



**After Action Report from
The Tropical Wave of July 7th, 2003 in Saint Lucia.**

1.0 OCCURRENCE

TROPICAL WAVE

2.0 DATE OF OCCURRENCE

JULY 7TH, 2003

3.0 AREAS AFFECTED

NATIONWIDE

4.0 IMPACT

4.1 Infrastructure

Roads:

SLIDES AT BARRE D'ISLE

**ROAD IN DEBARRA TEMPORARILY IMPASSABLE DUE TO
FLOODING FROM TWO RIVERS**

Bridges:

No damage reported

Etc:



4.2 Housing

REPORTS OF DAMAGE

ROOF DAMAGE AT MARCHARD

ROOF DAMAGE AT BANSE LA GRASE

ONE TREE FELL ON A HOUSE IN MORNE PANACHE

A COUPLE OF FENCES DOWN IN GROS ISLET

THREE ROOFS BLOWN OFF IN THE CACAO GIRAGD AREA

4.3 Critical Facilities and Utilities

Water:

WASCO reported no damage.

Electricity:

LUCELEC reported minimal damage throughout the Island. Nonetheless, Garrand and Denierre Riviere / Morne Panache were defined as the worst affected communities. LUCELEC's representative on DANA reported the following;

- One pole fell in the Garrand area leaving two customers without electricity for a short period.
- A transformer at Garrand got damaged, leaving several persons without electricity for a lengthy period.
- A fallen tree at the Barre De Lisle caused an extensive power outage in the Denierre Riviere/Morne Panache Communities. The repairs were ongoing at the time of this report on July, 09, 2003.
- The cost of damage is expected to be in the region of \$20,000.00.

Telephone:

Both Cable and Wireless and A, T& T Wireless indicated that no damage was experienced



4.4 Agriculture

The DANA committee reports:

On the banana industry:

Attempts at obtaining information from the several Banana companies have proven difficult. To date information obtained from the St. Lucia Banana Corporation (SLBC) suggest the following categorisation of damages:

Northern Farms	-	15%
Southern Farms	-	15%
Cul de Sac Valley	-	30%
Roseau Valley	-	30%
Mabouya Valley	-	30%

The representative of SLBC on the DANA sub-committee suggest that an overall 30% losses could be reported from their farms.

As regard to TQF, it has been reported that the most damage was in the valley areas, Cul De Sac, Roseau and Mabouya. The estimated percentage loss is in the region of 15 percent.

Efforts at obtaining information from the other companies have been extremely difficult; however, discussions held with both WIBDECO and Wincrop indicated that their assessment of the banana damage was 5 and 15 percent respectively.

Thus, considering a replanting cost of \$ 5,000.00 per acre, an island-wide loss of 15 percent, and based on the assumption of 4000 acres of land under active banana cultivation, the approximate cost of the damage would be \$ 3,000,000.00

DANA Committee report regarding the Ministry of Communications, Works, Transport and Public Utilities (MCWTPU):

On requesting information on a report from the MCWTPU, the DANA Committee was advised that the report had already been sent to the Prime Minister's Office. Perusal of a report from the MCWTPU on July 10, 2003, however, suggests that the Island-wide picture can also be defined as minimal damage. It indicates, that the damage can be categorised under fallen trees, landslides, choked drains and choked culverts. The total damage has been estimated at \$52,000.00 with the Barbonneau area being hardest hit.



Reports received at NEMO from District Disaster Committees mention:

TREE DOWN AT GRACE.

TREE DOWN AT MONIER

TREES DOWN AT SOUFRIERE

TREES DOWN AT MONCHY

BANANAS DOWN IN CUL DE SAC, CASTRIES @ DENNERY

4.5 Tourism

No damage reported

4.6 Commerce and Industry

No damage reported

4.7 Health:

Reports from both the MOH and the DANA Committee:

Minimal damage. All facilities are habitable and services have continued uninterrupted.

Two galvanized sheets blown away and some are loose on roof of outpatient building.

Golden Hope Hospital: galvanized sheets lose. Four corrugated sheets blown away. Flooding of nurse station on ground floor.

Barbonneau Health Centre: some water into building due to damaged roof cover. Loss of supplies, damaged linen and flooding of floors. Tiles loose.

Damage estimate to the Health Sector: \$ 2,450.00.

4.8 Casualties

None

4.9 Welfare

NO DAMAGE REPORTED, NO ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.



4.10. TOTAL COST OF DAMAGE.

THE TOTAL COST OF DAMAGE IS ESTIMATED IN:

BANANA INDUSTRY:	\$3,000,000.00
MINISTRY OF HEALTH:	\$ 2,450.00
MOWCTPU:	\$ 52,000.00

CONCLUSION (FROM THE DANA REPORT):

APART FROM THE BANABA FARMS IN THE THREE MAIN VALLEYS, BARBONNEAU SEEMED TO BE THE WORST HIT. THE STRONGEST WINDS WERE REPORTED IN THAT AREA AND RESIDENTS HAD REPORTED THAT TWO RESIDENCIES HAD LOST THEIR ROOFS. LUCELEC ALSO PIONTED OUT THAT THE GARRAND AREA WAS THE ONLY LOCATION WHERE FALLEN POLES WERE REPORTED.

THE OTHER COMPANIES, THOUGH CONTACTED WERE EITHER UNABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION OR THEIR PERSONNEL WERE NOT PRESENT TO SUPPLY THE RESULTS OF ANY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE TROPICAL WAVE.

RECOMMENDATION (FROM DANA REPORT)

IN ORDER TO A PROPER DAMAGE ASSESSMENT EXERCISE, REFLECTIVE OF A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON DAMAGE AFTER A DISASTER, THE FOLLOWING ARE DEEEMED NECESSARY:

ALL MEMBERS MUST BE NOTIFIED OF THEIR APPOINTMENT OR NOMINATION TO THE DANA SUBCOMMITTEE. THIS SHOULD HOLD FOR BOTH PTIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR BODIES.

THE MCWTPU SHOULD AT ALL TIMES SUBMIT A COPY OF THEIR REPORT TO DANA

INFORMATION PREPARED WITH THE REPORT FROM MR. EGBERT LOUIS, CHAIRPERSON OF THE DANA DISASTER COMMITTEE, REPORT FROM MR. AUGUSTIN COMPTON, MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND REPORTS FROM DISTRICT DISASTER COMMITTES' CHAIRPERSONS.



5.0 RESPONSE ACTIONS

NEMO PLACED ON ALERT AT 2:00PM

CASTRIES EAST COMMITTEE ACTIVATED BY CHAIR

WASCO TEAM PLACED ON ALERT

SLASPA TEAM PLACED ON ALERT

MIN OF TOURISM SOPS ACTIVATED

LIMITED TESTING OF TELECOMS

DANA COMMITTEE DEPLOYED

6.0 CONCERNS

MAIN CONCERNS ARE:

KEY RESPONSE PERSONNEL SHOULD CONTACT NEMO ONCE THEY HEAR ABOUT THE TROPICAL WAVE (OR STORM OR HURRICANE) AND SHOULD REMAIN REACHABLE AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY NEMO. SOME KEY PERSONNEL NEVER CONTACTED THE NEMO OR WERE IMPOSSIBLE TO BE REACHED NOT EVEN AT HOME.

DAMAGE REPORTS MUST BE SENT TO THE DANA DISASTER COMMITTEE. AS AGREED BY ALL AGENCIES THE DANA COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLATING ALL DAMAGE INFORMATION. MINISTRIES AND OTHER COMMITTEES SHOULD NOT SEND INDIVIDUAL REPORTS TO THE PM'S OFFICE, AS COLLATION IS THE DANA'S SOP.

INTRA-SECTORAL WARNING AND NOTIFICATION. MINISTRIES AND COMMITTEES MUST WARN AND NOTIFY INTERNAL PERSONS, ORGANISATIONS SO THE WHOLE SECTOR/COMMITTEE IS ALERTED AND TAKES PRECAUTIONS AND IS READY TO RESPOND IF NECESSARY. THIS WILL, AT THE SAME TIME, REDUCE DAMAGE WITHIN THE SECTORS (E.G., DAMAGE TO HEALTH SECTOR IN POINT 4 ABOVE.)



7.0 NATIONAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAMS DEPLOYED. SEE REPORT ON DAMAGE IN POINT 4.

8.0 NEEDS

8.1 Priority Action List

NONE

9.0 PROJECTIONS

THE TROPICAL WAVE HAS LEFT. NO FURTHER DAMAGE IS EXPECTED.

10.0 ASSISTANCE SOUGHT FROM DONOR AGENCIES

NONE NEEDED.

11.0 SUMMARY

IN GENERAL THE RESPONSE WAS ON TIME AND EFFECTIVE. ALL NATIONAL AND DISTRICT COMMITTEES (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SHELTER MANAGEMENT) WERE CONTACTED. NO MAJOR DAMAGE. ONLY THE BANANA INDUSTRY WAS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED. SOME MINOR DAMAGE TO HEALTH FACILITIES.

MOST OF THE DISTRICT AND NATIONAL DISASTER COMMITTEES CONTACTED THE NEMO AND WERE CONTACTED BY NEMO ON TIME. THOSE NOT CONTACTED SHOULD CONTACT THE NEMO IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WARNING IS ISSUED AND THEY KNOW ABOUT THE APPROACH OF A METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENON AND NOT WAIT UNTIL NEMO CONTACTS THEM.

NOT CONTACTING AND NOT BEING CONTACTED BY THE SHELTER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE CHAIRPERSON (RESPONSIBLE FOR THE



HURRICANE PLAN SHELTER MANAGEMENT EMERGENCY PROCEDURE) COULD HAVE CAUSED A BIG PROBLEM IF THE WAVE WOULD HAVE DEMANDED THE OPENING OF SHELTERS.

THE NEMO, GIS AND THE MEDIA WORKED VERY WELL TOGETHER TO BROADCAST REGULAR MESSAGES ANNOUNCING METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION REPORTED BY MET OFFICE.

SECTORS INVOLVED SHOULD BE FASTER IN ASSESING DAMAGE TO INFORM THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE AND THE NEMO. THE FINAL DAMAGE REPORT AND THE AAR CANNOT BE FINISHED ON TIME IF ALL THE REPORTS FROM THE SECTORS ARE NOT SENT TO THE DANA COMMITTEE.

SECTORS MUST IMPROVE INTRA-SECTORAL NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE; THIS IS, ONCE NOTIFIED THEY MUST NOTIFY IMMEDIATELY ALL THE KEY PERSONS WITHIN THE SECTOR; E.G., WITHIN THE HEALTH SECTOR, ONCE NOTIFIED, HOSPITALS MUST BE NOTIFIED AND KEY OFFICERS FROM THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH AS WELL; BY DOING THIS, SOME DAMAGE COULD BE AVOIDED BY TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES.

REGARDING THE MET OFFICE. ONCE THEY KNOW THE METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENON IS LIKELY TO APPROACH/IMPACT SAINT LUCIA. REGARDLESS OF THE INTENSITY (STRONG WAVE TO HURRICANE), THEY SHOULD CONTACT NEMO AND NOT WAIT NEMO TO CONTACT THEM. THIS CAN BE DONE BY TELEPHONE AND NOT JUST BY FAX. REGARDING THE MET REPORTS, THEY SHOULD SEND THE REPORTS TO THE NEMO ONCE PREPARED AND NOT WAIT TILL 5 PM OR 11 PM, ETC. TO FAX TO NEMO. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE NEMO TO HAVE THE INFORMATION ONCE IT IS PREPARED FOR DECISION MAKING AND DISSEMINATION.

ALSO, AFTER THE FIRST CONTACT BETWEEN THE NEMO AND MET OFFICE, KEY PERSONNEL, (SUCH AS THE DIRECTOR OF MET SERVICES, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HURRICANE PLAN WARNING PROCEDURE), SHOULD CONTACT THE NEMO AND REMAIN REACHABLE AT ALL TIMES BY THE NEMO.

ON THIS OCCASION, THE 6 AM MET REPORT ON JULY 8TH COULD NOT BE PREPARED AND SENT TO NEMO BECAUSE FORECASTERS REPORTED ILL IN THE MORNING. IN CASES LIKE THIS, MET OFFICE SHOULD BE PREPARED AND FIND A SOLUTION SO FORECAST IS NOT INTERRUPTED EVEN WHEN FORECASTERS ARE ILL, PARTICULARLY THE DAY AFTER A METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENON IS DETECTED.

IT IS NECESSARY TO REPEAT THAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORTS MUST BE SENT TO THE DANA DISASTER COMMITTEE. AS AGREED BY ALL AGENCIES THE DANA COMMITTEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLATING ALL DAMAGE INFORMATION. MINISTRIES AND OTHER COMMITTEES SHOULD



NOT SEND INDIVIDUAL REPORTS TO THE PM'S OFFICE, AS COLLATION IS THE DANA'S SOP.

IT WOULD BE IMPROTANT AND VERY USEFUL TO INTERVIEW THE DIRECTOR OF NEMO AND BROADCAST A MESSAGE BY HER EVERY HOUR OR EVERY TWO HOURS AND ON EVERY NEWS REPORT ON THE TV SO ALL THE POPULATION IS INFORMED ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING AND ABOUT WHAT TO DO.

ALSO THE TV NETWORKS COULD BROADCAST INFORMATION AT ALL TIMES THROUGH SCREEN SUBTITLES AS IS IT DONE IN MOST OF THE TV NETWORKS IN THE WORLD.

AGAIN, THE RESPONSE WAS A VERY GOOD ONE WITH THE EXCEPTIONS MENTIONED IN POINTS 6 AND 11 OF THIS REPORT. THE LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS SHOWN DURING TROPICAL STORM 'LILI' LAST YEAR SHOULD NOT BE LOST; ON THE CONTRARY IT CAN BE IMPROVED.

Summarized by: Arturo Lopez-Portillo, consultant to the NEMO

Date: 8th July 2003