The teleological argument assumes causal premises unjustified, the ontological argument irrationally assumes that existence is a predicate, and the cosmological argument merely entails the existence of uncaused thing(s) at best. As a result, I’ve developed a rough draft for a new Metaphysical argument which combines elements of the traditional arguments to prove that God exists. My general argument attempts to show that all that is currently caused must have originated from an uncaused Thing, which must have the attributes of the theistic God.

Outlined Syllogism:

1. A possible being is a thing that can receive existence.

2. A necessary being is a thing that can’t receive existence.

3. A necessary being must be eternal, changeless, infinite, unique, and having the essence of every quality it gives to other things.

4. If a possible being exists, then a necessary being must also exist.

5. It is true that a possible being exists.

6. Therefore, a necessary being must also exist.

7. Knowledge, value, and ability have their origin from the necessary being.

8. Therefore, the necessary being has the essence of knowledge, value, and ability.

9. The general theistic God is an eternal, infinite, unique being that has knowledge, value, and ability.

10. Therefore, the theistic God exists.

The first two statements are definitional. If statements 4 and 5 are true, then statement 6 must be true. If statements 3 and 7 are true, then statement 8 must be true. Statement 9 is definitional, and statement 10 is true if statement 8 is true. Therefore, statements 3, 4, 5, and 7 are the crucial steps that need to be sufficiently proven for this Metaphysical proof to be successful.

The crucial statements, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are delineated below:

An eternal thing is a thing without beginning or end to its existence. A thing that can’t gain existence is clearly a thing that is without beginning. For what is meant by beginning to exist is precisely the same as what is mean by gaining existence. If the attributes of a thing are such that that thing has no way of gaining existence, then that thing must also have no way of losing existence. This is simply because there is no way to logically conceive of a thing that is not able to gain existence and yet is able to lose it. How can anything be unable to gain what it can lose? If a cup can’t gain liquid and it has liquid, then that cup cannot lose liquid. Whatever "hole" would allow liquid to escape would also allow liquid to originally be able to enter. Similarly, whatever quality allows a thing to lose existence must also allow that thing to be able gain existence. By the converse, if a thing is unable to receive existence, then neither is it able to lose existence. Therefore, the necessary being must be eternal.

If a thing becomes a different thing, then the exact characteristics of the original thing no longer exist. But an eternal thing can’t stop existing, and so an eternal thing can’t become a different thing. Since the necessary being is an eternal thing, the necessary thing must be changeless.

We will first define an infinite thing. A thing that has limits possesses attributes in concrete amounts. For example, a sheet of paper is limited in the amount of space and weight it assumes. An infinite thing is a thing without attributes in concrete amounts. It possesses attributes in essence, meaning the attribute itself has definition in the thing that possesses it. For example, if an infinite thing possessed knowledge, then the nature of the infinite thing would include the very nature of knowledge. I might have some knowledge, but the infinite thing would include in its being the very essence of what knowledge is. The reason for this is that the essence of an attribute doesn’t include amount. Asking how much knowledge is the essence of knowledge is meaningless since the attributes that define knowledge aren’t themselves potential amounts. For example, power in itself is not an amount. Finite things can have power in various amounts, but an infinite thing if it possessed power, would be Power in essence.

Now we will show that the necessary being is equal to an infinite being. The unchangeable thing exists without the potential to become different. If a thing has an attribute in a particular amount then that thing exists with the real possibility of increasing or decreasing in that amount. Since an unchangeable thing has no potential to increase or decrease, an unchangeable thing can’t possess properties in any concrete amount. The only way a thing can exist without possessing properties in amounts is for that thing possess the very essence of those properties. Such a thing would be unlimited in whatever attributes it possessed. Therefore, a necessary being is infinite.

The reason for this is simple enough. The only way for two things to exist differently is for there to be some way to distinguish one from the other. But if there were some real way in which a necessary being could be different, then there would be real possibility for change. But a necessary being is unchangeable, and therefore can’t be different. There can only be one necessary being if any.

New kinds of things can’t come from nothing (the impossibility of something coming from nothing is proven below in 4). Things can only be caused by other things. If a thing of kind A exists, then it is impossible for a thing of kind B to come from thing A unless kind B is a subset of kind A. In that case, it might be possible for thing A to give existence to thing B by losing only the properties that make up kind B. But new properties in their purest form can’t arise from completely different properties. The original properties can’t generate what is beyond their own nature to generate. This philosophical principle is also confirmed by the law of conservation of matter which realizes that no new matter can result from preexisting matter. As a result, the necessary being must possess whatever qualities it causes to exist in other things. The qualities can be caused to exist in limited amounts though the necessary being is infinite in whatever attributes it possesses.

If a thing exists regardless of other existing conditions, then that thing can’t receive its existence from another thing. If it could, then it would be true that that thing can be nonexistent in a particular situation (namely, prior to receiving its existence). But a thing that exists regardless of conditions can’t be nonexistent in any situation. So if a thing exists regardless of other conditions, then that thing could not have received its existence. Therefore, if a thing can receive its existence, then that thing can’t be a thing that exists regardless of other existing conditions. If it exists, its existence can only result given sufficient conditions. Therefore, if a possible being exists, its sufficient conditions exist. The sufficient conditions for the existence of a possible being are either something or they are nothing.

"Something" describes any collection of properties that are actual. "Nothing" describes not something. The number zero might be just as real as the number one, but "nothing" is only real as a concept; but as a type of being, it is by definition, not actual.

If a thing receives its existence from nothing, then that "nothing" must have had existence to give, which is a contradiction. Such a situation would be comparable to an empty cup filling another cup with water. Clearly, if a cup receives water, then its source must also have water. Similarly, if a thing receives existence, then its source must also exist.

Therefore, a possible being must be dependent on another for its existence.

The other thing is either another possible being or it is not a possible being. If it is a possible being, then that possible being must depend on another thing. Is it possible for the causal series of beings to be only composed of possible beings?

It is not possible for thing A to receive its existence from thing B and then for thing B to receive its existence from thing A. If thing B depends on thing A for its existence, then thing A exists prior to thing B. Thing A can’t then depend on thing B since thing B wouldn’t have existence to support A with until A already has existence to support B with. If two people are falling off a cliff, it does them no good to hold onto each other. They still need a stable, non-falling person to support them. Similarly, dependent things can’t merely depend on each other. That would be like pulling oneself up from one’s bootstraps.

If the causal regress of possible beings is finite, then clearly either nothing or something else must cause the first possible being. Since it was established that something can’t be caused by nothing, a finite regress entails the existence of something(s) that is not a possible being. If all that exists are possible beings, then the regress must be infinite. In this case the series never started. It seems difficult to see how a series that never started could transgress an infinite number of moments to reach the present. However, we will allow remaining ambiguity to provide a benefit of doubt and assume it is possible for an infinite regress of possible beings to exist. In this case, each member in the series is dependent on another for its existence.

Is this claim that the whole series must be caused a fallacy of composition? For it is not always the case that the set has the same characteristics as its members. For example, the set of people who have a mother doesn’t itself have a mother. However, some characteristics of some sets do have the same characteristics as its members. For example, a set of brown tiles is itself a brown floor. The essential difference between these two examples is that in the later, the characteristic "brown" deals with the actual properties of the members. In the former, the characteristic of having a mother does not describe the actual properties of people. It merely describes a relational aspect of the people. Whether people have a mother or not, their actual properties are not affected. Whether tiles are brown or not, however, their actual properties are affected. Another example where the whole has the same essential nature as each member deals with books. If every book is only stabilized by resting on something else, then the entire stack of books (no matter how large) can only be stabilized by resting on something else.

Each possible being depends on another being for its existence. Since the need to depend on another flows from the nature of a possible being, it follows that the entire series of possible things must depend on another in order for the series to exist at all. Therefore, if a possible being exists, then a being that is not a possible being must also exist.

Since a possible being is a thing that can receive existence, a thing that is not a possible being is either not logically conceivable or it is logically conceivable, but can’t receive existence. Since it is logically impossible for a logically incoherent thing to exist, if a thing is not a possible being, it must be a thing that can’t receive its existence. This is precisely what a necessary being is (as I defined it). Therefore, if a possible being exists, then a necessary being must also exist.

I exist. This is not known by logical necessity, but by undeniable experience. In my attempt to deny that I exist, I must admit that it is impossible for a being to not exist and yet to experience denial. I am not the necessary being since I am not unchangeable. I experience change as I realize knew information, and it is impossible for me to meaningfully deny that I change. Therefore, I must be a possible being, a being that can receive existence from another. A possible being exists.

Since new kinds of intrinsic properties can’t arise, it follows that the properties of possible beings have their origin in the necessary being. The necessary being of course possesses the pure essence of these properties since it doesn’t possess properties in variable amounts. So the nature of whatever exists is possessed infinitely by the necessary being.

If knowledge didn’t exist, then every statement would be meaningless. But to state that every statement is meaningless is to state a meaningless statement. Thus, it is self-defeating to claim that knowledge doesn’t exist. Knowledge is not merely an organization of different beings, but is itself an attribute of being. If the former were true, then knowledge would be merely apparent, but not actual. Knowledge would be represented by combination of things, but it wouldn’t actually be a quality of any of those things. But apparent knowledge is not actual knowledge at all, and for all of my thoughts to merely appear to possess knowledge would be a self-defeating thought since I can’t rationally think my thoughts contain no real knowledge.

If value didn’t exist, then every value judgement would be worthless. But to consider every value judgement as worthless is to make a real judgement about value. That judgement itself would be worthless. But this is a contradiction to one’s motives for making such a judgement. The fact that we would find motive in making such a consideration demonstrates that we still consider the consideration "worth" making. But if the consideration is actually true, then nothing has worth, including that very consideration. Hence, to consider value as nonexistent is to value such a consideration and is a logically self-defeating move. Therefore, value exists.

Ability is merely the potential to actualize another. Clearly the cause of all else must have ability.

Since knowledge, value, and ability exist and every quality has its origin in the necessary being, the necessary being must possess knowledge, value, and ability.

This proof relies on two essential avenues to realize truth. It relies on a priori analysis to determine the logically necessary characteristics of possible beings and necessary beings if they exist. It also relies on a posteriori realization of my own existence and the kind of existence that it is. This realization is not logically necessary, though it is undeniably true. The combination of the empirical and the logical truth tests leads inescapably to the conclusion that theism is true.

Disclaimer: I wrote this when I was 18 years old and have not re-scrutinized it since then.