. In assessing evidence,
the Court has adopted the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt (see Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 264,
47. Furthermore, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100, ECHR 2000-VII).
b. The establishment of the facts
48. Since the facts surrounding the arrest and detention of the applicant are in dispute between the parties, the Court considers it appropriate to establish the facts by making its own assessment in the light of all the material before it, before examining the merits of the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment.
49. In this connection, the Court observes that the Government claimed that the applicant had been taken into custody on 15 June 1998 and that therefore the marks noted in the medical report of 15 June 1998 had existed prior to his arrest. The applicant alleged that he had been arrested on 11 June 1998 and that he had been ill-treated during his arrest and his detention period.
50. The Court notes, at the outset, that the Şırnak public prosecutor initiated an investigation into the abduction of the applicant and, subsequently, issued a decision of non-prosecution, holding that the applicant had not been kidnapped, but arrested by the gendarmerie on 15 June 1998 (see paragraph 16 above). In this regard, the Court finds it peculiar that the public prosecutor did not attempt to conduct further enquiries concerning the applicant's whereabouts between 11 and 15 June 1998. Moreover, he based his decision on the arrest report drawn up by the gendarmerie officers without having questioned its accuracy although there were other elements in the investigation file which cast doubt on its credibility.
51. In this connection, the Court observes that the applicant's son, Mehmet Özen, applied to the Şırnak Security Directorate and informed the latter that his father had been seen by one of their neighbours while being abducted by a group of armed men on 11 June 1998 (see paragraph 8 above).
52. Furthermore, on 13 June 1998 the applicant's neighbour who had allegedly witnessed the applicant's arrest stated before the police that the applicant had been taken by an armed group of six or seven persons (see paragraph 9 above).
53. Moreover, the arrest and the scene of the incident reports are also contradictory. While the time of the arrest was mentioned as 8.30 a.m. in the arrest report, the scene of the incident report referred to the time of arrest as 4 a.m. Besides, the findings of the medical report of 15 June 1998 do not appear to be wholly consistent with the content of the arrest report drafted by the gendarmerie. According to the latter, the applicant had sustained injuries to his head whereas the medical report does not refer to any mark on the applicant's head. In this connection, the Court emphasises that the arrest and scene of the incident reports did not bear the signature of the applicant.
54. The Court recalls its
earlier findings and those of the Commission concerning the inadequacy and
unreliability of the custody records of the gendarmerie in south-east Turkey in
the nineties (see Çakıcı v. Turkey
[GC], no. 23657/94, § 105, ECHR 1999‑IV; Timurtaş
v. Turkey, no. 23531/94, § 105, ECHR 2000-VI; Çiçek v.
55. Having regard to the Court's findings in these judgments and to the material before the Court, the Court considers that the facts that the public prosecutor decided to discontinue the investigation into the applicant's alleged abduction and that the official reports concerning the applicant's arrest are dated 15 June 1998 do not prove that the applicant was not taken into custody before this date. On the contrary, in the light of the aforementioned elements (see paragraphs 50-53), the Court finds it established that the applicant was arrested on 11 June 1998 by officers from the Şırnak gendarmerie command and kept in custody until 15 June 1998 without his detention being officially recorded. The Court thus accepts that the applicant sustained the injuries noted in the medical report of 15 June 1998 between 11 and 15 June 1998 while in the State authorities' control.
c. Application of the general principles in the
circumstances of the present case
56. The Court observes that
the applicant was not examined medically at the beginning of his detention on
11 June 1998 and did not have access to a lawyer or doctor of his choice while
in custody. On 15 and 24 June 1998 he underwent two medical examinations which
resulted in two medical reports. Both reports
referred to bruises and lesions on various parts of the applicant's body (see
paragraphs 10 and 12 above) which were consistent with the applicant's
allegations of ill-treatment. In this connection, the Court observes that the
Government have not provided a plausible explanation for the marks and injuries
identified on the applicant's body.
57. In the light of the above and in the absence of a plausible explanation by the Government, the Court concludes that the injuries noted in the medical reports were the result of inhuman treatment for which the Government bore responsibility.
58. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
59. The applicant alleged that he was denied an effective domestic remedy in respect of his complaint of ill-treatment, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention which provides:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.
A. Admissibility
60. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
61. The applicant contended
that he had raised his allegation of ill‑treatment before the public
prosecutor and the Magistrates' Court on 24 June 1998 as well as the
62. The Government contended
that the applicant's lawyer raised the allegation of ill-treatment only before
the
2. The Court's assessment
63. The Court reiterates that
the nature of the right safeguarded under Article 3 has implications for Article 13.
Where an individual has an arguable claim that she or he has been subjected to
ill-treatment by agents of the State, the notion of an effective remedy
entails, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a
thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification
and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the
complainant to the investigatory procedure (see Çelik and
İmret v.
64. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (see Yaşa v. Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2439-40, §§ 102-04; Çakıcı, cited above, §§ 80, 87 and 106; and Çelik and İmret, cited above, § 55). It must be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation. However, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.
65. On the basis of the
evidence adduced in the present case, the Court has found that the respondent
State is responsible under Article 3 of the Convention for the ill-treatment suffered by the
applicant in the custody of the gendarmerie. The applicant's complaint in this
regard is therefore arguable for the purposes of Article 13 in connection
with Article 3
of the Convention (see McGlinchey and Others
v. the United Kingdom, no. 50390/99, § 64, ECHR 2003‑V, Çelik and İmret, cited above, § 56).
66. The Court notes that the
applicant complained before the Şırnak public prosecutor, the Şırnak
Magistrates' Court and the
67. The Court therefore concludes that the applicant was denied an effective remedy in respect of his ill-treatment, and was thereby denied access to any other available remedies at his disposal, including a claim for compensation.
68. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
69. The applicant alleged under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that he had been arrested on 11 June 1998 and kept in the custody of the gendarmerie until 24 June 1998 without being brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention reads as follows:
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
A. Admissibility
70. The Government submitted that this complaint should be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The Government maintained that the length of the applicant's detention in police custody was in conformity with the legislation in force at the material time as the statutory limit for the period that suspects could be held in custody was ten days whereas the applicant was detained nine days. Nevertheless, he could have challenged the lawfulness and length of his detention in custody pursuant to Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
71. The Court notes at the
outset that it has already examined and rejected the Government's similar
objections in cases where the applicants' custody periods were in conformity
with the domestic legislation, holding that the remedy which exists in theory
provided under Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not an
effective one in practice within the meaning of Article 35 of the Convention (see,
for example, Öcalan, cited above, §§
66-71; Maçin v.
72. Nonetheless, the Court has already established that the applicant was deprived of his liberty on 11 June 1998 and kept in custody until 15 June 1998 without his detention being registered (see paragraph 55 above).
73. The Court observes in this connection that the applicant maintained before the judicial authorities that he had been arbitrarily deprived of his liberty for four days. However, not only was his allegation not investigated, but also the Şırnak public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute in respect of the allegations of abduction (see paragraph 17 above).
74. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that where the unacknowledged detention of a person by the security forces is allowed, that person has a real possibility to challenge the lawfulness or the length of the detention in question.
75. The Court therefore rejects the Government's objection.
76. The Government further maintained, in relation to the complaint under Article 5, that the applicant's custody period had ended on 24 June 1998, whereas he had submitted his application form to the Court on 23 January 1999, thus, failing to comply with the six-month's rule.
77. The applicant submitted, in reply, that he had sent his first letter to the Court on 22 December 1998 and had, therefore, complied with the six-month's rule.
78. The Court recalls that
the running of the six-month period is interrupted by the first letter from an applicant summarily
setting out the object of the application, unless the letter is followed by a
long delay before the application is completed (see Buscarini and Others v. San Marino [GC],
no. 24645/94, § 23, ECHR 1999-I, and Çelik
v. Turkey (dec.), no. 41993/98, 6 May 2003). The Court observes that the first letter setting out
the substance of the applicant's complaints was dated 22 December 1998 and was
sent to the Court by fax on the same day. The Registry of the Court was
informed in that letter that the formal application would be submitted shortly.
The application form was subsequently submitted on 11 February 1999,
i.e. one month and twenty days after the first letter. The Court therefore finds that
the application was introduced on 22 December 1998, and therefore in time.
79. Consequently, this part of the application cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or for non-compliance with the six-month rule.
80. The Court notes that this
part of the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
81. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that he had been kept in police custody for thirteen days without being brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power.
82. The Government submitted that the applicant's custody period was in absolute conformity with the domestic legislation in force at the time.
83. The Court reiterates that Article 5 in general aims to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with the right to liberty. Article 5 § 3 is intended to secure the rule of law by requiring the judicial control of the interference by the executive (see Sakık and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 26 November 1997, Reports 1997- VII, p. 2623, § 44).
84. The Court has already
noted that the applicant's detention in police custody lasted thirteen
days. It recalls that in the case of Brogan and Others v. the United
Kingdom, (judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B) it held that
detention in police custody which had lasted four days and six hours without
judicial control fell outside the strict time constraints of Article 5 § 3
of the Convention, even though its purpose was to protect the community as
a whole against terrorism (see, also, Keklik and Others v.
85. In the light of the principles enunciated in the Brogan case, the Court cannot accept that it was necessary to detain the applicant for thirteen days without judicial intervention.
86. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
87. The applicant complained
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had
been denied a fair hearing on account of the presence of a military judge on
the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, which tried him. He
further alleged under Article 6 §§ 1
and 3 (c) of the Convention that he had been deprived
of his right to legal assistance while in custody and that
the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court was based on his
statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment. The relevant parts of Article 6 of the Convention
provide as follows:
1. In the determination of ...any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal
offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means
to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require;
...
A. Admissibility
88. The Court notes that this
part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1.
89. The Government maintained that, by Law no. 4388 of 18 June 1999, amendments were made to remove military judges from the bench of the State Security Courts with a view to complying with the requirements of the Convention. In this connection they pointed out that, in the present case, the military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court had already been replaced by a civilian judge before the applicant's lawyer had put forward his submissions on the merits of the case and that the applicant was therefore convicted by a State Security Court which was composed of three civilian judges.
90. The applicant repeated
his initial submissions.
91. The Court has
consistently held that certain aspects of the status of military judges sitting
as members of the State Security Courts rendered their independence from the
executive questionable (see Incal v. Turkey,
judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports,
1998-IV, § 68, and Çiraklar v. Turkey,
judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VII,
§ 39). The Court also found in Öcalan
v. Turkey (cited above,
§§ 114-115) that, when a military judge participated in one or more
interlocutory decisions that continued to remain in effect in the criminal
proceedings concerned, the military judge's replacement by a civilian judge in
the course of those proceedings before the verdict was delivered failed to
dissipate the applicant's reasonably held concern about that trial court's
independence and impartiality, unless it was established that the procedure
subsequently followed in the state security court sufficiently allayed that
concern.
92. In the instant case, the
Court notes that before his replacement in June 1999, the military judge was
present at one preliminary hearing and six hearings on the merits. During these
hearings, the first-instance court heard the applicant, received one of the
gendarmerie officers' statements concerning the applicant's arrest and took a
number of procedural decisions. At one of these hearings, on 21 December 1998,
the applicant's lawyer maintained that the applicant had been subjected to
ill-treatment while in custody and requested the court to inform the public prosecutor's
office of the applicant's allegation of ill‑treatment. The first-instance
court, however, neither heard the applicant nor made any decision as to the
admissibility of the applicant's statements taken by the gendarmerie allegedly
obtained as a result of ill-treatment. It simply decided to authorise the
applicant to lodge a complaint with the public prosecutor's office. After the
replacement of the military judge with a civilian judge, the
93. In these circumstances, the Court cannot accept that the replacement of the military judge before the end of the proceedings disposed of the applicant's reasonably held concern about the trial court's independence and impartiality (see Öcalan, cited above, § 118; a contrario, Ceylan v. Turkey, (dec.), no. 68953/01, 30 August 2005; and Kabasakal and Atar v. Turkey, no. 70084/01 and 70085/01, § 34, 19 September 2006).
94. There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on this point.
2. Fairness
of the proceedings
95. The Government submitted that the applicant had not been subjected
to ill-treatment while in custody and that, therefore, his statements could not
be considered as having been taken under duress. They further contended that
the trial court had also taken other evidence into consideration in
establishing the applicant's guilt. The Government finally maintained that the
applicant could have requested to have access to his lawyer after the
prolongation of his custody period by the judge - that is to say after the
seventh day of his detention.
96. The applicant repeated his initial submissions.
97. The Court notes at the outset that it has already held in previous cases that a court whose lack of independence and impartiality has been established cannot in any circumstances guarantee a fair trial to the persons under its jurisdiction and that, accordingly, it is not necessary to examine complaints regarding the fairness of the proceedings before that court (see, among other authorities, Çiraklar, cited above, §§ 44-45).
98. Having regard,
nonetheless, to the particular circumstances of the case and, in particular, to
the fact that the main evidence which led the court to convict the applicant
was disputed by the latter, as well as to the conclusion it has reached under
Article 3 of the Convention, the Court considers in the instant case that
it must proceed with its assessment of the applicant's complaint that his trial
was unfair for reasons unrelated to the question of the status of members of
the state security courts. Only in this way will it be able to examine the
substance of the applicant's main allegation that the charges against him could
not have been found to have been made out if he had had a fair trial (see Hulki Güneş v. Turkey, no. 28490/95, § 85, ECHR 2003‑VII
(extracts), and Göçmen v. Turkey,
no. 72000/01, § 68, 17 October 2006).
99. The Court reiterates that its duty, according to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting States to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. While Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is primarily a matter for regulation under national law (see Schenk v. Switzerland, judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, §§ 45-46).
100. It is therefore not the
role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular
types of evidence for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of
domestic law may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty
or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a
whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This
involves an examination of the unlawfulness in question and, where violation
of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found
(see, among others, Khan v. the United
Kingdom, no. 35394/97, § 34, and Jalloh v.
101. In this connection, as regards the nature of the Convention violation found, the Court recalls that it has already held that the use of evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 in criminal proceedings infringed the fairness of such proceedings even if the admission of such evidence was not decisive in securing the conviction (see Jalloh, cited above, § 99; Söylemez v. Turkey, no. 46661/99, § 23, 21 September 2006; and, mutatis mutandis, Örs and Others v. Turkey, no. 46213/99, § 60, 20 June 2006).
102. In the present case, the Court notes at the outset that it has
already found that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment in breach
of Article 3 of the Convention while he was in the custody of the gendarmerie (see
paragraph 58 above). Furthermore, it is not disputed between the parties that
the applicant did not receive any legal assistance during his custody period
and that he had made statements before the gendarmerie in the absence of his
lawyer. The Court further observes that the applicant denied the accuracy
of those statements, alleging that he had been subjected to ill-treatment,
before the public prosecutor and the Magistrates' Court on 24 June 1998 as well
as throughout the proceedings before the
103. In this connection, the Court observes that Turkish legislation does not appear to attach to confessions obtained during questioning but denied in court any consequences that are decisive for the prospects of the defence (see Hulki Güneş, cited above, § 91, and Dikme v. Turkey, no. 20869/92, § 111, ECHR 2000-VIII). However, not only did the Diyarbakır State Security Court not determine the admissibility of the applicant's statements made in the custody of the gendarmerie before going on to examine the merits of the case, but also used these statements as the main evidence in its judgment convicting the applicant, despite his denial of their accuracy.
104. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the use of the applicant's statements obtained during his custody period in the absence of his lawyer in the criminal proceedings brought against him rendered his trial as a whole unfair.
105. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION
106. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of
the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
A. Damage
107. The applicant claimed 50,000
euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage and EUR 100,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
108. The Government contested
these claims
109. As regards the alleged
pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant, the Court notes that this claim has not been substantiated by any evidence whatsoever. It therefore
makes no award under this head.
110. The Court notes that it has found a violation of Articles 3, 5 § 3, 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and 13 of the Convention. Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, and deciding on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 15,000.
111. Nevertheless, the Court
considers that where an individual, as in the instant case, has been convicted
by a court which did not meet the Convention requirements of independence and
impartiality, a retrial or a reopening of the case, if requested, represents,
in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see Öcalan,
cited above, § 210).
B. Costs and expenses
112. The applicant also
claimed EUR 1,800 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
113. The Government submitted that the claim was excessive and unsubstantiated. They argued
that no receipt or any other document had been produced by the applicant to
prove his claim.
114. According to the Court's
case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of his costs and expenses
only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and
necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award
the sum claimed in full, less the sum of EUR 685 received in legal aid from the
Council of Europe, under this head.
C. Default interest
115. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the remainder of the application admissible;
2. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of
Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3
of the Convention;
5. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention in that the applicant was not tried
by an independent and impartial tribunal;
6. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article
6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in that the applicant did not have a fair
trial;
7. Holds
(a) by
six votes to one that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within
three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 15,000 (fifteen
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be
chargeable, to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable at
the date of settlement;
(b) unanimously that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, less EUR 685 (six hundred and eighty-five euros) granted by way of legal aid, plus any tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into new Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(c)
unanimously that from the expiry of the abovementioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
8. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicant's claim for
just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on 12 April 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the
Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following partly dissenting
opinion of Mr R. Türmen is annexed to this judgment.
B.M.Z.
S.Q.
PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE TÜRMEN
1. To my regret, I am unable to agree with the majority of the Court that the applicant was arrested on 11 June 1998 by officers from the Şırnak gendarmerie command and kept in custody until 15 June 1998 without his detention being officially recorded and that he was subjected to inhuman treatment during this period, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
2. In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt (see, for example, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656/94, § 264, 18 June 2002). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, for example, Ülkü Ekinci v. Turkey, no. 27602/95, § 142, 16 July 2002).
3. It appears from the facts of the case that on the day of the applicant's abduction, his son filed a petition with the national authorities, maintaining that the applicant had been kidnapped by six or seven persons and that a neighbour, Ö.K., had witnessed the abduction. Furthermore, on 13 June 1998 Ö.K. testified before the police that he had seen the applicant being taken away by seven men who were carrying rifles. He also stated that the applicant's hands had been tied and that he had been beaten by these men. It also appears that according to the medical report dated 15 June 1998, the applicant bore signs of ill-treatment on his body after his release from his kidnappers.
4. However, unlike the majority, I am unable to conclude that the applicant has laid the basis of a prima facie case that the armed persons who kidnapped him on 11 June 1998 were State officials or that State officials were implicated in the abduction. I therefore consider that the actual circumstances remain a matter for speculation and assumption. I am of the opinion that there is insufficient evidence on which to conclude that the applicant was, beyond reasonable doubt, taken into the custody of the gendarmerie and that the injuries noted in the medical report of 15 June 1998 were the result of inhuman treatment for which the Government bore responsibility.
5. In the light of the above, I conclude that there has not been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
6. Having regard to my conclusion in point 5 and to the Court's finding of a violation of the applicant's right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, I am also of the opinion that it was not necessary to examine the applicant's complaint under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention (see, for example, İncal v. Turkey, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, § 74).
7. Finally, as I consider that
there has not been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, I find the sum
awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damage excessive.