This paper is a pilot study of a most complex topic, outlining the directions my queries have wandered and the tentative conclusions these wanderings have produced.

Every conclusion drawn from our observation is, as a rule, premature, for behind the phenomena we see clearly are other phenomena the we see indistinctly, and perhaps behind these latter, yet others which we do not see at all.¹

Hegel presents the methodological orientation of this investigation:

In speaking of human nature we mean something permanent. The concept of human nature must fit all men and all ages, past and present.²

    The classificatory device "collective behavior" is an artificial construct reflecting not so much the existence of the phenomena it describes, as a lack of appreciation of the basic parameters of behavior itself, yielding a distinction primarily based on ignorance of the forces involved. An individual participating in a manifestation of collective behavior (using the term loosely) is still an individual and the concepts describing his behavior in any context should apply in all. Sociologists and social psychologists often recognize this: "collective behavior is analyzable by the same categories as conventional behavior."³ But the success in this undertaking is often less than clear. Our attack on this problem will come from a different direction, employing not sociological methodology but a psychological model that focuses on the emotions as behavioral determinants.
    LeBon observes that:

Science promised us truth, or at least a knowledge of such relations as our intelligence can seize: it never promised us peace or happiness. Sovereignly indifferent to our feelings, it is deaf to our lamentations. It is for us to endeavor to live with science, since nothing can bring back the illusions it has destroyed.⁴

LeBon has captured what might be termed the intellectual tenor of our epoch, one that Jung calls a reaction to the emotive reasoning of the Middle Ages. However, three questions arise: first, did science ever promise us anything; second, are the origins of peace and happiness not proper "scientific" concerns; and finally, has science destroyed illusions or simply buried complex relations in superficial contradictions? Or as Sapir put it:

Is it not possible that the contemporary mind, in its restless attempt to drag all the forms of behavior into consciousness and apply the results of its fragmentary or experimental analysis to the guidance of conduct, is really throwing away a greater wealth for the sake of a lesser and more dazzling one? It is almost as though a misguided enthusiast exchanged his thousands of dollars of accumulated credit at the bank for a few glittering coins of manifest, though little, worth.⁵

    I will now outline our model while briefly contrasting it with some other contemporary thought. Much of the impetus for this perspective is to be found in the ideas of the ancient Greeks, but it is based on a very simple observation--there are many ways of feeling. Harry Stack Sullivan proposes that:

The two absolutes I want to present at the moment are absolute euphoria and absolute tension.⁶

Though I agree with the idea of trying to describe the field of emotions, I would not be inclined to assume absolutes but rather leave the range open. Euphoria is a good term, but it has connotations of withdrawn stupor, or as Sullivan says:

Absolute euphoria can be defined as a state of utter well-being. The nearest approach to anything like it that there is reason for believing one can observe might occur in a very young infant in a state of deep sleep.⁷

In place of this rather restricted concept, I propose to use the Greek concept of happiness to describe the one end of the scale, with the euphoria Sullivan is fond of being a form of happiness.
    Sullivan's tension concept is also a bit narrow:

Absolute tension might be described as the maximum possible deviation from absolute euphoria. The nearest approach to absolute tension that one observes is the rather uncommon, always transient, state of terror.⁸

Once again, I would substitute another concept for tension and call it a subset of pain.  Though Sullivan's absolute tension example may be uncomfortable, more painful circumstances are not hard to imagine.
    At any rate, Sullivan goes on to say that:

These absolutes are approached at times, but almost all living is perhaps rather near the middle of the trail; that is, there is some tension, and to that extent the level of euphoria is not as high as it could be. While euphoria need not trouble us very much, tensions are a very important part of our thinking.⁹

To start modeling behavior by disavowing the relevance of half of the emotional range would seem a rather bizarre premise. One is left with the proposition that the goal of the system is somehow its statistical mean. It would appear an equally probable interpretation that the goal of the system is not equilibrium but happiness, not simply the homeostatic reduction of tension, but the generation of good feeling.
    However, describing emotions as a simple range on a sort of see-saw axis is also a rather useless, albeit neat, conceptual construct. Emotions are a highly complex phenomena, witness man's lack of control of them "for all his great mind."¹⁰ We will view emotions as a multi-parametric field that might be termed E-space (Emotion-space), and assume that we do not have a firm grasp of what defines an emotional state.
    Much psychoanalytic thought stumbles on this same point in that, as Szasz puts it, it holds "the premise that the behavior of persons said to be mentally ill is meaningful and goal directed,"¹¹ without an adequate concept of what these goals might be. Similarly, the concept of normality is invoked as a criterion for judging the validity of any given action. Freud and Liang do deal with this problem; however, in rather gloomy terms. According to Freud:

The programme of becoming happy, which the pleasure principle imposes on us, cannot be fulfilled; yet we must not--indeed cannot--give up our effort to bring it nearer to fulfillment by some means or other.¹²

While Laing argues:
 

Thus I would wish to emphasize that our 'normal,' 'adjusted' state is too often the abdication of ecstasy, the betrayal of our true potentialities, that many of us are only too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt to a false reality.¹³

Extending this topic to collective behavior, one is reminded of Hoffer's assertion that:

A rising mass movement attracts and holds a following not by its doctrine and promises but by the refuge it offers from the anxieties, barrenness and meaninglessness of an individual existence.¹⁴

    Our approach from Homer and Greek sources and involves the inversion of our habit of defining the individual as a constant and the emotions as variables, or as Karen Horney put it:

Man in our culture feels strongly that his own self is a separate entity, distinguished from or opposite to the world outside.¹⁵

Rather, we will assume the emotions to be constants and their environmental expression as the variable. Derived from this, our axiom is that the way an individual feels is the function of a complex relationship with his environment. Here the term environment is used as a field theoretical concept and implies some kind of complex of parameters stemming from the individual's biological-genetic, psychological, sociological, cultural and spiritual elements and the setting in which they operate¹⁶, thus attempting to depict the complex nature of E-space.¹⁷
 Any given feeling can be defined as a complex but discrete system of parameters in E-space. By defining a system synchronically, a feeling also diachronically defines a mode of conformity of implied actions derived from the extension of that feeling over time. It also follows that the mode of conformity defined by any particular feeling may or may not be in concordant relationship with the mode of conformity of any other emotion. As to what feeling the individual wishes to conform to in his behavior, we will take the Greek view that what he seeks is happiness; that is, living in such a way that he is consistently happy with his life. Aristotle asserts that we:

feel bound to class happiness as some form of activity ... it has been well said that the Good is that at which all things aim ... Happiness does not consist in pastimes and amusements, but in activities in accordance with virtue.¹⁸

Thus, our primary referent becomes our emotional state, and our behavior is directed towards enacting a satisfactory mode of conformity.
    Like Freud in referring to the "temporary endurance of 'pain' on the long circuitous road to pleasure",¹⁹ we recognize that emotions are a complex phenomena and that conforming to them is not a simple question. Thus, we arrive at what might be termed the mode of assertion, in which an individual tries consciously to parallel the mode of conformity through the guidance of some model of behavior. However, a cognitive model, or philosophical (in a broad sense) system will not necessarily be in concordant relationship with the feeling being sought; that is, what you think you are doing may not be what you are causing emotionally. How does the individual go about maintaining linkage between the cognitive overlay (what he thinks is going on) and the emotional reality (what he actually experiences)? We call the means of changing cognitive systems transformational patterns. One means of such change would be that described by Sapir above, i.e., analysis of the conditions in search of a resolution to the contradictions and conflicts.
    A proposition derived from this model concerns mental illness: transformational patterns need not be strictly intellectual and it may be that some psychiatric symptomatologies result from a loss of contact between the conceived and felt realities. As Anthony Wallace argues:

A principal problem for the research anthropologist, in a mental hospital setting, is to explain how a person comes to be extruded from his sociocultural system ... Is it because he has been unable to maintain stable cognitive maps sufficiently complex for them to sum to an equivalence structure with those of his fellows.²⁰

Perhaps the problem is an inability to either find within the culture or analytically derive a cognitive system that adequately describes and responds to the demands of the emotional reality encountered within. However, cross-cultural and diachronic mental illness data rather challenge Wallace's position that patients are 'extruded' in that the modalities of expression, symptomatology and even disease type the mentally ill use are heavily influenced by cultural context.²¹ This argument is also supported by the amount of consistency in symptomatologies found in a given cultural context. With some elaboration, we will see that this phenomenon is helpful in understanding "collective behavior".
    However, at this point, our model might benefit from a more visual presentation and noting certain parallels with models used in linguistic theory.²²
    The semantic of the system is its emotional goal. The deep structure is the system derived from this goal. The surface structure corresponds to the cognitive position and/or cultural guidance on ways to conform to this goal, and transformational patterns are those modalities developed by an individual to maintain or reestablish linkage between that which is held cognitively at variance with the deep structure, and consequently, the system's semantic. As the product of the systems we find linguistic output and the individual's emotional reality.

A kind of feedback mechanism exists between the output of either of these systems and the value this output is hoped to conform to (i.e., the semantic or emotional goal).
    Finally, in theoretical linguistics²³ the notion of a 'constraint' refers to an unconscious, semiconscious or conscious mechanism or rule that shapes the output of a system by organizing its input in established channels. An example of a conscious constraint is the way in which we learn the grammatical rules as to when to use "I" and when to use "me". Whether one chooses to follow them or not in a given context is a more complex issue.
    However, we will use this concept to describe the conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious constraints that guide behavior and might loosely be equated with manners, inhibitions and neuroses. Only this seminal statement of this concept would appear justified in this context; however, in applying it, underdeveloped as it is, I would like to restate and expand slightly on an earlier observation: the range of human emotions, the ways a person can feel, is huge. But one might argue that most people are comfortable (i.e., have an adjusted or integrated relationship) with a rather narrow segment of this range.²⁴ Consequently, the constraints a person is subject to tend to be developed within this limited range, raising an obvious question: What would the effect be of registering emotions that do not lie within this range and thus within the interpretational and reactional confidence that has been developed in a familiar emotional context?
 In considering this question, let us start with Aristotle's observation about the gods. As shown most clearly in The Iliad, The Greek conception of their deities was that they embody powerful emotions, knowledge and purposes, while at the same time deriving this power from the behavior and designs conceived in concordance with these purposes. Consequently, the behavior of the gods corresponds to a different emotional bases than that of mortals and --

If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods.²⁵

Aristotle's distinction is being used to illustrate that a mode of conformity from one emotional base may differ radically from that of another. The constraints applying to one may be inadequate guidance for understanding and acting in the other.
    This returns us to the proposition that the mode of conformity of one emotion may differ radically from that of another. The constraints applying to one may be inadequate guidance to interpretation and behavior in the other. This brings us back to the idea that mental illness may reflect the experiencing of emotions for which a culture lacks adequate guidance or descriptive conceptions, essentially isolating the individual in feelings he neither knows how to deal with nor to describe effectively. One of the results of this may be the rejection or disregard of what has become a foundationless system of constraints, leading perhaps to the lack of inhibitions often noted in schizophrenia and the manic phase of manic-depression.
    A second result may be an attempt to develop a descriptive conception that communicates a felt reality and bridges the gap between the feeling and its explanation to self and others. If the feeling is sufficiently removed from the culture's normal range, this description may appear highly fanciful and irrational. As a consequence, the acts based on the cognitive model's interaction with emotional reality may appear irrational as well and statistical enormities result.
    Thus, although the irrationality of crowd behavior is generally described as a separate phenomenon from conventional behavior, in fact it is not unique and can only be viewed as such when compared with 'normal' behavior.
    In our axiomatic model, Corollary 4 states that being systemic emotions are not necessarily isolates, while Corollary 5 is that the number of members in a given emotional situation and the congruence of their emotional responses is a function of the strength of the common parameters they are exposed to. Durkheim elucidates this proposition well and I will here quote at some length.

Thus, the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and pity in a crowd do not originate in any one particular individual consciousness. They come on each one of us from without and can carry us away in spite of ourselves. Of course, it may happen that, in abandoning myself to them unreservedly, I do not feel the pressure they exert on me. But it is revealed as soon as I try to resist them. Let an individual attempt to oppose one of these collective manifestations, and the emotions that he denies will turn against him. Now, if this power of external coercion asserts itself so clearly in cases of resistance, it must exist also in the first-mentioned cases, although we are unconscious of it. We are then the victims of the illusion of having ourselves created that which actually forced itself from without. If the complacency with which we permit ourselves to be carried along conceals the pressure undergone, nevertheless it does not abolish it ... So even if we ourselves have spontaneously contributed to the production of the common emotion, the impression we have received differs markedly from what we would have experienced if we had been alone. Also, once the crowd has dispersed, that is, once these social influences have ceased to act upon us and we are alone again, the emotions which have passed through the mind appear strange to us, and we no longer recognize them as ours. We realize that these feeling have been impressed on us to a much greater extent than they were created by us. It may even happen that they horrify us, so much were they contrary to our nature. Thus, a group of individuals, most of whom are perfectly inoffensive, may, when gathered in a crowd, be drawn into acts of atrocity.²⁶

 According to Durkheim, not only are emotions not isolates, but some of the parameters determining them are also additive in group situations. However, what is key to our argument is that crowd manifestations can generate an emotional field lying outside the boundaries of the normal emotional range. With this we are brought back to the model used to describe individual behavior in such a context except that we are dealing with an aggregate. However, the behavioral outcome may well be analogous as a result of the following similarities. First, the emotion shared may not conform to conventional description. Consequently, attempts at description of the feeling may be emotively valid but fanciful and apparently unconcerned with conventional modes of thought. According to LeBon:

A crowd scarcely distinguishes between the subjective and the objective. It accepts as real the images evoked in its mind, though they most often have only a distant relation with the observed fact.²⁷

Second, as in some forms of mental illness, the emotion may lead to the suspension of the constraint system the individual is normally subject to by removing him from the range of its validity.
    Thus, the actual behavior of an aggregate is dependent on the interaction of a number of variables: first, the nature of the feeling generated; second, the amount of variance between the feeling generated and the normal range of aggregate members; third, the nature of the interpretation derived to explain this phenomenon; and fourth, the actions deemed desirable as a result of this interpretation.
    In this construct I have tried to describe the salient variables in aggregate behavior, interpreting the term collective behavior as properly applying to the behavior of collectives rather than restricting its definition to more sensational manifestations. A group that does nothing (if that is possible) is still a group, an incident of collective behavior. When we get together, sometimes we behave differently and sometimes we do not; the model must include both situations.
    As it stands, the model for collective behavior is essentially limited to contiguous aggregates. It is a taxonomic problem as to whether to define "collective behavior" as being restricted to the behavior of collectives or to broaden the scope of the term to include "social movements". In fact, our model would require some elaboration to describe a "social movement". However, the two phenomena are obviously related and I am hopeful that the emotive approach will also prove useful in an analysis of social movements planned for the future. One notoriously practiced theorist argues that this is so.

The art of propaganda lies in understanding the emotional ideas of the great masses and finding, through a psychologically correct form, the way to the attention and thence to the heart of the broad masses.²⁸

    One final observation, the reader may have noticed that in using the term aggregate, I have not given a numerical boundary. Reflection on the variables presented to describe the behavior of an aggregate coupled with the earlier discussion of mental illness will show that the only value excluded is the null set.

Axiom - The way an individual feels is the function of a complex relationship with his environment.
Corollary 1. Emotionally reality is primary in human behavioral determination.
Corollary 2. Any given feeling can be synchronically described as an ordered system based on a complex but discrete system of parameters.
Corollary 3. A feeling, by defining a system synchronically, also defines a mode of conformity diachronically of implied actions derived from the maintenance of this emotional position.
Corollary 4. Being systemic, emotions are not necessarily isolates.
Corollary 5. The number of members in a given emotional situation and the congruence of their emotional responses is a function of the strength of the common parameters they are exposed to.
Corollary 6. Language is functional in the interpretation and manipulation of emotional reality.
Corollary 7. Feelings may or may not have adequate verbal representation.
Corollary 8. The cognitive interpretation of a mode of conformity is defined as the conscious mode of assertion of the causes of a given feeling synchronically and diachronically.
Corollary 9. The mode of conformity defined by a feeling may contradict the mode of conformity of any other feeling.
Corollary 10. The mode of assertion defined by the cognitive interpretation of a feeling may be in contradiction with the mode of conformity and/or the mode of assertion of another feeling.
Corollary 11. When the mode of assertion falls out of correspondence with the mode of conformity, transformational patterns are used to reestablish correspondence between the desired feeling and the its cognitive appreciation.
Corollary 12. The mode of conformity and/or assertion of one person is not necessarily a satisfactory behavioral guide for any other person with the correspondence of validity being defined by similarity of characteristics in background and emotional environment, i.e., goals and heritage.
 
 
 
 
 

1. Gustave LeBon, The Crowd (New York, 1972), p. 7.
2. G.W.F. Hegel, Reason in History (New York, 1953), p. 21.
3. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, 1962), p. 23.
4. LeBon, op.cit., p. 17.
5. Edward Sapir, "Unconscious Patterning" in The Unconscious: A Symposium (New York, 1928), pp. 41-42.
6. Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York, 1953), p. 34.
7. Idem.
8. Ibid., p. 35.
9. Idem.
10. Homer, The Iliad, trans. Richard Lattimore (Chicago, 1951), p. 378.
11. Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness (New York, 1961), p. 59.
12. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (London, 1963), p. 20.
13. R.D. Laing, The Divided Self (Baltimore, 1971), p. 12.
14. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York, 1966), p. 44.
15. Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York, 1964), p. 273.
16. For a discussion of field theory see J. Milton Yinger, Toward a Field Theory of Behavior (New York, 1965).
17. Some of the more obvious corrolaries of this axiom are presented in an appendix.
18. Aristotle, "Nichomachaen Ethics", ed. Walter Kaufmann, Philosophical Classics (New Jersey, 1968), pp. 433-434.
19. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (
20. Anthony Wallace, Culture and Personality (New York, 1970), p. 34.
21. Consider the culture-bound disorders such as koro and witigo as well as the changes in nature of mental illness in Westernizing societies, with its form generally going from hysteria to a more standard clinical picture as acculturation takes place. Marvin Opler claims that "as the peasant societies undergo acculturation, the rates and also the forms of illness begin to resemble those of our city culture." in Changing Perspectives in Mental Illness (New York, 1969), eds. Stanley Plog and Robert Edgerton, p. 103.
22.
23. David M. Perlmutter, Deep and Surface Structure Constaints in Syntax (
24.
25. Aristotle, "Nichomachaen Ethics", ed. Walter Kaufmann, Philosophical Classics (New Jersey, 1968), pp. 436.
26. Emile Durkheim,
27. LeBon, op.cit., p.
28. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf trans. J. Murphy (New York, 1939), p.