THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF AKSAKAL v.
(Application no. 37850/97)
JUDGMENT
FINAL
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Aksakal v.
The European Court of Human Rights (Third
Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr J. Hedigan,
Mr R. Türmen,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr E. Myjer,
Mr David Thór Björgvinsson,
judges,
and Mr S. Quesada,
Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 37850/97)
against the
2. The applicant, who had been
granted legal aid, was represented by Reyhan Yalçındağ and Cihan
Aydın, lawyers practising in
3. The applicant alleged that
State security forces had destroyed his home and possessions and had forced him
to leave his place of residence with no possibility of return and that he had
been denied an effective remedy in domestic law in violation of Articles 3, 6,
8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
4. The application was
transmitted to the Court on
5. The application was
allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of
Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article
27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.
6. By a decision of
7. On
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
8. The applicant was born in
1963 and lives in
A. The applicant's version of the
facts
9. Until April 1994 the
applicant lived in Görbeyli, a
10. On
11. The soldiers then rounded up the villagers beside the primary school and split them into two groups, one of women and children and the other of the men. They apprehended Süleyman Şanlı, aged 67, in the fields and stripped him naked and inflicted ill-treatment upon him before the villagers. The soldiers then beat the men of the village using clubs. At the same time, another group of soldiers entered the village and started destroying the villagers' possessions. All the windows and doors of their houses were broken. The soldiers took those goods which might be of use to them. In the meantime, the beating of the men continued. Before leaving the village, the soldiers told the villagers that they would return in three days and if the villagers were still there, they would kill them all. As it was spring and their crops were not yet ready for harvest, the inhabitants did not leave the village. They rather set about fixing their houses and other property.
12. On 12 May 1995 the soldiers arrived in the village, they assembled the villagers in the school yard and beat them as before. The soldiers demolished the houses and killed many of the livestock in the village.
13. In the second half of June 1995 the soldiers raided the village again and razed it to the ground, including the vineyards, orchards and forestry.
14. The applicant filed complaints with the offices of the State of Emergency Regional Governor, the Diyarbakır Chief Public prosecutor and the Diyarbakır Provincial Regiment Command. The applicants' fellow villagers' request to return and cultivate their lands was rejected by the authorities.
15. Meanwhile, the applicant
has submitted to the Court a report prepared by the Human Rights Association in
16. Another report entitled, “The Destruction of Villages in Southeast Turkey, prepared by Medico International and the Kurdish Human Rights project in June 1996, provides background information on the destruction of villages in South-east Turkey and makes suggestions on the steps to be taken in order to address the immediate humanitarian needs and long term strategies to remedy the problems of internally displaced persons.
17. The applicant has also furnished the Court with photocopies of four photographs showing four houses in ruins allegedly in Sexan (Görbeyli) village. However, it is not possible to determine the exact cause of the current state of these houses from these photos.
B. The Government's version of the
facts
18. On
19. In letters dated
20. In a letter of
21. The investigation conducted by the Security Directorate to find out the address of Alaattin Altan did not yield any result. Halis Aksakal could only be found at the end of four months' search.
22. On
23. Meanwhile, in a letter of
24. On
25. The preliminary investigation
was carried out by Captain Hacı İlbas, who was at the relevant time the
Gendarmerie Unit Commander in Lice. On
26. In his investigation
report dated
27. On
28. On
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
29. A full description of the
relevant domestic law may be found in Yöyler v.
Turkey (no. 26973/95, §§ 37-49,
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
30. The applicant alleged that his forced eviction from Görbeyli village and destruction of his house and possessions by the State security forces had given rise to breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read in so far as relevant as follows:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life [and] his home...
2. There shall be no interference
by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
31. The applicant submitted that his eviction from his family home and deliberate destruction of his property by the State security forces constituted a violation of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions and his right to respect for his family life. He also claimed that the circumstances surrounding the destruction of his property and his eviction from his village also amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.
32. The Government denied the factual basis of the applicant's complaints and submitted that they were unsubstantiated. The investigation conducted by the authorities had revealed that the applicant's village had never been evacuated or burned down by the security forces. The applicant had left his village of his own free will. Furthermore, there existed no obstacle preventing the applicant to return to his village.
33. The Court is confronted with a dispute over the exact cause of the
events giving rise to the present application. Accordingly, it must primarily
have regard to the general situation prevailing in the region at the time of
the alleged events. In this connection it observes that at the relevant time
violent confrontations had taken place between the security forces and members
of the PKK in the state-of-emergency region of
34. This being so, it is to
be pointed out that both the European Commission of Human Rights and the Court
have previously embarked on fact finding missions in similar cases in Turkey
where the State security forces were allegedly the perpetrators of the unlawful
destruction of property (see, among many others, the above cited judgments of Akdivar and Others and Yöyler; and İpek v.
35. It is a matter of regret for the Court that it is unable to attempt to establish the facts of the present case by embarking on a fact finding exercise of its own. However, it considers that such an exercise would not yield sufficient evidence capable of establishing the true circumstances of the case, given that the passage of a substantial period of time, almost eleven years in the instant case, makes it more difficult to find witnesses to give testimony and takes a toll on a witness' capacity to recall events in detail and with accuracy (see İpek, cited above, § 116). Accordingly, the Court must reach its decision on the basis of the available evidence submitted by the parties (see Pardo v. France, judgment of 20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-B, p. 31, § 28, cited in Çaçan v. Turkey, no. 33646/96, § 61, 26 October 2004).
36. As
noted earlier, the applicant has submitted reports concerning the evacuation
and destruction of villages in south-east
37. In this context, the Court notes that the applicant did not submit any independent eye-witness statement in relation to the burning down of his house and possessions by the security forces. Nor did he give any particulars as to the identity of the soldiers involved in the alleged events or when and how he was prevented by the authorities from returning to his village. Furthermore, it does not appear that the applicant intervened in the proceedings which were commenced by the Lice Public Prosecutor's office or that he pursued his case subsequent to the lodging of a complaint with the prosecuting authorities. The applicant has offered no explanation for his failure to follow up the investigation conducted by the authorities. Moreover, the Court also finds no evidence in the file which would rebut the Government's submissions and the findings of the national authorities, in particular, the testimonies obtained from the applicant's fellow villagers (see paragraph 26 above).
38. In the light of the above and having regard
to the applicant's failure to corroborate his allegations, the Court does not
find it established to the required standard of proof that the applicant's
house was burned down or that he was forcibly evicted from his village or prevented
from returning there by the State security forces.
39. Against this background, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
40. The applicant complained
that he had been denied access to all effective remedies in violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ...
tribunal...”
and Article 13 of the Convention, which reads:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.”
A. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
41. The applicant submitted
that his right of access to a court to assert his civil rights had been denied
on account of the failure of the authorities to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations. In his opinion, without such an
investigation, he would have had no chance of obtaining compensation in civil
proceedings.
42. The Government maintained
that the applicant had failed to pursue the remedies available in domestic law.
Had the applicant filed a civil action, he would have enjoyed effective access
to a court.
43. The Court notes that the
applicant did not bring an action before the civil courts for the reasons given
in the admissibility decision of
44. The Court therefore finds
it unnecessary to determine whether there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1
of the Convention.
B. Article 13 of the Convention
45. The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no effective remedy available in respect of his grievances under the Convention.
46. The Government contended that there had been no shortcomings in the investigation and that the authorities had conducted an effective inquiry into the applicant's allegations.
47. The Court reiterates that
Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a
remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in
whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The
effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to
deal with the substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to
grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some
discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention
obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13
varies depending on the nature of the applicant's complaint under the
Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective”
in practice as well as in law, in particular its exercise must not be
unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the
respondent State (see Dulaş and Yöyler, both cited above, §§ 65 and 87
respectively).
48. The Court recalls that on
the basis of the evidence collected in the present case, it has not found it
proved to the required standard of proof that the applicant's house was
destroyed by the State security forces as alleged (see paragraphs 31-40 above).
This does not however mean, for the purposes of Article 13, that his complaints
fall outside the scope of its protection (see D.P.
and J.C. v. the United Kingdom,
no. 38719/97, 10 October 2002, § 136). These complaints were not declared
inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and therefore necessitated an
examination on the merits. Furthermore, in its admissibility decision of
49. That said, the Court
reiterates that, notwithstanding the terms of Article 13 read literally, the
existence of an actual breach of another provision is not a prerequisite for
the application of the Article (Boyle and
Rice v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131,
§ 52). Accordingly, having regard to its findings in the admissibility
decision and to its conclusion that the applicant's allegations could not be discarded as being prima facie untenable (see paragraphs 36
and 37 above), the Court considers that the applicant's
complaints raised arguable claims of violations of the Convention for the
purposes of Article 13 of the Convention (see, mutatis
mutandis, insofar as the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention was
at stake, Mennitto v.
50. Turning
to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court notes that subsequent to
the applicant's criminal complaint to the authorities, an investigation was
carried out by a gendarme officer, who was appointed as an investigator by the
Commission on the Prosecution of Civil Servants attached to the Lice Administrative
Council (see paragraph above). The gendarme captain conducted an on-site inspection,
took statements from five witnesses, who were all inhabitants of Görbeyli, and
concluded that the applicant's allegations were unfounded (see paragraph 27
above). Relying on the findings and conclusion of the gendarme captain, the
Administrative Council decided that no proceedings should be brought against
the security forces and village guards (see paragraph 28 above).
51. However,
the Court notes that there were serious defects in the
investigation conducted by the authorities. In this connection, it points out
that the investigating authorities did not consider visiting the scene of the
incident in order to verify whether the applicant's house or any other house in
Görbeyli was indeed burned down, as alleged by the applicant. They were rather content to rely
on the information given by the Gendarmerie authorities that no houses were
burned down in Görbeyli (see paragraph 24). The
gendarme officer in charge of the investigation did not attempt to take
statements from members of the security forces who conducted operations in and
around Görbeyli village subsequent to the clashes on
52. In
any event, the Court has already found in a number of
cases that investigations carried out by local administrative councils could
not be regarded as independent since they were composed of civil servants, who
were hierarchically dependent on the governor, and an executive officer was
linked to the security forces under investigation (see Güleç v. Turkey, no. 21593/93, § 80, Reports 1998-IV; Yöyler
and İpek, both cited above,
§§ 93 and 207 respectively). The appointment of a gendarme officer as the
investigator in a case where gendarmes were alleged to have been the
perpetrators of the destruction of the property, and serious doubts about the
credibility of his investigation, do not permit the Court to reach a different
conclusion in the present case.
53. In these circumstances,
it cannot be said that the authorities have carried out a thorough and
effective investigation into the applicant's allegations of the destruction of
his house in Görbeyli.
54. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14
OF THE CONVENTION, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 3, 6, 8 AND 13 OF THE
CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
55. The applicant maintained
that, because of his Kurdish origin, he had been subjected to discrimination in
breach of Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Articles 6, 8 and
13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Article 14 provides as
follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.”
56. The applicant argued that
the destruction of his family home and possessions was the result of an
official policy, which constituted discrimination due to his Kurdish origin.
57. The Court has examined the applicant's allegation in the light of the evidence submitted to it, but considers it unsubstantiated. There has therefore been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION
58. The applicant alleged that the interference or restrictions complained of have been imposed for purposes incompatible with the Convention. He invoked Article 18 of the Convention, which reads:
“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”
59. The Court points out that it has already examined this allegation in the light of the evidence submitted to it, and found that it was unsubstantiated. Accordingly, no violation of this provision has been established.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
60. Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court
finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows
only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Pecuniary damage
61. The applicant claimed a total amount of 164,734.11 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary damage suffered by him as a result of the destruction of his house and his inability to regain his economic activities since April 1994.
62. The Government submitted that no just satisfaction should be paid to the applicant since there had been no violation of the Convention. They contended, in the alternative, that should the Court find a violation of any of the provisions of the Convention, the amounts claimed by the applicant were speculative and did not reflect the economic realities of the region.
63. The Court reiterates that
there must be a causal connection between the damage claimed by the applicant
and the violation of the Convention, and that this may, in an appropriate case,
include compensation in respect of loss of earnings (see amongst others, the Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain
(Article 50), judgment of 13 June 1994, Series A no. 285-C, pp. 57‑58,
§§ 16-20). However, the Court recalls that in the instant case it was not established to the
required standard of proof that the applicant's house was burned down or that
he and his family were forcibly evicted from their village by the State
security forces (see paragraph 39 above). Accordingly, there is no causal link
between the matter held to constitute a violation of the Convention – the
absence of an effective investigation – and the pecuniary damage claimed by the
applicant. It therefore dismisses the applicant's claim under this head.
B. Non-pecuniary
damage
64. The applicant claimed a total amount of EUR 35,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He referred in this regard to the pain and poverty he had suffered following his forced eviction from his village and the destruction of his house and possessions in Görbeyli.
65. The Government maintained that this amount was excessive and unjustified.
66. The Court has found that
the national authorities had failed to carry out an effective and thorough
investigation into the applicant's complaints in breach of Article 13 of the
Convention (see paragraphs 45-54 above). Accordingly, an award should be made
in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Taking into account the seriousness of the
allegations and deciding on an equitable basis the Court awards the applicant
EUR 4,000 to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date
of payment (see Nuri Kurt v. Turkey
no. 37038/97, § 132, 29 November 2005 and Artun
and Others v. Turkey, application no. 33239/96, § 88, 2 February 2006).
C. Costs
and expenses
67. The applicant claimed a
total of EUR 14441.90 for fees and costs in the preparation and presentation of
his case before the Convention institutions. This sum included fees and costs
incurred by his lawyers in
68. The Government maintained that this claim was excessive and unsubstantiated. They argued that no receipt or any other document had been produced by the applicant to prove their claim.
69. The Court would point out
that the applicant has only partly succeeded in making out his complaints under
the Convention. Yet, the present case involved complex issues of fact and law
that required detailed examination. That said, the Court reiterates that only
legal costs and expenses that have been necessarily and actually incurred can
be reimbursed under Article 41 of the Convention. Having regard to the details
of the claims submitted by the applicant, the Court awards him the sum of
EUR 3,000, exclusive of any value-added tax that may be chargeable, less
EUR 630 received by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe.
D. Default interest
70. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been no violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the
Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
2. Holds that it is not necessary to determine whether there has been
a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;
4. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the
Convention, in conjunction with Articles 3, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
5. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 18 of the
Convention;
6. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final,
according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,000 (four
thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, exclusive of any
value-added tax that may be chargeable, to be converted into new Turkish liras
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement and to be paid into the
applicant's bank account in
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
7. Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant's
representatives, within three months from
the date on which the judgment becomes
final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention,
EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), in respect of costs and expenses, exclusive
of any value‑added tax that may be chargeable, less EUR 630 (six hundred
thirty euros) granted by way of legal aid, to be converted into pounds sterling
at the rate applicable at the date of settlement and paid into the
representatives' sterling bank account in the
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing
on 15 February 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan
M. Zupančič
Registrar President