Unequal Benefactors and Beneficiaries:
The Utilitarian
Inadequacy of Mill's Arguments for Freedom
by
Sulma N. Portillo
A Thesis
Submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through
Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor
Windsor, Ontario, Canada
2007
© 2007 Sulma N. Portillo
The thesis examines
the complex, causal interconnection among freedom, power, and utility found in
J. S. Mill’s conception of individual development in On Liberty. For
Mill, individuals must form their character through modes of independent
thought, and the free expression of opinions and conduct in order to expand
their developmental power. Thus, individuals can obtain knowledge of self and
society, and thereby add to the common beneficial social and epistemic consequences,
namely utility.
The thesis analyzes
Mill's argument that free individual expression adds to utility. The freedom-utilitarian project's pursuit of
individual development and multi-sided truth relies on practices that are
inconsistent with the goals to maximize the individual's developmental power
and knowledge acquisition by the majority of society. The project facilitates the elite's role as
benefactors and beneficiaries to utility, but it hinders others' roles in
utility, and thus it is more an elitist project than a utilitarian one.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 2: DIVERSITY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND
DEVELOPMENTAL POWER
II. Individuality and Developmental Power
i) Individual Development and Human Nature
ii) The Individual Characteristics that Have High
Utility
iii) Mill's
Argument that Society Should Grant the Developmentally Powerful Greater
Political Power
iv) Argument that the Free Expression of
Individuality Adds to Progress
III. Diversity and Developmental Power
i) Argument that Diversity Renders Benefits to
Individual Development
ii) Diversity of Opinions and Diversity of Modes
of Life
iii) The Rise
of Negative Political Power and the Descent of Developmental Power
iv) Diversity of Education and Diversity of
Experiments
2) The
Epistemic Limitations of Experiments of Life
CHAPTER 3: THE PROGRESS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL ELITE
i) Individual Development and History
ii) The Relationship between Progress and Custom
iii) The Justice of Utilitarianism: Just for the
Elite?
III. The Elitist Assignment of Utility to Human
Natures
i) Moral and Intellectual Elitism and
Self-fulfilling Prophecies.
ii) The Fallacy of Innate Mental Giftedness
CHAPTER 4: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND CULTURAL
IMPERIALISM OVER THE TRUTH...
II. Mill's Main Argument that Freedom of
Expression has Beneficial Consequences for Society
ii) Free Expression of Held Opinions:
2.1) The Rationality of Responding to Objections
2.2) The Satisfaction of the Necessary Conditions
for Liveliness of Truthful Beliefs
3) Argument from the Synthesis of Truth: Epistemic Diplomats
4) The Equal Treatment of Falsehood and Truth
III.
Utilitarian Problems with the Use of 'Unrestricted' Expression for the
Pursuit of Truth
ii) Response to the Rationalization of the Equal
Treatment of Falsehood and Truth
iii) Response to the Synthesis of Truth Argument
iv). Response to the Argument from Rationality for
'Unrestricted' Expression
1) Free for Whom? 'Unrestricted' Expression: A Restricted Form of Expression
2) Free Speech as a Social Transmitter of
Cognitive Independence
3) The Pursuit of Truth through Laissez-faire
Expression and Social Darwinism
|
Unequal Benefactors and Beneficiaries: The Utilitarian
Inadequacy of Mill's Arguments for Freedom |
John
Stuart Mill argues that freedom has beneficial consequences for society. Mill views utilitarianism, not as merely the
mechanical application of principles, but as a "long-term social
project" (Wilson, 2007). In
accordance with this interpretation of Mill's utilitarianism, this thesis
discusses the various roles of freedom in Mill's utilitarianism, as evident in
On Liberty (1859), and understands his utilitarianism as a freedom-utilitarian
project. As a
project, utilitarianism seeks to intensify the societal expression of utility,
which is the common beneficial consequences of individual progress, the
intensity of which is based on the utility that society assigns to each of its
members. The more that society contributes
to the maximization of the utility of each of its members, the more that
society can be called utilitarian. Thus,
I maintain that utility and political equality are intertwined.
Mill grounds utility on the
"permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (CW, 18, Ch. 1,
¶11),[1]
and thus, he causally bases utility on individual progress. Individual progress is the advancement of an
individual's capacity for the exercise of developmental power. Developmental power is an individual's
capacity to learn about self and others, act and think creatively, exercise
choice, and determine her[2]
individuality. The acquisition of
knowledge of self and others depends on an individual's capacity to exercise
her individuality, that is, to keep individuality active by means of free
individual expression. Mill's view of
free individual expression includes two general forms of freedom. The first part is characterized by free
speech and independent opinion formation.
Mill defines free speech as socially, politically, and legally
unrestricted speech (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶42).
He defines freedom of opinion as the capacity for independent opinion
formation. The second part of free
individual expression is characterized by free individual conduct. Mill defines free conduct as conduct that
lacks social interference in matters that regard only the self and that have no
consequences for others.
Mill characterizes freedom as
that capacity which permits the independence of the individual. Freedom is the capacity for the independent
pursuit of individual improvement, or the pursuit of "our own good in our
own way" (CW, 18, Ch. 1, ¶13) without impeding others' same pursuit (CW,
18, Ch. 1, ¶13). Freedom adds to the
developmental power of an individual without undermining the developmental
power of others. Because it directs the
developmental power maximization of everybody, freedom is a good that
facilitates the expansion of individual developmental power; this expansion is
individual progress. Freedom adds not
only to the potential utility of an individual which is the individual's
potential capacity to add to the common good, but also to potential societal
utility which is the potential of society as a whole[3]
to contribute to its common good; this potential is developmental power. Because it permits the exercise and advancement
of developmental power, freedom adds knowledge and cultural and social
improvements to the common good. In the
ways discussed above, Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument posits that the
freedoms of speech, opinion, and conduct are necessary for the maximization of
utility. In short, Mill's
freedom-utilitarian argument is that freedom of individual expression adds to
the common good, and that, therefore, society should encourage this freedom.
Mill
proposes a freedom-utilitarian project for the pursuit of utility maximization
by means of free individual expression.
Mill's treatment of the freedom of conduct is more consistent with the
maximization of utility than his treatment of the freedom of opinion expression
and opinion formation. My thesis argues
that Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument provides inadequate consequentialist
support for its freedom-utilitarian project, and is impractical
for the maximization of utility. This
thesis suggests some requirements for a practical freedom-utilitarian project.
Mill does not consider all
the main likely consequences of his freedom-utilitarian project. That project is also a social epistemological
one, for it is intended to advance knowledge at the social level by facilitating
the expansion of individual developmental power which includes the capacity of
individuals to obtain knowledge about self and others. This thesis will show how the practice of the
freedom of speech and opinion formation that Mill's freedom-utilitarian
argument calls for would be counterproductive to the expansion of individual
developmental power. Thus, this thesis
will argue that Mill's project would fail to optimize individual expression to
the extent that he claims freedom can facilitate it. Since the maximization of utility depends on
the optimization of individual developmental power, and Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project would be unlikely to optimize individual
developmental power, that project would likely fail to reach its utilitarian
aims.
Mill's
social and political philosophy is normally viewed as an equalitarian one. The present thesis identifies some ways in
which Mill's social and political philosophy of freedom is not
equalitarian. One of these ways is that
elitism misguides Mill's claims about the personal requirements for the
optimization of individual development, and the maximization of social
utility. Elitist premises are
argumentative assumptions that reward only or more highly certain social
interests, and can unfairly have politically differential consequences for the
various social groups. The thesis shows
how the elitist premises of Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument are
unacceptable. If followed to their final
implications, it is evident that those elitist premises contradict Mill's
conclusion that his freedom-utilitarian project would help maximize utility.
The
elitist premises that only a few persons inherently have strong levels of
individuality, and that the stronger individualities can developmentally
benefit more from freedom of individual expression imply that the capacity for
developmental power varies among individuals and that so does the capacity to
benefit from free individual expression.
Even
worse for the capacity of the freedom-utilitarian project to help optimize
freedom and thus maximize utility, what Mill considers freedom fails to meet
the most important requirement for the optimization of cognitive freedom: the
promotion of mental independence and open-mindedness. In this way, it lacks the capacity to enhance
individual developmental power which includes the capacity of an individual to
obtain knowledge. The elitist premises
that only a few individuals can be impartial and that impartiality is necessary
for the individual attainment of knowledge imply that the majority of individuals
would not be able to obtain knowledge of self and others sufficient for
self-determination. Thus, the social
epistemology of Mill's freedom-utilitarian project impedes the capacity of
individuals to add knowledge to the common good, that is increase epistemic
utility, and thus the project cannot reach the maximization of epistemic
utility for which it aims.
Another way in which Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project is not equalitarian is that it implicitly supports
the tyranny of the inherently strong and the politically privileged. Admittedly, Mill neither overtly supports the
tyranny of the inherently strong nor does he seem to consciously intend to do
so. Mill recognizes the need for the
social discipline of strong individuals to prevent their exercise of their
greater developmental power to acquire political power in socially harmful
ways. Yet, we should be aware that,
under what Mill considers socially and politically unrestricted speech and
opinion formation, including opinions about which opinions are true, the
politically and inherently strong are most likely to have rule over truth that
would be tyrannical in at least two ways.
First, it would be culturally imperialistic in that the culture of the
elite social groups would have the most influence over what society accepts as
truthful opinions. Second, the presumed
rational justification of the elite's knowledge would depend on the maintenance
of the majority's ignorance or false opinions.
What Mill considers unrestricted expression is counterproductive even to
the individual development of tyrants insofar as it hinders their capacity to
obtain social discipline and to obtain reliable knowledge about others. An even worse way in which Mill's view of free
expression is counterproductive to utility maximization is how what Mill
considers unrestricted expression actually restricts the individual expression
of the politically and presumably developmentally normal or weak. "Unrestricted" expression not only
impedes the exercise of their developmental power but hinders the expansion of
that power, that is, their individual progress.
Because what Mill considers a freedom-utilitarian project is practical
for the power maximization of only the developmentally and politically powerful
individuals, it is best understood as an elitist project.
The
lack of equalitarianism of Mill's freedom-utilitarian project will be made yet
further evident. I develop the term
'political egoism' to account for Mill's bias.
An argument's premises are politically egoist if they rely on elitist
assumptions concerning the group to which the arguer belongs. Another term that I use to account for Mill's
bias is 'epistemic fairness,' and I develop a version of the concept 'epistemic
fairness' that fits the utilitarian aims of Mill's arguments for freedom. Epistemic fairness is a characteristic of
epistemological methods. In my view,
epistemic fairness[4]
is the degree to which these methods consider the number and the variety of
epistemic agents who are the active and direct benefactors and beneficiaries to
the pursuit, and the attainment, of knowledge.
This
thesis constructively critiques the freedom-utilitarian project in the
following two ways. For its critique,
this thesis diagnostically applies the concepts 'political egoism' and
'epistemic fairness' to identify the ways in which Mill's freedom-utilitarian
project lacks equalitarianism, its social epistemology is flawed, and its
practices that Mill recommends for that project are inconsistent with the
project's progressive aims. For its
constructiveness, this thesis uses these concepts to suggest some general
requirements for an adequate freedom-utilitarian project. The thesis suggests that utility maximization
requires consideration of the variety and number of epistemic agents who
actively and directly participate in, and benefit from, the pursuit of
knowledge of self and others, and of social and natural world.
Mill’s
freedom-utilitarian project at first glance appears to be for a developmental
meritocracy in which there is fair competition over social worth, and which
rewards individuals in proportion to their proved developmental power. However, the society that puts this project
into practice sets up self-fulfilling prophecies against the developmental
outcomes of the many individuals, if the project accepts unparsimonious
assumptions about human nature which contribute to perceptions that utility is
exclusive. Mill assumes that human beings vary in their degree of psychobiological
developmental power and in their possession of the attributes that facilitate
their capacity to improve their developmental power. This assumption is unparsimonious because we
all belong to the same species. So, the
simplest assumption sets the emphasis on commonality, not on difference. However, Mill emphasizes the inherent
differences in human nature and implies variations in inherent developmental
power.
Mill provides an inconsistent
discussion of freedom with various implications for the strength of developmental
power which freedom can foster, and for the extent to which freedom can
contribute to utility. To show that Mill
provides multiple treatments of freedom which vary in their consistency with
utility, the thesis explores the causal relationships among developmental
power, freedom, and utility.
The second chapter, entitled
"Diversity for the Individual and Developmental Power," discusses
Mill's treatment of freedom that is most consistent with the utilitarian aims
of his social project. Under the
treatment of freedom which is most consistent with utility maximization, Mill
suggests that freedom applies only to actions that add to developmental power
while the same actions do not hinder others' developmental power. For Mill, utility gains the most from social
conditions that permit as much freedom as the optimization of developmental
power requires. Society's capacity for
progress gains from its members' free exercise of individuality and especially
from the consequent expansion of their developmental power.
The
second chapter reconstructs Mill's argument that freedom of individual
expression and social diversity have developmentally and epistemically
beneficial common consequences. It will
examine Mill's politically egoistic argument that society would be wise to let
the intellectually strong lead it. His
premises for that argument make elitist and empirically unjustified claims;
they require but lack relevant scientific support.
The
second chapter shows how Mill causally connects individual development to
utility. To show this connection, the
chapter addresses the following questions:
For Mill, what is individual development? What causes individual development, and what
does it cause?
The
second chapter begins an overview of Mill's thought on the nature, the causal
factors, and the effects of individual development; the third chapter continues
that overview. The second chapter argues
that, for Mill, individual development depends on individuality which is the
developmental power of self and society.
Individuality has both a passive and an active form and its expression
varies by degrees. In its active form,
individuality consists of (1) inherent developmental power, (2) activity to
follow or be led by the inherent power, (3) activity to cultivate the power,
and (4) the consequent nature from the exercise of the power. In other words, active individuality can be
described as having at least three dimensions:
potential, action, and consequence.
Active individuality requires the original exercise and/or free exercise
of one's developmental power to intelligently follow one's nature, and thereby
cultivate individual and social developmental power. In its passive form, individuality consists
of (1) inherent developmental power, (2) neglect of the power, (3) the
degradation of the power, and (4) the consequential inability to use the
power. The type of individuality that
one has depends on whether one actively exercises one's individuality or
passively tries to conform one's individuality to socially desired ideals. As long as the individual maintains the
active form of individuality, she can remake her nature.
The developmental power of
everyone can be expanded by being effectually exercised for the cultivation of
one's nature. However, according to
Mill, a small proportion of individuals have more inherent developmental power
than others and, as long as their individuality remains active, their
developmental power is more likely than that of others to cultivate a great
nature. Others, on the other hand, are
more likely to exercise passive individuality, and thus can lose their capacity
to define and redefine their nature.
Mill
recognizes that individuality has psychobiological and social bases. Mill emphasizes the psychobiological diversity
of human beings over their commonalities, claiming that, to a large extent,
every individual has a unique inherent psychological nature. From this nature is derived her inherent
developmental power. There are
constraints for an individual's capacity to expand her developmental
power. First, the individual is capable
of making her nature under the constraints of her unique inherent developmental
power. There is a limited range within
which her capacity for self-definition can operate. The individual can learn about her
psychological developmental needs and capacities by means of
self-education. Experiments of life are
educative. In such experiments, the
individual tries, and may invent, modes of life to find which one best suits
her inherent nature for the facilitation of its growth. Paradoxically, for an individual to be able
to lead her nature, a necessary
precondition is that she must learn how to intelligently follow the inward tendencies of her nature. There are limits to the leadership that she
can exercise over her nature. She cannot
remove the inward tendencies, only discipline them. To some extent, following the inward
tendencies of one’s nature is inevitable.[5] Following those tendencies under intelligent
exploration, however, to obtain sufficient self-knowledge to properly
discipline them is a greater challenge.
Other constraints of an
individual's capacity to expand her developmental power include two necessary
conditions for the individual to actively exercise her individuality. These conditions include freedom and
diversity. Particularly, Mill argues for
socially, culturally, politically and legally unrestricted freedom to think
independently, express one's opinions, and act in self-regarding matters, i.e.
in matters that have no direct consequences for others. Additionally, Mill argues for toleration of
diversity of opinions, education, modes of life, and experiments of life. The greater the degree to which freedom and
diversity are present in her society, the greater the likelihood that the
individual will be able to expand her developmental power, and thus, that her
individuality will be effectual. Another
constraint for the expansion of developmental power is that the individual must
exercise it, and if she does not exercise it, she risks not only its reduction,
but also its loss.
A final constraint on the
capacity of the individual to expand her developmental power is negative
political power which is a suppressive form of power that socially restricts
the conduct of individuals, and imposes limits upon their behavioural
range. This exercise can impede the
capacity of individuals to choose behaviours that would facilitate their
growth. Mill is not completely opposed
to the exercise of negative political power.
What Mill argues against is the excessive exercise of negative political
power over the individual. This exercise
is excessive when it restricts freedom and diversity so much that it undermines
active individuality.
The more freedom and
diversity that one's social environment permits, the less likely that one will
remain a passive and relatively under-developed individual. Thus, freedom and diversity serve protective
functions for individual development, whereas their lack endangers active
individuality, and thereby also endangers individual development.
So
too, lack of freedom and lack of diversity undermine the capacity for social
progress. For Mill, social progress
requires significant increases in developmental power. At the personal level, the developmental
power of individuality consists primarily of originality. At the social level, developmental power
consists primarily of developed individuals and persons of genius whose
contributions have proved to be socially effectual and beneficial. The capacity for social developmental power
is protected by such individuals. Also,
eccentrics and individuals who, at times, deviate from the social norms serve
to protect the developmental power of their society. Simply put, the greater the number of these
individuals in society, the greater the protection for the power.
Individuality
by means of its favourable contributions to the capacity for individual
development is of the utmost social utility.
That is to say, individuality is the most likely to improve the common
good, and individuality brings the greatest benefits to society, for
individuality produces social progress.
For Mill, social progress means social change with positive qualities,
such as political improvements, especially increases in liberty and justice, moral,
social, cultural, and intellectual improvements. Also, social progress can include the
increased general psychological well-being of society's members. Individuality is crucial for the social
attainment of happiness. For, according
to Mill, the amount of social happiness[6]
depends on the happiness of the members of society, and their happiness is
facilitated by the satisfaction of their particular psychological and
biological developmental needs and the consequential growth of their natures.
Mill
gives an account of the interrelationship between freedom and power. Arguing that Mill gives both negative and
positive accounts of freedom, Baum (1998) finds that
Mill's
developmental view of individuality and autonomy leads him to articulate an
indispensable account of the interrelationship between freedom and power. Freedom, he maintains, consists of both the
absence of burdensome constraints on people's possible actions and the capacity
of persons for self-determination and self-government. (p. 215)
Mill views the negative aspect of freedom as
freedom from others' excessive exercise of political and social power over
one's inner and outer conduct. He views
the positive aspect of freedom as freedom to discover and make one's nature,
articulate one's character, determine one's mode of life, and, ultimately,
learn to identify the idiosyncratic requirements for one's happiness. In this way, he connects the positive aspect
of freedom with developmental power. An
examination of Mill’s On Liberty suggests that power over is not
the problem that he targets. 'Power
over' can be exercised socially, interpersonally or intra-personally. Simply stated, developmental power is power over
the development of one's nature and thus a capacity for free control over one's
actions. The negative form of political
power is the capacity to influence the behaviour of others, whereas the
positive form of political power is the capacity to determine one's behaviour
or to protect oneself from others' interference with one's behaviour. Developmental power, for Mill, is neither
completely a negative form of political power, nor a problem. As well, individuals can exercise power over
others in ways that assist other individuals to properly discipline their
natures, i.e. beneficially exercise power over their natures, so that, for
example, they cultivate their social sympathy.
In this way, even power over others is not necessarily a corrupt form of
power. Therefore, Mill does not suggest
a clear cut distinction between negative and positive political power as many
thinkers today construe it. Mill does
not argue for the complete elimination of negative political power (power over)
or its sources, e.g. customs. Rather, he
argues against the inappropriate[7]
use of negative political power and against excessive[8]
conformity to custom. Negative political
power works against utility when negative political power is used to impose
unnecessary restrictions upon individuals.
Developmental power (power over oneself) serves utility, for developmental
power consists of abilities that when exercised by the individual can have
progressive social consequences.
To explore how Mill assigns
utility, the second chapter of this thesis will find support for the following
five interpretive hypotheses regarding power which can affect the degrees of
freedom and utility possible for various individuals. First, Mill treats developmental power more
as a positive than a negative form of political power. He characterizes a psychobiological minority
with higher levels of developmental power, and thereby also with a greater
capacity to benefit others and themselves through their freedom. This is problematic because it implies that a
small social group is more likely than other groups to serve the common good.
The second interpretive
hypothesis is that Mill negatively correlates[9]
the amount of negative political power that a person has with the amount of
developmental power that she has. Mill emphasises
the morally negative aspects of negative political power. He characterizes the masses of persons with
higher levels of negative political power, and thereby with the lack of
capacity to benefit others and themselves through their freedom. This is problematic because it implies that
they lack the capacity to serve the common good. The third interpretive hypothesis is that
Mill positively correlates original actions with progressive consequences. He attributes original actions to the
developmental elite. This is problematic
because it implies that the developmental elite have a utility advantage above
others, since they are most likely to contribute to social progress. The fourth interpretive hypothesis is that
Mill positively correlates conformist actions with regressive
consequences. Mill causally attributes
conformist actions to the societal majority.
This is problematic because it implies that the majority of persons are
the least likely to serve the common good.
The first to fourth interpretive hypotheses will find support in the
second and third chapters of this thesis.
Mill positively correlates
the exercise of positive political power with improved psychological well-being
and the attainment of individual happiness.
The fifth interpretive hypothesis is that, in contrast to his favourable
view of positive political power, for Mill, the informal exercise of negative
political power includes mental coercion.
As the first and second hypotheses discussed, Mill characterizes the
developmental elite as having more positive political power than the masses of
persons, and he characterizes the masses as having, and promoting, more
negative political power than the developmental elite. This is problematic because it implies that
the masses are to blame for lack of social happiness, whereas the developmental
elite are the most likely to contribute to social happiness. The fifth interpretive hypothesis will find
support in the third chapter's part entitled "The Justice of
Utilitarianism: Just for the
Elite."
As mentioned in the
discussion for the second hypothesis, Mill characterizes ordinary persons as
having a greater likelihood for the exercise of the morally corrupt form of
negative political power, and he characterizes intellectuals with the exercise
of progressive positive political power.
Because of his interest in the maximization of actions that have
progressive consequences, Mill is concerned with the need to minimize the
morally corrupt form of negative political power, and to maximize the
developmental power of society. He calls
upon people to tolerate diversity in order to reduce society's exercise of
negative political power and permit individuals to exercise their developmental
power. Mill aspires for society to
assign greater political power to individuals with the most developmental
power.
Mill claims that individuals
who have the most developmental power in society tend to have the least
political power. That claim is
inconsistent with his other claim that the actions of developmentally powerful
individuals are more likely to produce social progress than the actions of
persons who have more negative political power.
Since the capacity to add to, or effect, social progress depends on the
capacity for politically and socially influential actions, it remains to be
clarified what Mill means by the claim that individuals who are the most likely
to bring about progressive consequences are less powerful.[10] The response to that question I provide in
the second chapter is that Mill positively links the political and social
influence of developmentally powerful individuals to the positive form of
political power, of which he implies there is a deficiency. But he does not make such a link to the negative
form, of which he claims that there is an excess. Thus, Mill thinks that the placement of more
formal political power in the hands of individuals who have greater levels of
developmental power would foster positive political power and reduce negative
political power.
The
third thesis chapter, entitled "The Progress of the Elite," argues
that Mill's developmental elitism, including moral, intellectual, and political
elitist aspects, fosters political inequality.
Also, the absolute notion of political equality that Mill accepts is
counterproductive to the maximization of individual development. Mill's elitist claims about developmental
differences and the nature of individual development, if accepted, would result
in a greater likelihood that the elite would make self-fulfilling prophecies[11]
against the societal majority's development maximization. In particular Mill denies the capacity of the
least developable individuals to meaningfully be history makers.
Mill
claims that the active exercise of individuality causes individual development,
that individual development can cause progress, and that individual progress
can cause history. Without
individuality, there is no individual development, and without individual and
social progress, there is no history.
Mill claims that, more indirectly, individuality causes social progress
and individual development causes history.
Social progress depends on favourable moments in the struggle between
individuality and despotic custom.[12] History involves the struggle of
developmental power to overcome the excesses of negative political power and to
reach greater levels of the expression of individuality and thereby human
freedom. Thus, history is the purposive
and political movement towards the individualization of humankind.
The
second chapter's parts on experiments of life and the third chapter argue that
Mill's social epistemological prescriptions for the advancement of
developmental power by means of self-education promote the developmental power
of the developmental elite, not the developmental power of the whole of
society. The problem is that Mill's
conception of individual development, upon which those prescriptions are based,
makes some un-parsimonious or unnecessarily strong assumptions about human
nature. In particular, Mill’s
assumptions about the inherent differences among the individual levels of
developmental power are counterproductive to the pursuit of the maximization of
the developmental power of every individual.
His assumptions about individual inherent differences set limitations for
the utility that is possible for most individuals. Specifically, the way that Mill assigns high
utility to an exclusive set of mental attributes is counterproductive to the
aim to maximize the utility of every member of society, or their capacity to serve
the common good.
A
serious problem with Mill’s freedom-utilitarian conception of individual
development is that its assignment of utility lacks impartiality; that
assignment is both elitist and politically egoist. These biases lead the project to be
inconsistent with its aim for political equality which according to Mill is the
essence of justice. The project is based
on the belief that society should accept certain practices because they will
benefit society. The belief is
incoherent because the consequentialist arguments that support it imply that
those practices would directly benefit mainly the developmental elite who
should rule society. Mill fails to see
that, if their society gives them unequal levels of political power, the
political interest conflicts between the developmentally powerful and the
underdeveloped or the least developable would intensify. Society would conduct this differential
assignment on the basis of the various levels of developmental power which the
developmental elite presume the society's members have. However, Mill does not urge society to
consider how this assignment would affect the capacity of the underdeveloped
individuals to satisfy their various psychological developmental needs. Thus, Mill's conception of individual
development promotes political inequality.
An
additional sign of Mill's lack of impartiality is that his conception of
individual development is also one-sided because of its political egoism. Mill accepts assumptions about human nature
that are in line with the political interests of the intellectual minority
group to which he belongs. He assigns
more value to the characteristics and causal attributes that reflect his
individual nature. He fails to see the
oppressive implications of his development maximization principles for persons
whom the developmental elite treat as the underdeveloped or least
developable. In short, Mill's project
offers a politically biased assignment of utility.
The
assignment is unnecessarily politically exclusive, because it is based on
un-parsimonious or unnecessarily strong assumptions about human nature; these
were explained previously. Even worse,
his consideration of differences is elitist, for he prefers the political power
of individuals whom he considers have a greater capacity to effectively
exercise such power because of their greater ability to obtain developmental
power; he recommends that the developmental elite should rule. The problematic bias is Mill's failure to consider
how the developmental elite's rule could undermine the capacity of the
underdeveloped to meet their various developmental needs. That lack of consideration for developmental
interests different from his own contributes to the politically egoistic nature
of his argumentation. By accepting
elitist and unparsimonious assumptions, he sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy
against not only the developmental power, but, because developmental power
affects utility, also the utility of most individuals. Consequently, the freedom-utilitarianism that
Mill proposes is weak.
The
fourth thesis chapter, entitled "Freedom of Expression and Cultural
Imperialism over the Truth," argues that Mill's view of free speech
misdirects his freedom-utilitarian project's social epistemology. What Mill considers socially unrestricted
speech lacks the functions for the enhancement of epistemic and individual
development that he claims it has.
Concerned with negative
political power because its excess interferes with liberty, Mill makes
recommendations to optimize liberty.
Mill claims that the developmental elite's exercise of power, whether
that power is negative or positive, is more likely to be virtuous than that of
others, and would optimize positive freedom because it would optimize negative
freedom, as the fourth chapter will explain.
Mill thinks that greater positive freedom facilitates the exercise, and
expansion, of individual developmental power, and thus also enhances the
capacity of society for progress.
Mill's
prescriptions for epistemic progress hinder the freedom-utilitarian project's
capacity to maximize utility through its promotion of the individual's exercise
of freedom. Political egoism again
misinforms the freedom-utilitarian project's social epistemological
recommendations. Mill inadequately considers
the likely consequences of the freedom-utilitarian project's recommended
practices for freedom. That project
prescribes the socially unrestricted practice of speech, but this practice
conflicts with the maximization of utility.
The recommendation for socially unrestricted speech is socially and
cognitively incoherent, as the fourth chapter of this thesis will explain. Consequently, that project is unlikely to
serve the social and epistemic utility which Mill claims that it can.
Unfortunately,
Mill's treatment of free speech and opinion formation is inconsistent with the
maximization of utility. Mill clearly
demands "absolute freedom" for cognitive expression (CW, 18, Ch. 1,
¶12). He writes: "Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign" (CW, 18, Ch. 1, ¶9). Further, Mill clearly states that it is
"obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining"
the overt expression of opinions (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶42). Thus, Mill makes clear his position on free
speech: society should not politically
or legally restrict speech.
My responses to Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project are consistent with the aims of his project and
with many of its claims. For instance,
the most developable individuals, if there are such individuals, require social
discipline to prevent them from impeding their personal development as well as
others' development, according to Mill.
So too, I add, for opinion formation and opinion expression to be free,
there must be social regulations to optimize their freedom, to give society
rational justification for the claim that opinion formation and opinion`
expression are free, and to prevent the tyranny of the politically strong.
That tyranny, as the fourth
chapter of this thesis argues, is likely to occur under the condition of what
Mill considers socially unrestricted speech and opinion formation. The acquisition of the multi-sided truth
which Mill seeks to promote is unlikely in a politically unequal context. The main point of the fourth chapter is that
under "unrestricted" expression, which is invisibly restricted
expression, the formation of truth would be elitist and thus inconsistent with
the promotion of cultural diversity, the advancement of rationality and mental
independence, and the synthesis of truth.
CHAPTER 2:
DIVERSITY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL POWER
Mill
calls for toleration of social diversity because social diversity is a
necessary condition for the expansion of individual developmental power. Social diversity facilitates the individual's
capacity to developmentally and epistemically benefit from free individual
expression. In turn, freedom of
individual expression fosters social diversity.
The second section of this chapter will focus on the central role of
individuality in the expansion of developmental power, whereas the third
section will focus on the instrumental role of social diversity in that
expansion.
The
position of this chapter is that political egoism weakens Mill's
freedom-utilitarian argument that the freedom of individual expression helps to
maximize utility. That argument's
consequentialist considerations are elitist in politically egoistic ways that
prevent the project from being adequately utilitarian. In particular, its one-sided premises
emphasize that it is socially important to maximize the developmental
capacities of the individuals whom Mill presumes are strong; these individuals
belong to the same developmental group to which he belongs. He even argues that society should permit the
rule of the developmental elite for the maximization of utility.
Mill
claims that human nature is inherently diverse so much that the various
individual natures have various needs for their development maximization. To take into account their various
developmental needs, he recommends the social toleration of diverse cultures
and opinions, and the free expression of individuality so that the inherently
various individual natures may have a chance to develop themselves. The free expression of individuality includes
not only choice of lifestyle but also free opinion formation and what Mill
considers socially and politically unrestricted expression of one's opinions.
Since Mill's argument that
free expression of individuality should be socially permitted is utilitarian,
its argumentative strength depends on the adequacy of its consequentialism,
which is the approach to arguing for certain actions based on the consequences
of those actions. For, utilitarianism
considers the consequences of actions to understand their utility. I maintain that if it is to advance
utilitarian aims, the strength of a consequentialist argument for certain
social conditions requires that all or at least most individuals are (1)
benefactors to the society by contributing to those social conditions and (2)
the societal conditions' beneficiaries.
Yet, Mill assumes that the characteristics that are most likely to
contribute to the social conditions that he recommends are inherently rare or
scarce, so much that only a few individuals could contribute to those social
conditions. Thus, he expects only a
societal minority to meaningfully add to the common good. Further, he expects that the minority of
strong individuals are most likely to immediately and directly benefit from the
social conditions, whereas he expects that the societal majority would benefit
from the social conditions mainly in the long-term and indirectly.
This chapter explores Mill's
elitist assumptions and claims about inherent differences among individual
natures that reduce the strength of his main argument that free individual
expression maximizes utility. This
chapter will reconstruct the components of that argument, with focus on its
premise that freedom of individual expression facilitates the expansion of
individual developmental power. To
reveal how individual developmental power affects the utility of one's actions,
the chapter explores how Mill assigns utility to multiple categories of human
beings based on the various degrees of developmental power of which he presumes
they are capable.
Problematic bias is evident
in Mill's lack of consideration for whether persons who are under-developed can
obtain the same developmental and epistemic benefits as the developmental
elite. He claims that the vast majority
of persons who are under-developed lack the characteristics that he considers
necessary for service to the common good, but does not consider whether this
lack will adversely impact their developmental outcomes. Mill inadequately considers the consequences
that the individual practices that he recommends most likely would have for the
development of those whom he presumes have normal or weak individual
natures. Thus, his argumentation is
one-sided; his arguments for free individual expression largely disregard the
interests of persons whom he presumes their inherent nature excludes from the
developmental elite.
This chapter finds support
for the following four interpretive hypotheses regarding individual capacities
for freedom, power, and progress which are relevant to an individual's capacity
to add to utility. First, Mill
positively correlates the innate capacity for individuality with the capacity
to improve individual developmental power.
The second interpretive hypothesis is that Mill negatively correlates
the degree of negative political power with the degree of developmental power
that the person possesses. He
characterizes the underdeveloped or what he considers the least developable
group with higher levels of negative political power. In other words, (1) the less negative
political power persons actually have, the more they have developmental power,
and vice versa, (2) the more negative political power persons have, the less
they are capable of developmental power.
Particularly, Mill claims that the masses of persons have more negative
political power than intellectuals. He
characterize the masses with, and causally attributes to the masses, the
exercise of negative political power over one another and especially over
statistical deviants, and thereby the interference with, or the reduction of,
the chances that individuals will cultivate, benefit from, and benefit others
by means of their developmental power.
Therefore, he does not assume only that the masses are less capable of
individuality and thus of developmental power and social diversity. He also assumes that they are more likely to interfere
with, and exercise negative power over, the developmental power of others than
intellectuals are, because the masses, in his view, threaten social diversity
and thereby endanger the availability of social opportunities that individuals
need to expand their developmental power.
The third interpretive
hypothesis is derived from the second way that Mill treats developmental power
as a positive form of political power:
Mill positively correlates the degree of the developmental power of a
person with the degree to which she likely will choose actions that have
progressive consequences, that is, original actions. Mill causally attributes progressive
consequences to the actions of persons whom he thinks have greater levels of
developmental power.
The fourth interpretive
hypothesis is that Mill negatively correlates the degree of the developmental
power of a person with the degree to which she likely will commit conformist
actions which result in mere social change, if any social change at all. He causally attributes a greater likelihood
to promote conformist actions to the masses of persons than to the intellectual
minority of persons. As opposed to
progressive social change, he positively correlates the masses with social
change that is either (1) the empty form of social change, i.e. social change
without improvement, or change for change's sake, or (2) the regressive form of
social change, i.e. change for the worse.
II. Individuality and Developmental Power
For Mill, the individual
characteristics and causal attributes that have high utility because they
enhance an individual's developmental power include genius, active
individuality, originality, intellectualism, impartiality, eccentricity, and
emotional intensity. This section draws
from On Liberty (1859) to explore how Mill assigns various levels of
social utility to at least two kinds of individuality and to individual
attributes based on their social consequences.
Individuality has active and passive forms. In the first part of this section, entitled
"Individual Developmental Power and Human Nature," I will discuss
that the maintenance of active individuality is important because it adds to
the satisfaction of one's idiosyncratic developmental needs, and thus
contributes to the perfection of one's nature based on its own ideal. In contrast to active individuality, passive
individuality can at most hope to satisfy social ideals of perfect human
nature, and these ideals are not necessarily consistent with the satisfaction
of one's individual psychological needs. The second part of this section,
entitled "The Individual Characteristics that Have High Utility,"
concerns how Mill assigns high levels of utility to presumably exclusive
individual attributes. In the third part
of this section, entitled "Mill's Argument that Society Should Grant the
Developmentally Powerful Greater Political Power," I will evaluate Mill's
argument that intellectuals and persons of genius deserve high levels of formal
political power, and discuss its fallacies and unacceptable assumptions. Third, in this section, especially in the
part entitled "Argument that the Free Expression of Individuality Adds to
Progress," I will show how Mill claims that freedom affects individuality,
and, in turn, individuality affects epistemic and cultural progress.
i) Individuality and Human Nature
Here,
I will show that Mill implicitly distinguishes between active and passive
individuality, and he expects that individual natures vary in their likelihood
to lead an active individuality. One
type of individuality benefits from free expression and is most likely to
benefit society through that expression.
The other is the product of social restraint and lack of free
exercise. Mill emphasizes that
individuals can follow and make their nature only so long as they maintain
their individuality active. Further,
Mill suggests that passive individuality reaches a point in time at which it is
no longer reversible. In light of these
developmental limitations, I will discuss the implications for the
developmental capacities of the individual who has either the active or passive
form.
From
the third chapter in On Liberty, entitled "Of Individuality, as one
of the Elements of Well-being," it is evident that Mill is preoccupied with the adequate and proper cultivation of human
nature. This cultivation requires a broad
theory of life. He stresses that
"human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and
develope itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces
which make it a living thing" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶4, emphasis added).
Because the human nature of all cannot fit into the same ideal type,
treatment of human nature as if it can conform to the same model impedes its
dynamic capacity for growth. Precisely
because of this impediment, Mill criticizes the Calvinistic theory, according
to which, "human nature being radically corrupt, there is no redemption
for any one until human nature is killed within him" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶7). The Calvinistic
theory promotes passive individuality, and represents a tendency towards a
"narrow theory of life" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶8) under which society cannot recognize the dynamic capacity
of individual development. Mill,
however, prefers a broad theory of life, since only through the guidance of
such a theory can the growth process of the individual be kept active.
Mill’s use of the
expressions "while mankind are imperfect" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶1), “ideal perfection of
human nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 4, ¶5) "perfect
human being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5), and his
criticism of Calvinistic theory combined with his belief that human error is
"corrigible" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶7)
show that Mill believes in some sort of human perfectibility,[13]
not just improvability. For example,
Mill writes: “Among the works of man,
which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first
in importance surely is man himself” (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶4). For another
example, after he discusses that persons should be allowed to make errors in
matters that regard only the self, Mill claims that, nevertheless, society
should tolerate personal judgments about the qualities that regard only other
selves. He writes:
I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by
others ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or
deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the qualities
which conduce to his own good, he is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection
of human nature. If he is grossly
deficient in those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will
follow. (CW, 18, Ch. 4, ¶5,
emphasis added)
Mill considers the capacity of
social criticism to be constructively useful to the criticized. He writes:
Though doing no worse to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to
judge him, and feel him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and
since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it
is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other
disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. (CW, 18, Ch. 4, ¶5, emphasis added)
If one is to benefit from such
criticism, the criticism must be true, and it must be possible to modify one’s
nature in the proportion the criticism calls for. However, it is uncertain to what extent Mill
thinks that one can modify one's nature.
On the one hand, he writes that one can develop and modify the expression of one's nature through one's
"own culture" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5).
One's nature is one's work (CW, Ch. 3, ¶4, 18).
On
the other hand, although he implies that one has a chance to contribute to the
value of one's "comparative worth as a human being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶4), Mill claims that
personal worth depends not only on what one does (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶4). What one is also
matters. The biologically inherent
mental capacities with which one can make one's nature, in Mill's view, vary
from person to person. Some
developmental factors are beyond one's control.
For example, "the inherent force of the human
understanding" is unequal across human beings (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶7, emphasis added).
According to Mill, only a few have a strong inherent capacity to
understand, and even in their rare case it is only relatively greater than that
of others.[14] Additionally, Mill suggests that some persons
have more inherent potential than others, for example, to experience strong
sentiments, which he claims add to their potential to develop a strong conscience,
as the third section in the next chapter will discuss. This entails that Mill thinks that some
persons have innate advantages in their moral perfectibility.
"The
danger which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of
personal impulses and preferences" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶6), warns Mill. Persons who presumably have a lower capacity
for individual development pose a greater threat than those who have a higher
capacity, because the former are most likely to suffer from this deficiency. The development of their individuality
reduces the level of threat which they pose.
Since they have a lower level of developmental power, they will always
likely pose this threat more than the developmentally powerful.
Mill
discusses that individual development requires one to follow and make one's
nature; to follow one's nature, one must observe one's inherent potential, and
to make one's nature, one must put effort towards one's individual
development. Mill is often unclear in
regards to the distinctions and connections that he draws between the two
developmental requirements.
Nevertheless,
it is clear that with the analogy of the growth of plants, Mill suggests that
environmental constraints restrict inherent growth potential (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶14). In Mill's view, the inherent potential is not
fixed, at least for being lowered. For
example, the religious and cultural pressures of society can kill human nature.
Active
individuality protects and fosters individual growth. The exercise of one's human capacities
provides one's inherent nature with the nourishment that it needs. In contrast, passive individuality threatens
the capacity for individual growth. Once
one has not followed one's inherent potential for a long enough period of time,
one has no nature left to follow, since one's human capacities have become
"withered and starved" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶6).
Therefore, evidently, Mill implies that human nature can degrade, that
is, that it can become less human.
Mill does not
follow his logic to its final implications.
If one has no inherent human potential left to follow, it is not
possible to have a human nature left to cultivate through one's efforts. If one lacks the capacity to understand
oneself, one cannot intelligently follow one's nature and learn how to direct
one's individual developmental efforts.
Thus, Mill suggests that the individual cannot reverse the degradation
of her inherent human potential.
That passivity
can kill human nature holds implications for the developmental power possible
for, and thereby the utility of, the dead natures. The dead natures would lack the capacity for
individual development. Persons who live
as passive individuals for a certain length of time, which Mill does not
specify, lose the capacity to exercise active individuality. Mill does not consider whether dead human
natures can rise again. If society
cannot assist the rebirth of a dead human nature, there are worse implications
than if it is only the individual who cannot reverse her passive condition. For example, rehabilitation would not
effectively direct older passive individuals away from criminal
activities. Mill emphasizes
self-development, not social intervention in support of individual
development. Thus, it is unlikely that
he considers the potential helpfulness of society to reverse the degradation of
human nature that results from lack of use.
Instead, he suggests that society is most useful when it does not
interfere, in the first place, with individual development. Mill thinks that if persons were left alone
to do what they think best suits their development, freed from social
censorship, they could "grow and thrive" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶6). Therefore, to the question of whether
individuality that has for long been passive can reactivate, Mill provides no
direct and clear response, and, if anything, his work implies a response in the
negative.
ii) The Individual Characteristics that Have High
Utility
Mill
assigns high utility to eccentricity, intellectualism, emotional intensity,
individuality, originality, impartiality, and genius, but he claims that high
levels of these are uncommon. Here, I
will textually support this chapter's position that Mill assigns utility to
various personal characteristics in elitist ways. The third chapter of this thesis will discuss
Mill's claims about the innate scarcity of impartiality and emotional
intensity, and provide additional textual and argumentative support for the claim
of elitism. The current part of this
chapter explores Mill's view of the causal connections among freedom, these
attributes, the expansion of developmental power, and progress including
improvements in freedom, and cultural and epistemic improvements.
Mill
posits that freedom lets individuality be active, which, in turn, fosters
individual progress. For Mill, progress
is the "development of the capacity for self-direction" (Harris,
1956, p. 173). In this way, progress
requires personal autonomy and increases in social freedom, i.e. freedom of the
individual from society’s interference.
In Mill's view, the individual must be free from society to determine
herself. Mill posits that individual
development is a necessary causal condition for social advancement, and
suggests that if society were to recognize this link, "there would be no
danger that liberty should be undervalued" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶2). Individual development increases the
individual's social utility, for that development leads to individual
happiness, and thereby also to social happiness. He writes:
It
is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves,
but by cultivating it, and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the
rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful
object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do
them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and
animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating
feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race,
by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his
individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore
capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of
life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is
more in the mass which is composed of them. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9, emphasis added)
Mill advises that society should foster the
"free development of individuality" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶2), because it
is "one of the leading essentials of well-being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶2). Individual development directly
contributes to "civilisation, instruction, education" and
"culture" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶2).
As well, Mill expresses
concern for the need to develop consideration for the good of others. He asserts that society should restrict the
actions of individuals only to the extent that the socially imposed restraints
will shape individuality to be in accordance with the good of others, and the
social purpose of justice. Consider:
As
much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human
nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with;
but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human
development. The means of development
which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations
to the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development
of other people. And even to himself
there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his
nature, rendered possible by the restraint upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid rules of justice for
the sake of others, developes the feelings and capacities which have the good
of others for their object. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9, emphasis added)
His discussion about the wisdom of ordinary
people who call upon individuals endowed with genius to govern also expresses
the same concern for the need to develop consideration for the good of
others. Mill writes that he is
not
countenancing the sort of 'hero-worship' which applauds the strong man of
genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his
bidding in spite of itself. All he can
claim is, freedom to point out the way.
The power of compelling others into it, is not only inconsistent with the
freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself.
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13)
He asserts that the spirit of
improvement should not drive persons of genius to undermine the spirit of
liberty, because to do so would undermine the freedom of others and corrupt the
self.
It
is clear, therefore, that Mill's ideas on individual development could not
justify overt tyrannical actions of persons of genius. He aspires for an age in which the people
would reach a stage of individual development sufficient for them to accept,
appreciate and support the emergence of an “intellectual aristocracy” (Harris,
1956, p. 167). Nevertheless, to the
extent that Mill promotes intellectual elitism in the distribution of social
power, his position on innate differentials in developmental power supports
subtle forms of the tyranny of persons that have genius, as I will argue in the
third section of the third thesis chapter.
In
Mill's view, the proper development of individuality is high in social
utility. First, personal development
requires the development of individuality.
Once developed, the individual can contribute to the development of
other individuals. Mill writes: "Individuality is the same thing with
development, and that it is only the cultivation of
individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings…these
developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped " (CW, 18, Ch.
3, ¶10, emphasis
added). Thus, individual developmental
power contributes to the capacity of society for progress.
The
result of individuality is originality which also has social utility, for
originality can add to epistemic and cultural progress. Mill writes:
It
will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human
affairs. There is always need of persons
not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are
true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more
enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶11)
Mill criticizes people, however,
because they tolerate originality on only abstract grounds, and do not actually
accept or engage in its practice (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶12).
He encourages them to accept originality in "thought and
action," because they too could benefit from originality, first, by fully
"opening their eyes" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶12). Doing so would
permit them the chance to be original themselves (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶12).
Further,
Mill suggests that eccentricity serves a social purpose in that eccentricity
demonstrates by example how to resist the tyranny of popular opinion. He writes:
In
this age, the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee
to custom, is itself a service.
Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity
a reproach, it is desirable, in order to break through that tyranny, that
people should be eccentric. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13)
Mill views lack of eccentricity as
a sign of the tyranny of popular opinion; he says, "that so few now dare
to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the time" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13). Mill positively correlates the
"amount of eccentricity" present in a society with the "amount
of genius" and with attributes that he thinks contribute to the
development of genius such as "strength of character," "mental
vigour," and "moral courage" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13).
A problem of how society affects
individual development is that the common modes of thought hinder it. For instance, persons tend to resist the individual
spontaneity which eccentric or uncommon modes of life express. For, persons tend to not have that
spontaneity and it is not in their immediate political interest to recognize
its worth. Mill writes:
the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the
common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any
regard on its own account. The
majority being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make them what they are),
cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody . . .
[Spontaneity is] looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and perhaps
rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what [the majority of moral
and social] reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for mankind.
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶2, emphasis added)
In the above passage, Mill implies that
individual spontaneity positively correlates with eccentricity, and that
individual spontaneity has both social utility and intrinsic worth. He observes that many persons are too vainly
focused on the worth of their own way of life to recognize the worth of
spontaneity.
Because
Mill presumes persons of genius are the most likely individuals to possess
superior potentials for originality, which, as we have seen, is a requirement
for social progress, he recognizes that intellectualism is high in social
utility. In his view, it is especially important for society to permit
intellectual and creative individuals as much freedom of expression as they
need to adequately develop their superior social utility. For, it is
the exceptionally intelligent and creative minority which is most capable of
individuality, and, thus, this minority of individuals has greater potential
for social utility. Mill views such individuals as inherently and
developmentally superior to others, and warns against “reducing” (CW, 18, Ch.
3, ¶11) their nature to that which is
common. Mill writes:
Persons
of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority; but
in order to have them, it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they
grow. Genius can only breathe freely in
an atmosphere of freedom. Persons of
genius are . . . more individual than
any other people -- less capable, consequently, of fitting themselves,
without hurtful compression, into any of the small number of moulds which
society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own
character. If from timidity they consent
to be forced into one of these moulds, and to let all that part of themselves
which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded, society will be
little the better for their genius. If
they are of a strong character, and break their fetters, they become a mark for
the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to commonplace.
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶11, emphasis added)
In the above way, Mill suggests
that the availability of a few lifestyle options is far from sufficient for the
development of the capacity for genius.
The fewer options that there are, the more common are social
practices. The exercise of choice among
things that are commonly done is more a matter of conformity than
individuality. But the activity level of
individuality benefits from the exercise of choice among original and various
things. Thus, there is no better
alternative to have than many alternatives.
The more life style alternatives that are available, the more that one
can exercise one's individuality.
In sum, original
individuals permit the creation of multiple life-style alternatives. Originality both adds benefits to, and
benefits from, the development of individuality. Thus, there is a mutual, positive
relationship between originality and individuality. Mill's discussion on the need to encourage
eccentricity suggests that where there is originality, there is
individuality. Also, it suggests that
the more these two are present, the more there is eccentricity, but that where
there is eccentricity, there is not necessarily genius. Eccentricity can serve some social utility,
for eccentricity models a variety of ways of life. The more the originality serves social
utility in terms of social progress, the more there is genius. The capacity for genius at least initially
requires eccentricity, but genius stands above it in terms of social
utility. Thus, according to Mill, genius
not being entirely innately, or in today's terms genetically, based depends on
more than self-development; it also, importantly, depends on the social consequences
of one's originality.
iii) Mill's Argument that Society Should Grant the
Developmentally Powerful Greater Political Power
Here, I will reconstruct and
evaluate Mill's argument that society should give persons of genius greater
political power. That argument suffers
from inconsistent premises.
Additionally, the argument suffers from unacceptable elitist
assumptions, and I will discuss two of those assumptions. One elitist assumption, which I will discuss
here, is that high levels of individuality are inherently scarce. The second assumption is that the masses are
less culturally diverse than intellectuals.
Other elitist assumptions include that there is a developmental elite
that has intellectual and moral developmental advantages, which result from
their superior endowments of impartiality and emotional intensity, that most
individuals do not have, and these are explored in the next chapter of this
thesis.
For
Mill, the societal majority, which not surprisingly consists of persons whose
intellectual experiences and political interests are different from his own,
are not capable of much social utility.
So, persons who lack the capacity to serve social utility are most wise
when they simply let the gifted few set the public policies. He writes:
No
government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political
acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did
or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let
themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the
counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things
comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one
individual. The honour and glory of the average
man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can
respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his
eyes open. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13, emphasis added)
An implication of such views is
that they could serve many self-fulfilling prophecies, as the next chapter's
third section, "The Elitist Assignment of Social Utility," discusses.
If
one reads the passages, which the first part of this section provided, and in
which Mill discusses the social consequences of the exercise of individual
characteristics that cause individual development, it is evident that he
emphasizes the superior developmental characteristics of persons of
genius. From this emphasis, one can
quite easily get the impression that Mill's basic argument that society should
assign greater social power to persons of genius rests on the claim that they
have more developmental power. Mill
supports the argument that the intellectual elite should be the political elite
in at least two structurally problematic ways.
In the first way, he seems to argue in a circle. Society's intellectual superiors have more
individual developmental power, which is also a form of positive political
power, because individual developmental power contributes to social
developmental power and thereby to the common good. So, intellectuals deserve greater political
power to maximize the common good. Additionally,
individuals who can have more individuality, i.e., individuals who have greater
developmental power which is a form of political power, can counteract the
political power of persons who lack strong individuality. This capacity that Mill considers protective
applies more when the developmentally and thus politically powerful are granted
greater political power, for example, when society encourages them to express
their greater individuality.
The second way that Mill
supports the argument that society should grant the developmental elite greater
political power suffers at the very least from inconsistent premises. For Mill, geniuses possess greater individual
developmental power, but not greater political power. Mill states:
"In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to
real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout
the world is to render mediocrity
the ascendant power among mankind" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13, emphasis
added). Mill claims that power tends to
be possessed by persons of mediocrity.
He continues: "The only
power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make
themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses" (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, ¶13). Popular opinion was to
become the most powerful agency in his time.
Mill writes:
in bringing about a general
similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment,
in this and other free countries, of the
ascendancy of public opinion in the State.
As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them
to disregard the opinion of the
multitude, gradually become levelled; as the very idea of resisting the
will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a will,
disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians; there ceases
to be any social support for non-conformity--any substantive power in society,
which, itself opposed to the ascendancy
of numbers, is interested in taking under
its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public.
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶12, emphasis added)
While
he does not fully acknowledge that the ascendance of the multitude of persons
itself results from increases in liberty and thus social progress, Mill speaks
of the ascendance as an ongoing change that is counterproductive to social
progress. Thus, society should
counteract the ascendance, in his view.
He stresses that his complaint is not with the fact that mediocrity
controls itself, but rather with the fact that "the government of
mediocrity" is "mediocre government" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13).
Mill
suggests that the more that the masses of mediocrity gain control over society,
the greater becomes the extent to which individuality can benefit society. He writes:
when
the opinions of masses of merely average
men are everywhere . . . becoming the
dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be the
more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher
eminences of thought. It is in these
circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of
being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently from the mass. (CW,
18, Ch. 13, ¶13, emphasis added)
In the above way, Mill asserts that to
counteract the excessive power of mediocrity over society, people should
encourage the individuality of intellectuals and persons of genius. Simply stated, the greater the excess of
mediocre power, the greater the need to encourage the expression of the
individuality of the exceptional members of society.[15]
However, it is difficult to
be convinced by Mill's explicit claim that intellectuals do not constitute a
powerful elite, for he clearly characterizes them as having greater
developmental power with all the capacity to socially influence the direction
of progress that it entails. Thus, he
recognizes developmental power as a form of political power. Yet, he ignores this recognition when it is
strategically advantageous for him to do so, in particular, when taking this
into account may not help to persuade society that its intellectual superiors
should also be its political superiors.
Mill implicitly admits that
the developmental power of persons of genius and intellectuals permits them
positive political power with which to direct social progress. This includes the exercise of influence over
the content of progress; for example, the developmental elite originate and
diversify cultural practices, and have influence over what cultures remain
available. Indeed, one reason that Mill
gives for his observation that originality has utility is that originality
makes possible social diversity, for original persons can invent new cultural
practices by means of life experiments.
Originality is a causal factor of the live, "social
experiments" which prevent the degeneration of social life into only a
state in which persons act out traditions, and which keep civilization
alive. This experimental service,
however, according to Mill, can be rendered only by a few individuals to whom I
refer as the developmental elite; in the third chapter of this thesis, I will
show that Mill suggests that intellectuals merit this designation, but I will
argue that to give this designation to any one is unfair because society lacks
reliable means to identify the persons who merit this designation. Mill writes:
It
is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody
alike: there are but few persons, in
comparison with the whole of mankind, whose experiments, if adopted by
others, would be likely to be any improvement on established practice. But these few are the salt of the earth;
without them, human life would become but a stagnant pool. Not only is it they who introduce good things
which did not before exist; it is they who keep the life in those which
already existed. If there were
nothing new to be done, would human intellect cease to be necessary? Would it be a reason why those who do the old
things should forget why they are done, and do them like cattle, not like human
beings? There is only too great a
tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the
mechanical; and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring
originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming
merely traditional, such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock
from anything really alive, and there would be no reason why civilization
should not die out. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶11, emphasis added)
In the above, Mill associates persons who supposedly
cannot creatively and beneficially affect society with death, whereas he
associates with life only the few who are the successful participants in their
original experiments of life. Whereas
the masses tend to conform to the existent cultural practices and add to social
stagnation, the developmental elite are most likely to reject certain practices
and replace them with improved practices.
Mill's argument that society
should grant exceptional intellectuals greater political power is based on some
unproven and elitist assumptions. He
assumes that the small number of individuals who are most capable of
individuality serves a greater diversity function than the masses which he
views as an increasingly homogeneous body.
Thus, the masses "of merely
average men" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13) are, by definition, "mediocre"
and the main sources of developmental interference and diversity
endangerment. "No government by a
democracy or a numerous aristocracy…ever did or could rise above
mediocrity," holds Mill (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶13). He does not expect that the self-education of
the masses can reverse their mediocre and developmentally dangerous
condition. Instead, he implies that the
masses' epistemic capacities are so limited that they cannot obtain adequate
self-knowledge because they cannot benefit from the social knowledge upon which
self-knowledge largely depends, as I will show in this chapter's section,
"Diversity and Developmental Power."
I will further argue that the majority of individuals would not be able
to meaningfully benefit from the knowledge that the developmental elite
acquire, in the fourth chapter's response to Mill's argument that free speech
facilitates the synthesis of truth.
Also, in the fourth chapter, I will show the inconsistencies present in
the endanger and protect associations, and the life and death associations that
Mill makes in his discussion of the rationality of free speech, and in his
claims that both truth and falsehood can add to the societal capacity to
acquire truth.
As we have seen, Mill’s claim
that persons of genius have less political power than others conflicts with his
claim that persons of genius have more developmental power than others. Additionally, Mill's claim that the masses of
persons whom he considers mediocre do not have more developmental power than
persons of genius conflicts with his claim that the "mediocre" masses
are more politically powerful than persons of genius. Political power can enhance the capacity of
an individual to develop her abilities, regardless of what those abilities may
be. No where does Mill claim that the
masses of persons have fewer abilities than the developmental elite, although
he rules out certain abilities for them.
Mill assumes that the masses
lack the individual developmentally powerful abilities which are also the
socially progressive abilities. It is
plausible that Mill thinks that developmentally powerful individuals have more
positive political power, i.e. the disproportionately low level of political
power exercised in society. Yet, they do
not have more negative political power, i.e. the disproportionately higher
level of political power exercised in society.
This explanation is consistent with this chapter's interpretive
hypotheses on the empirical relationships which Mill assumes exist among
intellectuals, the mediocre masses, power, and progress.
Mill's argument that society
should allow the developmentally powerful to lead is weak. For, the validity of the argument depends on
the empirical claims that he makes about inherent individual developmental
capacities, but he cannot substantiate those claims. Mill implies that social progress already
belongs to the developmentally powerful, and that their leadership would
maximize their own utility. He also
implies that social permission for the developmental elite to formally rule
society would contribute little to the utility of others. For Mill says the rule of the developmental
elite would lack direct, beneficial consequences for most members of
society. As I will explain in the
discussion of experiments of life, most persons would not benefit from social
comparison enough to obtain adequate knowledge of self and others and the
knowledge they could obtain would mainly be knowledge originally acquired by
the developmental elite. Hence, the
argument for the rule of the developmental elite is inadequately utilitarian.
iv) Argument
that the Free Expression of Individuality Adds to Progress
Here,
I will show that Mill posits that self-development by means of free individual
expression adds to epistemic and cultural progress. Self-development favourably contributes to
the acquisition of not only self-knowledge but also social knowledge. As well, self-development provides an
individual culture that is more compatible with the satisfaction of the
idiosyncratic, individual developmental needs than the socially available
culture. Thus, self-development
favourably contributes to individuals' happiness and thereby to social
happiness.
Mill
proposes that free individual expression is crucial for self-development
through experiments of life. Consider
the passage below which clearly suggests the proposed experimentation and its
aims. The proposition for developmental
experimentation regards (1) diversity of opinions, (2) diversity of modes of
life which are experiments of life whose worth must be practically proven, and
(3) the free expression of individuality.
For Mill, these conditions are necessary for progress so long as
humankind remains imperfect. The former
two states are the expression of the factor of individuality which is the most
influential factor in individual and social progress. Mill writes:
As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be
different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of
living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of
injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should
be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things
which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person's own character, but
the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is
wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the
chief ingredient of individual and social progress. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶1, emphasis added)
Similarly, there are passages in which Mill
claims that humankind must accept freedom of individual expression, opinions,
and modes of conduct to optimize its intellectual advancement. For this end, Mill optimistically views the
long-term importance of diversity of opinions.
After he argues for free expression from the acquisition of truth and
from the sustenance of the life of truth, Mill introduces his argument that
free expression of opinions is necessary for the synthesis of truth,[16]
in this way:
It
still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity
of opinion advantageous, and will continue to do so until mankind shall
have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems
at an incalculable distance. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶33, emphasis added)
For Mill, diversity of opinions is a necessary
condition for the synthesis of truth.
Mill expects that in the distant future the partial truths[17]
would be combined into the whole truth.
Because
of the importance of individuality's expression through various modes of life
for the purpose of individual development, Mill criticizes the excessive social
restrictions imposed upon the expression of different modes of life. He writes:
In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest,
every one lives under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what
concerns only themselves, the individual or family do not ask themselves--what
do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would
allow the best and highest in me to have fair play and to enable it to grow and
thrive. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶6)
The above passage claims that social
restrictions of the modes of life and modes of conduct restrain the human capacity
for growth, for the restrictions do not permit persons the opportunity to
consider what would be best for their individual development.
With
emphasis on the social utility of free expression, Mill argues that free
expression is a necessary condition for individual development. Through the
promotion of diversity, not only of diverse opinions but also of diverse modes
of conduct, free expression facilitates individual development, and, in turn,
social progress. For example, Mill
writes: "To give any fair play to
the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to
lead different lives. In proportion as
this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to
posterity" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9). Therefore, Mill views freedom as a necessary
condition for the "fair play" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9) of the development of each.
For
Mill, the freedom and diversity requirements
for individual development are secondary to the more utilitarian requirement
that human society should advance. He
thinks that individual development is the main factor in social progress, and
focuses on such development as the central factor in the progress of human
society.
III. Diversity
and Developmental Power
This
section draws from On Liberty (1859) to explore Mill's claims that
social diversity is a necessary condition for individual development, and the
expansion of developmental power.
Particularly, Mill recognizes the development enhancement functions of
diversity including diversity of opinion, education, modes of life, and of
experiments of life. I will discuss
diversity's development enhancement function in the first, third, and fourth
parts of this section.
This
section's second part, entitled "The Rise of Negative Political Power and
the Descent of Developmental Power," finds support for this chapter's four
interpretive hypotheses. These
hypotheses can be listed simply: (1) the
more one is capable of individuality, the more one is developmentally powerful;
(2) the more one is developmentally powerful, the less one can exercise
negative political power; (3) the more one is developmentally powerful, the
more likely one commits actions that have progressive social consequences; and
(4) the less one is developmentally powerful, the more likely one commits
actions that result in mere social change or even regressive social change, if
any social change at all.
Mill
assumes that the developmental problem of the masses of persons whom he
excludes from the category of developed individuals begins with their
relatively lower levels of developmental power.
And, he treats the masses of persons as problem people that interfere
with the development of persons of genius.
Mill characterizes the masses of persons with the greater likelihood to
promote, and choose, actions that result in mere social change, if any change
at all.
In
response to Mill's claims on the empirical relationships among the individual capacities
for freedom, power, and social progress, this section challenges the validity
of Mill's claims on the empirical relationships between intellectuals and the
masses, and the level of power and freedom which Mill assumes they have. The third part of this section, entitled
"The Rise of Negative Political Power and the Descent of Developmental
Power," shows the high questionability of Mill's following claims. He claims that the masses have lower levels
of developmental and positive power, and higher levels of negative power, that
they have less diversity than intellectuals, and, hence, are unlikely to
tolerate diversity, and thus that they hinder free individual expression.
i)
Argument that Diversity Renders Benefits to Individual Development
Mill
argues that society should tolerate diversity because of the social benefits
that diversity renders to the capacity for individual development. For one, Mill argues for diverse modes of
life and modes of conduct, for such are necessary for human growth. He compares persons to plants, and holds that
since persons have various inherent natures as the plants do, persons correspondingly,
i.e. on the basis of their inherent potentials, also have various developmental
needs for growth (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶14). Mill continues:
The same things which are helps to one person towards
the cultivation of his higher nature are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement
to one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order,
while to another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal
life. Such are the differences among
human beings in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and
the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless
there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain
their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic
stature of which their nature is capable. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶14, emphasis
added)
As the above passage suggests,
Mill's human growth argument for diversity of modes of life can be briefly
stated: Because persons are
psycho-biologically and socially different from each other, they must follow
their own life paths, if they are to obtain their optimal developmental
outcomes, and happiness.
Mill
refers to Wilhelm von Humboldt's thought that originality contributes to the
power and development of the individual, for originality gives incentive to (1)
the free expression of individuality and permits (2) the availability of
various situations. Citing von Humboldt,
Mill writes:
the
object 'towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts,
and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must
ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power and development;' that
for this there are two requisites, 'freedom, and variety of
situations;' and that from the union of these arise 'individual vigour and manifold
diversity,' which combine themselves in 'originality.'
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶2, emphasis added)
The above suggests that the
alteration of the degree to which the two necessary conditions are present
affects the strength of the individual developmental power which is possible
under the circumstances. Mill recognizes
that social circumstances can reduce the possible degree of individual
developmental power. He comments that
the second necessary condition for individual development, i.e., variety of
situations is, unfortunately, "everyday diminishing" in England (CW,
18, Ch. 3, ¶18).
Precisely because
it denies a sufficient range of life mode options, Mill objects to the public's
selective toleration of solely those preferences which are within the socially
accepted range. Mill criticizes the
discrepancy between the recognition that there are various preferences across
human beings and the social rejection of the diverse expression of those
preferences. Specifically, he criticizes
the way that persons are deprecated for "doing 'what nobody does' "
or for "not doing 'what everybody does' " (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶14).
ii) Diversity
of Opinions and Diversity of Modes of Life
Here, I will show that Mill
expects that diversity of opinions will diminish in time, because of epistemic
progress. But he is concerned that
diversity of opinions will prematurely diminish because of the ascendance of
the masses. Mill believes that diversity of opinion and diversity
of modes of life diminish due to the ascendance of public opinion and what he
considers “mediocre culture,” as I will discuss in the next part of this chapter. Mill emphasizes the social utility of the
free expression of diverse opinions and diverse modes of conduct, one for
epistemic advancement, and the other for individual and social improvement.
Mill
thinks that the "gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion
is necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and
indispensable" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶31).
He takes such narrowing as a sign of society's approach toward the
truth. He claims that although the loss
of diversity would be a significant drawback, that loss would not put a
complete stop to our ability to sustain the life of truth. He writes:
The
loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a
truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it
against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback
from, the benefit of its universal recognition. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶31)
After actual diversity of opinion ceases, Mill
suggests, we should substitute for actual diversity of opinion the attitude of
acting-as-if persons remain who have not yet converted to the truth. He writes:
Where
this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should like to see the
teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it; some
contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the
learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient
champion, eager for his conversion. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶31)
Thus, Mill suggests that when society obtains
the desired truth society should act as if it has not yet obtained it in order
to sustain that outcome.
However, Mill does not expect that diverse self-knowledge
will diminish in time. Since diverse
modes of life facilitate the acquisition of self-knowledge, which, in turn,
adds to individual happiness, it is reasonable to assume that Mill would agree
diverse modes of life likely will remain after humankind obtains complete
knowledge of the social and physical world.
The thesis of On Liberty is that each person has "a unique
range of potentialities, expressible in a relatively small range of possible
lives," and "the actualization of these potentialities is
indispensable" for any person's "greatest well-being," according
to Gray (1991, p. 200). Social
toleration of diverse modes of life is necessary so that persons may learn
about their individual inborn tendencies through a process of
self-experimentation. Since individuals
vary in their inborn tendencies, they have various requirements to achieve
happiness. Through the exploration of
their own nature, they may identify those requirements. "Mill denies that any one can achieve
happiness or the good life, unless he has his own conception of happiness; and
the diversity of legitimate conceptions of happiness is grounded in the
plurality of individual natures," writes Gray (1991, p. 203). Thus, evidently, for Mill, the various
tendencies in psychological human nature make it impossible for one conception
of happiness and the way to attain the "best" mode of life to apply
to everybody. For the aim to optimize
individual development, Mill calls upon people to tolerate the social diversity
that such development requires, and he is concerned that social diversity's
premature diminishment has negative implications for the capacity of
individuals to develop themselves. Mill characterizes the masses as lacking social diversity
so much that they cannot help but be intolerant about social diversity, as I
will discuss next.
iii) The Rise of Negative Political Power and the
Descent of Developmental Power
Mill claims that
public opinion adds to the negative political power of society through the
ascendance of the masses, and that by means of mentally coercive public opinion
the masses cause developmental and cultural degradation, promote social
conformity, and regressive social change.
Mill opposes the ascendance of the masses, because he positively
correlates losses in the cultural capacity to meet the developmental needs of
society with the ascendance of the masses.
His fears about the harms that the ascendance of the masses can cause
stem from his assumption that the masses are less culturally diverse than
intellectuals; I will challenge that assumption. Lastly, I will challenge the claim that the
ascendance of the masses endangers individual and thereby social development
power, and likely adds more to either social change without improvement or
regressive social change than to progress.
Specifically,
Mill claims that the ascendance of the masses contributes to cultural
assimilation. He writes:
The
circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their
characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different
neighbourhoods, different trades and professions, lived in what might be called
different worlds; at present, to a great degree in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now [read,]
listen [to, and] see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes
and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and
the same means of asserting them. Great
as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those
which have ceased. And the
assimilation is still proceeding. All
the political changes of the age promote it, since they tend to raise the low
and to lower the high. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶18, emphasis added)
In this way, Mill claims that
increases in the social mobility open to persons from the various classes
accompanies that the persons increasingly share common influences that shape
their behaviour. Society used to subject
the members of the same class to similar influences, and there were more
class-based cultural differences among persons.
Now it is all persons, regardless of class, who share common influences
in the determination of their conduct.
Therefore, as class differences diminish so do the class-based cultural
differences.
In
the above passage, Mill believes that the process that diminishes class-based
cultural differences, e.g. differences in rank and position, places persons who
formerly lived in separate worlds into the same one. Mill would rather all existent cultural
differences remain, and this includes the class-based cultural differences, and
he would rather various persons be kept in "different worlds" (CW,
18, Ch. 3, ¶18). The price to raise the low is to lower the
high, and that price is too high for it to be worth raising the low. Thus, Mill does not object to the raising of
the low itself, but to the lowering of the high as a means to raise the
low. Instead, he aspires for the raising
of high culture as a means to raise the lower.
He causally attributes to the ascendance of the masses the lowering of
the high. Mill positively correlates
heightened individual culture with the elevation of the low that does not
negatively affect high culture. In his
view, the ascendance of the high has more utility than the ascendance of the
masses. Therefore, Mill prefers a
cultural solution, i.e. cultural conditions that permit the free development of
the individual's culture,[18]
for a social structural problem, i.e. economic and political inequality.
Mill
believes that the political ascendance of mediocre culture has adverse effects,
for the ascendance reduces cultural diversity and originality, and thereby
hinders social progress in the following ways.
He does not consider the personal and social benefits of the advancement
towards political equality, which result from the ascendance, and which, in
turn, adds to social progress. He
believes that public formal educational systems can facilitate cultural
assimilation since "education brings people under common influences, and
gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments" (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, ¶18). He does not acknowledge that public
educational systems can allow persons to share the cultural literacy necessary
in order to stand a chance at levelling the political playing field in economic
and social life, and thus have the potential to contribute to social progress.
When
he claims that the ascendance of the masses interferes with cultural progress,
Mill does not acknowledge any benefit from improvement in the means of
communication such as educational opportunities. Rather, he complains that communicational
improvement promotes cultural assimilation because the improvement brings
"the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and [keeps] a
rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another" (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, ¶18).
Mill
additionally complains that the ascendance of mediocre culture inculcates
overly selfish values, e.g. self-indulgence without regard for others, in his discussion
that "the increase of commerce and manufactures" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶18) promotes cultural
assimilation. This increase diffuses
"more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, and [opens] all objects
of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of
rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all
classes" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶18). In that context, Mill complains about the
values that, he thinks, cultural assimilation brings the masses. He prefers that the masses not seek the
privileges that have, in past times, belonged to the higher classes but are now
more accessible to all than to aspire for the same conveniences, luxuries, and
prestige that greater economic wealth may bring. Particularly, Mill opposes the aspiration of
the masses to improve the economic and social terms of their lifestyle because
this aspiration conflicts with the interests of others to maintain their
lifestyles; he does not consider that the lifestyles that the masses could undermine
may be over-privileged so that this conflict may not be an adequately
reasonable concern. Mill focuses so much
on whatever may undermine the individual development of a virtuous, unselfish,
character, that he does not give nearly as much weight to the favourable
progressive significance of the social conditions.
Mill
thinks that the redistribution of power is made at the expense of, as mentioned
earlier, the reduced extent to which individual developmental power is possible
under circumstances that diminish cultural diversity. He spends much time in complaint about the
adverse effects that the ascendance of the masses presumably have upon the
degree of actualized individuality and diversity present in society. In particular, he believes the ascendance
interferes with the social experimentation, i.e. the live tests of the utility
of various opinions and ways of life, and the practical way to produce the good
society. Mill does not recognize the
social utility in their ascendance, i.e. that their ascendance contributes not
only to their personal progress, but, in noteworthy ways, also directly
contributes to social progress.
It
is important to carefully explore the consequences of the redistribution of
power which is involved in the ascendance of the masses, not only the
potentially negative consequences. The
power redistribution, which is involved with the ascendance, facilitates the
expression of the masses in ways which are, in fact, developmentally beneficial
for them. Mill does not take into
account that the power that the ascendance brings the masses is not only the
negative sort of power - power over others.
There is also positive power - power to do something for oneself or to
do something with others, which includes individual developmental power and can
add to (though also interfere with) the developmental power of others as
well. Another aspect of the ascendance
is the redistribution of both negative freedom, i.e., freedom from being
overpowered by others, and positive freedom, i.e., freedom to exercise positive
political power and developmental power.
Thus, individual developmental power is not being undermined as much as
Mill claims, and neither is freedom. The
threat of the ascendance of the masses is not nearly as great as Mill claims. Rather, the developmental power which gains
expression is likely to be different from that which was previously more
dominantly expressed. The developmental
power that gains expression is that of persons whose preferences have
previously more likely fallen outside of the socially accepted range which the
developmental needs of those in positions of power has shaped. The gained power is that of persons who those
above them likely punished for their deviations from the social norms with
political and economic exclusion. Thus,
the ascendance actually gives the chance to develop their selves more freely to
persons whose development or growth of individual developmental power other
persons in positions of power undermined.
Power is not
evenly distributed among the masses, and the power differentials among them add
to their diversity, but that does not mean that with fewer power differentials
among them, they will be meaningfully less diverse. It is very telling that Mill assumes that the
societal majority of persons are less diverse than an intellectual minority of
individuals, when it is more reasonable to expect that the larger group has
more diversity than the smaller group.
Mill characterizes the masses of persons as less capable of
individuality than the developmental elite, and, since diversity benefits from
high levels of individuality, that characterization makes the masses by
definition less diverse. The undeniable
fact, however, is that the "mediocre masses," not only intellectuals,
have always had diverse life styles and circumstances and thus various
political interests. The fact that the
masses of persons are culturally diverse makes Mill's claim that the masses
constitute social forces against cultural diversity questionable. As well, his claim that the "mediocre
masses" are less capable of individuality is unacceptable because of its
negative political implications and unreliable means of justification. Persons who have not realized socially
recognizable levels of individuality are neither necessarily unrealized due to,
nor likely to remain unrealized due to, a psycho-biologically inferior capacity
for individuality. Rather, social
deprivation of developmental opportunities, such as opportunities for
education, tends to undermine the capacity for self-development. Also, the lower levels of self-development
may falsely appear to exist because society does not recognize the
developmental achievements of persons whose life-styles are based on priorities
that deviate from the norm. Mill recognizes
that developmental opportunities are necessary for human growth. Unfortunately, his emphasis on the need to
give such opportunities to intellectuals obstructs his outlook on the masses,
and he misunderstands why the majority of persons are mediocre; the third
section in the third chapter will explain this misunderstanding further. Next I will explain how Mill expects that
social diversity by permitting experiments of life facilitates the acquisition
of knowledge of self and others which is necessary for individual development.
iv) Diversity
of Education and Diversity of Experiments
Mill
connects freedom of individual expression, diversity, and education to experiments
of life. Mill speaks of experiments,
such as in his discussion that rare originality facilitates the effectuality of
"experiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶11), as discussed earlier in this
chapter. And, Mill speaks of diversity
of education as itself being one of the "competing experiments" (CW,
18, Ch. 5, ¶13). According to Mill, the
experiments of life that he encourages are important aids to attain
self-knowledge (Gray, 1991, p. 200) to inform one's self-development.
For
Mill, diversity of experiments of life contributes to the satisfaction of
diverse developmental needs through diversity of self-education and the
consequent self-knowledge. Likewise,
Mill advises that society should treat public education as one among many
"competing experiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, ¶13) which contribute to
social education, and the consequent social knowledge. For opinions and modes of life to be diverse,
education needs to be diverse. Diverse
modes of education advance the self-knowledge and social knowledge which the
attainment of societal happiness requires.
Although
Mill is ambivalent about the social utility of formal, public systems of
education, because they can conform minds to one another, Mill thinks that
public education can be a part of social experimentation. Formal education can serve as an aid to
epistemic and social progress by being itself an experiment, an instance of
diversity of education, which, when taken together with the other modes of
education, promotes diversity of opinions and conduct.[19] Mill suggests further that public educational
systems could counteract the movement towards mediocre culture and public
opinion. For, formal, public education
can exemplify and promote a certain high standard of human developmental
achievement. Thus, Mill aspires for
diversity of thought and conduct, for diversity of education, and even for
diversity of what he considers life experiments.
1) The Roles of Social Comparison and
Competitive Free Play in Self-Education and Experiments of Life
Mill
claims that social comparison and competition have instrumental significance
for self-education by means of experiments of life. Yet, it is questionable whether experiments
of life could help all or most individuals to obtain knowledge of self and
others, and to advance their capacity for individual expression. For instance, Gray (1991) comments:
Mill
moves bewilderingly between the perspective of the practical agent and that of
the detached observer. On some views of
practical knowledge, it might seem that an experiment of living could yield
knowledge only to the committed partisan, the agent actively involved in its
undertakings. On other views, just the
opposite would be true. (p. 202)
In the question of who benefits most from
practical knowledge, if any one, as a result of engaging in experiments of
life, it matters whether one tries to learn only from one's experiments or also
from those of others. Experimenters can
benefit from the social interaction of their experiments of life through social
comparison and competitive free play.
Individuals can observe the results, not only of their own experiments
but also of the experiments of others.
Thus, individuals can learn about themselves in relation to others.
In
his criticism that the British do not value individuality and do not recognize
that free individuality facilitates the capacity for individual development,
Mill connects social comparison to individual development. He writes:
It is individuality that [they] war against: [they] should think [they] had done wonders
if [they] had made [themselves] all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of
one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of
either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority
of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of
producing something better than either. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17, emphasis added)
Mill recognizes the constructive
significance of individuality when combined with social comparison, especially,
as is evident in the above passage, to what today is termed 'upward social
comparison,'[20]
for individual development. That is to
say, when persons are different from each other, they can compare themselves to
one another in areas in which the referent person is more skilled. Such comparisons can show persons their
relative weaknesses, and thus, guide their efforts for personal growth. Persons need to obtain estimates of their
abilities relative to the abilities of others, and exercise their abilities in
order to improve them. It can be added,
individuals can serve as teachers by giving others the opportunity, even
through downward social comparison,[21]
to learn from the mistakes of others without having to repeat them.
For Mill, it is
important that every person strives to increase her "comparative worth as
a human being" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶4). A person can do
so through the employment of all of her faculties in the appropriate situations
in which each of those faculties is useful.
In
Mill's view, experiments of life are also important in the determination of
comparative personal worth and in the attainment of self-knowledge. The free play of individual natures has
beneficial social consequences. Mill
views individual natures as if they are in a constructive competition over the
utility of their original products and the individualities that they bring
forth in relation to their ability to contribute to social progress.
Mill's
work in the third chapter of On Liberty suggests that he views social
life as a process in which individuals learn about what is good, just and
truthful by means of experimentation, trial and error, social comparison, and
competition. I will provide answers to
the questions that follow. What does Mill mean by the term 'experiments'? And how does he connect trial and error, social
comparison and competition to these experiments? How reasonable is his claim that experiments
of life are developmentally beneficial, because they are epistemically
beneficial? I will argue that Mill
suggests two kinds of experiments, and that neither is likely to prove much
common developmental and epistemically beneficial consequences for
society. The first kind of experiment of
life can be called a meta-experiment of life; by "meta-experiment"
what I mean to say is that it is an experiment within an experiment; it belongs
at the individual level and is a subcomponent of the second kind of experiment
which is a social experiment of life.
I
will argue also that the kinds of experiments of life which Mill proposes would
likely lead to politically biased knowledge about the self and others. I will provide an analysis of these experiments
which shows that these are unlikely to contribute to epistemic and cultural
progress.
To
begin with, it should be noted that Mill calls himself an experimentalist. He does so, in part, to distinguish himself
from other empiricists who, in his time, were not well-liked, thus to give his
position more credibility. Also, it
could be that he makes this distinction because of the experiments of life
which he proposes. He argues that these
experiments are useful for the individual to obtain self-knowledge and
knowledge of others. His work suggests
that he thinks that the historical stage is a setting of experimentation for
the discovery of the psychological laws of individual natures and for their
perfection.
A
charitable reading of his use of the term 'experiment' sees that Mill uses this
term loosely, that is, he proposes only informal experiments. I will discuss the kinds of informal[22]
experiments which Mill proposes. Mill
calls the modes of life "different experiments of living" (CW, 18,
Ch. 3, ¶1). He does not treat these as
if they can be understood independently from each other. He means that there are multiple kinds of
experiments. The experimental kinds all
require diversity, but vary in their social scale. In one kind of experiment, an individual
tries ways of life. Diversity is
necessary for individuals to have multiple life style alternatives to try. Each
individual can try only one way of life at a time to search for the one which is
the most suitable for the actualization of her inherent potential. Mill thinks that human nature and inherent
potential vary across individuals, and thus the modes of life that could
optimize their growth also vary.
Another
kind of experiment of life that Mill uses refers to a social experiment. Mill recognizes that the epistemic and thus
individual developmental practical value of the various ways of life can be
understood relationally. This
recognition supports the social experiment interpretation. The use of the phrase "competing
experiments" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, ¶13) suggests a social experiment. The various opinions and modes of conduct,
and the various social programs, of which he gives the example of public
education, cannot properly compete only with themselves. If they are to compete, it is with each
other. Additionally, recall that Mill
claims that social comparison is beneficial for self-improvement (CW, 18, Ch.
3. ¶17). The experiment of life depends
on competition and social comparison; it depends on social interaction among
individuals who compare the results of their developmental trials or the fit
between their individual natures and the capacity of various modes of life to
satisfy their developmental needs. Thus,
the experiment of life can be called not only an experiment for individual
development but also an experiment for educative socialization. The test at a larger social scale of the
various ways of life provides more information about the practical value of
each way of life. In the experiment that
occurs at a larger social scale, various individuals compare the outcomes of
their ways of life with those of others, and thus permit the various ways of
life to compete for being the most practical way of life for certain individual
natures.
That
Mill argues for diversity and free expression of individuality, diverse
opinions, and actions for their epistemic instrumental significance supports
the social experiment interpretation.
These are the necessary conditions for the implementation of the social
experiment. The aforementioned necessary
conditions for the implementation of the social experiment permit the
co-existence of multiple modes of life and the diversification of modes of
life. As well, without the satisfaction
of the necessary conditions, social comparison and competition, the instruments
for the participants to apply in their social epistemological exploration would
not be relevant. That is, no one would
be able to compare one's mode of life with those of others. For, cultural homogeneity would minimize the
capacity for social comparison and competition.
Thus, without free individual expression and diversity, the social
experiment would not be capable of epistemic service. This social experiment is an irrelevant social
epistemological method in a culturally homogenous social context.
Next
I will argue that political inequality in a culturally diverse context can
interfere with experimental output such that it erratically reflects the
politically privileged cultural inputs more than others and thus yields roughly
culturally homogenous outputs. The
fourth chapter's response to Mill's argument that "unrestricted"
speech helps to maximize the acquisition of truth will make it further evident
that experiments of life do not necessarily demote the cultural assimilation of
the truth; these can, indeed, facilitate cultural imperialism over the truth,
which is inconsistent with the aim of Mill's social project to maximize the
societal capacity to synthesize the truth.
2)
The Epistemic Limitations of Experiments of Life
Here,
I argue that the informal social experiment is an irrelevant social
epistemological method in a politically unequal social context. The proposed experiments of life can be
understood, and the social experiment interpretation can be explained, in
today's terms. The epistemic value of
the live, social experiment which Mill proposes can be most accurately analyzed
based on current knowledge about the likely consequences of judgements derived
from social comparison cognitive processes and on how to conduct social
experiments.
The
necessary condition of diversity is easy to satisfy, for it simply requires the
presence of multiple modes of life in the working context of the social
experiment. Diversity can be considered
one of the main independent variables of the social experiment. The working context of the social experiment
has multiple experimental conditions.
Each experimental condition tests a separate mode of life. Each mode of life can be considered an
independent variable.
The
social experiment's examination of the ways of life treats them as competitors
for their social utility. The higher in
social utility, the more the ways of life facilitate the advancement of
knowledge. The advancement of knowledge
can be considered the secondary dependent variable of the social
experiment. Self-knowledge is
instrumental for the attainment of individual happiness and thus contributes to
social happiness. The intensity and
scope of social happiness can be considered the social experiment's primary
dependent variable.
One
important problem of the social experiment is that its working context does not
satisfy the necessary condition of free individual expression. Mill views free opinion formation and
expression of opinions as socially unrestricted expression. This view of free expression is incorrect, as
I will argue in the fourth chapter.
Here, I argue merely that the research instruments, namely, social
comparison and competition, are incompatible with the working context of the
social experiment. I base this argument
on the following main reasons.
Social
comparison is problematic when it occurs in a politically unequal context, because
in that working context social comparison can interfere with the arrival at
accurate judgments. The reasons for this
interference is that one's social position influences one's judgment and
thereby the assessment of one's abilities and opinions in comparison to those
of others (Festinger, 1954). Mill overestimates the extent to which members of various
groups benefit from the observed differences of others and can competitively
yet constructively compare themselves with others. He expects persons to acknowledge the good
qualities that others have which are different from their own, and even merge
the diverse good qualities. Even a brief
examination of social comparison processes shows us that this is unlikely, as
we will see next.
The
following cognitive tendencies bias one's social comparative judgments
(Festinger, 1954), and thus impair the capacity for impartial judgments. The dominant groups tend to have the most
influential power in social comparison processes. Persons tend to compare themselves with
others who are most like themselves and thus to open themselves to influence
from those who are most like themselves.
Persons tend to conform more to the opinions of the perceived socially
important referent groups. For example,
consider:
When there
is a range of opinion or ability in a group, the relative strength of the three
manifestations of pressures toward uniformity will be different for those who
are close to the mode of the group than for those who are distant from the
mode. Specifically, those close to the
mode of the group will have stronger tendencies to change the positions of
others, relatively weaker tendencies to narrow the range of comparison and much
weaker tendencies to change their own position compared to those who are
distant from the mode of the group. (Festinger, 1954, p. 134-135)
Thus, social comparison is likely to
result at best only in the integration of the aspects of like groups, and at
worst in the assimilation of subdominant cultures into the main referent
cultures.
Today's
social research knowledge suggests three additional problems with the social
experiment which contribute to the incompatibility between social comparison
and competition among individuals on the one hand and the working context of life
experimentation on the other. First,
nothing is done to prevent the experimental conditions from being
non-equivalents. Second and related, the
extraneous or confounding variables, that is, the variables that interfere with
the accuracy of the experimental results, are never considered as such. For instance, Mill does not view political
inequality in the working context of life experimentation as a factor that
interferes with an individual's capacity to obtain knowledge from personal
experiences. But Mill expects that, as
the social experiment yields its results, the social experiment will remove
factors, such as political inequality.
Third, the social experiment does not have a control condition; thus it
is reasonable to expect the accuracy of its knowledge results to be weak. I do not deny that some knowledge is possible
from informal social experimentation, but I deny the credibility of the
knowledge persons may claim they obtained from personal and socialization
experiences alone especially when reaching conclusions about how various
individuals stand in comparison to each other.
The
purpose of the social experiment is to facilitate the development of
competitive experiments of life, that is, life styles which are practical for
individual development. The social
experiment requires epistemic and cultural success for the practicality of the
life-styles that it initiates. The
social experiment's epistemic success requires the satisfaction of the
following condition: the research instruments, namely social comparison and
competition, must facilitate every participant's ability to correctly identify
the available lifestyle which is the most practical for the maximization of her
individual development. However, the
research instruments cannot facilitate such identification, because they are
incompatible with the working context of the experiment. For, political inequality is present in the
experimental conditions. But, political
inequality interferes with the accuracy of judgments drawn through social
comparison. Thus, it also interferes
with the identification of the most practical competitors. The research instruments unlikely enhance the
capacity of the participants to identify the most practical available life
style alternatives or invent ones which are more practical than the available
ones. So, the social experiment's
participants are unlikely to benefit epistemically from their experiments of
life.
The
social experiment's cultural success requires the satisfaction of the
additional following conditions. The
working context of the social experiment must be such that every participant is
able to switch to the experimental condition in which her preferred lifestyle
is the independent variable. This
ensures that the participants can refuse to practice the modes of life which
are impractical or less practical than the available life style alternatives
for the maximization of their individual development.
The
following two events would demonstrate that the requirements for the social
experiment's epistemic and cultural success have been met. First, the experimental conditions which have
impractical independent variables suffer from participant attrition. Both the individual developmental needs and
the lifestyle preferences of the participants are thus in agreement with the
acceptance or removal of certain experimental conditions. Second, the original participants introduce
new experimental conditions. The
participants invent new lifestyle alternatives which actually have more
practical independent variables than the removed conditions. In a politically unequal context, these
requirements for the social experiment's success ensure its failure.
The
social experiment suffers from the following two problems. First, its research instruments are incompatible
with the working context. Mill
overestimates the extent to which persons can developmentally and epistemically
benefit from social comparison and cultural competition in a politically
unequal social context. The informal
social experiment would lead to politically biased knowledge about the self and
others. The second problem from which
the social experiment suffers is that it does not do much to satisfy the
requirements for its cultural success; cultural progress is still possible
under it, but it is likely to be elitist.
Therefore, the social experiment would likely yield results in favour of
the cultural preferences of the politically privileged; it would be an
epistemically unreliable and politically confounded type of experiment.
Mill
envisions a society in which the individuality of the inherently strong elite
carries the unfortunate inherently weaker masses of persons who, even when they
exercise their individuality, cannot join the strong in the high standing of
social worth. In Mill’s
freedom-utilitarian world, happiness is, in principle, accessible by all, but,
as I have argued, it is not well distributed in practice. Some individuals are able to benefit more
from the intellectual pleasures, which Mill considers the higher pleasures,
whereas others are not for the following three main reasons. First, some inherently have stronger
capacities for feelings and impulses, according to Mill, as the next chapter
will further show. Second, as lack of
use leads to the degradation of persons' inherent potentials for human
capacities, and thus there are persons who cannot experience or appreciate the
higher intellectual pleasures. The third
main reason for why individuals vary in their capacity to experience and
benefit from the higher intellectual pleasures is related to the second
aforementioned reason. The best society
can do is prevent the degradation of persons; it can permit the individual to
develop herself without censorship, and with a variety of socialization
opportunities. Mill suggests that
neither can individuals favourably alter the inherent nature of their
developmental capacities, nor that society can do something to reverse the condition
after the degradation of their inherent capacities.
Admittedly,
the likelihood that one's actions will have high social utility does not
entirely depend on one's inherent developmental power. The strength of the social aspects of
developmental power to a large extent depends on the consequences of the
actions that involve the required characteristics. Consider originality. If an individual's original achievement
proves to be of great practical worth and the achievement is thus socially
beneficial, then the achievement proves the social strength of her
originality. In this way, the
consequences of one's actions influence the social value and strength of the
developmental capacities which those actions exercise.
However,
Mill expects that only the originality of a few
through their modes of life can have practical worth proven by the effectuality
of their experiments of life. Thus, only
a few can influence culture through effective participation in the production
of the lifestyle alternatives. Since the
developmentally powerful are more likely to be original, their actions are more
likely to be effectually original.
Furthermore,
Mill's politically elitist aversion to the ascendance of the masses leads Mill
to overlook the social utility of the masses' potential contribution to social progress. He speaks about the ascendance of the masses
with emphasis on its negative aspects as if it is simply a matter of
undesirable social change, and as if that ascendance involves no noteworthy
social progress. Mill claims that
"the permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as
many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals"
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17). However, he speaks
about the very masses being liberated as if they do not consist of individuals,
and as if they cannot contribute to improvement and are unlikely to benefit
from it. He does not recognize their
liberation as such. Instead, he takes
the signs that the masses experience gains in power, i.e. power which permits
liberation, as simply signs of loss to the societal capacity for freedom.
In
contrast to how he treats the masses, Mill focuses on the social utility of
intellectuals, eccentrics, and persons of genius; in his view, they possess the
characteristics which increase the likelihood that one will add to social
improvement. Mill does not consider that
the masses may also have characteristics that can add to social improvement. He implies that the ascendance of the masses
does not serve any meaningful social utility.
He overstates the causal role of individual development in the
production of social progress, and understates the significance of improved
social conditions for social progress.
Additionally,
Mill claims that the principle of social utility is not arbitrary and that,
therefore, it can be impartially used, for example, to resolve conflicts
between other moral principles (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶29). Yet, as I argued, Mill's considerations of
the social utility of various cognitive attributes are problematically biased,
namely elitist, and arbitrarily, overly individualistic: the more he associates
a thing with individuality, the more social utility and value, whether
intrinsic or extrinsic, that he assigns to it.
He implies that individual spontaneity has intrinsic worth, though his
arguments for the worth of individuality suggest only its extrinsic worth. He argues for individuality's worth because
it facilitates human development, and, in turn, it adds to social progress,
and, ultimately, to happiness. He claims
that all eccentricity, which requires individuality, has at least extrinsic
value. Of genius, he says that it is
inherently capable of greater individuality, and he assigns genius high
effectual social worth.
Mill
considers the instrumental value of diversity for individual development, and
claims that the ascendance of the masses of persons functions to endanger
diversity. He claims that, even in the
absence of the ascendance of the masses, diversity of opinions diminishes as
society approaches truth. In contrast to
this view of diverse opinions, he claims that there are multiple inherent human
potentials, and correspondingly various needs for human growth. Thus, he suggests, because of their
developmental function, various modes of conduct should remain.
Finally,
the developmental functions that Mill attributes to diversity through its role
in self-education and experiments of life are at best optimistic. As discussed in the final part of this
chapter on the limitations of the experiments of life, these experiments are
less likely to be beneficial than Mill expects.
An implication of these limitations is that the overstatement of the
utility of experiments of life can be harmful for the capacity to develop, for
this overstatement suggests that individuals are responsible for their
developmental outcomes to an extent greater than they actually are. While he ignores the effects of differential
political relations among diverse groups, Mill places the locus of developmental
responsibility on the individual, and builds unjustified expectations about the
extent to which self-development is possible for individuals. That locus of developmental responsibility
and, as the next chapter will argue, the unjustified expectations, can,
instead, hinder the desired individual development.
CHAPTER
3: THE PROGRESS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL
ELITE
In
this chapter, I will argue that the practices that Mill considers optimize
individual progress are mainly likely to facilitate the developmental power,
and thereby the progress of elite individuals.
This chapter will support the interpretive hypotheses that Mill treats
developmental power mainly as a positive form of political power, and that he
expects that the developmental elite have the most capacity to exercise this
power, and thus they also have the most capacity to progress as individuals in
ways that add to utility.
Mill
views individual development as the advancement towards the triumph of
developmental power over negative political power. The power of individuality is the capacity to
develop. Individual development is the
effectual exercise of that power which forms the causal basis of history. That is to say, developmental power causes
history, and the actions of the most developable individuals are most likely to
have progressive significance. For Mill,
history is purposive and its purpose is progress, not mere social change, but
rather social improvements or increases in liberty. History concerns the consequences of
individuality towards the triumph of good in its struggle against evil. The continuation of history requires that
individuality be in a social state in which it has the capacity to win the
struggle. Mill favourably views
individual development, and he assumes that the outcomes of the
individualization of self are inclined towards the good. For Mill, the main purpose of individual
development is the attainment of individual and social happiness.
Mill thinks that individual
development has crucial importance for the advancement of history. Mill's argument for his freedom-utilitarian project
is politically egoistic, for whereas he recognizes the developmental elite as
potential history makers, he excludes the underdeveloped or whom he presumes
are less developable from this recognition.
Thus, political egoism has implications that the developmental elite are
unlikely to expect that persons who they presume are developmentally below them
to be history makers, and thus the developmental elite can set up a
self-fulfilling prophecy against the social majority's capacity to add to
utility.
The
political egoism of Mill's argument for his freedom-utilitarian project is
additionally evident in that he assumes that individuals from the developmental
elite group to which he belongs have a greater capacity to serve as benefactors
and beneficiaries. For example, Mill
claims that only a few individuals can render the service of impartiality, and
he connects impartiality to the exercise of justice. In this way, for him, only a few who we may
call epistemic diplomats have the capacity both to comprehend the truth and to
directly contribute to epistemic progress.
The few have a greater capacity than the majority to developmentally
benefit from their impartiality. For,
the few are more likely than the majority to develop just characters, because
the few have the developmental advantage of impartiality, and thus they are
also more likely to efficaciously contribute to the administration and
implementation of socially just practices.
Finally,
this chapter provides a utilitarian critique of the developmental aspects of
Mill's freedom-utilitarian project and, in particular, of the project's
absolute notion of political equality: that it is counterproductive to the
maximization of utility. Mill
overestimates the extent to which mere developmental opportunities benefit
society, even when he admits that there are important cases in which only the
few will be able to benefit from such opportunities. He expects various outcomes from inherently
diverse people in their responses to the developmental opportunities. For Mill, society should foster the exercise
of the developmental power of everybody, but some inherently have more
developmental power - they are more individual than others and thus they have
more of the energy that drives progress.
He calls such individuals "the stronger specimens of human
nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9). These few have
greater capacities than the majority to benefit from social environmental
factors, such as the opportunity for free expression, and from their own
development. This chapter will explore
the preceding claims and discuss their implications for the capacity of society
to facilitate individual development and social progress.
This section supports the interpretive
hypotheses that individuality and conformity differentially influence the type
of social change that is possible in certain situations. Mill thinks that since the developmental
elite are more likely to choose original actions than developmentally normal or
weak persons, they are also more likely to contribute to social and cultural
progress. By contrast, Mill thinks that
since the developmentally normal or weak are more likely to commit conformist
actions, they are also more likely to contribute to situations in which only
non-progressive or even regressive social change is possible.
Mill claims that the masses of persons
are most likely to practice informal negative political power in the form of
mental coercion, and accepts an absolute notion of political equality. I argue that absolute political equality is
problematic because it facilitates the mental coercion which Mill recognizes as
counterproductive to the cultivation of the individual's progressive capacities. Mentally coercive processes can make
self-fulfilling prophecies. Even if
society would practice what Mill considers absolute political equality, and
even if the developmental elite were also the political elite, mental coercion
would still be likely and developmentally unfavourable self-fulfilling
prophecies would lead to the violation of equality of the masses of persons,
and thus also to injustice. The notion
of absolute political equality is inadequately utilitarian and, therefore, is
inconsistent with Mill's freedom-utilitarian project.
i) Individual Development and History
There
is a parallel between Mill's view of individual development as the articulation
of individuality and his view that individual and social progress make history
happen. Mill has a favourable view of
individual development; he claims that as long as persons individualize their
choices, in matters that regard only their selves, whatever life outcomes they
have are good for society because the individualization of choice increases
liberty. He thinks that if one follows
individuality, one's orientation inclines, though not necessarily moves,
towards the good. He excessively trusts
the worth of individuality and individuals whom he deems possess greater
capacity for individuality. For example,
he claims that society is better off when persons individualize their choices
and their individualized actions have negative outcomes for themselves than
when they conform to legitimate modes of conduct which are beneficial to their
society. For Mill, although persons in
the former situation inflict a "constructive injury" (CW, 18, Ch. 4,
¶11) on society, it is a bearable one that adds to "the greater good of
human freedom" (CW, 18, Ch. 4, ¶11).
Similarly,
Mill flatters the nature of individuality insofar as he claims that history,
not only should involve, but actually depends on the development
of individuality. For Mill, history
concerns more than events that influence social changes. History regards a special kind of social
change, namely progress. For Mill,
progress means increases in the capacity of individuals to articulate their
natures to the effect that they contribute to social, cultural, intellectual
and/or moral improvement. History
requires individuality's gradual attainment of social improvement and
liberty. History's continuation depends
on the struggle between individuality and despotic custom.[23] As long as individuality is in a social state
in which it can win in its struggle with despotic custom, history
continues. An exploration of Mill's
definition of progress will show that, Mill thinks, as soon as custom triumphs
over individuality, history ceases.
Mill
claims that history depends on progress, not on mere social change. In his view, a high degree of conformity to
custom is incompatible with progress, but compatible with mere social
change. Conformity is a necessary
condition for custom, and contributes to the despotism of custom. Conformity to custom hinders individuality
which is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for social
progress. For Mill, progress, in terms
of liberty and social improvement, and a despotic degree of conformity to
custom are rivals on the stage of history.
He writes:
The
despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement,
being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better
than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of
liberty, or that of progress or improvement . . . the contest between the two
constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17)
As well, improvement and liberty can become
rivals in those times in which improvement is forced upon a people, but liberty
is, normally, the best friend of improvement (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17).
According
to Mill, history can come to an end by either the cessation of social progress
or the rejection of individuality, especially as a result of despotic
custom. In fact, Mill claims: "The greater part of the world has,
properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of Custom is
complete" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17, emphasis added). If there is no more social progress, history
ceases. If history ceases, social change
without progress or what can be called the empty form of social change may
still be possible. For, the empty form
of social change does not require individuality. Mill recognizes that social change can occur
as a result of conformity. In
particular, he claims that conformity en masse can cause social change. For example, he contrasts the form of
despotic custom of the East with the form of despotic custom which could occur
in Europe. The despotism of custom which
threatens the European nations "does not preclude change, provided all
change together" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17).
Whereas the East's despotism of custom led to lack of social change,
Mill predicts that in Europe despotic custom would lead to lack of social progress. Thus, in his comparison of the forms of
Eastern and Western despotic custom, Mill distinguishes between social progress
and mere social change.
Mill
elaborates the distinction between social progress and mere social change, in
his discussion of the progressiveness of Europeans in at least three ways. First, Mill describes Europeans as
"progressive as well as changeable" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17). Second, Mill implies that progress and social
change do not necessarily occur at the same time when he warns against change
for change's sake without any greater idea such as that of beauty to guide it
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17). Third, Mill warns
about vain, counterproductive presumptions that guide European
improvement. For example, he criticizes
the European idea of moral improvement.
This idea holds Europeans as good and demands that others should be as
good as Europeans (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17).
Mill objects to that idea because it goes against the maintenance of
diversity which protects society from despotic custom, and thus secures the
social capacity for progress.
Mill
claims that individuality causes progress.
He writes: "A people, it
appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality"
(CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17). Thus, Mill claims
that the works of individuality sustain social progress, in his discussion that
Europeans pretentiously claim that they are progressive but lack the
individuality that would make their claim true.
Therefore,
according to Mill, social change can be subdivided into the empty form of
social change and progress. These two
forms have distinct causes. Causes of
the empty form of social change include conformity en masse, the initiation of
change for the sake of change, or the social acceptance of a notion of
improvement that is false or counterproductive.
The widespread adoption of a new cultural practice can be an example of
the empty form of social change.
Conformity contributes to the creation, maintenance, and despotism of
customs. Individual development is the
main cause of progress, and thus promotes the advancement of history. The despotism of custom, which occurs when
the proportion of the presence of conformity to custom is greater than the
proportions of progress and liberty, signals history's end.
ii) The Relationship between Progress and Custom
Mill
often treats progress and conformity to custom as if they are mutually exclusive
in action when Mill claims that actions committed in conformity to custom
cannot be progressive. If people accept
this claim as true, there are implications for the progressive capacities of
the majority of persons whom Mill views as the most likely to commit conformist
actions, because of their lack of individuality.
We
can see how Mill regards progress as independent from custom when he writes:
"the progressive principle . . . in either shape, whether as the love of
liberty or of improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, involving at
least emancipation from that yoke" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶17). The availability of customs is insufficient
for the development of the individuality which is necessary for progress. For, individuality requires the exercise of
choice among things not commonly done (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶6).
Admittedly,
Mill seems to aspire for the spirit of progress to be customarily or widely
accepted[24]
by means of greater toleration of originality and diversity in practice; this
is evident in two ways. First, Mill
criticizes persons who lack the custom to tolerate originality, and who do not
see any need for progress; he claims that such persons are the ones who most
need the originality which is necessary for progressive action (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶12). Second,
Mill implicitly suggests that society should become accustomed to the sight of
diversity, because diversity is necessary for progress. He warns:
"mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they
have been for some time unaccustomed to see it" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶19, emphasis added).
Thus, Mill treats the state of being unaccustomed to the sight of
cultural diversity as a problem, and he suggests that custom can be used to
promote or at least secure cultural diversity.
However,
the customary or wide acceptance of the spirit of progress has a conformity
requirement; that it should be the cultural practice to tolerate individuality,
originality and diversity so as to allow the social promotion and maintenance
of diversity. This conformity
requirement has much more limited causal importance than the requirement for
the personal exercise of active individuality because individuality has the
diversity function. The cultural
practice of toleration for individuality and experiments of life would empower
only individuals who have the capacities for individuality and originality, and
Mill expects the developmental elite have greater levels of these capacities.
Although
Mill recognizes that there can be, and at times has been, too much
individuality, he does not explain how individuality can become excessive. The current problem, Mill identifies, is that
"society has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger
which threatens human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal
impulses and preferences" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶6).
For Mill, although custom is necessary to discipline persons so that
they may behave in accordance with the common good, too much custom is a
hindrance to the advancement of the common good. As despotic custom impedes the free
exploration of one's nature, despotic custom also impedes the original
articulation of individuality, and thereby prevents the expression of human
freedom, and the societal capacity for progress.
Finally,
this discussion on the relationship between progress and custom adds support to
the fourth interpretive hypothesis that Mill negatively correlates conformist
actions with progressive consequences.
This hypothesis was previously supported in the second chapter as well
as in this chapter's part, "Human Development and History." Mill views conformity to custom as largely
incompatible with progress. That view
holds the implication that the societal majority who lack the capacities for
original actions and strong individuality, thus lack progressive capacities.
iii) The Justice of Utilitarianism: Just for the
Elite?
Here,
I will argue that the absolute notion of political equality is inconsistent
with the goal of Mill's freedom-utilitarian project to add to common beneficial
developmental consequences for society's members and thus do developmental
justice. Mill's views that the essence
of justice is political equality and that we should reject mental coercion are
inconsistent with his claim that we should accept absolute political
equality. This inconsistency is evident
in that what Mill considers absolute political equality permits mental coercion
and thus undermines political equality and thereby also justice. I will argue that absolute political equality
facilitates mental coercion and is thus unjust.
I will limit that discussion to what would be viewed as unjust based on
the general views on injustice that Mill discusses in the fifth chapter of his
book Utilitarianism (1863), and to what is recognizable as unjust from a
freedom-utilitarian perspective. This
perspective would regard as important whether mental coercion impedes
individual expression and hinders the capacity of an individual to expand her
developmental power, and thereby undermines the utility of her individual
characteristics. For the constructive
part of my critique in this section, I will show that a freedom-utilitarian,
consequentialist perspective helps to compensate for the inadequacies of the
general views on injustice. I will
elaborate on Mill's view that mental coercion is an unjust form of negative
political power. In contemporary terms,
mental coercion includes psychological oppression. I will show the applicability of the general
views on justice to psychological oppression.
Psychological oppression interferes with the individual's capacity for
free opinion expression, independent opinion formation, and free action.
A rise in social awareness
about what is unjust is a meaningful social improvement. Mill's distinction
between mere social change and social progress rests on whether social
improvement is involved, as the previous parts of this chapter discussed. Whereas social change does not necessarily
have good qualities, such as increases in justice, social progress does because
it is a matter of greater liberty or of social improvement. Mill’s most insightful comment on social
improvement in Utilitarianism (1863) reads:
The entire history of social improvement has been a series of
transitions, by which one custom or institution after another, from being a
supposed primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of a
universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny.
So it has been with the distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and
serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is,
with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35)
Thus, he views increased
recognition of injustice and inequality as an important characteristic of
social improvement.
According
to Mill, knowledge of injustice is practical for knowledge of justice. Mill writes that to understand justice it is most
useful to understand its opposite (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶3) He
addresses the commonly held views that it is unjust (1) to violate legal rights
unless they be forfeited or undeserved (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶4); or (2) to violate moral rights (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶5); it is unjust to (3) give more or less, whether
punishment or reward, than others deserve (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶6); or (4) to dishonestly and deliberately express or build
expectations of oneself and then violate them (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶7); or (5) to be partial in improper situations (CW, 10, Ch.
5, ¶8); or what I take to be Mill's sixth
view, though he does not number it, that it is unjust to violate equality,
which he holds to be the "essence" of justice (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶9), although
under the general view society may restrict equality by considerations of
social expediency (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶9).
Mill
considers "the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part,
and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality" (CW,
10, Ch. 5, ¶31). Thus, that which impedes utility is both
unjust and immoral. Indeed, Mill
understands justice in terms of moral principles which when taken as a whole
are high in utility (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶36). These principles facilitate the resolution
among whatever existing principles of justice there are (CW, 10, Ch. 5,
¶36-37). Thus,
moral principles can support Mill's position that utilitarianism is practical.[25] Mill writes: "particular cases may occur
in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the
general maxims of justice" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶36). These principles
are to be prioritized, though not without exceptions (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶36).
Because
it ranks the principle priorities, that would not otherwise be ranked,[26]
Mill argues that utilitarianism has a practical role in its service to
justice. However, his elitist
assumptions about human nature undermine the practicality of his
freedom-utilitarian project. Mill claims
that impartiality, which is an attribute required for justice, is innately
scarce. Mill connects impartiality to
justice; being impartial is of both primary and secondary significance for
it. Not only is impartiality important
for the fulfillment of other obligations of justice, such as impartial
judgement of the legality of the conduct of the accused, but it is also
included by the most ordinary and enlightened alike as a maxim among the
precepts of justice. Impartial persons
make practical the greatest happiness principle[27]
by respecting the maxim of equality, for they can regard the happiness of all
with numerical equality, so that one person's happiness is "counted for
exactly as much as another's" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35).
Thus, impartiality is "involved in the very meaning of Utility, or
the Greatest-Happiness Principle" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35).
Unfortunately,
for Mill, only the few can render the service of impartiality – the epistemic
diplomats who thus have an essential role to play for the reconciliation of the
partial truths, and thus for the acquisition of the truth, as the fourth thesis
chapter discusses. The consideration of
the view that only a few can be impartial, and the view that impartiality is
important for justice holds implications for the differential moral developmental
capacities of various individuals. The
impartial few have certain advantages in the development of just and moral
characters, whereas the partial majority has the inherent misfortune that it
lacks these developmental advantages.
Furthermore,
elitist perceptions about various inherent abilities can violate justice by
means of mentally coercive processes.
The five general views about what is unjust that Mill mentions in his
discussion on justice, in addition to Mill's claim that the essence of justice
is equality, can help us to understand how mental coercion is unjust. I will focus on psychological oppression
which is a type of mental coercion. The
general views, to be consistent with their nature and with each other, can and
should be applied to the case of psychological oppression. Psychological oppression consists of the
internalization of stereotypes and social perceptions. When persons internalize the negative views
others express of them, they forcefully become not only oppressed by others but
also self-oppressors (Bartky, 2005, p. 105).
Contemporary societies regularly commit psychologically oppressive
practices, but societies tend to ignore the implications of those practices for
the oppressed individuals' capacity for freedom; I will examine these
implications especially for how society violates the psychologically oppressed
individual's political equality and freedom.
The severity of the injustice of psychological oppression becomes more
apparent by the number of the general views of injustice, listed above, that
can apply to it. But recognition of the
injustice of psychological oppression does not require that the general views
directly apply to it.
In
some important ways, the general views are inadequately applicable to
psychological oppression. The general
views give too much weight to the internal dispositions of the individual and,
in particular, to whether the individual is aware that she is doing wrong. For instance, the fourth general view of
injustice claims that it is unjust to deliberately develop false
expectations about one self.
Under this view, intention matters.
However, to the advantage of a utilitarian perspective, it regards the
consequences as important to understand whether a particular action is unjust.
The
fourth principle recognizes that it is unjust for individuals to build false
expectations about themselves, because doing so places others at a disadvantage
in their relation with the individual.
In a social world, it is recognizable that it is unjust to build false
expectations about other individuals, because this places the individuals at a
disadvantage in their relation with others.
Therefore, in contemporary society, we should recognize that it is
unjust to dishonestly express or develop untrue expectations of others especially
when they are thus forced to build false expectations about themselves. This is even more remarkable when persons
treat others in such a way that they render others unable to violate the untrue
expectations. Persons express one of the
most deeply unjust forms of dishonesty when they set self-fulfilling prophecies
to work to turn falsehood into truth.
Furthermore,
the imposition of one’s opinions of others upon them to dictate others'
self-image is a violation of their legal and moral right to have freedom of
opinion formation and opinion expression.
This illustrates that psychological oppression can also involve
punishment that is undeserved and thus violates principle three. The imposition of the opinions one holds of
others upon them punishes others for not being whom one wants them to be, and
compels them to conform to one’s expectations and perceptions of the type of
persons that they are.
When
one forces upon others what they think of themselves, one does not treat them
as one ought to treat equals, and thus violates their equality. One takes away their capacity to choose their
identity. Instead, one chooses for them
in self-regarding matters. Thus, one
interferes with the active exercise of their individuality, and thereby
undermines their developmental power.
If it is unjust
to build false expectations about oneself, then it is unjust, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, to force others to, unknowingly, build false
expectations about themselves. This is
especially the case when persons expect others to express that they are treated
more equally than they actually are or that they are unequal in regards to some
important characteristics and socially beneficial causal attributes. For, the advancement of knowledge and the
expansion of individual developmental power add to utility, not the advancement
of ignorance and the hindrance of individual progress. This treatment both violates their equality
and increases the likelihood that their equality will be further violated as a
consequence of the false expectations.
Socially marginalized groups regularly receive such treatment in
patriarchal systems of whiteness (Henry & Tator, 2006). That is to say, the practice is common in
social systems that treat white skin colour and masculinity and the individual
attributes that are associated with being white or being male as the standard
of comparison for members of groups viewed as deviant. Although the expressed or internalized
expectations are untrue, they serve many self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, the expectations have real social
consequences. This type of injustice is
one of the expenses[28]
of so-called free expression.
Mental
coercion includes what is presently understood as 'psychological
oppression.' For Mill, mental coercion
is an expression of negative political power.
Those who have negative political power can practice mental
coercion. Mill views mental coercion as
that which compels persons to conform to the socially legitimate opinions and
thought patterns. Mill writes that persons
need protection from how public opinion interferes with their individual
development and opinion formation.
Consider this well-known passage:
Protection
. . . [is needed] against the tendency of society to impose, by other means
than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those
who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the
formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all
characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate
interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find
that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good
condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism. (CW, 18,
Ch. 1, ¶5)
In the above passage, Mill asserts that the
importance of the need to eliminate social and cultural psychological coercion
is as great as that of political despotism.
Yet,
Mill accepts the absolute notion of equality, which, when socially applied, not
only facilitates mental coercion, but also limits the variety of developmental
opportunities for individuals, as I will now argue. Mill's acceptance of the absolute notion of
political equality is inconsistent with the pursuit of the maximization of
individual development, because absolute political equality facilitates the
capacity of the elite to mentally coerce others and to influence the kinds of
developmental opportunities that are most commonly available in society. We can understand this inconsistency in light
of Mill's emphasis on the psychobiological differences among individual
natures, and his claim that their developmental needs vary. Because the individual natures of the
developmental and political elite do not have exactly the same developmental
needs as everyone else, the reinforcement of elitist perceptions about what is
the best way to satisfy individual needs hinders the satisfaction of needs that
the elite does not experience. When
various individuals are coerced by the elite's perceptions, for example,
through psychologically oppressive processes, to view their natures, not as
they actually are, but as the elite views them, it is more difficult for
individuals to recognize and adequately satisfy their actual developmental
needs. Thus, the elite do not treat the
natures of others as distinct, and the elite violate others' political equality
because they interfere with others' capacity to independently form their
identities including their opinions about themselves.
In
regards to the violation of equality, Mill insightfully and rightfully writes:
all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient,
assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so
tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been
tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities
under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would
make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last
learned to condemn. (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35)
In the above passage, Mill
connects mistaken notions of expediency to the violation of equality. Additionally, Mill recognizes that the approach
to equality is in certain cases itself mistaken. He comments that "the justice of giving
equal protection to the rights of all, is maintained by those who support the
most outrageous inequality in the rights themselves" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶9). In this section I limit my discussion to the
mistaken notion of absolute equality, and I will argue that the social
application of this notion of equality leads to the violation of equality.
Society
should support the worth of social policies with their practical effects, not
merely their ideal effects. If Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project is to be practical, as Mill claims that it is, it
must be concerned with more than the intentions behind actions; undeniably, any
utilitarian project needs to be consequentialist. Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, it is
important to determine whether the real consequences of social policies are
good and meet the objectives of the policies.
Yet, an absolute notion of political equality does not suffice for
utilitarian purposes, because what is considered absolute equality serves
mainly the progress of the political elite.
Unfortunately,
Mill supports what he considers an absolute notion of political equality. He endorses the "highest abstract
standard of social and distributive justice" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35), for which, he asserts,
"all institutions, and the efforts of all virtuous citizens," should
aspire (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35). He states that "we should treat all
equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have deserved equally well of
us" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35). He asserts that "society should treat
all equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have
deserved equally well absolutely" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶35, emphasis added).
Thus, he accepts a notion of political equality that offers a highly
abstract standard, and an absolute one, for how society treats its members that
deserve equal treatment. That standard
is impractical for the purposes of the freedom-utilitarian project, because
that standard is inconsistent with the aim for development maximization.
Political
equality based on what some consider absolute terms is not necessarily absolute
political equality. What Mill considers
absolute political equality is based on an illusion of absoluteness, as society
tends to support its members in merely legally, not practically, absolute equal
terms. Development maximization benefits
from society's sensitivity to diverse developmental needs. Yet, what is considered absolute political
equality is insensitive to diverse developmental needs, and thus it is
inconsistent with their satisfaction.
Absolute
political equality pertains to systematic equality. The elimination of systematic (formal)
inequality is insufficient, for systematic inequality is not the only type of
inequality. Systemic (informal) social
inequality is more difficult to identify and eliminate than systematic
inequality. Power differentials among
groups affect the social system, and produce systemic political
inequality. The consequences of those
differentials conflict with the desired effect of political equality. It is systemic inequality that makes possible
mental coercion.
The
"absolute" notion of political equality does not protect society from
adopting biased developmental standards and biased recommendations for the
satisfaction of developmental needs.
People can treat each other in accordance with the dominant standard/s
that are based on what the political elite consider the important needs, and
the considered needs are not only the developmental ones. The political elite influence society to
practice what the elite considers the best ways to satisfy those needs. The social supports are more compatible with
the needs of the socially privileged than with the needs of the socially
disadvantaged. The socially available
developmental supports are incompatible with the satisfaction of diverse
needs. Thus, the treatment of persons is
not in accordance to the actual needs of everyone. When political equality is thus defined, the treatment
of persons corresponds with the experiences and the things that matter the most
to the dominant group/s.
The
"absolute" notion of political equality ignores how equal treatment
can contribute to political inequality.
Political equality based on "absolute" terms mistakenly
equates political equality with equality of treatment. Although persons, at least in principle, have
access to the same supports, they do not all have access to precisely the ones
they need, in practice. With its
emphasis on sameness and the same treatment, the absolute notion of political
equality simply refuses to take differences into account, as if doing so
necessarily runs counter to politically equal treatment. Ironically, its "political
equality" does not extend to diverse groups. It makes political equality a thing that
roughly exists only within the dominant group, and a myth when used to describe
the whole of society. Political equality
based on absolute terms cannot foster equal relations, for it lacks the
flexibility required for equal relations.
Consequently, on the basis of absolute political equality, society
cannot equally support the developmental needs of everyone.
The
absolute notion of political equality does not ensure equal opportunities. Mill's focus on competition among individual
experiments of life corresponds with a notion of political equality that is
based on equal opportunities. Mill
claims that society should give all individuals the opportunity to develop
themselves through experiments of life, but he expects that only a few will
create progressively effectual experiments of life, as I discussed in the
second chapter.
Opportunities
cannot be equal when persons do not stand an equal chance to successfully
pursue them. In contemporary society,
there are many progressives who prefer an equity approach, because when the
competition is unfair, "equal opportunities" can only be an
ideal. Opportunities must have a
significant likelihood of realizability in order to provide a basis for
equality. The greater is the likelihood
that some persons stand to realize opportunities above others, the lower is the
equality of their opportunities. For
those persons who are unlikely to successfully pursue the opportunities, the
"opportunities" can be nothing more than pseudo-opportunities.
The notion of
absolute political equality conforms to the social aversions of the time, in
particular, today's aversion towards "unequal treatment." Absolute political equality denies more than
recognizes individual differences. The
popularly held, "absolute" notion of political equality is a reaction
to the historical reality that the differential treatment of diverse people has
been linked to political inequality.
Yet, the aversion against unequal treatment ensures unequal
developmental results. Because of the
aversion, society treats certain persons in ways that are practical for the
satisfaction of their needs, while it deprives others, who are presumably also
being treated as equals, of the developmental opportunities that foster the
cultivation of their particular natures.
For
opportunities to be equally available for everybody, society has to be
sensitive to the various needs and circumstances among politically unequal
persons. It is not the same
opportunities that have to be available to everyone; it is the ones they
need. Absolutely equal treatment, in
legal principle, can mean politically unequal treatment, in practice (Fleras
and Elliott, 2003, p. 133). Not even the
condition of "equal opportunities" as the same opportunities was met
in Mill’s time, nor is it being met today.
Neither is the relative condition of equal opportunities, which I
suggest is the availability of the particular opportunities required for one's
development.
The
equal opportunities approach to political equality is inappropriate because it
ignores that social resources influence the variety of opportunities that
people have. Equality of the
developmentally crucial resources that people have, such as formal education,
permits persons certain kinds of developmental opportunities. When the competition is unfair, society
should focus on the improvement of access to the various developmentally
crucial resources and on the achievement of equal levels of developmental
realization, which does not necessarily mean the same material and life-style
outcomes. Individuals who have the
freedom to develop themselves according to their preferences, psychological
needs, and interests will unlikely have the same outcomes, since their outcomes
will express the various preferences and interests they followed which were not
the same.
Development
maximization would benefit from a notion of political equality that is
practical in that it optimizes the likelihood that people will achieve their
potentials, whatever those potentials may be.
To understand development maximization, it is useful to distinguish
between (1) the likely degree to which one will achieve one's potential and (2)
how much potential one has to achieve.
In the regards to the first of these, some persons have advantages for
the achievement of their potential, such as fast rates of intellectual,[29]
emotional, and moral progress and privileged social conditions that allow them
access to a good education. These are
factors that aid the realization of their biological capacities. Other persons have more social and personal
obstacles to overcome while they strive for individual development. To take into account these types of personal
differences in development maximization project plans, society should give
relatively equal developmental supports to its members, that is, the supports
should be compatible with the various needs of persons. Society should support the development of its
members in proportion to and in ways appropriate to their developmental
needs. Yet, with an absolute notion of
political equality, this sufficiently flexible support is not possible. The next section of this chapter discusses a
fallacy that Mill makes in his assumptions that there are various potentials
for intellectual, moral, and political achievement, and reveals further how Mill’s freedom-utilitarian project is practical for
only a few individuals.
III. The Elitist
Assignment of Utility to Human Natures
Elitist
expectations can spoil the chances for human nature’s progress and utilitarian
developmental powers. With its hidden
expectations, which are counter-productive to the development of the majority
of individuals, the society would undermine the very developmental power that
it sought to maximize, and along with it, its project's capacity for the
maximization of utility.
When
the leaders and benefactors to society share in common similar personal
characteristics that permit them to constitute an elite category that consider
themselves as most capable to serve the common good, and base on their elitist
and one-sided assumptions practices that benefit only or mainly themselves,
those people can be called politically egoistic. The presence of political egoism in a social
project is inconsistent with the aim for political equality. The successful application of Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project largely depends on individual characteristics and causal
attributes including the capacities for genius, effectual originality, and
impartiality, which he expects only a few individuals possess. This claim that the individual
characteristics that have high utility are scarce makes it seem impractical for
most of society's members to participate in the freedom-utilitarian project,
and thus excludes not only their characteristics but also their achievements
from utility. An exclusive
utilitarianism is impractical because it cannot benefit from the whole social
body, and denies a large social segment the opportunities that they could
obtain only through work as benefactors.[30]
i) Moral and Intellectual Elitism
and Self-fulfilling Prophecies
Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy against the
moral and intellectual developmental progress of the societal majority. The project promotes elitist assumptions
about differential inherent developmental capacities; these assumptions place
the majority of individuals at a developmental disadvantage, and thus hinder
their capacity to add to utility.
Kendall
and Carey (1968) find that Mill is a precursor of contemporary elitism. They claim that Mill’s elitism does not
consist of separate components – intellectual and moral – but rather combines
these into one form of elitism based on intellectual excellence. Mill assumes that individuals who have the
most intellectual worth also have the most moral worth and vice versa. For Kendall and Carey (1968), Mill’s elitist
mindset begins with the following proposition:
The “intellectual and “moral” resources (that is, “worth”) of the
citizenry of the democratic state, which must be “organized” for purposes of
government, is, like it or not, to be found in the Few, not the Many, above the
roster’s Great Divide, not above and below it. (Kendall & Carey, 1968, p.
38)
Mill proceeds to absorb moral
worth into intellectual worth, as he posits that individuals who have more
knowledge or those endowed with intellectual superiority should have the power
to guide the conduct of government.
Mill expects that
certain individuals have the inherent capacity to serve the common good more
than others. Mill claims that only the
originality of a few would prove to have utility, as discussed in the second
chapter of this thesis. Also, Mill
argues that few individuals benefit from free individual expression more than
others. Particularly, when it comes to
natural "heroes," society "knows not how to make them" (CW,
18, Ch. 3, ¶5) and
the best that it can do for them is allow them the freedom to make themselves,
and respect that they cannot be socially-engineered.
For
Mill, especially the gifted few who happen to inherently possess more of the
"raw material of human nature" and a more "energetic
nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5), in other words, more human potential, and thus, who can
access a larger portion of human nature, suffer, if they are not allowed to
freely develop. In turn, society suffers
the consequences when society does not allow them to fully actualize their
presumably greater potential for good.
Consider Mill’s claims in the following passage, and follow them to
their final implications:
To
say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various
than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of the raw material
of human nature, and is therefore capable, perhaps of more evil, but
certainly of more good. Strong
impulses are but another name for energy.
Energy may be turned to bad uses; but more good may always be made of
an energetic nature, than of an indolent and impassive one. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶5, emphasis added)
Thus, members of the developmental elite are
capable of more evil as well as of more good compared to those whom Mill
considers the less developable. However,
Mill assumes that if members of the developmental elite are given liberty, then
they are more likely to contribute to social improvement than to social
regression in terms of added injustice and falsehood.
Mill
claims not only individuals who have achieved greater levels of moral maturity
deserve greater social privileges, but he also claims that some individuals
have greater inherent potential for greater moral privileges than others. Also, in today's terms, they benefit from
psycho- and socio-biological developmental privileges. Mill predicts that such individuals naturally
will acquire a greater morality, if given developmentally hospitable social
circumstances. First, while Mill
recognizes that strong feelings and emotions are not necessarily corrupt, Mill
claims that those who have more of these qualities can develop a greater
conscience compared to those who have lower levels. He writes: "it is not because men's
desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are
weak" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5). He
continues: "there is no natural
connexion between strong impulses and a weak conscience. The natural connexion is the other
way" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5, emphasis added).
The connection between impulses and a weak conscience applies for those
with inherently weak impulses but not for those with strong impulses. For Mill, how some persons develop conscience
suffers from their deficient energies, but how other persons develop conscience
suffers from the improper balance of their strong energies. He writes:
desires
and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and
restraints: and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced;
when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength, while others,
which ought to co-exist with them, remain weak and inactive. (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶5)
For an energetic character, one must develop a
strong will to govern strong impulses (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5).
The
moral dimension of Mill's developmental elitism depends on the assumption that
the very attributes which he deems important in moral development are naturally
scarce. As mentioned in the previous
section, Mill suggests that impartiality is a helpful attribute for the development
of a just character. He claims that only
a few are capable of impartiality, thus he designates this important
developmental attribute as a naturally scarce one.
Further, Mill's developmental
elitism consists of natural scarcity claims including that there are
individuals who naturally have stronger passions and thus have more with which
to work in their development of other assets such as virtue and self-discipline
which are also required for a strong moral character. He writes:
Those
who have most natural feeling, are
always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest. The same strong susceptibilities which
make the personal impulses vivid and powerful, are also the source from
whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest
self-control. It is through the
cultivation of these, that society both does its duty and protects its
interests. (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5, emphasis added)
Mill emphasizes the potential of the members
of the developmental elite for good, and that society should let them cultivate
their greater developmental potential.
He adds that these "stronger specimens of
human nature" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9) should
have their freedom of action restricted only from "encroaching on the
rights of others" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9). Therefore, Mill holds a moral psycho- and
socio-biological developmental form of elitism but, as the previous quotation
shows, he prefers that they should not impede anyone's development. The recommendation that Mill makes for the
prevention of the interference of the most developable with the growth of the
least developable is inadequate for the development maximization of both
groups.
Mill's
elitist emphasis on the development of individuals whom he considers mentally
gifted is at the expense of full appreciation for the human potential of
persons whom he supposes do not inherently possess energetic natures, and have
less access to portions of human nature.
Mill underestimates not only the intellectual but also the emotional,
and even the moral potential of those persons.
Mill's view that development is possible for everyone means little next
to his view that the degree of developmental potential varies by person. He excessively focuses on what the mentally
gifted can contribute to social progress.
He ignores not only that those whose abilities look ordinary are also
capable of great growth, that they are not necessarily doomed by their nature
to mediocrity, but also especially that they, too, have much to contribute to
social progress. They can favourably
influence the developmental power of others, as discussed in chapter two.
Mill's
position on the various inherent potentials of human natures also suffers from
moral elitism, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Mill's morally elitist claims have
biological, social and psychological developmental dimensions. In his view, free expression is crucial especially
for the development of persons who have more potential than others to develop a
good conscience, virtue, self-discipline, and impartiality.
Mill
claims that the developmental elite both developmentally and epistemically
benefit from free expression more than others.
They can both earn more developmental power and learn more through its
exercise. For Mill, persons of genius
can serve as benefactors to social freedom and can benefit from that freedom
more than others can. Persons of genius
are "more individual" than
others (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶11). If they receive the
social freedom which permits self-expression, then more individual growth can
accrue to persons of genius than to persons who are presumably less capable of
individuality. The assumed greater
capacity to exercise active individuality permits persons of genius a greater
likelihood that they will improve the social freedom that fosters their
individual growth.
Mill's view that
certain individuals have greater potential to benefit from free expression
functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy to the effect that society could permit
some individuals more freedom of expression on the basis of the expectation
that they can benefit more from freedom.
Thus, society would fulfill the prophecy that some individuals benefit the
most from free expression. If some individuals
receive the most opportunities to benefit, then they are likely to experience
the most benefit.
Also,
individuals whom society perceives as capable of producing greater utility,
such as for improving social freedom, could, on the basis of their perceived
greater social utility, be granted more privileges, for example, participation
in the social policy making process. And
their greater social privileges would empower their developmental capacities,
and they would likely prove to have more social utility. Because "the moral worth of actions is
to be judged in terms of the consequences of those actions,"[31]
the actions of many persons comparatively turn out not only to have lower
social worth but also lower moral worth.
Mill's developmental elitism has social
developmental dimensions in addition to the psycho-biological dimension
discussed earlier in this section. The
social developmental dimension is evident, for instance, in Mill's
considerations of how society can facilitate or impede intellectual progress.
ii) The Fallacy of Innate Mental
Giftedness
The
fallacy of innate mental giftedness results from the overstatement of the
connection between a faster or "more energetic" intellectual
developmental rate and intellectual potential.
Practices based on this fallacy interfere with society's capacity to
satisfy the various individual developmental needs. Here, I explain how some views of mental
giftedness are problematic, and make some recommendations for the optimization
of individual development. First,
'genius' is a socially constructed category.[32] The dominant cognitive values of society
selectively pick and choose the elements of genius, and they provide the basis
for standards by which society judges the 'genius' of individuals. Second, the development of most, if not all,
persons who initially appear to have ordinary intellectual abilities is not
limited to the cultivation of their ability to appreciate the extraordinary
abilities of persons of genius enough to accept them as their leaders. They can develop extraordinary abilities, if
given sufficient opportunities to do so and a social environment which supports
human growth in practical ways. Third,
understanding the social problems posed by views that the mentally gifted
belong to a minority would help us to maximize society's capacity to fully
benefit from its members' cognitive abilities.
Although
Mill claims that there are inherently diverse individual natures, he does not
acknowledge the possibility that the social conditions which optimize the
intellectual capacities of one developmental group may undermine the
development of intellectual capacities for another developmental group. For example, Mill claims that persons of
genius intellectually and developmentally benefit the most from the
unrestricted expression and formation of opinions. However, he does not consider whether this
practice is sometimes harmful for the intellectual developmental capacities of
others.
Mill
underestimates the extent to which socially valued individual attributes such
as rationality, intelligence and genius are socially constructed, arbitrarily
constituted and demarcated, and subject to being enhanced or limited by social
constraints. The assumption that persons
of genius are born more than made will keep persons of genius in the elite and
minority category in which Mill expects that they will remain: “Persons of genius, it is true, are, and are
always likely to be, a small minority” (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶11).
However, the assumption of the scarcity of genius is not in the interest
of development maximization because it sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy
against the high prevalence of genius.
Mill's
assumption that there are various human intellectual, creative, and moral
potentials results from a common fallacy of innate mental giftedness. It regards the growth potential of the
mentally gifted as superior to the growth potential of persons who mature at
average rates, because it takes innate speed as being indicative of innate
mental capacity. Under this fallacy, the
faster rate of intellectual progress among individuals who society considers as
exceptionally, intellectually gifted, to use today's term, is taken as a sign
of their greater potential to achieve more than persons who progress more
slowly. Although many people accept this
sort of evaluation of intellectual potential, the fact that some mature at an
earlier age is not of much relevance to their amount of potential for growth
that remains. It is possible that one
can assume the opposite, i.e. the fact that a person has already reached a high
level of intellectual maturity can indicate that she has less growth to
experience, since she has already "grown up." To consider another way to connect
intellectual maturation rate to the unactualized potential that remains, it is
useful to compare persons who inherit faster psychological maturation rates
with persons who inherit privileged social circumstances. In proportion to the height of their social
ascription, society recognizes that persons do not have the potential for much
more social ascendance. For example, society
does not expect a person born into a billionaire family to have the potential
to experience much more upward social mobility.
Yet, if a person demonstrates a faster rate of intellectual progress,
people normally expect that the person has much more growth to achieve compared
to persons who progress at an average rate.
People tend to infer a person's full mental potential from the amount of
potential that the person has realized.
For example, people tend to take that women have not achieved as many
considered great works of philosophy as men have as a sign of women's inferior intellectual
potential. The expectation that what can
be realized follows from what has been realized is especially dubious when
people judge what has been realized in a politically unequal social context
where some persons have greater developmental opportunities than others, and
thus a greater likelihood that they will achieve more than others.
Yet, I suggest
that no inference at all about potential can be based on past individual
development. Only what has been
actualized can be reliably measured. Mental
potential, or inherent mental capacity, is an illusory idea that has long been
used to exclude certain human beings from socially valued categories, even from
the category of human being itself.
Mental attributes, such as 'intelligence,' are largely, but not
entirely, socially constructed. It is
uncertain and cannot be made certain whether human potential varies by
person. My point is that no measurement
of arbitrarily constituted and arbitrarily demarcated constructs can be
reliable, even if there are (and there must be some) innate mental
differences. Thus, Mill’s assumption
that there are various inherent differences among the mental capacities across
human beings that restrict their individual range of mental possibilities is
not only unparsimonious or unnecessarily strong, but even more so it is
impractical for the purposes of utility maximization.
The acceptance,
instead, of the simple assumption that the potential of all human beings is
immeasurably great can help to maximize individual development. For, we all have the capacity to become
persons of genius, if given a nurturing social environment with adequate and
appropriate supports and opportunities for individual growth. This assumption would prove to have greater
utility than the unparsimonious one that Mill accepts, and which continues to
be popularly held in the present day.
What can be realized just does not follow from what has been
realized.
I
brought attention to Mill's claims that there are inherent differences among
individual potentials for intelligence, emotion, and morality. I disagreed with those claims and objected to
the notions of innate mental giftedness and innate mental scarcity which those
claims contain. Since Mill assumes that
there is a positive correlation between intelligence and morality, his
intellectual elitism is doubly problematic.
Mill assumes that
there are natural losers and natural winners.
For Mill, the individual can
expand her developmental power within a limited range of possibilities that is
unique to the individual. Some
individuals have a wider inherent range of developmental possibilities. For example, they are more capable of great
evil but also of great good, and the direction of their development is inclined
towards the good. Also, the strength of
the inherent developmental power varies by individual. Individuals can work within the range of
their developmental possibilities to affect the social expression of their
developmental capacities, and realize themselves.
Unfortunately, for Mill,
individuals cannot favourably alter the inherent value of the strength of their
developmental capacities. The inherent
strength of particular traits is positively correlated with the social strength
of those traits. It follows from Mill's
assumptions that individuals who have a more narrow range of developmental
possibilities are unlikely to escape their disadvantaged condition because they
have relatively lower inherent developmental power. And since greater levels of developmental
power increase the capacity for social utility, there are unfair implications
for the social worth which certain individuals can attain.
Because
of the influential role of expectations upon behaviour, the views that some persons
have greater intellectual and moral biological potentials than others have real
social consequences. This is the case no
matter how untrue the evaluations are.
The evaluations are problematic because they disregard the socially
constructed aspects of the mental attributes under consideration, such as
intelligence and genius. Also, the
evaluations disregard the genetic-environmental interaction aspects of the
mentioned attributes.
I
am concerned that Mill's views that some persons can developmentally benefit
more from important social environmental factors, such as freedom of
expression, also have real social implications, regardless of whether they are
truthful or not. One of the social developmental implications of Mill's thought on
the developmental elite is that political inequality interferes with the
adequate cultivation of human developmental capacities. Political inequality influences the
characterization of what is considered mental giftedness, and recognition of
human psychological developmental needs, and of the practices adequate for
their satisfaction.
CHAPTER
4: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND CULTURAL
IMPERIALISM OVER THE TRUTH
This
chapter argues that what Mill considers socially unrestricted speech is
unlikely to help much in the advancement of multi-sided knowledge, and is
inconsistent with the promotion of the independent thought mode, human
rationality, and cultural diversity. I
will explore the utilitarian and consequentialist basis for Mill's main
argument that free individual expression, including free speech, independent
thought, and free self-regarding action, add to common epistemically beneficial
social consequences. The main argument
for freedom of individual expression is that it permits independent thinking,
diversity of opinion and conduct, diversity of education and experiments of
life. These social conditions each serve
utility by contributing to individual development, rationality, and epistemic
and social progress.
Mill
argues for socially unrestricted speech because he is concerned that society's
practice of censorship does not encourage the independent thought mode. He recognizes that society practices mental
coercion and pressures persons to think along common lines of opinion, as I
discussed in the second chapter. Mill
admits that protection is needed "against the tyranny of the prevailing
opinion and feeling" (CW, 18, Ch. 1, ¶9), but he asserts that restricting
expression is not the appropriate way to obtain this protection. On the one hand, Mill recognizes that
"unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of prevailing opinion,
really does deter people from professing contrary opinions, and from listening
to those who profess them" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶42). As well, he concedes that "for the
interest…of truth and justice, it is far more important to restrain this
employment of vituperative language" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶42). On the other hand, he states that it is
"obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining" it
(CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶42). Thus, Mill makes
his position clear on freedom of speech:
it should not be legally or politically restricted.
Mill
provides arguments for freedom of individual expression, not from the natural
rights of human beings, but rather from the utility of free expression. Mill's arguments for liberty emphasize the
utility of liberty. "If, somehow,
the principles of liberty and utility were to conflict, Mill would assert that
the principle of utility must be upheld," writes Strasser (1984, p.
68). Although utility could be used, for
example, by referring to the no harm principle to support censorship, in
practice utility cannot support censorship on the basis of avoiding harm;[33]
for example, the selection of the most appropriate censors and ideas on what
constitutes harm are not infallible.
Whereas
conflicts between utility and liberty may not be real, what Mill considers free
speech does conflict with his freedom-utilitarian project's aim to maximize
utility. Mill's "genius lay in
showing why apparent conflicts between utility and liberty were not real. His greatness as a defender of liberty is
precisely due to his ability to show why liberty must be protected on
utilitarian grounds,"
according to Strasser (1984, p. 68).
This chapter will argue that the maximization of utility conflicts with
the socially unrestricted practice of free speech which Mill proposes on the
basis of a faulty view of liberty, although not precisely with liberty.
The
second section of this chapter, entitled, "Mill's Main Argument from Beneficial Consequences for Freedom of
Expression," reconstructs Mill's utilitarian arguments for what he
considers free speech and opinion formation.
The third section of this chapter, entitled "Utilitarian Problems
with the Use of 'Unrestricted' Expression for the Pursuit of Truth,"
provides a utilitarian constructive critique of those arguments. It uses the concepts 'political egoism' and
'epistemic fairness' to describe the problems of Mill's social epistemology and
to suggest revisions for an improved freedom-utilitarian project. The third section's fourth part, entitled
"Response to the Argument from
Rationality for 'Unrestricted' Expression," suggests a notion of
free speech as the social transmitter of cognitive independence that is more
consistent with the utilitarian aims of Mill's freedom project for the pursuit
of mental independence, open-mindedness, and self-knowledge and social
knowledge than the notion of unrestricted speech.
II. Mill's Main Argument that Freedom of
Expression has Beneficial Consequences for Society
In
this section, I will explore how Mill approaches free speech, and I will
reconstruct the various components of Mill's argument that free speech has
epistemic and developmental beneficial consequences for society's members.
Today
"free" expression is accepted in many countries, especially first
world governments and the United Nations.
For instance, article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
reads: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations, 1948). But societies approach such statements in
culture-bound ways. No power has
bothered to rigorously define the terms of 'free expression.' Generally, these are assumed to have
laissez-faire meaning. Thus defined,
being free from social restrictions imposed upon one's communicational
activities is indicative of having freedom to communicate and freedom to form
one's opinions.
Mill's
On Liberty (1859) is popularly credited for the laissez-faire approach
to free speech. Mill's position for free
expression can be subdivided into the arguments from the benefits of
independent thinking, from fallibility, from rationality and from the synthesis
of truth.
Here,
I will discuss some of Mill's claims on the beneficial relationship between
free expression and individual development, and his concerns with the capacity
of social restrictions to undermine individual development. Mill thinks that free expression contributes
to individual development. For instance,
free expression facilitates independent thinking, for free expression fosters
the open-mindedness which independent thinking requires. Mill's concern is that restricting expression
beyond considerations regarding the good of society would not permit
individuals to develop to their full potential.
Restricted expression could at best make strong individuals become
resistant to the excessive demands of restraint (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9). In other words, unnecessary social
restrictions not only impede the developmental need satisfaction of stronger
individuals but also promote their social deviance.
Mill
also stresses the need to foster the development of independent thinkers. He goes so far as to credit the advancement
of truth more to wrong opinions that result from the independent thought mode
than to true opinions that the thinker does not hold rationally. He writes:
"Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and
preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only
hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think" (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
¶20).
Furthermore,
as Mill puts it, "no one can be a great thinker who does not recognize,
that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever
conclusions it may lead" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶20). Mill assumes that the independent thinker
values truth and is open-minded, that is, has the attitude of willingness to be
persuaded to any opinions, regardless of what they may be, so long as they are
true; the open-minded individual chooses
to make as many modifications or changes to her opinions as are necessary to
make those opinions more truthful. The
open-minded search for the truth is necessary for developing good judgment and,
thus, epistemically rightful or rationally justified confidence in one's
practices (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶7). Hence,
for Mill, the function of open-mindedness is the individual development of
knowledge, good judgement, and virtue; free expression permits the independent
thinker to obtain these.
ii) Free Expression of Held Opinions:
Here, I will provide a summary of Mill's main arguments for
free expression of personal opinions.
These include arguments from human fallibility, rationality, and truth
synthesis. Lastly, I will discuss Mill's
claims on the mutually beneficial relationship between free expression and
individual development.
Mill
argues from the fact that human beings are not infallible. He asserts that we should not allow
assumptions of certainty in matters in which we cannot have absolute certainty
to be used to restrict expression. Since
it is possible that we can make mistakes even in matters of which we feel the
most certain, we should always permit the opportunity for the correction of our
mistaken beliefs. Society should not
deny that opportunity to anyone. Mill
writes: "if all mankind minus one,
were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind
would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the
power, would be justified in silencing mankind" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶1). Mill continues with the claim that to silence
the opinions of no matter how small a number is a public offence because the
benefits of free expression are not only private. That is to say, those benefits are not
limited to the persons who express themselves.
Thus, from the start of his fallibility argument for free expression,
Mill proceeds to further develop a general argument that individual
opportunities for free expression benefit society.
The
argument from the rationality of free expression consists of two main
components. Mill argues that free
expression has a crucial role to play in the rational (1) acquisition of the
truth and (2) sustenance of the truth.
For
Mill, the acquisition of the truth gains from knowledge about what is truthful
as well as about what is false.
Consider:
the
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent
from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth:
if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the
clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶1,
emphasis added)
In the above passage, Mill claims
that to learn the truth of why something is false is almost as useful as to
learn the truth of why something is true.
Mill connects the acquisition of truth with the recognition of falsehood
so much that, he thinks, knowledge of why something is true nearly half depends
on knowledge of why something is false.
That is to say, knowledge of falsehood is part of knowledge of the
truth; the truth of falsehood and the truth of the truth are parts of the whole
truth. The rational acquisition of
knowledge requires that one should explore both truths and falsehoods while one responds to objections, as I
will discuss next.
2.1) The Rationality of
Responding to Objections
Mill
thinks that the truth is multi-sided, and that responding to objections facilitates
an individual's capacity to identify the various sides of the truth. As well, he thinks that one should respond to
objections in order to have a justified claim to the truth. He writes:
He who knows only his own side, knows little of that. His reasons may be
good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the
reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he
has no ground for preferring either opinion. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶22)
To develop rational opinions, one
must not only understand the premises for one's side but also defend one's
position against objections. Consider
that doctrines are "never really known, but to those who have attended
equally and impartially to both sides, and endeavoured to see the reasons of
both in the strongest light" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶22).
Mill
assumes that free expression promotes diversity of opinions, which, in turn, is
necessary for the acquisition of truth.
He writes: "only through
diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance
of fair play to all sides of the truth" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶35, emphasis added). The promotion of diversity increases the
availability of opinions; this availability permits the opportunity for persons
to work with all the available opinions, not only with the ones with which they
agree. Given diverse opinions, free
expression allows persons to consider equally the various opinions and their
objections.
2.2) The Satisfaction of the Necessary Conditions
for Liveliness of Truthful Beliefs
The
second component of Mill's argument from rationality primarily consists of the claim
that liveliness of belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. In turn, the necessary conditions for
liveliness of belief include that the believer should arrive at and search for
opinions to constantly challenge her beliefs, and resolve the challenged
beliefs through an independent thought process.
Discussion helps beliefs to satisfy the knowledge requirement, for it
exposes beliefs to challenges. Mill
warns about "the mischievous operation of the absence of free
discussion" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶25). Not only one's
knowledge of the premises for one's beliefs but also one's grasp of the meaning
of truthful beliefs diminishes through the passage of time, if one does not
discuss those opinions with others who do not hold them (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶25-26). Thus, for
truthful beliefs to be known, the believer must obtain and sustain them in a
rational manner, that is, through discussion.
Although
Mill does not provide an explicit definition of free discussion, his claims
about the functions of free discussion, the "mischievous operation of the
absence of free discussion," and the consequences of its absence suggest
how he defines free discussion. It is an
intellectual and communicational "struggle" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶26) among opposing opinions
that sustains not only the grounds of each true opinion, but "the meaning
of the opinion itself" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶25). Mill strongly asserts that knowledgeable
beliefs must be challenged to be lively so much that he describes discussion in
terms that contradict each other; his view of 'discussion' is comparable to the
phrase 'peace is war.' He writes:
"[the meaning of ethical doctrines and religious creeds] continues to be
felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller
consciousness, so long as the struggle
lasts to give the doctrine or creed
an ascendancy over other creeds" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶26, emphasis added).
Thus, Mill describes 'discussion,' which is a word that suggests "a
pacific attitude towards argumentation" (Hansen, 2006, p. 2), negotiation
and diplomacy, as a matter of doctrines or creeds struggling to keep the
strength of the life of their meaning, and even to gain greater strength in
their dominance over others (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶26). Discussion is a rational requirement to
sustain the "living power of the doctrine," (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶26, emphasis added) and to retain the full meaning of the
original opinions (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶25). Later in this chapter, I will show how Mill's
treatment of discussion contributes to the incoherence of his argument that
free expression facilitates the advancement of rationality.
3)
Argument from the Synthesis of Truth:
Epistemic Diplomats
Another
of Mill’s arguments for freedom of expression is from the synthesis of truth in
which he claims that epistemic diplomats play a central role. "Truth has no chance but in proportion
as every side of it, every opinion which
embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so
advocated as to be listened to" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶38, emphasis added), writes Mill. The synthesis of truth requires the bold
expression of multiple opinions on the same issues. Mill expects that the over all free play of
expression is multi-sided and reveals various stories and perspectives. In this way, one can know not only one's
position but also others' positions. The
awareness of the various views allows one to be responsive to others’
objections, and thereby inform one's position.
Thus, free expression has the additional practical benefit that it
permits not only toleration of the co-existence of diverse views, but the
various views to interact, and hence the benefit of discourse. From Mill’s viewpoint, free expression is a
process by which the diverse partial truths gradually merge into opinion
clusters of larger and more integrated truths, until eventually there is only
one cluster of whole truthful opinions.
Mill
recognizes that controversy can raise "even
persons of the most ordinary intellect to
something of the dignity of thinking beings" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶20, emphasis added). Yet, he expects "persons of the most
ordinary intellect" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶20)
neither to play an active role in the synthesis of truth nor to immediately
acquire knowledge of society. In the truth synthesizing process, epistemic diplomats would
have the central role in the reconciliation of the one-sided and disputed
truths or, in other words, in the aggregation of truths. Epistemic diplomats are individuals who
benefit from the possession of the main characteristic, namely impartiality,
which the synthesis of truth requires, who epistemically gain the most from
free discussion, and who negotiate the synthesised truth. For Mill, the capacity for impartial
judgement is rare. Mill writes: "there are few mental attributes more
rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgement between
two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before
it" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶38). Mill's political egoism begins with his
restriction of the number of social epistemic agents to the developmental elite
group to which he belongs.
While
Mill deems impartiality necessary to advance the comprehension of the truth, he
expects that impartiality benefits only a few individuals, and suggests that
most individuals neither can help much advance knowledge nor can they gain much
rationality. Mill writes: "truth,
in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the
reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently
capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to
correctness" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶35). So, epistemic
diplomacy is the inherent duty of the few. Mill suggests that the advancement of
rationality of the few is made at expense to the rationality of the majority of
individuals. For Mill, the danger
that free expression poses for the views of the majority is epistemically
acceptable because it benefits the rational few who act as epistemic
diplomats. Mill writes:
I
do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all
possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical
sectarianism. Every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about, is
sure to be asserted, inculcated, and in many ways even acted on, as if no other
truth existed in the world, or at all events none that could limit or qualify
the first. I acknowledge that the
tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest
discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth
which ought to have been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the more
violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it
is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of
opinions works its salutary effect. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶38,
emphasis added)
It is the epistemic diplomats who are
capable of advancing social knowledge, not the narrow minded societal
majority. Thus, the risked loss to the
majority's already small capacity for knowledge and the risked reinforcement of
the majority's ignorance do not count in Mill's social knowledge acquisition
equation.
4) The Equal Treatment of
Falsehood and Truth
Here, I will draw from Mill's
arguments that human fallibility, the rationality of responding to objections,
and the epistemic need to attend to extreme opinions entail a need for free
expression.[34] First, we are fallible. For example, we are not certain about which
of the available opinions is the most truthful.[35] Second, false opinions can inform truthful
opinions as much or nearly as much as truthful opinions can inform false
ones. Third, the consideration of
extreme opinions can inform our development of multi-sided opinions. Therefore, we should treat all opinions as if
they have equal potentials for being the most truthful or the most false, and
as if they can equally inform our opinions.
For
Mill, "the truth of an opinion is part of its utility" (CW, 18, Ch.
2, ¶10). The other part is its
falsity. An earlier part of this chapter
examined a passage which claims that falsehood enhances the life of the truth,
for falsehood shows the truth about what is false, not only about what is
true. Opinions that are partly true are
also partly false, and so are their opposites, but the false and true parts
that the opposite opinions have are different from each other. Opinions that are entirely true have their
true content entirely missing from their opposite opinions which are entirely
false. Identification of the truths and
falsehoods that one's opinion lacks undoubtedly adds to one's capacity to
respond to the objections of others as well as to one's capacity to construct
more persuasive positions. Mill gives
the example that thought in terms of progress or reform informs thought in
terms of order or stability, and vice versa (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶35). When one tries to reconcile both thought
modes or observes the opinions of others who operate the various thought modes,
these modes can provide useful input to one's position, whether they belong to
oneself or not. Mill lists other pairs
of opposites or antagonisms in social life including democracy and aristocracy,
property and equality, co-operation and competition, luxury and abstinence,
sociality and individuality, and liberty and discipline. Both elements in each pair are useful, and,
therefore, should be "enforced and defended with equal talent and
energy" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶35, emphasis added). Thus, Mill argues that we should equally
treat truths, falsehoods, and extreme modes of thought.
III. Utilitarian Problems with the Use of
'Unrestricted' Expression for the Pursuit of Truth
Here,
I will provide responses to Mill's arguments that truth synthesis and
rationality require no social restriction on expression. I will provide a response to Mill's argument
for the epistemically equal treatment of falsehood and truth; that argument
includes an evaluation of claims that Mill makes in his fallibility,
rationality, and truth synthesis arguments.
Mill neither epistemically justifies nor ethically justifies his social
epistemology, and it cannot be justified, for it lacks epistemic fairness. For the individual to justify her knowledge,
she needs to give more than reasons for her beliefs. For the individual to rationally[36]
hold her reasons, she needs to obtain them through epistemically fair means, as
I will discuss next.
I
will suggest what can be considered a utilitarian, and thus consequentialist
notion of epistemic fairness, and argue that Mill's freedom-utilitarian project
does not pass the epistemic fairness test.
Under my proposal, the examination for epistemic fairness must consider the
number of epistemic agents who are the benefactors and beneficiaries to the
pursuit and the attainment of knowledge.
One criterion for epistemic fairness would consider the social means by
which individuals obtain knowledge. The
means are epistemically fairer, the greater the number of epistemic agents
whose knowledge benefits from their own and others' pursuit of knowledge. Another important criterion for epistemic
fairness would consider the results or likely results of particular epistemic
pursuits. The results are fairer, the
greater the number of epistemic agents who actively and immediately benefit
from the acquisition of knowledge. In
short, the more the means and ends of the utilitarian society's freedom project
contribute to the equalization of the distribution of the benefits and harms
from the acquisition of knowledge, the fairer that those means and ends are.
In
particular, two main conditions affect the extent of epistemic fairness of
cases of knowledge pursuit and attainment.
First, the utilitarian society must maximize the number of epistemic
agents whose social and cognitive development benefits from the pursuit and the
attainment of social and self-knowledge.
Second, the utilitarian society must minimize or reduce the number of
epistemic agents whose social and cognitive development is undermined by their
own and others' pursuit and attainment of social and self-knowledge.
For
Mill, the obtained knowledge would be ethically justified because under the
free expression of opinions, at least in principle, all have their chance to be
heard. Mill is concerned that society's
interference with liberty is more likely to have harmful than good consequences
(Strasser, 1984, p. 65). As an example
of an unfavourable consequence of restricting the expression of opinions,
society persecutes the benefactors to the truth and thus endangers the
emergence of new truths (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶16-17). Mill argues that, therefore, society should
not impair the utilitarian capacities of expression through political and legal
restrictions, and suggests a marketplace of ideas[37]
which does not ban the sale of any deemed falsehood or unpopular truth.
However,
historically, what Mill calls free expression has been more ideal than real
(McMurtry, 1998, p. 192), and the reality of its absence overpowers the ideal
of its presence, while the ideal that it is present makes it difficult for
society to recognize the reality that it is absent. "Society always has, and constantly
exercises, the power to silence," as Kendall (1960) puts the social
incapacity for unrestricted expression (p. 979). In light of this problem, this section asks,
'What will secure us from corrupt or tyrannical media?' When society views the institution of the
media as possessing liberty of the press, this view serves to legitimize the media's
practices, even when those practices are not free from harmful political
influence. Without appropriate and
adequate censorship the news media, for example, cannot ethically report the
news. Slanted news stories about war and
violence promote the mistreatment of members of badly portrayed social groups,
and inaccurately represent the nature of the human population and its diverse
interests. Just because society gives
the various sources of the media the opportunity to consider diverse political
interests and, in principle, media sources claim to do so, does not mean that
they will, over all, do so in a politically balanced, honest, multi-sided
manner in practice.
The
press is inevitably restricted; it cannot escape censorship, whether externally
by the government or internally by its owners and by those who have the power
to influence it. Since the press is
inevitably subjected to social restrictions, the social restrictions placed
upon it should be transparent and decided in a fair, equitable, and cooperative
manner. This section advises that we
should understand freedom of expression not simply as a negative epistemic and
developmental right of the individual for socially unimpeded cognitive
expression but rather primarily as a positive right to think and choose actions
independently. As well, this section
brings attention to society's responsibility for the promotion of freedom of
expression; society has the ethical obligation to facilitate its members' independent
thought mode and independent choice of actions.
Only thus, can freedom of expression do justice to the truth.
i) Response to the Argument from the Rational
Sustenance of the Life of Truth for "Unrestricted" Expression
Here,
I will raise some objections to Mill's argument that rationality helps to
sustain the liveliness of truth, in light of the following passage. Mill writes:
If
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error
for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶1)
The premises in the above passage
are one-sided in at least two ways.
First, Mill emphasizes the benefits of
free expression to human society in the acquisition of rationally justified
knowledge. He emphasizes the expenses to
the society that does not permit the expression of all opinions in terms of
loss of opportunities to enliven or uplift the rationality of its members'
opinions.
The
second way in which the above passage reveals one-sided premises is that Mill
implicitly claims that falsehood enhances the life of the truth because
exposure to falsehood gives us the opportunity to understand why something is
false. The validity of that claim
depends on whether persons tend to benefit from that opportunity, and whether
the personal benefits obtained from that opportunity outweigh the personal
harms. However, the validity of that
claim is questionable: Mill expects that
mainly the developmental elite group to which he belongs will experience the
benefits of exposure to beliefs that are based on falsehoods; thus the
one-sidedness of his claim is also politically egoistic.
The
presence and awareness of opportunities do not necessarily have beneficial
consequences over all or even at all.
For instance, some persons use the presence and awareness of economic
and communicational opportunities to justify unequal economic and
communicational outcomes. In Canada,
members of privileged social groups are much more likely to successfully pursue
economic opportunities to obtain influential positions in the media (Fleras
& Elliott, 2003). Thus, the same
opportunity can vary by its degree of likelihood to have beneficial
consequences depending on the person who pursues it. Also, persons can successfully pursue
opportunities to the benefit of the promotion of the opinions of certain social
groups, and the persons can, in turn, create other opportunities to harm the
image of persons with rival opinions.
For example, persons can use their expression to poison the well for the
expression of others. Opportunities for
expression do not necessarily, whether directly or indirectly, have good
outcomes for society.
By
assuming that opportunities for expression will have beneficial consequences
over all, Mill overstates the reality of the benefits that
"unrestricted" expression render to society. For instance, in the last sentence of the
previous quotation, the assumption is that the persons being exposed to
falsehood would recognize it as such, that is to say, that they would benefit
from the opportunity to detect falsehoods.
The argument that rationality requires "unrestricted"
expression rests on the validity of the assumption. Mill claims that everyone can benefit from
"unrestricted" expression.
However, he predicts that only a rational few, at a time, will
epistemically benefit from expression.
He does not explain how social knowledge, in the long-term, will become
more rational. Another opportunity that
"unrestricted" expression brings is for the elimination of
prejudice. Prejudice, for Mill, is
"not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being"
(CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶21). This opportunity has to be realized to be a
true benefit, and, in line with utilitarianism, the greater the number of
persons who realize the opportunity, the greater the benefit to society.
However,
Mill predicts that the majority is too one-sided[38]
to benefit from the opportunity. If one
considers that dismal prediction, the acceptability of the argument from
rationality that favours "unrestricted" expression is highly
questionable. We should give weight to Mill's argument from rationality only to the extent
that "unrestricted" expression provides the benefits that he claims
it does. As we have seen so far, this is
unlikely.
ii) Response to the Rationalization of the Equal
Treatment of Falsehood and Truth
I will discuss the political
implications of the epistemically equal treatment of falsehood and truth, which
support my argument against Mill's claim that "unrestricted"
expression has utility. This discussion
will show how Mill rationalizes the epistemically equal treatment of the
expression of falsehood and truth. Mill
goes too far when he overstates the epistemic and social utility of falsehood
by encouraging that it be treated as equal to that of the truth. I will argue that Mill's claim that the equal
treatment of falsehood and truth facilitates the advancement of rationality is
another reason for why Mill's social epistemology is inadequately
utilitarian. Mill holds the unrealistic
expectation that the epistemically equal treatment of falsehood and truth would
add to the politically equal treatment of persons who hold the ignorant or
knowledgeable opinions. Yet, the equal
treatment of false opinions and truthful ones does not entail the politically
equal treatment of the human beings who hold those opinions. The epistemically equal treatment of
falsehood and truth facilitates the advancement of the rationality of the few
at the expense of the rationality of the many, and thus it offers an elitist
treatment of society.
Mill takes the perspective of
the epistemic diplomat who tries to integrate the various truths, and treats
the ignorance of others as a tolerable part of the means to the end of
knowledge. Mill's argument for the equal
treatment of falsehood and truth demonstrates one-sided thinking, for Mill does
not consider that this exposure endangers others' knowledge capacities. Also, this treatment is politically egoistic
because Mill recommends this treatment as beneficial for the developmental
elite group to which he belongs, and the epistemic diplomat in particular. Mill considers only the positive consequences
of the treatment of the expressions of falsehood and truth as epistemic
developmental equals, because he attends only to the positive consequences that
it has for epistemic diplomats. Yet, he
ignores that this treatment may have negative epistemic developmental
consequences for the partisans. The
availability of extreme opinions presents social opportunities for the rational
development of epistemic diplomats, and potential intellectual rewards. These opportunities are unlikely to bring
rewards to the partisans, but rather make the partisans likely to incur
expenses from being the ones to make available the extreme opinions. The implications of this elitist bias in
Mill's considerations of the social capacity for knowledge will be further discussed
in my response to Mill's argument that "unrestricted" expression
makes possible the synthesis of truth.
I question the capacities of
"unrestricted" expression and ignorance to add knowledge to the
common good, that is, their epistemic utility.
Mill treats the ignorance of the extreme thinkers as a means to the end
of knowledge for society. Since he finds
epistemic utility in the expression of ignorance, Mill argues that society
should treat the expression of falsehood as equal to that of truth. We are ignorant about which opinions are the
most truthful opinions. And, even
ignorant opinions can serve epistemic utility.
Not only can persons who hold untruthful opinions be more knowledgeable
because of those opinions than persons who hold more truthful opinions, they
can epistemically benefit from the ignorant or untruthful opinions of
others. So, for Mill, we should treat
ignorant or untruthful opinions as the epistemic equals of knowledgeable
opinions.
The use of ignorance as a
means to knowledge is unlikely to adequately permit the attainment of knowledge
for all members of society.
Encouragement of ignorance contradicts the aim to obtain knowledge
about, and of, society. Mill's argument
implies that the societal majority's ignorance must be exploited for the
knowledge of the social few. The
epistemic diplomatic pursuit of knowledge takes into account what extreme
thinkers have to say in hope that society will obtain the desired multi-sided
knowledge. However, the obtained
knowledge lacks multi-sidedness and is epistemically unfair, as I will argue
next.
Mill's consequentialism does
not satisfy the first condition for epistemic fairness, since, he expects, only
a small number of individuals are the active benefactors and the immediate
beneficiaries to the pursuit of knowledge.
Neither does his consequentialism satisfy the second condition for
epistemic fairness. The epistemic
diplomats obtain knowledge at the risk to the knowledge capacities of the
many. Mill's freedom-utilitarian project
encourages the extreme thinkers, whose beliefs benefit the diplomats, to hold
on to false or ignorant views. That the
expression of extreme versions of beliefs permits the epistemic diplomats to
work to reconcile those beliefs is not sufficient for the epistemic fairness of
the knowledge that they obtain from their investigation of the extreme
beliefs. For, the epistemic diplomats
cannot develop adequately reconciled beliefs, and they should not try to do so,
at the expense to maintain others' ignorant beliefs especially the higher their
number. That the ignorant or false and
extreme views of the many facilitate the knowledge acquisition of the few does
not permit the satisfaction of the utility requirement for epistemic fairness.
Furthermore,
that, in principle, an "all-questions-are-open questions society"
cannot value the truth more than falsehood makes that society's capacity to
acquire knowledge questionable (Kendall, 1960).
"Unrestricted" expression makes such a society more closed
than the impression its ideal gives. An
"all-questions-are-open questions society," in practice, restricts
the questions that its members can pose (Kendall, 1960). As the society disperses into different
directions of opinions, it is likely to lose public consensus on fundamental
truths. The public’s toleration of both
falsehood and truth makes it difficult or impossible for society to rectify
extreme social movements that falsehood drives.
Thus, so long as the persons pose or attend to one-sided questions the
answers they find will unlikely be multi-sided.
Mill's
ideal of a discursively open society, in practice, restricts what society's
members can say, and, as Kendall (1960) argues, in such a society "the
ultimate loser is the pursuit of truth" (p. 978). The equal treatment of falsehood and truth is
epistemically and ethically unjustified.
For, when falsehood is tolerated so are, inevitably, the very things to
which its presence contributes including ignorance, and, in turn, injustice
including oppression. False beliefs are
more likely than true beliefs to have unjust implications.[39] Proponents of political opinions that happen
to be false are comparatively less likely interested in the politically equal
treatment of persons who are different from themselves, for they are less likely
to accept the true claim that political equality is ethical. And, the society that treats the proponents
of falsehoods and the proponents of truth as equal epistemic champions is most
likely to fall into increasingly deeper extremes and oppositions that lead to
increased political inequality between its members. Thus, the society suffers from severe
discrepancies between its social principles and its practices.
In short, persons can exploit
society's treatment of falsehood as the epistemic developmental equal of the
truth to restrict discussion in ways that demote its freedom, and thus
falsehood cannot appropriately serve as the epistemic ally of truth. In light of my discussion, Mill’s claim that
open discussion has utility is inconsistent with his call for the epistemically
equal treatment of the expression of falsehood and truth.
iii) Response to the Synthesis of Truth Argument
For
Mill's truth synthesis argument that "unrestricted" expression has
epistemic utility to be valid, the truths must be able to become adequately
integrated. I will argue that such
integration is unlikely, and, therefore, that Mill's social epistemology is
inadequately utilitarian for the following three main reasons. First, political inequality facilitates
cultural imperialism over truth, and makes unlikely the integration of the
truths of all cultures. Since political inequality
interferes with the societal capacity for unrestricted expression, the
synthesis of truths of all cultures remains unlikely. Mill ignores that the societal majority's
lack of participation in the pursuit of knowledge interferes with the synthesis
of truth. Second, if most persons cannot
or do not sufficiently participate and acquire knowledge, participation in the
pursuit of knowledge is exclusive, and can interfere with society's acquisition
of multi-sided knowledge. This
under-participation of society in that pursuit does not permit meaningful
additions to common beneficial epistemic consequences. Mill ignores that socially limited
participation in the pursuit of knowledge and socially limited acquisition of
knowledge lacks utility. If the incapacity
of the majority of individuals to participate in the pursuit of knowledge or
their lack of participation in that pursuit interferes with their capacity to
acquire knowledge, the few individuals who can and do sufficiently participate
in the pursuit of knowledge can add only little knowledge to the common good. Greater participation in the pursuit of
knowledge leads to more multi-sided knowledge with which to work in the further
pursuit of knowledge. So, if most
persons would participate in the pursuit of knowledge, each person would have
greater potential to add more knowledge to the common good than if only a few
participate. Yet, Mill suggests that the
majority of individuals are likely neither to be able to sufficiently
participate in the pursuit of knowledge nor to acquire knowledge sufficient for
meaningful increases in their capacity to freely develop themselves. Third, Mill's claims about the nature of the
human mind are inconsistent with the claim that the practices that he
recommends for the synthesis of truth have utility. Mill views the human mind as typically
incapable of impartiality. Yet, he
suggests a notion of open-mindedness that is a form of scepticism akin to truth
agnosticism, thus he also suggests that open-mindedness requires a high level
of impartiality. Also, Mill views the
human mind as inherently one-sided, and he encourages the expression of
one-sided opinions. Yet, he also
encourages the acquisition of multi-sided opinions. The practices that Mill recommends for the
synthesis of truth, would exclude the majority of individuals from participation
in the pursuit of knowledge, and hinder their knowledge acquisition. Therefore, especially but not only if Mill's
claims about the nature of the human mind are true, the practices that Mill
recommends for the synthesis of truth would be more harmful than beneficial to
the social acquisition of knowledge, and thus lack utility.
Consider
that the relations among social groups have never been, and are not,
politically equal, and are unlikely to become so anytime soon. From this consideration, one can see that the
truth which Mill calls integrated is most likely to remain biased in favour of
the values, preferences, political interests, and worldviews of the dominant
group/s for an indefinite period of time.
Although the ideals of cultural integration are different from those of
assimilation, "in practice, however, the outcomes of either may be
indistinguishable" (Fleras & Elliott, 2003, p. 16). Since the powerful benefit the most from
"unrestricted" expression, they can use it for assimilationist purposes. Based on the popular idea that the mainstream
can safely "integrate" minorities while it adds to itself some of the
elements of the minority cultures, the integration approach has not proven to
be effective. Persons who the mainstream
cultures incorporate normally are unable to keep much of significance from
their original cultures.[40] Thus, dominant cultures ensure their own
survival at the expense of the loss of the cultural integrity of subdominant
cultures. Similarly, the pursuit of the
integration of truth occurs within a cultural context. The limitations that apply for cultural
integration influence the integration of truth as well.
The
claim that society can adequately integrate all truths is for related reasons
both ethically and epistemically unjustified under circumstances in which there
is political inequality in the pursuit and attainment of knowledge. For the general consequentialist argument in
favour of what Mill considers unrestricted expression to be adequately
utilitarian, the expenses that society incurs as a result of the
"unrestricted" expression must be acceptable. That is, the expenses must not be higher than
the benefits, and they must not support the tyranny of the minority. Yet, this is not the case, as I argued
previously. The "unrestricted"
expression of extreme opinions reinforces the majority's ignorance and thus
hinders the majority's knowledge acquisition.
It is the epistemic diplomats who are supposed to be the active
benefactors and immediate beneficiaries to social knowledge, under Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project. Therefore,
it is the epistemic elite whose truths social knowledge reflects, and hence the
social knowledge does not reflect adequately integrated social truths.
Indeed,
for Mill, knowledge is the outcome of violent competition, and, in my view, it
is unlikely that violent competition can yield adequately integrated
truth. Mill claims that the nature of
the one-sidedness of the human mind makes it impossible for society to
peaceably uncover the truth. Due to the
scarcity of epistemic diplomatic capacities, "the rough process of a
struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners" (CW, 18, Ch.
2, ¶35) adjusts our conception of the truth.
In fact, Mill goes as far as the claim that,
Not
the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of
half of it, is the formidable evil; there is always hope when people are forced
to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors
harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by
being exaggerated into falsehood. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶38, emphasis added)
In response to the preceding claim, however,
we should acknowledge that "unrestricted" expression itself does not
and cannot force people to listen to all sides. What matters is whether the expression
actually is free. The
"unrestricted" practice of expression can bring some persons
opportunities for development, not necessarily developmental results. Individuals choose what they do with
developmental opportunities including whether they recognize their
developmental worth.
Contrary
to Mill's claim that "unrestricted" expression forces people to
listen to all sides, the "unrestricted" practice of expression promotes
one-sided cognitive modes.
"Unrestricted" expression can be used to reinforce existent
prejudice. Indeed, the majority takes
what today is considered free expression as simply an opportunity to search for
opinions and facts that support one's version of the truth. Confirmation bias is the cognitive tendency
to select or attend to information that supports one's beliefs and to omit or
ignore information that contributes to their disconfirmation.[41] Mill's assertions that "the generality
of the world" leans to the side to which it "feels most
inclination" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶22), and that free discussion likely
reinforces the "sectarian views" of "impassioned partisans"
(CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶38) suggests his implicit awareness of confirmation bias. And so does his assertion that "in the
human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the
exception" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶33), and his denial of the capacity of the
societal majority for impartial thought (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶38). These claims suggest that Mill has at least
an implicit notion of confirmation bias.
In his view, the human tendency to be one-sided interferes with the
majority's capacity to benefit from expression.
Mill's freedom-utilitarian project hopes to maximize the individual capacity
to cognitively benefit from expression.
Yet, his project's recommendation for socially unguided cognitive
expression are inconsistent with his views about the biased nature of human
cognition, for the views suggest that the individual cannot adequately guide
her own thoughts towards knowledge. That
he ignores the implications of his own psychological assertions when he argues
for "unrestricted" expression further suggests that Mill argues
one-sidedly for that expression and that his own one-sidedness may itself be
the result of confirmation bias.
Many-sidedness
cannot have the force to guide without appropriate social facilitation of
cognitive free expression, if one-sidedness is the cognitive default and thus
more inherently forceful. Mill's expectation
that epistemic advancement is slow but possible under the guidance of those who
accept "many-sidedness"[42]
is unjustified given his own claims about one-sidedness. He recognizes that one-sidedness is the
cognitive default. Even worse, Mill's
expectation that multi-sided truths can compete with one-sided truths is
inconsistent with his claim that one-sided truths have more force. Mill claims that
so
long as popular truth is onesided, it is more desirable than otherwise that
unpopular truth should have one-sided
assertors too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant
attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the
whole. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶33, emphasis, added)
Apparently, for Mill, the forceful assertion
of one-sided truth is epistemically justified.
For example, he considers exposure to falsehood, which one-sided truth
is more likely to reflect than multi-sided truth, as epistemically beneficial. Mill expects that "wrong opinions and practices
[will] gradually yield to fact and argument" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶7). Yet, Mill recognizes, "very few facts
are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their
meaning" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶7). It is
questionable whether the rhetoric which often accompanies the story telling of
perspectives would be able to escape one-sidedness, for rhetorical comments
tend to be politically biased.
Mill's
claim that social questions deserve, wherever warranted, "this and
that" responses, and should not be taken as being "either-or"
questions is rational. However, he
selectively targets this advice, apparently giving it only to the epistemic
diplomats and intellectuals. For, the
mode of extreme thought, which he encourages for partisans because he views the
observation of opinions obtained through that mode as epistemically beneficial
for the epistemic diplomats, happens to positively correlate with the either-or
cognitive mode. This mode of thought is
inconsistent with the aim to obtain social knowledge that reflects adequately
integrated truth.
Mill recommends that to
synthesize the truth the epistemic diplomats must reconcile the apparent
antagonisms and dualisms. However, it is
unlikely that this reconciliation will happen, for the cognitive modes which
Mill claims society should practice impede the epistemic diplomats' capacity to
obtain knowledge that reflects adequately integrated truths.
It merits notice that the
claim that society should treat the elements in each pair of opposites and
social antagonisms as equals is questionable, for they unlikely have equal
epistemic and ethical importance. For
example, property and political equality are unlikely to be of equal benefit to
society. The elements of property and
equality are fundamentally incompatible.
In capitalist systems, in particular, private property tends to
undermine equality.[43]
For
Mill, the opposites, when combined, keep each other within the
"limits of reason and sanity" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶35). The reason of the epistemic diplomats combines
opposites, and thus integrates truth and permits sanity. Further, one could expect that as the
diplomats' knowledge spreads throughout society the extreme thinkers should
become less extreme.[44]
Therefore,
at the very best, there is a time lag in the social distribution of the rewards
that result from the extreme thought mode.
This time lag in the distribution of knowledge from epistemic diplomats
to the extreme thinkers merits attention.
Next I will explore some implications of this knowledge distribution
time lag.
This
time lag weakens Mill's freedom-utilitarian argument, because the knowledge
benefits are not socially distributed in a way that maximizes the epistemic
utility of the majority of society's members.
As we have seen, the impartial epistemic diplomats would obtain the
primary rational, developmental advantage from their investigation of one-sided
beliefs. By contrast, those who hold the
extreme beliefs have their rational development hindered by those beliefs. The intellectual elite's epistemic cultural
transformations are supposed to assist indirectly and in the long-term the
rational development of the partisans.
The partisans cannot personally benefit from their own extreme views,
but rather they benefit as a social group from the extreme views of previous
generations of extreme thinkers.
For Mill, the intellectual
elite are most capable of being active epistemic agents, whereas
non-intellectuals can be the passive recipients of knowledge that intellectuals
find. Only intellectuals can obtain
social knowledge on their own, and thus they are active epistemic agents. There is no active role partisans can play
for the intellectual advancement of their society. The societal majority can obtain mainly
second-hand social knowledge - i.e. knowledge that they did not originally
acquire, and thus most persons are passive social epistemic agents.
The multiple kinds of
knowledge cannot be equally found by various persons. Anyone can obtain self-knowledge through
experiments of life. However, even for
the acquisition of self-knowledge, the partisan is remarkably, epistemically
disadvantaged compared to the diplomat in two related ways. First, self-knowledge depends on social
comparisons and thus on knowledge not only of oneself but also of others. However, the epistemic diplomat can
appreciate others' perspectives more than the partisan can. The epistemic diplomats are not only supposed
to be the active benefactors but also immediate beneficiaries to synthesized
truth. Society in general only benefits
in the long-term. Second, self-knowledge
depends on social knowledge or knowledge originally acquired by others, whether
it is knowledge that others have found about themselves or about their social
and natural world.
The fact that self-knowledge
to some extent depends on knowledge about others is relevant not only to the
partisan's capacity to obtain self-knowledge but also to that of the epistemic
diplomat. For, if the social knowledge
that epistemic diplomats obtain does not reflect adequately integrated truths,
the social knowledge does not permit the epistemic diplomats to understand
others enough to optimize their own self-knowledge.
Mill
encourages the continuation of one-sidedness in the unpopular opinions so long
as there is one-sidedness in the popular opinions (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶33). Contrary to Mill's claim that the forceful
assertion of one-sidedness can be epistemically beneficial, the assertion of
one-sidedness is neither more forceful nor more epistemically beneficial when the
popular opinions are one-sided.
One-sided expression likely demotes open-mindedness in the society that
lacks multi-sided expression. Mill
claims that an attitude of open-mindedness is required for the development of
flexible and multi-sided thought. Moreover, for Mill, the attitude of
open-mindedness upon which the pursuit of synthesized truth depends is akin to
truth-agnostic scepticism: the
open-minded person must be equally open to all opinions but, to avoid the
assumption of infallibility, closed to the conviction of any belief. That attitude is meant to guard one from
being “lost in one’s mind,” i.e. able to see only from one's perspective, as
the partisan supposedly is. But, this
open-mindedness, instead, makes the way for one to “lose one’s mind,” i.e. lose
the progressive cognitive capacity to form new perspectives, because the
attitude requires the suspension of judgment.
In my view, the attitude which Mill views as open-mindedness is more a
matter of closed mindedness, that is, no new perspective taking, than
open-mindedness which requires the individual to understand, and form, multiple
perspectives. Thus, the acceptance of
the condition of truth-agnostic scepticism as necessary for the pursuit of truth
cripples, if not paralyzes, the epistemic endeavour.
Therefore,
one-sidedness is inconsistent with the pursuit of multi-sidedness carried on by
the same person and the same society.
The truth-agnostic, sceptical type of open-minded attitude avoids claims
of certainty and hence conviction of belief.
Thus, this attitude is incompatible with the epistemic capacities of the
societal majority who, according to Mill, are not capable of impartiality, and
much less are they capable of this kind of "open-mindedness," which
requires an extremely high level of impartiality. This attitude is also incompatible with the
reconciliatory aims of the epistemic diplomats who are supposed to judge the
truths of claims; with this attitude's extreme approach to open-mindedness,
they are also supposed to be non-judgemental.
Because
of its social and cognitive incoherence, the truth synthesis argument for
"unrestricted" expression is weak and unacceptable. The expected gradual movement towards
many-sidedness seems infinite in duration since it is dysfunctional. By Mill's admission, the opportunity for
"unrestricted" expression would unlikely affect the majority's
prejudice. Their cognitive tendencies
severely limit the extent to which the majority could benefit from their
cognitive expression and the chances that they can develop multi-sided
beliefs. Even worse for the prospects of
the effectiveness of Mill's project, according to Mill, the movement towards
many-sidedness requires the strong assertion of one-sidedness, which would
likely reinforce the existent prejudice.
As I argued, the requirement for the forceful assertion of one-sidedness
is inconsistent with the requirement for open-mindedness, and with the pursuit
of multi-sided truth.
iv) Response to the Argument from Rationality for
"Unrestricted" Expression
For
the advancement of human rationality, the practical thing to do is to socially
regulate the expression of opinions in ways that will optimally facilitate free
cognitive expression, that is, the independent and open-minded formation of
opinions and the expression of multi-sided opinions. I will argue that what Mill considers
socially unrestricted speech is inconsistent with the aim to optimize free
individual expression, and the exercise of the independent thought mode in
particular. Here, I outline the
arguments that I will make in the next parts of this chapter.
I
will provide a consequentialist critique of socially unrestricted speech. I maintain that intentions have little
importance in social reality where what matters are the implications and
consequences of our opinions and actions.
From a consequentialist perspective, the meaning conveyed is more
important than the intentions of the speakers or writers, because the meaning
that their messages convey is more likely than the intentions to influence the
actions of the listeners or readers. Put
another way, because it is more difficult to recognize the intentions than the
meaning conveyed, it is unlikely that they will influence one's actions. Similarly, I maintain that principles provide
insufficient guidance for cognitive developmental and communicational
activities. Principles neither guarantee
nor optimize the chances that persons will act in ways that have favourable
consequences for the expression of society's members. Informed and institutionalized practices can
optimize freedom of expression.
I
accept Mill's claim that freedom of expression makes societal progress towards
justice possible, but I reject his definition of free opinion expression and
opinion formation. I will discuss two
general types of expression, one which reinforces the status quo and the other
which contributes to social progress.
The relationship between the "unrestricted" expression that
some societies view as free expression and societal progress is incompatible,
for that expression charges expenses to, and in some important ways hinders,
societal progress. The problem is that
contemporary societies that claim they permit free expression do not
distinguish between these two types of expression, because they overestimate
the freedom of their expression. I
maintain that freedom of expression both benefits from social and epistemic
justice and contributes to justice.
While free expression is a necessary condition for justice, justice is
also a necessary condition for free expression.
I
will argue that it is a myth that "unrestricted" expression is more
conducive to social justice than regulated expression. "Unrestricted" expression is
politically impossible in politically unequal social contexts. The laissez-faire approach to expression
simply allows those who hold the most power over the communicative situation,
namely the owners of the press and the like, to invisibly set the restrictions
upon the expression. The invisibility of
the restrictions of expression makes it difficult for society to recognize what
is unjust about the expression, and thus hinders attempts to improve its
freedom. I will show that the
laissez-faire practice of free expression increases the likelihood that
expression will be socially expensive, that is, harmful for disadvantaged
groups. For, the laissez-faire practice
of expression tends to benefit those who have power and it disproportionately
harms those who do not.
"Unrestricted" expression is socially expensive in that it
facilitates the political elite's capacity to restrict the communicational and
social opportunities of the politically disadvantaged. Thus, it is developmentally harmful for the
elite because it undermines their social discipline and capacity for unbiased
knowledge but especially more for the disadvantaged.
I
will show that regulated expression can be free. Individuals who aspire for positive freedom
are misdirected, if they take the indirect route of negative freedom. The methods for positive freedom of
expression require that society should set and implement regulations to
optimize that freedom. Liberal thinkers
may worry that expression can become excessively restricted. They need a reminder that negative freedom,
too, can become excessive and, in its extreme form, it is incompatible with
positive freedom. Society can and should
ensure freedom by regulating expression in ways that optimize the individual
capacity for open-mindedness and the individual exercise of the independent
thought mode. Thus, by means of the
regulation of expression, society can accomplish the following epistemically
and developmentally beneficial tasks.
Society can provide rational justification for its claim that it
actually practices free expression.
Society can optimize positive freedom in ways that also promote negative
freedom. Regulations on the media's
expression can ensure that the media covers a wide range and depth of issues
sufficient for society to render meaningful epistemic and developmental
opportunities, while these regulations also counteract the societal capacity
for mentally coercive practices. In
these ways, society can facilitate the expansion of individual developmental
power. For the laissez-faire liberal
thinker, the idea that government can optimize freedom may seem
paradoxical. After all, the
"unrestricted" expression which they assume is free expression
corresponds with the negative sort of right and with negative freedom. I will emphasize the need for positive
freedom of expression while I will also recognize the need for negative
freedom. And, I will emphasize freedom
as a positive right, while also recognizing that freedom is a negative right as
well.
I
will discuss that "unrestricted" expression of opinion formation and
the held opinions does not generally favour societal progress towards justice
over increasing societal injustice.
Likewise, "unrestricted" expression does not necessarily
favour the acquisition of truth over the acquisition of falsehood. I will show that "unrestricted"
expression is fit for the reinforcement of the socially held falsehoods and the
production of additional social falsehoods.
Expression
is free in proportion to the justice of the society in which it occurs. That is to say, there is a positive
relationship between the freedom of expression and the degree of justice
present in the society that practices freedom of expression. I will suggest that the capacity of expression
to promote and contribute to justice and truth depends, in part, on how
transparent its social restrictions are.
Only an equitable kind of expression that is more concerned with
communicational outcomes than with mere communicational opportunities can do
justice to the pursuit of truth and social progress. The communicational outcomes need not be the
same to equally satisfy the various individual needs.
1) Free for
Whom? 'Unrestricted' Expression: A Restricted Form of Expression
Here,
I will argue that "unrestricted" expression as a form of free
expression is, ultimately, restricted and socially expensive expression; it is
socially and politically restricted and epistemically and ethically
costly. My critique on the laissez-faire
practice of expression will focus on how the media invisibly politically
restricts speech with consequences that are inconsistent with independent
opinion formation, the promotion of open-mindedness, and the acquisition of
knowledge.
Mill
does not substantiate that "unrestricted" expression is politically
possible. He overlooks the role of
political inequality, and thus he ignores questions such as 'Who gets to communicate?' Mill holds an implicit notion of confirmation
bias, as discussed in my response to Mill's argument that
"unrestricted" expression maximizes the societal capacity to
synthesize the truth. However, he does
not consider the political effects of the fact that generally persons are more
likely to listen to other persons similar to themselves than to persons who are
different from themselves. He does not
consider that some persons benefit more politically not only epistemically from
the opportunity for expression. Such
beneficiaries are normally those who already have the power. He does not give serious coverage to the
harms that society may incur as a result of "unrestricted"
expression. Contrary to his assumptions,
expression is not free simply because one is, in principle, permitted to
communicate with others. In fact,
certain persons can afford to express themselves more than others. The one-sided opinions of socially privileged
persons are more likely to be vocal and more advocated in public than the
one-sided opinions of the socially disadvantaged.
Mill
naively advocates "unrestricted" expression. Similarly, he also naively advocates what is
popularly considered free trade. He
advocates "the doctrine of international free trade…as the means whereby
all countries [can] secure the benefits of international specialization"
(Harris, 1956, p. 70). Mill sees
"no necessary connection between the international free trade movement and
imperialism" (Harris, 1956, p. 70).
For example, he overlooks the fact that certain countries have their
specializations forced upon them by, and according to the interests of, the
dominant countries. "Free"
trade is comparable to "unrestricted" expression in its negative
implications for the individual capacity to independently cognitively develop,
and the question 'Free for whom?' applies to both. What is popularly considered free expression
is not necessarily free. The extent to
which expression is free significantly depends on the amount of power that is
held by the communicative agents.
Mill
misunderstands the issue of the exercise of power in social relations (Harris,
1956, p. 172). His lack of consideration
for the role of power in social relations is evident in the fact that he does
not recognize that "the market of ideas," which to him means the
process of free discussion, can convert into "an arena of competitive
salesmanship" (Harris, 1956, p. 172-173).
In short, to speak in capitalist terms, in the market place of ideas
some can afford to advertise their products more than others. This fact holds implications for the
individual's capacity to pursue knowledge through "unrestricted" or
invisibly restricted social expression; this form of expression is often based
on the capitalist and laissez-faire notions of the business of the press. This form of expression can propagate
falsehoods and can result in social distress, and the reinforcement of old, and
creation of new, injustices As we will see next, these forms of expression
inevitably suffer from internal censorship of the press, that is, the owners of
the press control its censorship according to their ideological interests.
The
lack of freedom of the market and freedom of the press are mutually reinforcing
(McMurtry, 1998). The rules of the market
hinder the freedom of the press. Those
who have wealth and power can control the press and have an interest in, as
well as the ability to, impede as much as they desire expression opposed to the
market. McMurtry (1998) argues that
"the degree of exclusion of oppositional representations and views in a
market (or other) society is proportionate to how clearly such representations
or views contradict its pattern of rule" (p. 204), or the basic social
structural fact that capitalist corporations dominate the media. The operations of exclusion choose what is to
be "ruled out as unspeakable," "omitted," "selected
out," and "marginalized" (McMurtry, 1998, p. 202).
The
ideal of the free press does not reflect reality,[45]
regardless of the claims of the press that it does. Consider:
In
the venerable ideal of "a marketplace of ideas," the "freedom of
the press" is the jewel in the crown.
It promises a vital congress of contesting voices and views, a debate of
the public good in which all who come to the meeting place of fellow citizens
can be heard by and argue with peers. (McMurtry, 1998, p. 192)
By stigmatizing and mentally coercing
individuals who dare question its freedom, the press maintains the appearance
that it is free. Consider:
Because
of its resonance as a social ideal, "the free press" is still
expounded as a sacred value, indeed as the ultimate expression of the
"free market." This, in turn, is conceived as synonymous to a "free
society" or to "the Free World."
Anyone who ever doubts the freedom of 'the free press' risks being
condemned as hostile to society's most basic liberties. (McMurtry, 1998, p.
195)
Because it violates free cognitive expression,
mental coercion is inconsistent with free expression, as the previous chapter
explained. The press is free insofar as
it can express what it wants, but this capacity does not suffice for free
expression. The press can
"condition the conscious and unconscious lives of masses across the
globe" (McMurtry, 1998, p. 195).
Thus, the press hinders the masses' free cognitive expression because it
impedes their exercise of the independent thought mode. These consequences for the minds of the
masses of the press's expression do not permit the press freedom of expression.
Another
way by which the press, under the influence of the economic market, hinders
independent thought formation is that it narrows the range of knowledge that it
expresses. Knowledge promotes
independent thought formation because knowledge permits the thinker a greater
number of cognitive opportunities to make considerations and choices over
beliefs. However, the requirements of
operations of the market contradict the requirements of knowledge. Consider:
the
concepts of "rationality" and "knowledge" come to be absurd
expressions. What knowledge requires, the "knowledge-based economy"
rules out. What wider comprehension and
impartiality demand, the "rationality" of profit-maximization
blinkers from view. When we examine the
assertion of the 'new knowledge-based economy' more closely, we come to realize
that it selects against whatever does not conform to its demand
structures. It is, in this way, more
properly designated as "an ignorance-based economy." (McMurtry, 1998,
p. 187)
The operations of the market are incompatible
with the maximization of knowledge, rationality, and impartiality.
Not
surprisingly, the capitalist press is an inadequate educational resource,
because it does not express an adequate range and depth of opinions. The inconsistent standards between the market
and education can explain this inadequacy.
In particular, the motivations, methods and the standards of excellence
of the market contradict the motivations, methods and the standards of
education. For instance, two standards
of excellence in education include "how inclusively it takes into account
others' interests and avoids one-sided biases," and "how deep and
broad the problems it poses are to one who has it" (McMurtry, 1998, p.
188). In contrast to the former
educational standards, the standards for the economic market include "how one-sidedly its own product is made to
sell," and "how problem-free the product is and remains for its
buyer" (McMurtry, 1998, p. 188, emphasis added).
Consequently,
"unrestricted" expression permits the tyranny of one-sided views, and
the tyranny of the economically privileged people who hold them. For example, invisibly restricted expression
facilitates indoctrination. Consider:
Propaganda
and indoctrination are identifiable by repetition of a one-sided view that is
not open to counterevidence or argument, by closure to opposing voices and
facts, and by incessant repetition of a received doctrine. With the media as with other capitalist
enterprises, private owners and their advertiser patrons have the legal right
to select and exclude as they choose. . . "Freedom of the press"
belongs, by the rules of the market itself, only to those who own one.
(McMurtry, 1998, p. 200)
The owners of the press can be as one-sided as
they wish, able to spread propaganda and indoctrinate their viewers, readers,
and listeners, with the power to select and exclude the expression of whomever
they choose. Thus, expression, in public
places, can be exercised mainly by members of groups who already hold more than
their fair share of power. They have
more opportunities to do so. It is in
their political interest to practice censorship. So too, consider that the media "creates
a condition for controlling thought without our awareness of what is
happening," that "propaganda is the inevitable consequence of
creating messages that support one point of view to the exclusion of
others," and that "[reflect] the interests of those who own or
control the media" (Fleras and Elliott, 2003, p. 331). Thus, with its expression under the
guise of being "unrestricted" expression, the media can interfere
with the open-mindedness and independent thought formation of its viewers.
Therefore,
the myth that there is "unrestricted" expression facilitates
power-driven expression's capacity to maintain the existing societal
structure. For, when unrecognized as
restricted, expression can constrict thought and compel opinions to form toward
the side of the economically and politically privileged.
Society
unevenly distributes the benefits of democracy and of its principles, including
freedom of expression, and, so long as society continues to do this, it will
continue to be unable to maximize the acquisition and expression of
knowledge. For example, racialized
groups, that is, groups of persons whom society considers as having a visible
minority status, benefit the least from what society largely considers
democratic and free expression (Henry and Tator, 2006).[46] The media simply dismiss the concerns of
racialized groups with claims that the groups are opposed to freedom of
expression. Consider:
There
exists in the media a significant resistance to altering the power of the
dominant culture. Attempts by racial
minorities to protest and resist racist images and discourse in the media are
frequently challenged by the media.
These protests are seen by the corporate elite as attempts to suppress
freedom of expression and are equated with censorship. (Henry and Tator, 2006,
p. 272)
Ironically, the media does not recognize that
racialized minority groups concerned with the media may regard White-dominated
expression as tyrannical because it impedes their own freedom of
expression. Society connects the way the
marketplace operates without constraint to the championed freedom of expression
(Henry & Tator, 2006, p. 272). Terribly,
free speech refers to only "the rights and privileges that very few groups in . . . society
possess, in terms of their access to the media" (Henry & Tator, 2006,
p. 273, emphasis added).
Furthermore,
when members of disadvantaged groups express themselves in public, society
expects them to be polite to the interests of the dominant groups. Disadvantaged persons are coerced by social
expectations to make overly generous concessions and deny the extent to which
society discriminates, exploits, marginalizes or oppresses them. Take the example of first generation
racialized immigrants and their children who may be citizens by birth, all of
whom may state in public their actual social experiences in an effort to raise
awareness of the true extent to which they are socially devalued and
subordinated. When they do so, society
tends to perceive them as outrageous and ungrateful to the kindness that has
been given to them by their great, "host" country. Terribly thus, some persons simply can afford
to express themselves truthfully more than others, whereas covert demands for
dishonesty are systemically imposed upon some in ways that are inconsistent
with the promotion of their political equality.
In
terms of consequences for the freedom of the involved parties, the social and
mental coercion to express things about oneself, and to adopt opinions, that
favour the politically privileged interests is comparable to the coercion
against the "least developed" and "developing" states in
international liberalization. I
discussed psychological oppression's interference with the free formation of
opinions including the opinions that persons hold about themselves, in the
previous chapter. Now I will briefly
mention how international "liberalization" interferes with the
self-determination of economically disadvantaged societies, and thus with the
free social and cultural expression of its members. In international trade, the largely
unregulated exchange of goods benefits the "first" world more than
the "third" world. Some
countries can afford to participate in those exchanges more freely than
others. In fact, "free" trade,
not only is accompanied by international agreements on regulations for trade
conduct, but is actually forced upon some societies. In principle, free trade is meant to be free
for whomever is willing to sell and buy.
In practice, there are regulations that in effect force some unfortunate
societies to participate in those exchanges, even when participation goes
against their economic interests. For
example, coerced by the international bank institutions, some countries are
forced to adopt programs to restructure their domestic economies, even when
these programs are against the interests of their civil life (Madeley, 2000, p.
58). The World Trade Organization
falsely presents "itself as a forum for members to negotiate over trade
liberalization" (p. 60), writes Madeley (2000). He continues:
In
practice the organization is a trade liberalization juggernaut which has been
ceded enormous power by its members. It
uses that position to further the cause of liberalization, to the chief benefit
of those who stand to gain the most: in
practice, the transnational corporations. (Madeley, 2000, p. 60)
The interests of transnational corporations
monopolize how societies practice liberalization.
Lastly, there are what can be
considered cultural monopolies in the context of “unrestricted” expression and
“negotiable” truths. And there are
cultural monopolies that do not permit free competition over the “best buy”
culture. When the standards to measure
the worth of a culture are determined by the dominant culture, it is of no
surprise that the culture most likely to be viewed favourably by those
standards is the dominant culture. In
practice, through the control of the press by capitalist interests, the free
market serves in the assimilation of culture.
The dominant cultures are able to cast the most influence in the
assimilation of the subordinate cultures into the dominant,
"market-friendly" culture. The
final part of this chapter will return to this point.
2)
Free Speech as a Social Transmitter of Cognitive Independence
Here, I will focus on the pursuit of free speech and
independent opinion formation. I will
argue that the freedom of speech depends on the extent to which independent
thought motivates the speech, and the extent to which the speech promotes
others' independent thought mode.
Independent thought both benefits from knowledge and contributes to
knowledge. As well, the capacity for
open-mindedness benefits from freedom and it contributes to freedom. Hence, freedom of speech has to be positively
supported by educational and social resources that facilitate the acquisition
of knowledge, and by adequate opportunities for public expression. Independent thought should be informed enough
to be able to properly, wisely, and freely direct speech toward the truth and
justice, because doing so will increase the likelihood of the speech's
promotion of further independent thought.
Free
speech cannot be limited to self-talk, nor can free thinking be limited to
introspection. Free expression is a
social activity, and as such an internal disposition-focused definition of, and
approach to, it is inappropriate. To
adequately understand free expression, society needs knowledge of how social
situations affect the internal dispositions that contribute to the freedom of
opinion formation and an individual's motivation to communicate her
opinions. Free expression can be
socially facilitated by practices that are informed by relevant social,
cognitive, and behavioural scientific knowledge on how to socially promote the
independent thought mode. The freedom of
speech is positively influenced when it is directed from within by independent,
informed, and principled thought modes, and from without by fair policies and
programs set by the government and by media organizations designed to
facilitate independent thought formation.
Invisibly restricted speech is not necessarily guided
by the love of the truth and justice, and thus, there is no reason to believe,
as Mill does, that it will result in the acquisition of either. Undeniably, when society allows persons to
say whatever they want they can use their "unrestricted" speech, for
example, to express lies, to disregard the truth, or to be neutral to the
truth. The point is that "unrestricted"
expression is not necessarily a better friend of justice and truth than
transparent, socially regulated expression.
Certain conditions have to be met for expression to come to be an ally
of the just and truthful, and a companion of freedom.
Regulated expression can be
consistent with free cognitive expression so long as its restrictions
facilitate the exercise of the independent thought mode. Counterproductive to the promotion of the
independent thought mode, the politically privileged persons can politically
and unfairly benefit from the illusion of unrestricted expression and its
constriction of human thought. And, they
can unnecessarily limit what can be expressed to the political advantage of the
politically privileged themselves. Thus,
expression disempowers the growth capacities of individuals, for it limits
their cognitive and social developmental opportunities.
For
Mill, if it is to be free, thinking must be independent, as the previous
section of this chapter discussed. The requirement
of independent thought for freedom which Mill accepts is inconsistent with his
acceptance of "unrestricted" cognitive expression and social
communication. It is also inconsistent
with his implicit encouragement of the majority's ignorance for the sake of the
epistemic diplomats' knowledge advancement.
Knowledge fosters mental independence, so the acquisition of knowledge
is inconsistent with invisibly, politically restricted expression, which
facilitates mental coercion and the promotion of one-sided views. As well, unrestricted thought is led only by
the default of human cognition, and independent thought is not one of those
inherent cognitive defaults. Rather, independent
thought requires social and cognitive discipline. Standards of logic can guide independent
thought so that it may avoid fallacious thought modes. As well, it benefits from the guidance of
social cognitive knowledge identified by the social sciences. Mill would agree with the claim that
independent thought must be guided by rational principles so long as these are
not socially imposed. While an agent is
free who gets to think or say in such and such a way, such and such a thing,
this freedom can be developmentally expensive for both the recipients and the
agent herself. For example, human beings
tend to think in heuristic ways, using schemata acquired by social learning
(Aronson, Wilson, Akert & Beverly, 2004, p. 76), and they tend to select
only the information that fits into those schemes and ignore other information
(Nickerson, 1998). For that reason, when
human beings are left alone to think in an undisciplined way, they may make
foolish decisions, some of which result in social costs both to others and to
themselves. If the schemes they hold are
false, and unjust, no one benefits from their thoughts no matter how
unrestricted their faulty thought mode is considered to be. Their thinking thus can, in fact, be
expensive in terms of eliminating opportunities to develop more sophisticated
thinking habits and thereby good judgement.
Also, their unrestricted thought mode could be expensive in that it
leads them to close themselves to being persuaded to the contrary opinion with
the result that they are unjust to others.
For instance, negative stereotypes influence persons to unjustly expect
the worst from certain others, and, in many cases, lead persons to treat others
according to the held stereotypes.
Thinkers who stereotype the most severely are unlikely to choose to give
the discriminated persons the opportunity to be perceived in a more positive
light.
Therefore,
expression may be free insofar as it tolerates the opinions of existent
independent thinkers, but to the extent that it hinders the formation of new
independent thinkers, it may, indeed, lack freedom and be socially and
developmentally expensive.
"Unrestricted" expression of thought can be counterproductive
to the aim for individual development, as evident, for example, when persons
act in accordance with gender and racial stereotypes to deny developmental opportunities
to others. Individual thought requires a
good education, whether formal or informal, to develop the critical and
creative skills, habits and attitudes, and knowledge bases with which to
proceed from and towards free thought.
Independent thought cannot occur when one proceeds from ignorance and an
undisciplined mind. Individual thought
needs to be provided with certain cognitive and social supports for it to
develop the independence which is necessary for its freedom. That is why education should be treated as a
positive right. The independent thought
modes are unlikely to be exercised by under- or mal-educated minds.
Mill
overemphasizes the beneficial contributions that "unrestricted"
expression supposedly renders to social progress. He does not do justice to the social
distress, the social expenses incurred as a result of "unrestricted"
expression. He does not acknowledge the
fact that "unrestricted" expression can be a hindrance to social
progress. For instance, Mill unfairly
challenges persons who, as he says, may be ill thought of, and ill spoken of,
or persons whom what he considers "free" speech may victimize, to
simply learn to cope with it. He writes:
Those
whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in power, or
from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open
avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought
of and ill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould
to enable them to bear. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶19)
Thus questioning the intentions and
dispositions of persons who others may adversely target through their speech,
he turns the issue into a personal one for any of those to whom the comment may
apply, not only for the intended group.
In
the previous quotation, Mill ignores the fact that private issues can also be
public ones, that what affects persons can also have significance for the
groups to which the persons belong. He
does not seriously consider the fact that marginalized social groups can be
disempowered by what he considers free speech when they are unfavourably
targeted by it. Admittedly, Mill
recognizes that in regards to the resolution of the various beliefs on the
truth,
if
either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be
tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens
at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time
being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which
is in danger of obtaining less than its share. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶35)
However, the preceding comment gives empty
advice. Mill expects that there should
not be any institutional practices to optimize adherence to principles such as
that persons should act to minimize harm through speech, because such practices
would have the "undesirable" consequence that they restrict
expression. But, institutional practices
can promote independent thought, and facilitate free cognitive expression
through their maximization of favourable, developmental opportunities to
increase the likelihood of rational cognitive outcomes. For example, imagine a society that regulates
the way that hateful books can be sold and signed out of libraries. The society legally requires that hateful
books be sold or signed out in pairs or multiples such that the buyer or
library patron must purchase or borrow at least two books with opposing
perspectives, one hateful, and the other or others informed by ethics,
philosophy and the social sciences. That
society would maximize the opportunity for the buyers of books to read the
counter-perspective books. Although this
opportunity would not necessarily prove beneficial, it would increase the
likelihood that the readers consider the more informed, counter-perspectives
instead of simply accepting the messages of the hateful book. This practice, which I proposed above, would
encourage the individual exercise of the independent thought mode and would
actually demote the extreme form of censorship of banning books. Thus, the practice is consistent with Mill's
argument that society should encourage the development of independent thinkers
and with his criticism against silencing controversial voices. Mill considers that ideally individuals
should listen to the lowest voices, but that is as far as he goes. He does not consider that without endorsing
the necessary practical institutional changes, given the political imbalances
in communication, such advice lacks seriousness and is devoid of
substance. What I brought attention to
in the previous parts of this section are the differences between Mill's ideal
of free speech and the requirements for the practice of free speech.
3) The Pursuit of Truth through Laissez-faire
Freedom and Social Darwinism
Here,
I will explore whether the freedom-utilitarian project's argument from
rationality promotes violence and has social Darwinist implications. I will argue that, ironically, the argument
from rationality is willing to sacrifice the rationality of many individuals
for the sake of the rationality of a few individuals. The argument from rationality promotes not
only symbolic violence, but also human physical violence over the truth, and
has some social Darwinian implications for members of cultures whose truths the
privileged do not select. Mill's
freedom-social epistemological project is incompatible with the pursuit of epistemic
and cultural progress.
Mill
recognizes that "unrestricted" expression can do disservice to
justice (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶37). However, Mill
sees some injustices as "necessary" or permissible evils for the
ultimate end of the justice which he thinks will result from knowledge of the whole
truth.
Mill
argues for "unrestricted" expression because of the developmental
service that it does for the rational acquisition of truth, although it does so
through militancy.
"Unrestricted" expression performs a militant service for the
truth, since keeping the truth lively requires the sacrifice of life. For true opinions to be rationally held,
violence is permissible. Reconsider
Mill's claim that "not the violent conflict between parts of the truth,
but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil" (CW, 18,
Ch. 2, ¶38). Mill suggests that to keep
the life of the truth is more important than to safeguard human life. Partial truths are embodied in those who hold
them, including those who are willing to fight for them, and are loyal to them
to the death.
Mill
associates the rational acquisition of the whole truth with violence which may
be deadly, by associating its parts with engagement in violent conflict that would
have the distant, but eventual consequence of arrival at the whole truth. So, while Mill associates the truth with life
and falsehood with death, he also, whether intentionally or not, associates the
truth with death and falsehood with life.
The quality of the life of the truth benefits from keeping falsehood
alive as well. Mill's argument that
"unrestricted" expression advances rationality promotes not only
symbolic violence among partial truths but, while it promotes that symbolic
violence, it also promotes physical violence among the persons who hold those
partial truths. Mill's argument that
there are utilitarian benefits to "unrestricted" expression
inadequately accounts for the fact that human social conflicts can result from
persons' aggressive demands that others should accept the truths of the
demanding party. Mill's argument from
rationality implicitly claims that the majority's ignorance should be tolerated
so that the knowledgeable few may work with the ignorant, partially true,
extreme beliefs of others to rationally uncover larger truths. Thus, that argument accepts the uneven social
distribution of knowledge, without considering how that mal-distribution can
impede certain people from achieving the benefits of social knowledge and from
benefiting society through the informed choosing of actions.
Next, I will consider the
connection from the freedom-utilitarian project's social epistemology to social
Darwinism. Mill assumes that the truth
is to a large extent invincible. He says:
when
an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in
the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it,
until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable
circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to
withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it. (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶17)
However, humankind has neither ever witnessed,
nor is it witnessing right now, a historical stage in which political
inequality has been absent, and thus political inequality has so far proven
that it reproduces itself throughout the ages.
And, so long as political inequality is not directly treated, Mill's
prediction that the most truthful stories will become immortal, while the false
ones will die out is not justified.
Neither is the expectation that the most just and beautiful ideas and
cultures will persevere, while the ugly and unjust ones will be chased out of
what some presume is the naturally good order of the world. Social Darwinists, and the like, make the
preceding presumption. They locate the
defects to lie within the dispositions and cultures of marginalized groups for
their apparent lack of adaptability, and fail to see the defects in the social
environment. Thus, they fail to take
into account that not only good and truthful things are demanded from persons
by their society as requirements for their social fitness. Social Darwinists assume that everyone is
socially given a fair chance to satisfy those demands or that the unfairness is
the result of inherent differences. At
the very least, social Darwinists do not recognize the epistemic need to
consider whether the demands the social environment makes are fair for the
identification of good cultures. Since
the order of the social world is mainly socially constructed, and those social
constructions do not necessarily correspond with the truth of anything, there
is no reason for why we should expect that the 'whole' truth, if there is such
a thing, would fit the best into our social world.
In
great irony, the connection between market theory and social Darwinism is
noteworthy. Social Darwinist ideology,
which holds that the socially fittest survive, impedes capitalists from seeing
the defects of their theory. The
proponents of market theory assume that their theory is infallible:
Market
theory introduces the logic of social Darwinism before Darwin. Darwin reproduced the struggle for survival,
in which masses of the species die as a matter of course, to the non-human
realm, in which selection is not by man-made design. The market theory has not developed such a
distinction between realms . . . It did
not occur to Smith or Ricardo that starvation, even mass starvation, could
count as an argument against the truth or beneficence of the invisible hand of
the market. On the contrary, they saw it
as the effective mechanism whereby market laws of supply and demand worked with
the labour factor of production. They
did not much concern themselves with the death or life of the "inferior
classes." Like the Social
Darwinists they preceded by a century, they thought this to be a "natural
law" . . . The certitude and the dominance of market doctrine have
increased in intensity as crises become more acute . . . An intense certitude
and demand for absolute rule in accordance with perceived divine design are
characteristics of fundamentalist faiths, particularly in dark times. Of note here, however, is the closure of the
market doctrine at its most "scientific" and "rigorous"
levels of advocacy and defence to any possible disproof of its principles. If a theory rules out any possibility of
factual disconfirmation, it is not a scientific or even rational theory, but a
closed dogma. But which basic principle
of the market doctrine is now open to evidence or argument that could show it
to be mistaken? What extreme
accumulation of wealth at the top of society, or destitution and misery for the
majority of society, can indicate to this system of thought that something is
wrong with its invisible hand of distribution? (McMurtry, 1998, p. 76-77)
The deaths of persons whose needs have not
been met are obvious signals that political inequality interferes with the
proper function of the market laws of supply and demand. Capitalists ignore these signals. Capitalists cannot recognize the
unreliability of the laws of supply and demand because, under the spell of
perceived infallibility, they are irreversibly confident about these laws. No social observation, no matter how severe,
could stop the capitalists continued following of these laws. These optimists dogmatically expect that
eventually the laws of supply and demand will prove to be the rational
mechanisms for the distribution of goods, even though there are no indications
that it is rational to expect this.
With
capitalists' overwhelming control over it, the "free press" excludes
knowledge in proportion to how much the knowledge goes against capitalist
interests. Ironically, it turns out that
market theory, as discussed in the previous quotation, and upon which Mill
naively places his faith, has made the very assumption of infallibility which
Mill warns against. The proponents of
the “free" market deny the public the opportunity to refute market theory. Mill never anticipates that the "market
place of ideas," as a result of "free trade," could suffer this
fate.
So,
how does the social Darwinism present in the capitalist treatment of the
economic market compare to Mill's freedom-utilitarian social epistemological
treatment of the market place of ideas and the market place of life
styles? Mill does not concern himself
with the life or death of cultures which are "proven" to be
unsuitable for individual development by the cultural preferences which
individuals freely express. The market
laws of supply and demand are applicable to the "unrestricted"
selection of the most developmentally appropriate cultures. Invisibly restricted freedom permits the
demand for the "fittest" cultures, while diversity permits the
various cultural supply. The developmental
elite get to select the "fittest" truths. Mill writes:
"Progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only
substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for another, improvement
consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time,
than that which it displaces" (CW, 18, Ch. 2, ¶33, emphasis added). The truths that are selected mainly depend on
the preferences and social and individual needs of the persons who have a say
in the selection. The same main problems
are present in both the capitalist market and the market place of ideas and
lifestyles. Political inequality hinders
the capacity of demand to accurately reflect the preferences and developmental
needs of all persons. The social and
cultural supplies are not distributed among all persons who actually need and
prefer them.
The
important distinction between the social Darwinist principle for the
identification of the "best" products in the capitalist market and
freedom, as a social epistemological principle for the pursuit of truth and the
most developmentally supportive cultures, is that the utilitarian nature of the
freedom project can guard it from the assumption of infallibility. The freedom social epistemological project
which Mill proposes can be judged based on the most important utilitarian
standard, namely, utility. This thesis
has sought to understand the utility of Mill's freedom-utilitarian project
including that of the project's developmental and social epistemological
features through an investigation of the project's consequences for the various
members of society. This investigation
has included a careful examination of the features of the freedom-utilitarian
project plan with the aim to predict the project's likely consequences for
various social groups based on philosophical reflection, current social
scientific knowledge, and interdisciplinary insight.
This
thesis chapter finds that Mill's ill-defined freedom misdirects his social
epistemological project. The
laissez-faire freedom principle does not take into account political
inequality. Instead, the principle
hinders awareness of the influence of political inequality on the expression of
individuality and on efforts to develop one's various capacities. Optimistically, Mill expects gains in
political equality will result from the freedom-utilitarian project's cultural
and epistemic improvement functions. The
practice of laissez faire freedom for the freedom-utilitarian project's pursuit
of individual development maximization is doubly problematic and
inappropriate. For, this practice both
adds to the project's limitations and makes those limitations difficult to
identify.
The
confounding effects of political inequality undermine not only the epistemic
capacities of politically disadvantaged persons. The epistemic capacities of the politically
privileged are undermined as well, although not as severely as those of the
disadvantaged. Recall that, for Mill,
the kinds of knowledge which persons can find depend on their capacity for
impartial judgement and on the nature of the opinions which they hold. The epistemic diplomat can obtain both
knowledge of self and social and natural world, whereas extreme thinkers can
obtain mainly self-knowledge. Persons
can obtain self-knowledge through "experiments" of life. The epistemic diplomat has the advantage,
above extreme or partial thinkers, of the capacity to obtain other kinds of
knowledge that are useful to make informed social comparisons. However, due to the influence of political
inequality on our capacity to make accurate social comparisons, even the
epistemic diplomat's capacity to obtain self-knowledge is social and
psychologically hindered.
The
approach to free speech that condemns social restrictions upon it throws Mill's
freedom- utilitarian social project into error.
This approach treats free speech as apolitical, but free speech cannot
be properly depoliticized.
"Unrestricted" expression is not politically possible in a
social context of political inequality.
Mill's argument for "unrestricted" expression from truth
synthesis is weak. The main reason for
this is that "unrestricted" expression facilitates cultural
assimilation, and thus it politically biases the expression of the obtained
"integrated" truths.
"Unrestricted" expression conflicts with the adequate
distribution of opportunities for free expression. If society always restricts expression at
least invisibly, it is best to regulate the expression transparently. Therefore, the most reasonable option to
maximize social freedom is to properly regulate expression.
As
it turns out, because it lacks consideration of how political inequality interferes
with the utility maximization of society, Mill's
"freedom-utilitarian" project is inadequately utilitarian, because
the project's consequentialist assessment of the utility of free expression is
politically egoistic. The
freedom-utilitarian arguments for "unrestricted" expression make
considerations from its favourable consequences for individuals who, because of
their social circumstances and presumed inherent superior endowments, are the
most capable of being the benefactors to, as well as benefiting from, such
expression Those arguments do not
consider the harmful consequences for anyone.
Mill's politically egoistic social project primarily considers the
individual development and the benefits of political and individual expression
for the few developmentally strong individuals.
The developmental and political gains of the few are promoted at expense
to the gains of the under-developed and even the presumably less developable. Last but not least, the project permits a
greater likelihood of social harm for the politically under-privileged who have
less social permission to express themselves and are thus unlikely to
developmentally benefit from that expression.
Mill's utilitarian argument
for the free expression of individuality is weak. Mill's politically egoistic assumptions and
claims about human nature recommend social attitudes and practices that could
help optimize the developmental power of only a minority of individuals. The societal majority will be excluded from
being the benefactors to, and the active and direct beneficiaries of, the
practices that Mill recommends. From a
utilitarian perspective, lack of consideration for the societal majority's
utility is a profound weakness: the
majority would either be unlikely to benefit developmentally or not benefit as
much as the elite from the practices that the freedom-utilitarian argument
claims are beneficial to society.
Mill's
assumptions about inherent developmental power differentials encourage a social
condition of unequal benefactors and beneficiaries,
in light of the causal interdependence of individual developmental power
and utility.
In Mill's view, some individuals have inherent strengths across the
attributes which he considers serve social utility, and which, when used, allow
such individuals a greater likelihood of being the benefactors to social
progress. As well, when these
individuals have these attributes, they are likely to be the beneficiaries of social
environmental factors that foster individual development.
Mill
holds several forms of elitism: intellectual, moral and political elitism. Taken together, these constitute a broader
form of elitism, namely, developmental elitism.
Mill presumes that the developmental elite consist of rare
individuals. If accepted, the ideal of
developmental elitism would rationalize the deprivation of most persons'
opportunities for individual development.
Thus, developmental elitism would waste the developmental resources of
most persons. So, I am concerned with
Mill's view that society should grant intellectuals more political power. What warrants concern about his form of
intellectual elitism are its unwarranted psycho-biological and social
developmental assumptions.
Mill's
intellectual elitism constitutes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The social expectation that certain persons,
in this case those among the majority, who have developed their abilities to
ordinary levels, cannot much serve society in socially important practices such
as public administration has developmentally unfavourable implications for such
persons. This social expectation could
lead them to not receive the opportunity to further their abilities. Deprived of adequate developmental opportunities,
the majority of individuals would, consequently, most likely provide little
utility. Thus, such persons would be set
up to have less social worth.
Mill
emphasises individual responsibility for self-development, and for the
improvement of one's social and personal worth.
Mill is concerned with the responsibility of society mainly when it
comes to society's duty to let persons develop themselves as it suits each
one. He thinks that this permission for
their developmental independence would leave them a sufficient range of choices
to improve their "comparative worth" as human beings (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶4).
Mill places the locus of developmental responsibility
on the individual who is supposed to exercise and expand her developmental
power in ways that produce not only individual but also social progress. He recognizes that individual expression has
not only personal consequences, but social consequences as well for the pursuit
of knowledge. He recognizes that the
pursuit of knowledge is both an individual and social pursuit.
However,
Mill's recommendations for approaching individual and social freedom and for
the pursuit of knowledge focus on an individual's dispositions and pay little
attention to the social situations which contribute to the maximization of
individual development. Mill's position
that the individual can use "unrestricted" expression to learn the
truth about her psychological nature removes the recommended
"experiments" of life from their social context. Mill's arguments do not account for the
effects of the existing social and power differentials on the degree of
accuracy possible for the experimental results.
Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project does not account for political inequality, an
interfering factor in both self-education and the advancement of knowledge of
others and world. Rather, he naively
expects that self-education and social epistemic advancement will remedy
political inequality. Consequently, Mill
inadequately explores society's duties for the maximization of individual
development. He ignores the social
responsibility required for the maximization of the freedom of every
individual's expression and opinion formation.
Political
egoism is a form of argumentative bias under which an arguer recommends certain
practices based on the claim that those practices will benefit society, yet the
arguer suggests that the benefit will apply only or mainly for an elite to
which she belongs. Politically egoistic
arguments hold political implications that an exclusive social group will
benefit from certain recommended practices while other social groups will be
either unaffected or harmed by those practices.
For
a strong freedom-utilitarian project, the freedom of expression and its
benefits should be widely distributed, as the fourth chapter explained. Yet, political egoism in Mill's
considerations prevents a distribution of benefits wide enough for meaningful
additions to the common good, and thus political egoism prevents an epistemically
fair project.
This
thesis identifies the main problem with Mill's freedom-utilitarian project is
that it is to be pursued in profound contradiction to its aim to maximize
utility. Over all,
"unrestricted" expression is an epistemically and ethically
unjustified way to pursue the truth.
Mill does not carefully examine the consequences of
"unrestricted" expression; he ignores how the means that he
recommends for the advancement of knowledge contradict the ends. Mill does not recognize the cognitive and social incoherence present between each
of the following pairs of ideals and practices.
First, he promotes a culture of individualism for the sake of cultural
pluralism, but, in turn, for the sake of the arrival at the one
"perfect" culture of knowledge.
Second; he promotes diversity toleration for the expression of personal
one-sidedness, but also for the sake of the advancement towards impersonal
multi-sidedness. Third, he encourages
the competition among the "sales people in the market place of ideas"
over the promotion and sale of their one-sided truths, but for the sake of the
cooperative production of multi-sided truths.
Fourth, Mill encourages cultural diversity and declares opposition to
cultural assimilation, but disregards the suggested cultural assimilation's de
facto cultural genocide of the deemed falsehoods that can occur, even when what
is pursued is the de jure "integration" of the deemed truths. Thus, at best, it is possible to integrate
the truths of the privileged cultures while denying the truths of subdominant
cultures. Fifth, Mill encourages the
assertion of personal opinions that are one-sided and thus largely ignorant
because they lack multi-sided truth, for the sake of opinions that are
multi-sided and thus knowledgeable because they include reconciled one-sided
truths. Out of one-sided opinions, the
impartial few may develop multi-sided truthful opinions which the one-sided
opinion possessors may never know. Thus,
the ignorance of the partial many is the means to the knowledge of the
impartial few. Sixth, Mill encourages
the expression of one-sided opinions, which he deems are most compelling, for
the sake of the promotion of open-mindedness, which requires the acquisition of
multi-sided opinions, but if one-sided opinions actually are more compelling,
then it is most likely that they would demote open-mindedness. Seventh, Mill neglects the irrational world
that would be dying over falsehood for the sake of a rational few living with
the truth. Mill encourages the blood
sport in which the contestants must fight over partial truths for the sake of
the impartial reconciliation of truths by the more epistemically worthy
spectators. Mill disregards the loss of
human life that can result from the pursuit of the enlivenment of the truth,
and he disregards that it is socially harmful to tolerate the irrationality of
the majority of individuals for the sake of the rationality of the few.
Mill explicitly denies
support for the tyranny of the developmentally strong minority, but this is
only his intention. While it tries to
avoid the tyranny of the majority, the freedom-utilitarian project plan
expresses political egoism that promotes the tyranny of the minority in
practice through the promotion of the developmental elite's rule over social
progress. This tyranny may seem
paradoxical because progress proceeds under it.
However, the progress is based on the satisfaction of the elite's
developmental needs, and the advancement of their political interests and
various preferences. This is not
progress that considers the needs of all society's members. This is just politically egoistic progress
under which the developmentally strong individuals are the main possessors of
their social world. History belongs to
the developmentally strong. They are the
progressive ones who continue it.
Culture belongs to them. They are
the ones who originate and diversify its cultural practices. The truth belongs to them. They are the ones who find its whole. Freedom belongs to them. They are the ones whose individualities are
strong enough to permit them to contribute the most to, and benefit the most
from, freedom's improvement. Society
belongs to them. They are the ones
deemed fit to lead it. For Mill, the
societal majority is most wise when it simply follows.
Mill
optimistically looks forward to a time in the distant future, when there would
be one culture of knowledge, but as many ways of life as there are individual
natures. I submit, even then, society
under the influence of the developmental elite would assign the various individual
natures differential levels of social utility, but no longer on the basis of
their advancement of social progress.
This differential assignment would likely be based on their capacity to
sustain the achieved state of social progress.
Since, for Mill, the social worth of the consequences of one's actions
determines their moral worth, and he expects that only a small number of
individuals will take such effectual actions, high levels of moral worth would
continue to belong to the few.
While
he argues for "unrestricted" speech from the need to sustain the life
of the truth, Mill misses the wide, concrete picture. The "market place of ideas" is
located on the earth. Disputes within it
are part of an ongoing battle upon the stage of human history with real social
consequences, real social distress, as humankind is forced to confront life and
death issues, not only epistemic issues.
The loss of life that occurs in battles over some perceived truth is not
only the loss of the liveliness of the truths present in one's opinions. The life risked does not only belong to the
ideas in a contest between the "sales persons" in the
"marketplace of ideas." The
loss of the life of the deemed truth does not only result in the academic
distress of thinkers whose opinions have been refuted, or in the loss of
rationality for those who, unable to discuss their beliefs, have lost a
rationally justified claim to them. The
issues humankind confronts have to do with the survival of the rational aspects
of our cognitive and social life and the potential for civilizational
extinction, both materially and socially.
Cultural
imperialism over the truth has implications for the ways of life that society
deems acceptable or rejects. The
political and social environment between and within all nations of the world
sets the specific demands or the criteria for the adaptability of nations. So long as in the world environment, the
dominant cultures continue to set their politically egoistic, self-interested
demands on diverse people, the cultures that survive the longest are not going
to be the most adapted to the truth or the good. Instead, it is cultures that are the most
compatibly self-centered which will be the fittest in it, that is, so long as
society does not destroy itself through its own corruption of “rationality,”
"truth," and the “good.”
Some cultures are destined to
die away because they cannot adapt to the demands of the corrupt world
historical environment. Regardless of
their truths, some beliefs are destined to die with their cultures because they
lack compatibility with the dominant cultures.
The political and social environment of the extinct culture was likely
structured largely by its dominant groups and in accordance to their own
political interests and their own versions of the truth and justice, which do
not necessarily reflect the truthful and just.
In fact, dominant versions of truth and justice tend to be based on the
opposite, that is, falsehoods and oppressive ideologies. Bluntly put, when one's social environment
demands one's acceptance of falsehoods, one is not going to survive in it by
telling the truth. Thus, the truths
which are the most dominant are neither necessarily nor potentially the most
synthesized socially available truths, so long as the social structures do not
reflect the truth of the various individual natures. For example, the real biological potential of
human beings is not, and has never been, reflected by the social structures;
these better reflect the truth that the world is dominated by falsehoods about
individual developmental capacities.
The
freedom-utilitarian project treats the rational life and developmental needs of
the individual as if their satisfaction can, to a large extent, be detached
from the social environment which influences the nature of those needs. For this reason, the progress that Mill's
freedom-utilitarian project can bring for the individual is mainly in
principle, not in practice. The enhanced
appearance of progress is not necessarily accompanied by actual progress. The mere appearance of progress can help to
secure the mainstream illusion that society is already progressive. Laissez-faire freedom ideals, such as those
of Mill, which are not meant to be implemented through enforceable programs,
can only add to rationalizations of the existing order. Since laissez-faire freedom ideals appear to
support rationality, and "unrestricted" expression is the
"blessed" rule of the "developed" world, many accept the
view that challenging the status quo is irrational. Consequently, while progress is hindered in
practice, progress is preserved as an abstract notion held in some principled
minds.
The
social developmental capacity is inherent to the individuals that constitute
society, but this capacity can, to a large extent, be socially facilitated or
hindered for individuals.
"Unrestricted" expression and formation of opinions interferes
with the capacity for individual development.
At its best such expression unevenly promotes individual
development. As "unrestricted"
expression makes the strong developmental capacity scarcer and promotes the
contest over the worth of the development of each individual, the
freedom-utilitarian project continues a perpetual condition of unequal
benefactors and beneficiaries.
Finally,
I suggest that there are various argumentative biases including one-sidedness
that weaken Mill's consequentialist arguments for freedom, and thus that he
fails to meet his own epistemic standard of multi-sidedness. Mill is perhaps motivated to assert one-sided
views so that his position may be more forceful and compelling (CW, 18, Ch. 2,
¶33). This would explain why Mill's
discussions on the capacity of free individual expression to add to the common
good are often biased in their coverage.
Mill focuses on the benefits of politically unrestricted expression, but
he does not give enough coverage to the harms that can result from it. He ignores logical conflicts and examples
that problematize his views.[47] This thesis has identified at least seven of
the incoherences in Mill's freedom-utilitarian project, and explained that
these incoherences are the consequence of political egoism.
Books:
Aronson, Elliot, Timothy Wilson, Robin Akert, & Fehr Beverly. Social
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Education Canada Inc, 2004: 61-97.
Bartky, Sandra. “On Psychological
Oppression.” Feminist Theory: A
Philosophical Anthology. Cudd, Ann E, & Robin O. Andreasen, Eds.
Blackwell Publishing, 2005, 105-113.
Fleras, Augie, & Jean Leonard Elliott, Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race and Ethnic Dynamics
in Canada. Fourth Edition. Prentice
Hall: 2003.
Gould, Stephen J. The
Mismeasure of Man. W. W. Norton
& Company: 1996.
Gray, John. "Mill's Conception of Happiness and The Theory of
Individuality.” J. S. Mill On Liberty In Focus. Gray, John., &
Smith, G. W, Eds. Routledge, 1991: 190-211.
Henry, Frances, & Carol Tator. The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society. Third Edition. Thomson, Nelson: 2006.
McMurtry, John. Unequal Freedoms:
The Global Market As An Ethical System. Garamond Press: 1998.
Mill, John Stuart. 1863. "Utilitarianism." Collected Works
of John Stuart Mill, Volume X, University of Toronto Press, Robson, J. M,
Ed. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969: 203-259.
Mill, John Stuart. 1863. "On Liberty." Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII, University of Toronto Press, Robson, J. M,
Ed. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969: 213-310.
Solomon,
Miriam. Social Empiricism. The MIT Press: 2001.
Journal Articles:
Baum, Bruce. "J. S. Mill on
Freedom and Power." Polity, 31, 2, (Winter 1998): 187-216.
Doyle, Tony. "A Utilitarian Case for Intellectual Freedom In
Libraries." Library Quarterly, 71, 1, (Jan 2001): 44-71
Festinger, Leon. "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," Human
Relations, 7, (1954): 117-140.
Hansen, H V. "Mill and the Moral Economy of Ideas," Unpublished
Manuscript, (Apr 2006): 1-10.
Harris, Abram L. "John Stuart Mill's Theory of Progress." Ethics, 66 (3), (Apr
1956): 157-175.
Hughes, Patricia. “The Reality versus the Ideal: J. S. Mill’s Treatment of Women, Workers, and
Private Property.” Canadian Journal
of Political Science, 12, 3, (Sep 1979): 523-542.
Kendall, Willmoore. “The ‘Open Society’ and Its Fallacies.” American Political Science Review,
54, (4), (Dec 1960): 972-979.
Kendall, Willmoore, & Carey, George W. “The Roster Device: J. S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism.” Western Quarterly, 21, 1, (1968):
20-39.
Kimball,
Roger. "One Very Simple Principle." New Criterion, 17, 3, (Nov 1998): 4
Nickerson,
R.S. "Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises." Review
of General Psychology, 2, (1998): 175-220.
Strasser, Mark. “Mill and the
Utility of Liberty.” Philosophical
Quarterly, 34, 134, (Jan 1984): 63-68.
Verburg, Rudi. "John Stuart Mill's Political Economy: Educational
Means to Moral progress," Review of Social Economy, 64, 2, (Jun
2006): 225-246.
Websites:
Mill, John
Stuart. (1874). On Nature. Lancaster E-text.
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_on.htm (1996).
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(Dec 10, 1948).
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Fred. "John Stuart Mill." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/ (July 10, 2007).
Sulma
Portillo was born in San Salvador, El Salvador, in August 28, 1977, where she
spent her early years during a time of civil war. To escape the Salvadoran civil war, in 1982,
her family migrated to the United States, then, in 1985, to Windsor, Ontario,
Canada where she has lived since.
Portillo
has dedicated much time to learning and cultivating her various intellectual
and creative skills. In 1998, she
commenced her undergraduate studies at the University of Windsor in the
Psychology program. That year, she took
her first course in Philosophy "Reasoning Skills." She did not pre-cognize that she would later
study Philosophy as an undergraduate student, while working for Informal Logic, and that she would
assist the same professor of the "Reasoning Skills" course, who
happened to be an Editor of the journal.
Even less did she pre-cognize that she would go on to study Philosophy
at the Master's level, while working as a Graduate Teaching Assistant of the
"Reasoning Skills" course.
In her fourth year of Psychology, she
took the course "Informal Logic: Argumentation" which was taught by
Ralph Johnson who would later employ her at the journal Informal Logic. The
argumentation course stimulated her interest in the study of Philosophy. The capacity of philosophical study to help
in the development of good reasoning and argumentation skills impressed her. Also, that year, she took the course
"Informal Logic: Fallacy" which she would later take again, but this
time as a Graduate Teaching Assistant, while working with Catherine Hundleby,
the professor of the course, and her Master's Philosophy thesis advisor.
Portillo
graduated from the University of Windsor with a Bachelor of Arts degree with
Honours in Psychology with Thesis in 2002.
During the academic year after her graduation, she worked as a Research
Assistant for the Psychotherapy Research Centre at the University of
Windsor. In this time, she studied
International Relations and Development.
As well, she held other positions as a Research Assistant for the
Department of Political Science and for the Department of Sociology and
Anthropology.
Portillo
took the undergraduate courses "Philosophy of Science" and
"Philosophy of Education" which Professor Parr taught, and
"Metaphysics," "Environmental Ethics" and "Social and
Political Philosophy" which Jeff Noonan taught. As well, she took the undergraduate third
year course "Philosophy of Mind" which Marcello Guarini taught. These courses stimulated her interest in
philosophical study so much that they influenced her choice to major in
Philosophy.
In
her official, first semester as a Philosophy undergraduate major, she took the
third year course "Mind Design and Android Epistemology" which
Guarini taught. Later in her first year
of graduate philosophical studies, she took a course on Philosophy of Artificial
Intelligence and Cognitive Science which Guarini taught, while employed as a
Research Assistant helping Guarini in the development of neural networks. Also, in her first semester as a Philosophy
undergraduate major, she obtained the position of Editorial Assistant at the
journal Informal Logic where she
worked for three years helping the Editors including Hans Hansen. Hansen later employed her to contribute to
the research analysis of the arguments used in the 2004 Canadian national
election campaign. As well, she took a
graduate seminar course on John Stuart Mill which Hansen taught, and for
Portillo's philosophy Master's thesis, Hansen was the Internal Reader. Additionally, that same semester, she took
the course "Existentialism" which Johnson taught and an ethics course
which Blair taught. Last but not least,
in the same semester she took the courses "Early Modern Philosophy:
Empiricism" and the third year course "Theories of Nature" which
were taught by Philip Rose, with whom she later worked as the Graduate Teaching
Assistant of the course "Environmental Ethics."
In
2005, Portillo graduated from the University of Windsor with the Bachelor of
Arts degree with Combined Honours in Philosophy and Political Science, and a
minor equivalent in Sociology. During
the summer which followed her graduation, she worked as a Teaching Assistant in
the Department of Philosophy.
Portillo
was able to pursue her Master of Arts degree in Philosophy with the help of a
University of Windsor tuition scholarship.
As well, graduate assistantships have permitted her an interesting and
rewarding experience working with the instructors of some of the courses that
she completed earlier as a student at the same university.
Portillo
has a wide range of academic interests, and looks forward to further
opportunities to explore these interests.
Her main philosophical interests include social and political
philosophy, particularly, the notion of the 'just society.' Also, she is interested in philosophy of
social science, in part, because the development of fair, non-elitist approaches
to the study of social phenomena is essential for understanding the nature of
the just society. Additionally, she is
interested in the philosophy of education, and, in particular, anti-oppressive
education, because it is crucial for the development of wisdom on social
justice. Last but not least, she is
interested in the philosophy of mind and concepts such as wisdom and
rationality which consists of both critical thinking and creativity. These mental attributes are important for the
development of good judgment which is essential for the capacity to understand
and conceive the just and peaceful society.
[1] Throughout
this thesis, I will use the abbreviation CW to refer to the Collected Works
of John Stuart Mill; the full citation of this work can be found in the
bibliography of the current thesis. For
Mill's essay On Liberty and for his work Utilitarianism, I will
textually draw primarily from the eighteenth and the tenth volumes respectively
of the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill.
[2] For
the rest of this thesis, I will use the feminine pronouns “her” and
"she" to balance the use of the masculine pronoun in the quoted
material.
[3] For
Mill, society is the sum of its individual members (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9). With society thus defined, since freedom adds
to individual developmental power, freedom also adds to societal developmental
power.
[4] Epistemic
fairness is an idea "entailed by social empiricism" (Solomon, 2001,
p. 12), which "evokes the social side of epistemology" (Solomon,
2001, p. 148).
[5] See
J. S. Mill’s On Nature (1874).
[6] It
is beyond the scope of this thesis to detail Mill's understanding of
happiness. For the purpose of this
thesis, it is sufficient to note that Mill treats social happiness as the
aggregate of individual happiness (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶9), and that he views individual
happiness as the active individual's long-term developmental outcome.
[7] The
use of negative political power is inappropriate when it interferes with
matters that regard only the self. I
will not discuss the problems with the claim that there are matters that regard
only the self. it is sufficient to say
that most matters, if not all, are not self-regarding matters.
[8] Conformity
to custom is excessive when it results in despotic custom.
[9] For
this thesis, whenever I say that Mill 'negatively correlates' or 'negatively
relates' and 'positively correlates' or 'positively relates,' I am referring to
particular claims Mill makes about the direction of an empirical relationship
between two variables. When two
variables are said to be positively related, what is meant is that as one
variable increases, so does the other, or vice versa, when one variable
decreases, so does the other. When two
variables are said to be negatively correlated, what is meant is that as one
variable increases, the other decreases, and vice versa.
[10] When
those with higher levels of negative political power exercise influence over
others it likely contributes to social regression, if to any change at
all. By assuming that the societal
majority have higher levels of negative political power than the developmental
elite have formal political power, Mill implies that social regression and no
social change are more likely than social progress. This can explain what Mill means by the claim
that those who have more developmental power, and thereby more capacity to
contribute to social progress, do not have more political power.
[11] An
individual makes a self-fulfilling prophecy when s/he acts in ways that
influence her own experiences or another individual's experiences to confirm
the expectations that the individual had prior to making her actions (Aronson
et al., 2004).
[12] A
despotic custom is a common cultural practice that is exercised to an extent which
undermines the social capacity for progress.
[13] As
it will be discussed in the next section of this chapter and in the third
chapter of this thesis, Mill thinks that humans, to a large extent, differ in
their psycho-biological natures. So,
humans can perfect their natures observing their own inherent range of
developmental possibilities and their idiosyncratic psychological needs and
preferences. That is, the ideal state of
the human nature of each is the main referent in her pursuit of perfectibility. Mill assumes that there is not enough
commonality among human natures for there to be an ideal type of human nature.
[14] For
Mill, human beings have little potential for understanding, over all.
[15] Mediocre
persons are unaware of the worth of individuality, whether it is their own or
that of others. So, they are unlikely to
encourage the individuality of intellectuals. Thus, it is up to intellectuals
to encourage their own individuality.
[16] In
the fourth chapter of this thesis, I will discuss Mill's argument that free
expression is necessary for the synthesis of truth.
[17] Throughout
this thesis, I will use the term "partial truth" to refer to either
propositions whose degree of accuracy is not complete, i.e. propositions that
in one or multiple ways are partly true and partly false or to systems of
belief that are based on both true and false propositions.
[18] See
Verburg (2006) for a discussion on Mill's position on the primacy of
individual moral development for the treatment of poverty.
[19] Mill
writes: "All that has been said of
the importance of individuality of character, and diversity of opinions and
modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of
education" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, ¶13). He
continues: "An education
established and controlled by the State should only exist, if it exist at all,
as one among many competing
experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep
the others up to a certain standard of excellence" (CW, 18, Ch. 5, ¶13).
[20] Persons
use upward social comparison as a strategy to enhance their capacity to develop
their skills (Aronson et al., 2004, p. 169).
[21] Persons
use downward social comparison as a strategy to identify their strong skills
relative to the skills of others (Aronson et al, 2004, p. 168).
[22] The
social experiment is informal for the following reasons. First, there is no overseeing researcher in
charge of the social experiment. The
experiment requires individuals to trial modes of life. These individuals are the only
"researchers." Each individual
is in charge of her life style trials only.
The "researchers" are not organized for the purpose of the
social experiment. Most likely, they do
not even see the larger picture, and are unaware that their experiments of
living are within the social experiment of living. They are meta-researchers in that the social
experiment of living depends on their individual experiments of living. There is no one keeping records of the
results of the social experiment. The
results can be found in the outcomes of individual lives. No one is keeping track of all those outcomes
and comparing them. Individuals can be
aware of the results of their own trials.
The social experiment does not yield a single set of results but rather
continuously updated results. It is a
historically ongoing experiment whose duration extends beyond each generation
as various individuals test the ways of life.
[23] A
custom is a common cultural practice. A
despotic custom is a cultural practice that is exercised so commonly that it
undermines the social capacity for progress.
The despotism of custom occurs when custom exercises
more than a "divided rule with liberty and progress" (CW, 18, Ch. 3,
¶17).
[24] I use the terms 'customarily' and 'widely accepted' as if they are
interchangeable. I do not use the term
customarily to refer to only the mindless following of custom. For, Mill recognizes that conformity to a
custom does not necessarily entail, though it generally entails, uncritical
acceptance. He admits that mindful
conformity to custom is also possible.
For example, he advises that "an intelligent following of custom,
or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom, is better than a blind
and simply mechanical adhesion to it" (CW, 18, Ch. 3, ¶5, emphasis added).
Thus, I think that it would be an overstatement
to claim that Mill defines 'customary acceptance' as uncritical conformity to
custom.
[25] Another
reason for why Mill argues that utilitarianism is practical
is because utilitarianism draws from and puts to use the natural human
attributes of sociality, the sentiments of social sympathy, and the attribute
of human intelligence. The idea of
justice consistent with utilitarianism is not ethically egoistic. That is to say, utilitarianism does not claim
that persons ought to do what they think is best for themselves. Rather, Mill writes that we should not resent
hurts to ourselves unless the hurts are of the sort which society is also
interested in repressing (CW, 10, Ch. 5,
¶20). It is moral to exclusively
subordinate the sentiment of justice, an element of which is the "natural
feeling of retaliation or vengeance" (CW, 10,
Ch. 5, ¶20), to the "social sympathies" (CW, 10,
Ch. 5, ¶20). Doing so allows us to be
just persons, that is, persons who resent a hurt to society, and thus, whose
sentiment of justice "acts in directions conformable to the general
good" (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶20). Our highly developed human intelligence
allows us to have a wider range of sympathy (CW, 10,
Ch. 5, ¶19). If we were not to
subordinate the sentiment of justice to social feeling, we would be led by it
to resent selfishly or to "resent indiscriminately whatever anyone does
that is disagreeable to us" (CW, 10, Ch.
5, ¶20).
[26] Mill argues that the various existent principles of what is unjust, such
as the five that he identifies, show that natural justice is ambiguous. Natural justice can be used to justify
various views (CW, 10, Ch. 5, ¶9). Thus, it cannot provide a ranking system for
moral principles.
[27] The
greatest happiness principle states that individual actions and social
practices that contribute the most to social happiness are the most
utilitarian.
[28] In
the fourth chapter, I will discuss how what Mill considers free speech as
socially expensive.
[29] I
am not saying that a fast intellectual progress rate is always an
advantage. Whether it is an advantage
depends on the social circumstances of the learner including whether the formal
educational system has a curriculums and educational programs which are
flexible enough to facilitate the intellectual progress of students with
various needs.
[30] Benefactors are more likely to obtain direct and immediate benefits from
their contributions to society, as the fourth chapter will show in regards to
knowledge.
[31] Wilson
(2007).
[32] For
a discussion of the problems with understanding intellectual abilities see
Stephen Jay Gould's Mismeasure of Man
(1981).
[33] See
Doyle (2001).
[34] The
connection that I draw here can reveal the unacceptable implications of Mill's
argument from rationality for the equal treatment of falsehood and truth. The next section of this chapter explores
those implications.
[35] I
use 'opinion' to refer to a belief consisting of at least one proposition. If an opinion consists of multiple
propositions, some of its propositions can be false while others can be
true. Thus, opinions can have both true
and false contents, and vary in their degree of accuracy and falsity.
[36] The
examination of the individual's rationality requires also an evaluation of the
social rationality of the individual's actions.
[37] Although
Mill does not explicitly use the metaphor of marketplace of ideas (Hansen, 2006,
p. 5), his argument that society should not restrain the expression of opinions
is consistent with the use of such a metaphor to convey Mill's treatment of the
free expression of opinions.
[38] Mill
writes that the "generality of the world" is one-sided in that it
leans towards the side to which it "feels most inclination" (CW, 18,
Ch. 2, ¶22). I use the term
'one-sidedness' to refer either to this inclination or the expression of
opinions that consider only or mainly one side of an issue, and I use the term
'one-sided' to describe those opinions.
[39] Here,
I accept the assumption that the good positively correlates with the truthful;
this assumption is evident in the works of ancient Greek philosophers, such as
Plato.
[40] "For
example, although immigrants in the United States are expected to melt into the
American pot, this cauldron remains irrefutably white, male, English-speaking,
and middle class in orientation," write Fleras and Elliott (2003, p. 16). In the United States, the pot has served a
rather "monocultural stew" (Fleras & Elliott, 2003, p. 16). Unfortunately, Canada too is shifting towards
the "integration" approach (Fleras & Elliott, 2003, p. 16).
[41] See
Nickerson (1998).
[42] I
use the terms "many-sidedness" as the expression of, or the capacity
to understand multiple perspectives and "multi-sided" as the
expression of that capacity.
[43] For an account of how Mill’s acceptance
of private property rights stands at odds with his ideal of gender equality,
see, for example, Hughes (1979).
[44] Mill
does not make this expectation clear and he does not explain how this could
happen.
[45] The
conditions for a free press are not fulfilled now, and they have never been
fulfilled. "Certain conditions for
a free press were more in evidence in North America in the second half of the
nineteenth century," notes McMurtry (1998, p. 192). Although not in the same region of the world,
that was around the time that On Liberty (1859) was published, and
before corporate interests had taken over the press. However, at that time, another form of
censorship affected the press, namely, religious censorship. The second chapter of On Liberty is
largely a reaction to that censorship.
[46] The
media are not democratic in their portrayals of racialized groups because the
"norms, values, and assumptions of White, male-dominated institutions
continue to prevent the mass media from fairly and accurately reflecting and
representing the multiracial reality of Canadian society" (Henry &
Tator, 2006, p. 273).
[47] See
Kimball (1998).