SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF EZEL TOSUN v.
(Application no. 33379/02)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Ezel Tosun v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Second
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr J.-P.
Costa, President,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr M. Ugrekhelidze,
Mrs A. Mularoni,
Mrs E. Fura-Sandström,
judges,
and Mr S. Naismith,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 33379/02) against the
2. The applicant was represented by Mr Tüfek, Mr Ahmetoğlu and
Ms Ünal, lawyers practising in
3. On
THE FACTS
4. The applicant lives in
5. In 1973 the authorities
conducted a land registry survey in Mudanya and
revised the local plans. Following this revision, 25 plots belonging to the
applicant were registered in the Land
6. On
7. In 1982 the case was
transferred to the
8. On
9. On
10. The proceedings are still
pending before the
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
11. The applicant complained
that the length of the proceedings was incompatible with the “reasonable time”
requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time
by [a] ... tribunal...”
12. The Government argued
that the case was complex.
13. The period to be taken
into consideration began on
14. The Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis only permits it to
consider the period of 18 years that has elapsed after
A. Admissibility
15. The Government first submitted
that the application was outside the Court’s competence ratione temporis.
16. The Court notes that it
has already dismissed such an objection in its Şahiner judgment (cited
above, § 21). It finds no particular circumstances in the instant case which
would require it to depart from that finding. Accordingly, the Court rejects
this objection by the Government.
17. The Government further asked
the Court to dismiss the application for failure to exhaust domestic remedies,
under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They maintained that the applicant should
have complained to the national authorities prior to her application to the
Court. They stated that at no stage of the domestic proceedings did the
applicant question their length.
18. The Court reiterates that the
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that an applicant make
normal use of effective and sufficient remedies that are capable of remedying
the situation at issue and affording redress for the breaches alleged (see Karassev v. Finland (dec.), no.31414/96,
ECHR 1999-II.)
19. The Court observes that
the Turkish legal system does not provide any remedies to accelerate
proceedings. Nor does it award any compensation for delays in the proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that there was no appropriate, effective
remedy which the applicant should have exercised for the purposes of Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention (see Hartman v. the
20. The Court further
considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning
of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible
on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
21. The Court reiterates that
the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light
of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria:
the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant
authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among
many other authorities, Frydlender v.
France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
22. The Court has frequently
found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues
similar to the one in the present application (see for example Frydlender, cited above).
23. In the present case, the
proceedings have been pending before the national courts since 1974; i.e. for
more than thirty one years. During this time, the domestic courts have
delivered only two decisions. Having examined all the material submitted to it,
the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or
argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers
that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed
to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
24. There has accordingly
been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
25. The applicant further
complained that the length of the proceedings had infringed her right to the
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1.
26. The Government argued that the applicant did not have the status of a victim in respect of her complaint. They maintained that, as the proceedings were still pending before the domestic court, it was not established whether or not the applicant was the owner of the disputed land.
27. The Court notes that this
complaint is closely linked to the one examined above and must therefore
likewise be declared admissible.
28. However, having regard to
its finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph 24 above), the
Court does not consider it necessary to examine the merits of this complaint
separately (see Zanghì v. Italy,
judgment of 19 February 1991, Series A no. 194-C, p. 47, § 23).
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE
CONVENTION
29. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the
Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial rep
A. Damage
30. The applicant claimed 15,000
US Dollars (the equivalent of 12,820 euros – EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage
and USD 10,000 (EUR 8,545) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
31. The Government contested
these claims.
32. The Court does not
discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage
alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it accepts that the
applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage, such as distress and
frustration, on account of the duration of the proceedings, which cannot be
sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation alone. Taking into
account the circumstances of the case and having regard
to its case-law, the Court awards the full sum claimed – EUR 8,545 - in respect
of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
33. The applicant also
claimed USD 15,000 (EUR 12,820) for her lawyers’ fees and USD 300 (EUR 256) for
the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
34. The Government contested
these claims.
35. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 under this head.
C. Default interest
36. The Court considers it
appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;
3. Holds that no separate issue arises under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is
to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention, EUR 8,545 (eight thousand five hundred and forty-five euros) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect
of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable, which sums are to
be converted into New Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on
S. Naismith J.-P.
Costa
Deputy Registrar President