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The History of the Undefeated
A few words in commemoration of the 1979 Revolution
Mansoor Hekmat
It is said that in recent years, a process of 'review' has been taking
place
among revolutionaries and the leftist opposition of Iran. A glance at
the
numerous publications, which this grouping publishes particularly
outside of
Iran, confirms this, though it is seriously doubtful whether the term
'review' is suitable to describe this development. In solitude - when
pronouncing the truth does not harm anyone - one could call this a
process
of repentance. But publicly where political correctness holds sway
especially during these days, perhaps the term 'new thinking' is a more
suitable equivalent. The concept of revolution and revolutionism in
general
and the 1979 Iranian revolution in particular have been the first
victims of
this 'new thinking'.
Every month, mountains of materials are published by individuals,
circles
and groups made up of remnants and aged revolutionaries of the 1979
revolution. To read and follow all these and share in the
preoccupations and
illusory worlds of their writers is both extremely difficult and
futile. It
is not difficult, however, to see the development of this 'new
thinking'.
One can use the association method used by psychologists to check the
reaction of this literature to key words such as the very concept of
'revolution'. The picture that emerges leaves no room for ambiguity.
Revolution: excess, revolution: violence, revolution: oppression,
revolution: destruction.
And why not? Who of these survivors of the 1979 revolution can shut
their
eyes for a moment, think about the past 17 [now 24] years and have one
pleasant recollection? Millions of people have been condemned to life
under
the most reactionary and brutal social system, a society based on
terror,
poverty, and lies in which happiness is forbidden, being a woman is a
crime,
living is torment and escape impossible. An entire generation, perhaps
more
than half the population, has been born in this hell and has no other
recollection than this. And for many others, the most living memory is
that
of the unforgettable faces of admirable human beings who were
slaughtered.
Wasn't 1979 - the year of the revolution - the beginning of this
nightmare?
Perhaps for some, the tragic fate of the 1979 revolution plays a role
in the
development of this 'new thinking'. Neither the extent of this
repentance
nor the bitter tone and hysteria of today's 'new thinkers', however,
can be
explained by the defeat of the 1979 revolution. It is as if you are
sitting
by a bridge and witnessing the return of a defeated army. It isn't
unexpected to find them melancholy, bewildered, silent, and depressed.
This
crowd, however, has clenched their fists. When you listen more
carefully,
it's as if they are whispering an anthem. Yes, you are not mistaken;
they
are going to war - a war on their own 'land' and 'camp' and 'fortress'
or
whatever they previously called it. They are returning to take revenge
on
'themselves' and yesterday's 'insiders'. For someone who looks out from
within the fortress, this is definitely a dreadful scene.
Few unsuccessful revolutions and defeated movements have so bitterly
been
bidden farewell by their former enthusiasts. The constitutional
revolution,
the movement for the nationalisation of the oil industry, the period
during
Allende's rule, the Portuguese revolution and the miners' strike in
Britain,
for example, have always received the greatest respect from their own
veterans and participants. The reason for today's 'new thinking' by
yesterday's revolutionaries must be sought elsewhere. The reality is
that
these years, the years after the 1979 revolution, coincided with a much
more
important development on a global scale. The fall of the Eastern Bloc -
only
lately called the 'socialist camp' by the propaganda of the most
deceptive
spokespersons of the Warsaw and NATO pacts and their idiotic supporters
-
was a political and social earthquake which shook the entire world. The
elimination of one pole from a bipolar world was in itself
earth-shattering
enough - a world in which for many decades, everything from economics
and
production to science and art took shape based on the confrontation
between
these two poles. However, what was decisive in the realm of ideas and
thoughts was the fact that the rulers of the world and their vast herds
of
spokespersons and scrounging propagandists in the universities and
media
were able to portray the fall of the East as the fall of communism and
the
end of socialism and Marxism. All these theatricals did not last more
than
six years, and all indications today suggest that this period of deceit
has
reached its end. These six years, however, shook the world.
This was
not the
end of socialism, but was a glimpse of what a nightmare the end of
socialism
could really be and what a swamp the world could become without the
herald
of socialism, the hope of socialism and the 'dangers' of socialism. It
became clear that the world - both ruler and the ruled - identified
socialism with change. The end of socialism was called the end of
history.
It became clear that the end of socialism is the end of the expectation
for
equality and prosperity, of free thinking and progressiveness and of
hope
for a better life for humanity. They interpreted the end of socialism
as the
unchallenged rule of the laws of the jungle and the right of might in
economics, politics and culture. And immediately fascism, racism,
chauvinism, ethnocentrism, religion, and bullying spilled out of every
crack
in society.
The wave of 'new thinking' that followed on a global scale was a
spectacle.
In an international race of repentance and ingratiation, yesterday's
virtues
were disdained, principals were scorned at and ideals were ridiculed.
Contemptuousness and submission became the meaning of life. In the
repentant
culture of the new world order's intellectuals, anyone who wanted a
better
life for human beings, believed that the current situation could and
must
change, believed in people's equality and called them to a better life,
spoke of the necessity for people's collective efforts to influence
their
fate and share in the world, and held the state and society responsible
for
the individual and their peace of mind and freedom was labelled
idealist,
old fashioned, na�ve and dim-witted from a thousand and one corners.
Despair
became the symbol of wisdom. Forsaking high human ideals was seen as a
sign
of realism and insight.
It suddenly became evident that any newly
appointed
journalist and assistant lecturer or any recently retired general had
ready-made answers to the intellectual giants of the modern world from
Voltaire and Rousseau to Marx and Lenin and that the entire
complexities of
freedom and equality seeking and the efforts of hundreds of millions of
people in recent centuries, was nothing more than a complete waste of
time
on the road to the grand monument of the 'end of history' that must be
forgotten ever so quickly.
It is within this international environment that yesterday's
revolutionaries
are engaged in the 'review' of the 1979 revolution and revolutionism in
general. Rather than being the result of the defeat of the 1979
revolution,
their conclusions owe themselves to global trends, which mocked ideals
and
principals, and became fashionable for some years.
It is said that history is written by the victors. It must be added,
however, that history, which is written by the defeated is ever more
false
and venomous, since this latter is nothing but the former dressed in
mourning, surrender and self-deceit. If history is the story of change,
then
real history is the history of the undefeated - the history of the
movement
and people who still want and are struggling for change, the history of
those who are not willing to bury their ideals and hopes of a human
society,
the history of people and movements that are not at liberty of choosing
their principles and aims and have no choice but to strive for
improvements.
In the history of both the victors and defeated, the 1979 revolution is
a
step for the rise of Islam and Islamism and the cause of the current
situation in Iran. In real history, however, the 1979 revolution was a
movement for freedom and prosperity, which was smashed.
The calamities of the period after the revolution in Iran must be
attributed
to those responsible. People were right to reject the monarchy and the
discrimination, inequality, oppression and degradation that went with
it and
rise up in protest. People were right to not want a king, SAVAK [the
secret
police], torturers and torture chambers at the end of the 20th century.
People were right to take up arms against an army, which massacred them
at
the earliest manifestations of their protests. The 1979 revolution was
an
act for freedom, justice and human dignity. The Islamic movement and
the
Islamic government were not only not the result of this revolution, but
were
rather a deliberate means of suppressing the revolution, and brought to
the
fore when the fall and failure of the Shah's regime was confirmed.
Contrary
to commonly held views, the Islamic Republic did not primarily owe its
existence to the network of mosques and the swarm of petty mullahs. The
source of this regime was not religion's power among the people; it was
not
Shiism's power, people's lack of interest in modernism and their hatred
of
Western culture, excessively accelerated urbanisation and lack of
'practicing democracy', etc.
This nonsense might be useful for the
career of
half-wit 'Orientalists' or media commentators, but it does not have the
slightest relation to the truth. The very forces that were supporting
the
Shah's regime and training the SAVAK until the day before brought the
Islamic current to the fore of the 1979 revolution - those who
recognised
the radicalisation and left leaning potential of the Iranian revolution
and
had learnt their lesson from the oil workers' strike; those who needed
a
green belt for Cold War rivalries. Money was spent for the
'Islamisation' of
the Iranian revolution; plans were drawn up, meetings were organised.
Thousands of people - from Western diplomats and military attach�s, to
the
ever honourable journalists of the world of democracy - worked
intensely for
months until a backward, marginal, rotten and isolated tradition in the
political history of Iran was turned into the 'revolution's leadership'
and
a ruling alternative for the urbanised and newly industrialised society
of
Iran in 1979.
Mr. Khomeini did not come from Najaf and Qom and as the
head
of a swarm of donkey-riding mullahs from en-route villages but from
Paris
via air. The 1979 revolution was a manifestation of the genuine
protests of
the deprived people of Iran but the 'Islamic revolution' and the
Islamic
regime were the result of the Cold War, the result of the most modern
political dealings of the world at the time. The architects of this
regime
were the strategists and policy makers of Western powers, the very same
ones
who today, from within the swamps of cultural relativism, once again
legitimise the very monster they created as the natural product of
'Islamic
and eastern society' and worthy of the people of the 'Islamic World'.
The
entire West's economic, political and propaganda resources were pulled
together for months before and after February 1979 in order to
establish and
maintain this regime.
The very fact that this social engineering became possible in Iran,
however,
owes itself to the situation and condition of the political and social
forces within Iran. There was enough material available for this task.
Islamic currents existed in all countries of the region. Until the
events in
Iran, however, this movement did not at any point become a notable
political
force and a main player on the political scene of these countries. The
Islamic (counter) revolution was not constructed on the insignificant
force
of the Islamic current, but rather on primary political traditions of
the
Iranian opposition. The Islamic counter-revolution was built on the
nationalist and so-called liberal tradition of the 'National Front',
which
more than anything else feared workers and communists and had spent its
entire life biting its nails under the monarchy's cape and religion's
robe.
It was a tradition, which in its entire history had been unable to
organise
even a semi-secular offensive against religion in Iran's politics and
culture. It was a tradition in which its leaders and personalities were
among the first to swear allegiance to the Islamic movement.
The
Islamic
counter-revolution was built on the Tudeh Party's tradition in which
anti-Americanism and strengthening its international camp at any price,
made
up the philosophy of its existence and which saw the Islamic regime,
irrespective of its consequences for the people and freedom, as a
playground
for manoeuvre and manipulation. The Islamic counter-revolution was
built on
a corrupt anti-modernist, anti 'westernisation', xenophobic and
Islam-ridden
tradition dominant in a majority of the intellectual and cultural
segments
of society in Iran, which shaped the initial environment of the youth
and
student protests. Khomeini triumphed not because superstitious people
saw
his reflection on the moon, but rather because the traditional
opposition
and this corrupt nationalist and regressive culture saw him - who was
the
most imported and manufactured personage of Iranian contemporary
political
history - as 'made in Iran', anti-Western and one of their own and thus
rose
to praise him.
The Islamic counter-revolution was the result of the
fact
that the modernist-socialist oil industry and big industries' workers
lost
the initiative in the protest scene to the traditional opposition of
Iran.
It was they who received Khomeini's personage and the Islamic
revolution
scenario from the West and sold it to the protesting masses of people.
Despite all this, the Islamic theatrics only created a delay in the
development of the 1979 revolution. The events immediately following
the
February uprising showed that the dynamics of the revolution was still
there. Irrespective of what was said, it showed that people had
nevertheless
come to and remained at the fore for freedom and social prosperity not
for
Islam. Eventually, the 1979 revolution, like most revolutions, was
defeated
not by deceit and lies, but by an extremely bloody suppression. During
February 11, 1979* and June 20, 1981* was all the opportunity Islam and
the
Islamic movement managed to obtain for the guardians of the Shah's
regime.
And of course, that's all they needed. In the real history of Iran,
June 20,
1981 is joined to September 8, 1978* and is the next link in the chain.
Khomeini, Bazargan, Sanjabi, Madani, Forouhar, Yazdi, Banisadr, Rajaie
and
Beheshti are the names which must follow Mohamad Reza Pahlavi,
Amouzgar,
Sharif Emami, Bakhtiar, Oveisi, Azhari, and Rahimi as characters that
came
to the fore one after the other to block the revolution and people's
protests. The continuous blows of the protest movement defeated the
monarchist regime and its various characters. In contrast, the Islamic
government managed to buy time, restore the forces of reaction and
smash the
people's revolution in the bloodiest form. The agenda of both regimes
was
one and the same.
More than half of the people of Iran are too young to hold even a vague
recollection of the 1979 revolution. Their connection to the events of
that
period is not unlike the connection of the 1979 revolutionary
generation
with events during the Mossadegh period and 1953 coup - a spent and
inaccessible period, which is only in the minds of and regarded as
important
by its own contemporary generation. Interpretations of that period are
many
and numerous, but more than saying anything about an historical truth,
they
pass judgement on the narrator and their place in today's world. Human
beings always look at the past from a contemporary perspective and seek
justifications for their current will and deeds. In looking at the 1979
revolution, our 'new thinkers' are looking to raise a banner in today's
Iran. This banner, however, has always existed. Each time, who, and
through
which ceremony, and by reciting which verses assembles under this
banner is
secondary.
* September 8, 1978: the date when the Shah's army massacred
demonstrators
in Jaleh Square in Tehran * February 11, 1979: the date of the Iranian
revolution * June 20, 1981: the eventual juncture that the Islamic
regime's
suppression took place.
This above is a translated summary of an article first published in
Persian
in 1995.
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