Doğu Strateji ve Tahlil Merkezi

Merkezimiz mailine gelen, ABD ve CIA'nin Latin Amerika, Türkiye, Uzak Doğu ve Avrupa'da 1963 yıllarından beri uyguladığı İŞKENCE TALİMATINI neşrediyoruz.

Bu talimat tam 40 yıldır, yüzbinlerce insana işkence yapmak için kullanılmıştır.
KUBARK ismiş verilen dökuman Amerika'nın ve Amerikan istihbarat örgütlerinin işkence suçunu kanıtlamak için yeterli bir materyeldir. Orjinalinden okursanız; milim milim insanlara nasıl işkence yapılacağını ve sorgulanarak, acı çektirilerek, duyusal yoksunlukla insanlardan nasıl bilgi alacağını yazmakta.

Yeni ortaya çıkan KUBARK isimli işkence talimatının tam metnini üç bölüm halinde sunuyoruz. Saygılar ve iyi kabuslar.

Asagıdaki Fransız sitesinden, Fransız İstihbaratı tarafından ele
geçirilmiş Amerikan ve CIA işkence manuellerini pdf dosyaları olarak
indirebilirsiniz.

Burada yüzlerce sayfalık ünlü manueller mevcut. Çok yüklü dosyalar oldukları için yollayamıyoruz. Orjinal gizli metinler scannerdan geçirilmiş olarak aşağıdaki sitede var.
1) CIA KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual (1963) ve

2)CIA Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual (1983)

Bu manueller kontrgerilla tarafından Türkiye'de de kullanılmıştır. İşkence yontemlerinin detaylı olarak verildiği bu talimnamelerde, tüm milletlerarası hukuk ve kanunlar ihlal ediliyor.

Bu manueller CIA ve ABD'nin ne kadar vahşi ve barbar oldugunu
kanıtlamaya yeterli resmî dökumanlardır. Bu manuellerdeki sadist
yontemler uzun senelerdir milletimiz üzerine de uygulanmış ve hala da uygulamaktadır.

Bir de Amerika şimdi neden Anadolu insanı bizden nefret ediyor
demektedir. Amerika'dan ve Amerikan yönetiminden sadece Anadolu insanı
değil bütün dünya ve Amerikan halkı da nefret etmektedir. Bunun sebebi de Irak da, Afganistan da vr Ebu Gurayb de gorduklerimiz ile onların “teorisi” olan bu dokumanlardır!

Bir not: Bu dokumanları, “sular seller” gibi “ezberleyenler”, simdi milletimizin önune “umut” olarak çıkmaktadırlar; bakınız, DYP lideri Mehmet Ağar!..

Okuyun bunları ve “kurda kuzu” teslim etmeyin; ve şunu şuurlaştırın:

“- YA MUNTAKİYM ALLAH! BİZİ İNTİKAMINA MEMUR ET!”

http://www.reseauvoltaire.net/article14005.html

KUBARK: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION MANUAL

I.      Introduction

A. Explanation of Purpose

This manual cannot teach anyone how to be, or become, a good interrogator. At best it can help readers to avoid the characteristic mistakes of poor interrogators.
Its purpose is to provide guidelines for KUBARK interrogation, and particularly the counterintelligence interrogation of resistant
sources. Designed as an aid for interrogators and others immediately
concerned, it is based largely upon the published results of
extensive research, including scientific inquiries conducted by
specialists in closely related subjects.

There is nothing mysterious about interrogation. It consists of no
more than obtaining needed information through responses to
questions. As is true of all craftsmen, some interrogators are more
able than others; and some of their superiority may be innate. But
sound interrogation nevertheless rests upon a knowledge of the
subject matter and on certain broad principles, chiefly
psychological, which are not hard to understand. The success of good
interrogators depends in large measure upon their use, conscious or
not, of these principles and of processes and techniques deriving
from them. Knowledge of subject matter and of the basic principles
will not of itself create a successful interrogation, but it will
make possible the avoidance of mistakes that are characteristic of
poor interrogation. The purpose, then, is not to teach the reader how
to be a good interrogator but rather to tell him what he must learn
in order to become a good interrogator.

1 [page break]



The interrogation of a resistant source who is a staff or agent
member of an Orbit intelligence or security service or of a
clandestine Communist organization is one of the most exacting of
professional tasks. Usually the odds still favor the interrogator,
but they are sharply cut by the training, experience, patience and
toughness of the interrogatee. In such circumstances the interrogator
needs all the help that he can get. And a principal source of aid
today is scientific findings. The intelligence service which is able
to bring pertinent, modern knowledge to bear upon its problems enjoys
huge advantages over a service which conducts its clandestine
business in eighteenth century fashion. It is true that American
psychologists have devoted somewhat more attention to Communist
interrogation techniques, particularly "brainwashing", than to U. S.
practices. Yet they have conducted scientific inquiries into many
subjects that are closely related to interrogation: the effects of
debility and isolation, the polygraph, reactions to pain and fear,
hypnosis and heightened suggestibility, narcosis, etc. This work is
of sufficient importance and relevance that it is no longer possible
to discuss interrogation significantly without reference to the
psychological research conducted in the past decade. For this reason
a major purpose of this study is to focus relevant scientific
findings upon CI interrogation. Every effort has been made to report
and interpret these findings in our own language, in place of the
terminology employed by the psychologists.

This study is by no means confined to a resume and interpretation of
psychological findings. The approach of the psychologists is
customarily manipulative; that is, they suggest methods of imposing
controls or alterations upon the interrogatee from the outside.
Except within the Communist frame of reference, they have paid less
attention to the creation of internal controls -- i.e., conversion of
the source, so that voluntary cooperation results. Moral
considerations aside, the imposition of external techniques of
manipulating people carries with it the grave risk of later lawsuits,
adverse publicity, or other attempts to strike back.

2 [page break]



B. Explanation of Organization

This study moves from the general topic of interrogation per se
(Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI) to planning the counterintelligence
interrogation (Part VII) to the CI interrogation of resistant sources
(Parts VIII, IX, and X). The definitions, legal considerations, and
discussions of interrogators and sources, as well as Section VI on
screening and other preliminaries, are relevant to all kinds of
interrogations. Once it is established that the source is probably a
counterintelligence target (in other words, is probably a member of a
foreign intelligence or security service, a Communist, or a part of
any other group engaged in clandestine activity directed against the
national security), the interrogation is planned and conducted
accordingly. The CI interrogation techniques are discussed in an
order of increasing intensity as the focus on source resistance grows
sharper. The last section, on do's and dont's, is a return to the
broader view of the opening parts; as a check-list, it is placed last
solely for convenience.

3 [page break]
II.      II. Definitions

Most of the intelligence terminology employed here which may once
have been ambiguous has been clarified through usage or through
KUBARK instructions. For this reason definitions have been omitted
for such terms as burn notice, defector, escapee, and refugee. Other
definitions have been included despite a common agreement about
meaning if the significance is shaded by the context.

1. Assessment: the analysis and synthesis of information, usually
about a person or persons, for the purpose of appraisal. The
assessment of individuals is based upon the compilation and use of
psychological as well as biographic detail.

2. Bona fides: evidence or reliable information about identity,
personal (including intelligence) history, and intentions or good
faith.

3. Control: the capacity to generate, alter, or halt human behavior
by implying, citing, or using physical or psychological means to
ensure compliance with direction. The compliance may be voluntary or
involuntary. Control of an interrogatee can rarely be established
without control of his environment.

4. Counterintelligence interrogation: an interrogation (see #7)
designed to obtain information about hostile clandestine activities
and persons or groups engaged therein. KUBARK CI interrogations are
designed, almost invariably, to yield information about foreign
intelligence and security services or Communist organizations.
Because security is an element of counterintelligence, interrogations
conducted to obtain admissions of clandestine plans or activities
directed against KUBARK or PBPRIME security are also CI
interrogations. But unlike a police interrogation, the CI

4 [page break]



interrogation is not aimed at causing the interrogatee to incriminate
himself as a means of bringing him to trial. Admissions of complicity
are not, to a CI service, ends in themselves but merely preludes to
the acquisition of more information.

5. Debriefing: obtaining information by questioning a controlled and
witting source who is normally a willing one.

6. Eliciting: obtaining information, without revealing intent or
exceptional interest, through a verbal or written exchange with a
person who may be willing or unwilling to provide what is sought and
who may or may not be controlled.

7. Interrogation: obtaining information by direct questioning of a
person or persons under conditions which are either partly or fully
controlled by the questioner or are believed by those questioned to
be subject to his control. Because interviewing, debriefing, and
eliciting are simpler methods of obtaining information from
cooperative subjects, interrogation is usually reserved for sources
who are suspect, resistant, or both.

8. Intelligence interview: obtaining information, not customarily
under controlled conditions, by questioning a person who is aware of
the nature and perhaps of the significance of his answers but who is
ordinarily unaware of the purposes and specific intelligence
affiliations of the interviewer.

5 [page break]

III. Legal and Policy Considerations

The legislation which founded KUBARK specifically denied it any law-
enforcement or police powers. Yet detention in a controlled
environment and perhaps for a lengthy period is frequently essential
to a successful counterintelligence interrogation of a recalcitrant
source. [approx. three lines deleted] This necessity, obviously,
should be determined as early as possible.

The legality of detaining and questioning a person, and of the
methods employed, [approx. 10 lines deleted]

Detention poses the most common of the legal problems. KUBARK has no
independent legal authority to detain anyone against his will,
[approx. 4 lines deleted] The haste in which some KUBARK
interrogations have been conducted has not always been the product of
impatience. Some security services, especially those of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc, may work at leisure, depending upon time as well as
their own methods to melt recalcitrance. KUBARK usually

6 [page break]



cannot. Accordingly, unless it is considered that the prospective
interrogatee is cooperative and will remain so indefinitely, the
first step in planning an interrogation is to determine how long the
source can be held. The choice of methods depends in part upon the
answer to this question.

[approx. 15 lines deleted]

The handling and questioning of defectors are subject to the
provisions of [one or two words deleted] Directive No. 4: to its
related Chief/KUBARK Directives, principally [approx. 1/2 line
deleted] Book Dispatch [one or two words deleted] and to pertinent
[one or two words deleted]. Those concerned with the interrogation of
defectors, escapees, refugees, or repatriates should know these
references.

The kinds of counterintelligence information to be sought in a CI
interrogation are stated generally in Chief/KUBARK Directive and in
greater detail in Book Dispatch [approx. 1/3 line deleted].

The interrogation of PBPRIME citizens poses special problems. First,
such interrogations should not be conducted for reasons lying outside
the sphere of KUBARK' s responsibilities. For example, the

7 [page break]



[approx. 2/3 line deleted] but should not normally become directly
involved. Clandestine activity conducted abroad on behalf of a
foreign power by a private PBPRIME citizens does fall within KUBARK's
investigative and interrogative responsibilities. However, any
investigation, interrogation, or interview of a PBPRIME citizen which
is conducted abroad because it be known or suspected that he is
engaged in clandestine activities directed against PBPRIME security
interests requires the prior and personal approval of Chief/KUDESK or
of his deputy.

Since 4 October 1961, extraterritorial application has been given to
the Espionage Act, making it henceforth possible to prosecute in the
Federal Courts any PBPRIME citizen who violates the statutes of this
Act in foreign countries. ODENVY has requested that it be informed,
in advance if time permits, if any investigative steps are undertaken
in these cases. Since KUBARK employees cannot be witnesses in court,
each investigation must be conducted in such a manner that evidence
obtained may be properly introduced if the case comes to trial.
[approx. 1 line deleted] states policy and procedures for the conduct
of investigations of PBPRIME citizens abroad.

Interrogations conducted under compulsion or duress are especially
likely to involve illegality and to entail damaging consequences for
KUBARK. Therefore prior Headquarters approval at the KUDOVE level
must be obtained for the interrogation of any source against his will
and under any of the following circumstances:

1. If bodily harm is to be inflicted.

2. If medical, chemical, or electrical methods or materials are to be
used to induce acquiescence.

3. [approx. 3 lines deleted]

8 [page break]



The CI interrogator dealing with an uncooperative interrogatee who
has been well-briefed by a hostile service on the legal restrictions
under which ODYOKE services operate must expect some effective
delaying tactics. The interrogatee has been told that KUBARK will not
hold him long, that he need only resist for a while. Nikolay
KHOKHLOV, for example, reported that before he left for Frankfurt am
Main on his assassination mission, the following thoughts coursed
through his head: "If I should get into the hands of Western
authorities, I can become reticent, silent, and deny my voluntary
visit to Okolovich. I know I will not be tortured and that under the
procedures of western law I can conduct myself boldly." (17) [The
footnote numerals in this text are keyed to the numbered bibliography
at the end.] The interrogator who encounters expert resistance should
not grow flurried and press; if he does, he is likelier to commit
illegal acts which the source can later use against him. Remembering
that time is on his side, the interrogator should arrange to get as
much of it as he needs.

9 [page break]

IV. The Interrogator

A number of studies of interrogation discuss qualities said to be
desirable in an interrogator. The list seems almost endless - a
professional manner, forcefulness, understanding and sympathy,
breadth of general knowledge, area knowledge, "a practical knowledge
of psychology", skill in the tricks of the trade, alertness,
perseverance, integrity, discretion, patience, a high I.Q., extensive
experience, flexibility, etc., etc. Some texts even discuss the
interrogator's manners and grooming, and one prescribed the traits
considered desirable in his secretary.

A repetition of this catalogue would serve no purpose here,
especially because almost all of the characteristics mentioned are
also desirable in case officers, agents, policemen, salesmen,
lumberjacks, and everybody else. The search of the pertinent
scientific literature disclosed no reports of studies based on common
denominator traits of successful interrogators or any other
controlled inquiries that would invest these lists with any objective
validity.

Perhaps the four qualifications of chief importance to the
interrogator are (1) enough operational training and experience to
permit quack recognition of leads; (2) real familiarity with the
language to be used; (3) extensive background knowledge about the
interrogatee's native country (and intelligence service, if employed
by one); and (4) a genuine understanding of the source as a person.

[approx. 1/2 line deleted] stations, and even a few bases can call
upon one or several interrogators to supply these prerequisites,
individually or as a team. Whenever a number of interrogators is
available, the percentage of successes is increased by careful
matching of questioners and sources and by ensuring that rigid
prescheduling does not prevent such matching. Of the four traits
listed, a genuine insight into the source's character and motives is
perhaps

10 [page break]



most important but least common. Later portions of this manual
explore this topic in more detail. One general observation is
introduced now, however, because it is considered basic to the
establishment of rapport, upon which the success of non-coercive
interrogation depends.

The interrogator should remember that he and the interrogatee are
often working at cross-purposes not because the interrogates is
malevolently withholding or misleading but simply because what he
wants front the situation is not what the interrogator wants. The
interrogator's goal is to obtain useful information -- facts about
which the interrogatee presumably have acquired information. But at
the outset of the interrogation, and perhaps for a long time
afterwards, the person being questioned is not greatly concerned with
communicating his body of specialized information to his questioner;
he is concerned with putting his best foot forward. The question
uppermost in his mind, at the beginning, is not likely to be "How can
I help PBPRIME?" but rather "What sort of impression am I making?"
and, almost immediately thereafter, "What is going to happen to me
now?" (An exception is the penetration agent or provocateur sent to a
KUBARK field installation after training in withstanding
interrogation. Such an agent may feel confident enough not to be
gravely concerned about himself. His primary interest, from the
beginning, may be the acquisition of information about the
interrogator and his service.)

The skilled interrogator can save a great deal of time by
understanding the emotional needs of the interrogates. Most people
confronted by an official -- and dimly powerful -- representative of
a foreign power will get down to cases much faster if made to feel,
from the start, that they are being treated as individuals. So simple
a matter as greeting an interrogatee by his name at the opening of
the session establishes in his mind the comforting awareness that he
is considered as a person, not a squeezable sponge. This is not to
say that egotistic types should be allowed to bask at length in the
warmth of individual recognition. But it is important to assuage the
fear of denigration which afflicts many people when first
interrogated by making it clear that the individuality of the
interrogatee is recognized. With this common understanding
established, the interrogation can move on to impersonal matters and
will not later be thwarted or interrupted --

11 [page break]



or at least not as often -- by irrelevant answers designed not to
provide facts but to prove that the interrogatee is a respectable
member of the human race.

Although it is often necessary to trick people into telling what we
need to know, especially in CI interrogations, the initial question
which the interrogator asks of himself should be, "How can I make him
want to tell me what he knows?" rather than "How can I trap him into
disclosing what he knows?" If the person being questioned is
genuinely hostile for ideological reasons, techniques of manipulation
are in order. But the assumption of hostility -- or at least the use
of pressure tactics at the first encounter -- may make difficult
subjects even out of those who would respond to recognition of
individuality and an initial assumption of good will.

Another preliminary comment about the interrogator is that normally
he should not personalize. That is, he should not be pleased,
flattered, frustrated, goaded, or otherwise emotionally and
personally affected by the interrogation. A calculated display of
feeling employed for a specific purpose is an exception; but even
under these circumstances the interrogator is in full control. The
interrogation situation is intensely inter-personal; it is therefore
all the more necessary to strike a counter-balance by an attitude
which the subject clearly recognizes as essentially fair and
objective. The kind of person who cannot help personalizing, who
becomes emotionally involved in the interrogation situation, may have
chance (and even spectacular) successes as an interrogator but is
almost certain to have a poor batting average.

It is frequently said that the interrogator should be "a good judge
of human nature." In fact, [approx. 3 lines deleted] (3) This study
states later (page "Great attention has been given to the degree to
which persons are able to make judgements from casual observations
regarding the personality characteristics of another. The consensus
of research is that with respect to many kinds of judgments, at least
some judges perform reliably better than chance...."
Nevertheless, "... the level

12 [page break]



of reliability in judgments is so low that research encounters
difficulties when it seeks to determine who makes better
judgments...." (3) In brief, the interrogator is likelier to
overestimate his ability to judge others than to underestimate it,
especially if he has had little or no training in modern psychology.
It follows that errors in assessment and in handling are likelier to
result from snap judgments based upon the assumption of innate skill
in judging others than from holding such judgments in abeyance until
enough facts are known.

There has been a good deal of discussion of interrogation experts vs.
subject-matter experts. Such facts as are available suggest that the
latter have a slight advantage. But for counterintelligence purposes
the debate is academic. [approx. 5 lines deleted]
It is sound practice to assign inexperienced interrogators to guard
duty or to other supplementary tasks directly related to
interrogation, so that they can view the process closely before
taking charge. The use of beginning interrogators as screeners (see
part VI) is also recommended.

Although there is some limited validity in the view, frequently
expressed in interrogation primers, that the interrogation is
essentially a battle of wits, the CI interrogator who encounters a
skilled and resistant interrogatee should remember that a wide


___________________

*The interrogator should be supported whenever possible by qualified
analysts' review of his daily "take"; experience has shown that such
a review will raise questions to be put and points to be clarified
and lead to a thorough coverage of the subject in hand.

13 [page break]



variety of aids can be made available in the field or from
Headquarters. (These are discussed in Part VIII.) The intensely
personal nature of the interrogation situation makes it all the more
necessary that the KUBARK questioner should aim not for a personal
triumph but for his true goal -- the acquisition of all needed
information by any authorized means.

14 [page break]

V. The Interrogatee

A. Types Of Sources: Intelligence Categories

From the viewpoint of the intelligence service the categories of
persons who most frequently provide useful information in response to
questioning are travellers; repatriates; defectors, escapees, and
refugees; transferred sources; agents, including provocateurs, double
agents, and penetration agents; and swindlers and fabricators.

1. Travellers are usually interviewed, debriefed, or queried through
eliciting techniques. If they are interrogated, the reason is that
they are known or believed to fall into one of the following
categories.

2. Repatriates are sometimes interrogated, although other techniques
are used more often. The proprietary interests of the host government
will frequently dictate interrogation by a liaison service rather
than by KUBARK. If KUBARK interrogates, the following preliminary
steps are taken:

a. A records check, including local and Headquarters traces.

b . Testing of bona fides .

c. Determination of repatriate's kind and level of access while
outside his own country.

d. Preliminary assessment of motivation (including political
orientation), reliability, and capability as observer and reporter.

e. Determination of all intelligence or Communist

15 [page break]



relationships, whether with a service or party of the repatriate's
own country, country of detention, or another. Full particulars are
needed.

3. Defectors, escapees, and refugees are normally interrogated at
sufficient length to permit at least a preliminary testing of bona
fides . The experience of the post-war years has demonstrated that
Soviet defectors (1) almost never defect solely or primarily because
of inducement by a Western service, (2) usually leave the USSR for
personal rather than ideological reasons, and (3) are often RIS
agents.

[approx. 9 lines deleted]

All analyses of the defector-refugee flow have shown that the Orbit
services are well-aware of the advantages offered by this channel as
a means of planting their agents in target countries.

[approx. 14 lines deleted]

4. Transferred sources referred to KUBARK by another service

16 [page break]



for interrogation are usually sufficiently well-known to the
transferring service so that a file has been opened. Whenever
possible, KUBARK should secure a copy of the file or its full
informational equivalent before accepting custody.

5. Agents are more frequently debriefed than interrogated. [approx. 3
lines deleted] as an analytic tool. If it is then established or
strongly suspected that the agent belongs to one of the following
categories, further investigation and, eventually, interrogation
usually follow.

a. Provocateur. Many provocation agents are walk-ins posing as
escapees, refugees, or defectors in order to penetrate emigre groups,
ODYOKE intelligence, or other targets assigned by hostile services.
Although denunciations by genuine refugees and other evidence of
information obtained from documents, local officials, and like
sources may result in exposure, the detection of provocation
frequently depends upon skilled interrogation. A later section of
this manual deals with the preliminary testing of bona fides . But
the results of preliminary testing are often inconclusive, and
detailed interrogation is frequently essential to confession and full
revelation. Thereafter the provocateur may be questioned for
operational and positive intelligence as well as counterintelligence
provided that proper cognizance is taken of his status during the
questioning and later, when reports are prepared.

b. Double agent. The interrogation of DA's frequently follows a
determination or strong suspicion that the double is "giving the
edge" to the adversary service. As is also true for the interrogation
of provocateurs, thorough preliminary investigation will pay handsome
dividends when questioning gets under way. In fact, it is a basic
principle of interrogation that the questioner should have at his
disposal, before querying starts, as much pertinent information as
can be gathered without the knowledge of the prospective

17 [page break]



interrogatee.

[2/3 of page deleted]

d. Swindlers and fabricators are usually interrogated for
prophylactic reasons, not for counterintelligence information. The
purpose is the prevention or nullification of damage to KUBARK, to
other ODYOKE services Swindlers and fabricators have little of CI
significance to communicate but are notoriously skillful timewasters.
Interrogation of them is usually inconclusive and, if prolonged,

18 [page break]



unrewarding. The professional peddler with several IS contacts may
prove an exception; but he will usually give the edge to a host
security service because otherwise he cannot function with impunity.


B. Types of Sources: Personality Categories

The number of systems devised for categorizing human beings is large,
and most of them are of dubious validity. Various categorical schemes
are outlined in treatises on interrogation. The two typologies most
frequently advocated are psychologic-emotional and geographic-
cultural. Those who urge the former argue that the basic emotional-
psychological patterns do not vary significantly with time, place, or
culture. The latter school maintains the existence of a national
character and sub-national categories, and interrogation guides based
on this principle recommend approaches tailored to geographical
cultures.

It is plainly true that the interrogation source cannot be understood
in a vacuum, isolated from social context. It is equally true that
some of the most glaring blunders in interrogation (and other
operational processes ) have resulted from ignoring the source's
background. Moreover, emotional-psychological schematizations
sometimes present atypical extremes rather than the kinds of people
commonly encountered by interrogators. Such typologies also cause
disagreement even among professional psychiatrists and psychologists.
Interrogators who adopt them and who note in an interrogatee one or
two of the characteristics of "Type A" may mistakenly assign the
source to Category A and assume the remaining traits.

On the other hand, there are valid objections to the adoption of
cultural-geographic categories for interrogation purposes (however
valid they may be as KUCAGE concepts). The pitfalls of ignorance of
the distinctive culture of the source have "[approx. 4 lines deleted]

19 [page break]



[approx. 8 lines deleted]." (3)

The ideal solution would be to avoid all categorizing. Basically, all
schemes for labelling people are wrong per se; applied arbitrarily,
they always produce distortions. Every interrogator knows that a real
understanding of the individual is worth far more than a thorough
knowledge of this or that pigeon-hole to which he has been consigned.
And for interrogation purposes the ways in which he differs from the
abstract type may be more significant than the ways in which he
conforms.

But KUBARK does not dispose of the time or personnel to probe the
depths of each source's individuality. In the opening phases of
interrogation, or in a quick interrogation, we are compelled to make
some use of the shorthand of categorizing, despite distortions. Like
other interrogation aides, a scheme of categories is useful only if
recognized for what it is -- a set of labels that facilitate
communication but are not the same as the persons thus labelled. If
an interrogatee lies persistently, an interrogator may report and
dismiss him as a "pathological liar." Yet such persons may possess
counterintelligence (or other) information quite equal in value to
that held by other sources, and the interrogator likeliest to get at
it is the man who is not content with labelling but is as interested
in why the subject lies as in what he lies about.

With all of these reservations, then, and with the further
observation that those who find these psychological-emotional
categories pragmatically valuable should use them and those who do
not should let them alone, the following nine types are described.
The categories are based upon the fact that a person's past is always
reflected, however dimily, in his present ethics and behavior. Old
dogs can learn new tricks but not new ways of learning them. People
do change, but what appears to be new behavior or a new psychological
pattern is usually just a variant on the old theme.

20 [page break]



It is not claimed that the classification system presented here is
complete; some interrogatees will not fit into any one of the
groupings. And like all other typologies, the system is plagued by
overlap, so that some interrogatees will show characteristics of more
than one group. Above all, the interrogator must remember that
finding some of the characteristics of the group in a single source
does not warrant an immediate conclusion that the source "belongs to"
the group, and that even correct labelling is not the equivalent of
understanding people but merely an aid to understanding.

The nine major groups within the psychological-emotional category
adopted for this handbook are the following.

1. The orderly-obstinate character. People in this category are
characteristically frugal, orderly, and cold; frequently they are
quite intellectual. They are not impulsive in behavior. They tend to
think things through logically and to act deliberately. They often
reach decisions very slowly. They are far less likely to make real
personal sacrifices for a cause than to use them as a temporary means
of obtaining a permanent personal gain. They are secretive and
disinclined to confide in anyone else their plans and plots, which
frequently concern the overthrow of some form of authority. They are
also stubborn, although they may pretend cooperation or even believe
that they are cooperating. They nurse grudges.

The orderly-obstinate character considers himself superior to other
people. Sometimes his sense of superiority is interwoven with a kind
of magical thinking that includes all sorts of superstitions and
fantasies about controlling his environment. He may even have a
system of morality that is all his own. He sometimes gratifies his
feeling of secret superiority by provoking unjust treatment. He also
tries, characteristically, to keep open a line of escape by avoiding
any real commitment to anything. He is -- and always has been --
intensely concerned about his personal possessions. He is usually a
tightwad who saves everything, has a strong sense of propriety, and
is punctual and tidy. His money and other possessions have for him a
personalized quality; they are parts of himself. He often carries
around shiny coins, keepsakes, a bunch of keys, and other objects
having for himself an actual or symbolic value.

21 [page break]



Usually the orderly-obstinate character has a history of active
rebellion in childhood, of persistently doing the exact opposite of
what he is told to do. As an adult he may have learned to cloak his
resistance and become passive-aggressive, but his determination to
get his own way is unaltered. He has merely learned how to proceed
indirectly if necessary. The profound fear and hatred of authority,
persisting since childhood, is often well-concealed in adulthood, For
example, such a person may confess easily and quickly under
interrogation, even to acts that he did not commit, in order to throw
the interrogator off the trail of a significant discovery (or, more
rarely, because of feelings of guilt).

The interrogator who is dealing with an orderly-obstinate character
should avoid the role of hostile authority. Threats and threatening
gestures, table-pounding, pouncing on evasions or lies, and any
similarly authoritative tactics will only awaken in such a subject
his old anxieties and habitual defense mechanisms. To attain rapport,
the interrogator should be friendly. It will probably prove rewarding
if the room and the interrogator look exceptionally neat. Orderly-
obstinate interrogatees often collect coins or other objects as a
hobby; time spent in sharing their interests may thaw some of the
ice. Establishing rapport is extremely important when dealing with
this type.[approx 3 lines deleted] (3)

2. The optimistic character. This kind of source is almost constantly
happy-go-lucky, impulsive, inconsistent, and undependable. He seems
to enjoy a continuing state of well-being. He may be generous to a
fault, giving to others as he wants to be given to. He may become an
alcoholic or drug addict. He is not able to withstand very much
pressure; he reacts to a challenge not by increasing his efforts but
rather by running away to avoid conflict. His convictions
that "something will turn up", that "everything will work out all
right", is based on his need to avoid his own responsibility for
events and depend upon a kindly fate.

Such a person has usually had a great deal of over-indulgence in
early life. He is sometimes the youngest member of a large family,

22 [page break]



the child of a middle-aged woman (a so-called "change-of-life baby").
If he has met severe frustrations in later childhood, he may be
petulant, vengeful, and constantly demanding.

As interrogation sources, optimistic characters respond best to a
kindly, parental approach. If withholding, they can often be handled
effectively by the Mutt-and-Jeff technique discussed later in this
paper. Pressure tactics or hostility will make them retreat inside
themselves, whereas reassurance will bring them out. They tend to
seek promises, to cast the interrogator in the role of protector and
problem-solver; and it is important that the interrogator avoid
making any specific promises that cannot be fulfilled, because the
optimist turned vengeful is likely to prove troublesome.

3. The greedy, demanding character. This kind of person affixes
himself to others like a leech and clings obsessively. Although
extremely dependent and passive, he constantly demands that others
take care of him and gratify his wishes. If he considers himself
wronged, he does not seek redress through his own efforts but tries
to persuade another to take up the cudgels in his behalf -- "let's
you and him fight." His loyalties are likely to shift whenever he
feels that the sponsor whom he has chosen has let him down. Defectors
of this type feel aggrieved because their desires were not satisfied
in their countries of origin, but they soon feel equally deprived in
a second land and turn against its government or representatives in
the same way. The greedy and demanding character is subject to rather
frequent depressions. He may direct a desire for revenge inward, upon
himself; in extreme cases suicide may result.

The greedy, demanding character often suffered from very early
deprivation of affection or security. As an adult he continues to
seek substitute parents who will care for him as his own, he feels,
did not.

The interrogator dealing with a greedy, demanding character must be
careful not to rebuff him; otherwise rapport will be destroyed. On
the other hand, the interrogator must not accede to demands which
cannot or should not be met. Adopting the tone of an understanding
father or big brother is likely to make the subject responsive. If he
makes exorbitant requests, an unimportant favor may provide a satis-

23 [page break]



factory substitute because the demand arises not from a specific need
but as an _expression of the subject's need for security. He is likely
to find reassuring any manifestation of concern for his well-being.

In dealing with this type -- and to a considerable extent in dealing
with any of the types herein listed -- the interrogator must be aware
of the limits and pitfalls of rational persuasion. If he seeks to
induce cooperation by an appeal to logic, he should first determine
whether the source's resistance is based on logic. The appeal will
glance off ineffectually if the resistance is totally or chiefly
emotional rather than rational. Emotional resistance can be
dissipated only by emotional manipulation.

4. The anxious, self-centered character. Although this person is
fearful, he is engaged in a constant struggle to conceal his fears.
He is frequently a daredevil who compensates for his anxiety by
pretending that there is no such thing as danger. He may be a stunt
flier or circus performer who "proves" himself before crowds. He may
also be a Don Juan. He tends to brag and often lies through hunger
for approval or praise. As a soldier or officer he may have been
decorated for bravery; but if so, his comrades may suspect that his
exploits resulted from a pleasure in exposing himself to danger and
the anticipated delights of rewards, approval, and applause. The
anxious, self-centered character is usually intensely vain and
equally sensitive.

People who show these characteristics are actually unusually fearful.
The causes of intense concealed anxiety are too complex and subtle to
permit discussion of the subject in this paper.

Of greater importance to the interrogator than the causes is the
opportunity provided by concealed anxiety for successful manipulation
of the source. His desire to impress will usually be quickly evident.
He is likely to be voluble. Ignoring or ridiculing his bragging, or
cutting him short with a demand that he get down to cases, is likely
to make him resentful and to stop the flow. Playing upon his vanity,
especially by praising his courage, will usually be a successful
tactic if employed skillfully. Anxious, self-centered interrogatees
who are withholding significant facts, such as contact with a hostile
service,

24 [page break]



are likelier to divulge if made to feel that the truth will not be
used to harm them and if the interrogator also stresses the
callousness and stupidity of the adversary in sending so valiant a
person upon so ill-prepared a mission. There is little to be gained
and much to be lost by exposing the nonrelevant lies of this kind of
source. Gross lies about deeds of daring, sexual prowess, or
other "proofs" of courage and manliness are best met with silence or
with friendly but noncommittal replies unless they consume an
inordinate amount of time. If operational use is contemplated,
recruitment may sometimes be effected through such queries as, "I
wonder if you would be willing to undertake a dangerous mission."

5. The guilt-ridden character. This kind of person has a strong
cruel, unrealistic conscience. His whole life seems devoted to
reliving his feelings of guilt. Sometimes he seems determined to
atone; at other times he insists that whatever went wrong is the
fault of somebody else. In either event he seeks constantly some
proof or external indication that the guilt of others is greater than
his own. He is often caught up completely in efforts to prove that he
has been treated unjustly. In fact, he may provoke unjust treatment
in order to assuage his conscience through punishment. Compulsive
gamblers who find no real pleasure in winning but do find relief in
losing belong to this class. So do persons who falsely confess to
crimes. Sometimes such people actually commit crimes in order to
confess and be punished. Masochists also belong in this category.

The causes of most guilt complexes are real or fancied wrongs done to
parents or others whom the subject felt he ought to love and honor.
As children such people may have been frequently scolded or punished.
Or they may have been "model" children who repressed all natural
hostilities.

The guilt-ridden character is hard to interrogate. He may "confess"
to hostile clandestine activity, or other acts of interest to KUBARK,
in which he was not involved. Accusations levelled at him by the
interrogator are likely to trigger such false confessions. Or he may
remain silent when accused, enjoying the "punishment." He is a poor
subject for LCFLUTTER. The complexities of dealing with conscience-
ridden interrogatees vary so widely from case to case that it is
almost impossible to list sound general principles. Perhaps

25 [page break]



the best advice is that the interrogator, once alerted by information
from the screening process (see Part VI) or by the subject's
excessive preoccupation with moral judgements, should treat as
suspect and subjective any information provided by the interrogatee
about any matter that is of moral concern to him. Persons with
intense guilt feelings may cease resistance and cooperate if punished
in some way, because of the gratification induced by punishment.

6. The character wrecked by success is closely related to the guilt-
ridden character. This sort of person cannot tolerate success and
goes through life failing at critical points. He is often accident-
prone. Typically he has a long history of being promising and of
almost completing a significant assignment or achievement but not
bringing it off. The character who cannot stand success enjoys his
ambitions as long as they remain fantasies but somehow ensures that
they will not be fulfilled in reality. Acquaintances often feel that
his success is just around the corner, but something always
intervenes. In actuality this something is a sense of guilt, of the
kind described above. The person who avoids success has a conscience
which forbids the pleasures of accomplishment and recognition. He
frequently projects his guilt feelings and feels that all of his
failures were someone else's fault. He may have a strong need to
suffer and may seek danger or injury.

As interrogatees these people who "cannot stand prosperity" pose no
special problem unless the interrogation impinges upon their feelings
of guilt or the reasons for their past failures. Then subjective
distortions, not facts, will result. The successful interrogator will
isolate this area of unreliability.

7. The schizoid or strange character lives in a world of fantasy much
of the time. Sometimes he seems unable to distinguish reality from
the realm of his own creating. The real world seems to him empty and
meaningless, in contrast with the mysteriously significant world that
he has made. He is extremely intolerant of any frustration that
occurs in the outer world and deals with it by withdrawal into the
interior realm.

26 [page break]



He has no real attachments to others, although he may attach symbolic
and private meanings or values to other people.

Children reared in homes lacking in ordinary affection and attention
or in orphanages or state-run communes may become adults who belong
to this category. Rebuffed in early efforts to attach themselves to
another, they become distrustful of attachments and turn inward. Any
link to a group or country will be undependable and, as a rule,
transitory. At the same time the schizoid character needs external
approval. Though he retreats from reality, he does not want to feel
abandoned.

As an interrogatee the schizoid character is likely to lie readily to
win approval. He will tell the interrogator what he thinks the
interrogator wants to hear in order to win the award of seeing a
smile on the interrogator's face. Because he is not always capable of
distinguishing between fact and fantasy, he may be unaware of lying.
The desire for approval provides the interrogator with a handle.
Whereas accusations of lying or other indications of disesteem will
provoke withdrawal from the situation, teasing the truth out of the
schizoid subject may not prove difficult if he is convinced that he
will not incur favor through misstatements or disfavor through
telling the truth.

Like the guilt-ridden character, the schizoid character may be an
unreliable subject for testing by LCFLUTTER because his internal
needs lead him to confuse fact with fancy. He is also likely to make
an unreliable agent because of his incapacity to deal with facts and
to form real relationships.

8. The exception believes that the world owes him a great deal. He
feels that he suffered a gross injustice, usually early in life, and
should be repaid. Sometimes the injustice was meted out impersonally,
by fate, as a physical deformity, an extremely painful illness or
operation in childhood, or the early loss of one parent or both.
Feeling that these misfortunes were undeserved, the exceptions regard
them as injustices that someone or something must rectify. Therefore
they claim as their right privileges not permitted others. When the
claim is ignored or denied, the exceptions become rebellious, as
adolescents often do. They are

27 [page break]



convinced that the justice of the claim is plain for all to see and
that any refusal to grant it is willfully malignant.

When interrogated, the exceptions are likely to make demands for
money, resettlement aid, and other favors -- demands that are
completely out of proportion to the value of their contributions. Any
ambiguous replies to such demands will be interpreted as
acquiescence. Of all the types considered here, the exception is
likeliest to carry an alleged injustice dealt him by KUBARK to the
newspapers or the courts.

The best general line to follow in handling those who believe that
they are exceptions is to listen attentively (within reasonable
timelimits) to their grievances and to make no commitments that
cannot be discharged fully. Defectors from hostile intelligence
services, doubles, provocateurs, and others who have had more than
passing contact with a Sino-Soviet service may, if they belong to
this category, prove unusually responsive to suggestions from the
interrogator that they have been treated unfairly by the other
service. Any planned operational use of such persons should take into
account the fact that they have no sense of loyalty to a common cause
and are likely to turn aggrievedly against superiors.

9. The average or normal character is not a person wholly lacking in
the characteristics of the other types. He may, in fact, exhibit most
or all of them from time to time. But no one of them is persistently
dominant; the average man's qualities of obstinacy, unrealistic
optimism, anxiety, and the rest are not overriding or imperious
except for relatively short intervals. Moreover, his reactions to the
world around him are more dependent upon events in that world and
less the product of rigid, subjective patterns than is true of the
other types discussed.

C. Other Clues

[approx. 4 lines deleted]

28 [page break]



The true defector (as distinguished from the hostile agent in
defector's guise) is likely to have a history of opposition to
authority. The sad fact is that defectors who left their homelands
because they could not get along with their immediate or ultimate
superiors are also likely to rebel against authorities in the new
environment (a fact which usually plays an important part in
redefection). Therefore defectors are likely to be found in the ranks
of the orderly-obstinate, the greedy and deriding, the schizoids, and
the exceptions.

Experiments and statistical analyses performed at the University of
Minnesota concerned the relationships among anxiety and affiliative
tendencies (desire to be with other people), on the one hand, and the
ordinal position (rank in birth sequence) on the other. Some of the
findings, though necessarily tentative and speculative, have some
relevance to interrogation. (30). As is noted in the bibliography,
the investigators concluded that isolation typically creates anxiety,
that anxiety intensifies the desire to be with others who share the
same fear, and that only and first-born children are more anxious and
less willing or able to withstand pain than later-born children.
Other applicable hypotheses are that fear increases the affiliative
needs of first-born and only children much more than those of the
later-born. These differences are more pronounced in persons from
small families then in those who grew up in large families. Finally,
only children are much likelier to hold themselves together and
persist in anxiety-producing situations than are the first-born, who
more frequently try to retreat. In the other major respects -
intensity of anxiety and emotional need to affiliate - no significant
differences between "firsts" and "onlies" were discovered.

It follows that determining the subject's "ordinal position" before
questioning begins may be useful to the interrogator. But two
cautions are in order. The first is that the findings are, at this
stage, only tentative hypotheses. The second is that even if they
prove accurate for large groups, the data are like those in actuarial
tables; they have no specific predictive value for individuals.

29 [page break]

VI. Screening and Other Preliminaries

A. Screening

[approx. 2/3 line deleted] some large stations are able to conduct
preliminary psychological screening before interrogation starts. The
purpose of screening is to provide the interrogator, in advance, with
a reading on the type and characteristics of the interrogatee. It is
recommended that screening be conducted whenever personnel and
facilities permit, unless it is reasonably certain that the
interrogation will be of minor importance or that the interrogatee is
fully cooperative.

Screening should be conducted by interviewers, not interrogators; or
at least the subjects should not be screened by the same KUBARK
personnel who will interrogate them later.

[approx. 10 lines deleted]

Other psychological testing aids are best administered by a trained
psychologist. Tests conducted on American POW's returned to U. S.
jurisdiction in Korea during the Big and Little Switch suggest that
prospective interrogatees who show normal emotional responsiveness on
the Rorschach and related tests are likelier to prove cooperative
under interrogation than are those whose responses indicate that they
are apathetic and emotionally

30 [page break]



withdrawn or barren. Extreme resisters, however, share the response
characteristics of collaborators; they differ in the nature and
intensity of motivation rather than emotions. "An analysis of
objective test records and biographical information is a sample of
759 Big Switch repatriates revealed that men who had collaborated
differed from men who had not in the following ways: the
collaborators were older, had completed more years of school, scored
higher on intelligence tests administered after repatriation, had
served longer in the Army prior to capture, and scored higher on the
Psychopathic Deviate Scale - pd.... However, the 5 percent of the
noncollaborator sample who resisted actively - who were either
decorated by the Army or considered to be 'reactionaries' by the
Chinese - differed from the remaining group in precisely the same
direction as the collaborator group and could not be distinguished
from this group on any variable except age; the resisters were older
than the collaborators." (33)

Even a rough preliminary estimate, if valid, can be a boon to the
interrogator because it will permit him to start with generally sound
tactics from the beginning - tactics adapted to the personality of
the source. Dr. Moloney has expressed the opinion, which we may use
as an example of this, that the AVH was able to get what it wanted
from Cardinal Mindszenty because the Hungarian service adapted its
interrogation methods to his personality. "There can be no doubt that
Mindszenty's preoccupation with the concept of becoming secure and
powerful through the surrender of self to the greatest power of them
all - his God idea - predisposed him to the response elicited in his
experience with the communist intelligence. For him the surrender of
self-system to authoritarian-system was natural, as was the very
principle of martyrdom." (28)

The task of screening is made easier by the fact that the screener is
interested in the subject, not in the information which he may
possess. Most people -- even many provocation agents who have been
trained to recite a legend -- will speak with some freedom about
childhood events and familial relationships. And even the provocateur
who substitutes a fictitious person for his real father will disclose
some of his feelings about his father in the course of detailing his
story about the imaginary substitute. If the screener

31 [page break]



has learned to put the potential source at ease, to feel his way
along in each case, the source is unlikely to consider that a casual
conversation about himself if dangerous .

The screener is interested in getting the subject to talk about
himself. Once the flow starts, the screener should try not to stop it
by questions, gestures, or other interruptions until sufficient
information has been revealed to permit a rough determination of
type. The subject is likeliest to talk freely if the screener's
manner is friendly and patient. His facial _expression should not
reveal special interest in any one statement; he should just seem
sympathetic and understanding. Within a short time most people who
have begun talking about themselves go back to early experiences, so
that merely by listening and occasionally making a quiet, encouraging
remark the screener can learn a great deal. Routine questions about
school teachers, employers, and group leaders, for example, will lead
the subject to reveal a good deal of how he feels about his parents,
superiors, and others of emotional consequence to him because of
associative links in his mind.

It is very helpful if the screener can imaginatively place himself in
the subject's position. The more the screener knows about the
subject's native area and cultural background, the less likely is he
to disturb the subject by an incongruous remark. Such comments
as, "That must have been a bad time for you and your family,"
or "Yes, I can see why you were angry," or "It sounds exciting" are
sufficiently innocuous not to distract the subject, yet provide
adequate evidence of sympathetic interest. Tasking the subject's side
against his enemies serves the same purpose, and such comments
as "That was unfair; they had no right to treat you that way" will
aid rapport and stimulate further revelations.

It is important that gross abnormalities be spotted during the
screening process. Persons suffering from severe mental illness will
show major distortions, delusions, or hallucinations and will usually
give bizarre explanations for their behavior. Dismissal or prompt
referral of the mentally ill to professional specialists will save
time and money.

The second and related purpose of screening is to permit an educated
guess about the source's probable attitude toward the

32 [page break]



interrogation. An estimate of whether the interrogatee will be
cooperative or recalcitrant is essential to planning because very
different methods are used in dealing with these two types.

At stations or bases which cannot conduct screening in the formal
sense, it is still worth-while to preface any important interrogation
with an interview of the source, conducted by someone other than the
interrogator and designed to provide a maximum of evaluative
information before interrogation commences.

Unless a shock effect is desired, the transition from the screening
interview to the interrogation situation should not be abrupt. At the
first meeting with the interrogatee it is usually a good idea for the
interrogator to spend some time in the same kind of quiet, friendly
exchange that characterized the screening interview. Even though the
interrogator now has the screening product, the rough classification
by type, he needs to understand the subject in his own terms. If he
is immediately aggressive, he imposes upon the first interrogation
session (and to a diminishing extent upon succeeding sessions) too
arbitrary a pattern. As one expert has said, "Anyone who proceeds
without consideration for the disjunctive power of anxiety in human
relationships will never learn interviewing." (34)


B. Other Preliminary Procedures

[approx. 2 lines deleted] The preliminary handling of other types of
interrogation sources is usually less difficult. It suffices for the
present purpose to list the following principles:

1. All available pertinent information ought to be assembled and
studied before the interrogation itself is planned, much less
conducted. An ounce of investigation may be worth a pound of
questions.

2. A distinction should be drawn as soon as possible between sources
who will be sent to [approx. 1/2 line deleted site organized and
equipped for interrogation and those whose

33 [page break]



interrogation will be completed by the base or station with which
contact is first established.

3. The suggested procedure for arriving at a preliminary assessment
of walk-ins remains the same [approx. 4 lines deleted]

The key points are repeated here for ease of reference. These
preliminary tests are designed to supplement the technical
examination of a walk-in's documents, substantive questions about
claimed homeland or occupation, and other standard inquiries. The
following questions, if asked, should be posed as soon as possible
after the initial contact, while the walk-in is still under stress
and before he has adjusted to a routine.

a. The walk-in may be asked to identify all relatives and friends in
the area, or even the country, in which PBPRIME asylum is first
requested. Traces should be run speedily. Provocation agents are
sometimes directed to "defect" in their target areas, and friends or
relatives already in place may be hostile assets.

b. At the first interview the questioner should be on the alert for
phrases or concepts characteristic of intelligence or CP activity and
should record such leads whether it is planned to follow them by
interrogation on the spot [approx. 1 line deleted]

c. LCFLUTTER should be used if feasible. If not, the walk-in may be
asked to undergo such testing at a later date. Refusals should be
recorded, as well as indications that the walk-in has been briefed on
the technique by another service. The manner as well as the nature of
the walk-in's reaction to the proposal should be noted.

34 [page break]



d. If LCFLUTTER, screening. investigation, or any other methods do
establish a prior intelligence history, the following minimal
information should be obtained:

[approx. 1/3 page deleted] (7

[approx. 1/2 page deleted]

h. [approx. 3 lines deleted]

35 [page break]



[entire page redacted, except for "4." about 3/4 of the way down the
page]

36 [page break]



[approx. 4 lines deleted]

5. All documents that have a bearing on the planned interrogation
merit study. Documents from Bloc countries, or those which are in any
respect unusual or unfamiliar, are customarily sent to the proper
field or headquarters component for technical analysis.

6. If during screening or any other pre-interrogation phase it is
ascertained that the source has been interrogated before, this fact
should be made known to the interrogator. Agents, for example, are
accustomed to being questioned repeatedly and professionally. So are
persons who have been arrested several times. People who have had
practical training in being interrogated become sophisticated
subjects, able to spot uncertainty, obvious tricks, and other
weaknesses.


C. Summary

Screening and the other preliminary procedures will help the
interrogator - and his base, station, [one or two words deleted] to
decide whether the prospective source (1) is likely to possess useful
counterintelligence because of association with a foreign service or
Communist Party and (2) is likely to cooperate voluntarily or not.
Armed with these estimates and with whatever insights screening has
provided into the personality of the source, the interrogator is
ready to plan.

37 [page break]

VII. Planning the Counterintelligence Interrogation

A. The Nature of Counterintelligence Interrogation

The long-range purpose of CI interrogation is to get from the source
all the useful counterintelligence information that he has. The short-
range purpose is to enlist his cooperation toward this end or, if he
is resistant, to destroy his capacity for resistance and replace it
with a cooperative attitude. The techniques used in nullifying
resistance, inducing compliance, and eventually eliciting voluntary
cooperation are discussed in Part VIII of this handbook.

No two interrogations are the same. Every interrogation is shaped
definitively by the personality of the source - and of the
interrogator, because interrogation is an intensely interpersonal
process. The whole purpose of screening and a major purpose of the
first stage of the interrogation is to probe the strengths and
weaknesses of the subject. Only when these have been established and
understood does it become possible to plan realistically.

Planning the CI interrogation of a resistant source requires an
understanding (whether formalized or not) of the dynamics of
confession. Here Horowitz's study of the nature of confession is
pertinent. He starts by asking why confessions occur at all. "Why not
always brazen it out when confronted by accusation? Why does a person
convict himself through a confession, when, at the very worst, no
confession would leave him at least as well off (and possibly better
off)...?" He answers that confessions obtained without duress are
usually the product of the following conditions:

38 [page break]



1. The person is accused explicitly or implicitly and feels accused.

2. As a result his psychological freedom - the extent to which he
feels able to do what he wants to - is curtailed. This feeling need
not correspond to confinement or any other external reality.

3. The accused feels defensive because he is on unsure ground. He
does not know how much the accuser knows. As a result the
accused "has no formula for proper behavior, no role if you will,
that he can utilize in this situation."

4. He perceives the accuser as representing authority. Unless he
believes that the accuser's powers far exceed his own, he is unlikely
to feel hemmed in and defensive. And if he "perceives that the
accusation is backed by 'real' evidence, the ratio of external forces
to his own forces is increased and the person's psychological
position is now more precarious. It is interesting to note that in
such situations the accused tends toward over response, or
exaggerated response; to hostility and emotional display; to self-
righteousness, to counter accusation, to defense.... "

5. He must believe that he is cut off from friendly or supporting
forces. If he does, he himself becomes the only source of
his "salvation."

6. "Another condition, which is most probably necessary, though not
sufficient for confession, is that the accused person feels guilt. A
possible reason is that a sense of guilt promotes self-hostility." It
should be equally clear that if the person does not feel guilt he is
not in his own mind guilty and will not confess to an act which
others may regard as evil or wrong and he, in fact, considers
correct. Confession in such a case can come only with duress even
where all other conditions previously mentioned may prevail."

39 [page break]



7. The accused, finally, is pushed far enough along the path toward
confession that it is easier for him to keep going than to turn back.
He perceives confession as the only way out of his predicament and
into freedom. (15)

Horowitz has been quoted and summarized at some length because it is
considered that the foregoing is a basically sound account of the
processes that evoke confessions from sources whose resistance is not
strong at the outset, who have not previously-been confronted with
detention and interrogation, and who have not been trained by an
adversary intelligence or security service in resistance techniques.
A fledgling or disaffected Communist or agent, for example, might be
brought to confession and cooperation without the use of any external
coercive forces other than the interrogation situation itself,
through the above-described progression of subjective events.

It is important to understand that interrogation, as both situation
and process, does of itself exert significant external pressure upon
the interrogatee as long as he is not permitted to accustom himself
to it. Some psychologists trace this effect back to infantile
relationships. Meerlo, for example, says that every verbal
relationship repeats to some degree the pattern of early verbal
relationships between child and parent. (27) An interrogatee, in
particular, is likely to see the interrogator as a parent or parent-
symbol, an object of suspicion and resistance or of submissive
acceptance. If the interrogator is unaware of this unconcsious
process, the result can be a confused battle of submerged attitudes,
in which the spoken words are often merely a cover for the unrelated
struggle being waged at lower levels of both personalities. On the
other hand, the interrogator who does understand these facts and who
knows how to turn them to his advantage may not need to resort to any
pressures greater than those that flow directly from the
interrogation setting and function.

Obviously, many resistant subjects of counterintelligence
interrogation cannot be brought to cooperation, or even to
compliance, merely through pressures which they generate

40 [page break]



within themselves or through the unreinforced effect of the
interrogation situation. Manipulative techniques - still keyed to the
individual but brought to bear upon him from outside himself - then
become necessary. It is a fundamental hypothesis of this handbook
that these techniques, which can succeed even with highly resistant
sources, are in essence methods of inducing regression of the
personality to whatever earlier and weaker level is required for the
dissolution of resistance and the inculcation of dependence. All of
the techniques employed to break through an interrogation roadblock,
the entire spectrum from simple isolation to hypnosis and narcosis,
are essentially ways of speeding up the process of regression. As the
interrogatee slips back from maturity toward a more infantile state,
his learned or structured personality traits fall away in a reversed
chronological order, so that the characteristics most recently
acquired - which are also the characteristics drawn upon by the
interrogatee in his own defense - are the first to go. As Gill and
Brenman have pointed out, regression is basically a loss of autonomy.
(13)

Another key to the successful interrogation of the resisting source
is the provision of an acceptable rationalization for yielding. As
regression proceeds, almost all resisters feel the growing internal
stress that results from wanting simultaneously to conceal and to
divulge. To escape the mounting tension, the source may grasp at any
face-saving reason for compliance - any explanation which will
placate both his own conscience and the possible wrath of former
superiors and associates if he is returned to Communist control. It
is the business of the interrogator to provide the right
rationalization at the right time. Here too the importance of
understanding the interrogatee is evident; the right rationalization
must be an excuse or reason that is tailored to the source's
personality.

The interrogation process is a continuum, and everything that takes
place in the continuum influences all subsequent events. The
continuing process, being interpersonal, is not

41 [page break]



reversible. Therefore it is wrong to open a counterintelligence
interrogation experimentally, intending to abandon unfruitful
approaches one by one until a sound method is discovered by chance.
The failures of the interrogator, his painful retreats from blind
alleys, bolster the confidence of the source and increase his ability
to resist. While the interrogator is struggling to learn from the
subject the facts that should have been established before
interrogation started, the subject is learning more and more about
the interrogator.


B. The Interrogation Plan

Planning for interrogation is more important than the specifics of
the plan. Because no two interrogations are alike, the interrogation
cannot realistically be planned from A to Z, in all its particulars,
at the outset. But it can and must be planned from A to F or A to M.
The chances of failure in an unplanned CI interrogation are
unacceptably high. Even worse, a "dash-on-regardless" approach can
ruin the prospects of success even if sound methods are used later.

The intelligence category to which the subject belongs, though not
determinant for planning purposes, is still of some significance. The
plan for the interrogation of a traveller differs from that for other
types because the time available for questioning is often brief. The
examination of his bona fides , accordingly, is often less searching.
He is usually regarded as reasonably reliable if his identity and
freedom from other intelligence associations have been established,
if records checks do not produce derogatory information, if his
account of his background is free of omissions or discrepancies
suggesting significant withholding, if he does not attempt to elicit
information about the questioner or his sponsor, and if he willingly
provides detailed information which appears reliable or is
established as such.

[approx. 2 lines deleted]

42 [page break]



[approx. 5 lines deleted]

Defectors can usually be interrogated unilaterally, at least for a
time. Pressure for participation will usually come [approx. 1/2 line
deleted] from an ODYOKE intelligence component. The time available
for unilateral testing and exploitation should be calculated at the
outset, with a fair regard for the rights and interests of other
members of the intelligence community. The most significant single
fact to be kept in mind when planning the interrogation of Soviet
defectors is that a certain percentage of them have proven to be
controlled agents; estimates of this percentage have ranged as high
as [one or two words deleted] during a period of several years after
1955. (22)

KUBARK's lack of executive powers is especially significant if the
interrogation of a suspect agent or of any other subject who is
expected to resist is under consideration. As a general rule, it is
difficult to succeed in the CI interrogation of a resistant source
unless the interrogating service can control the subject and his
environment for as long as proves necessary.

[approx. 20 lines deleted]

43 [page break]



[1/3 of page deleted]


C. The Specifics

1. The Specific Purpose

Before questioning starts, the interrogator has clearly in mind what
he wants to learn, why he thinks the source has the information, how
important it is, and how it can best be obtained. Any confusion here,
or any questioning based on the premise that the purpose will take
shape after the interrogation is under way, is almost certain to lead
to aimlessness and final failure. If the specific goals cannot be
discerned clearly, further investigation is needed before querying
starts.

2. Resistance

The kind and intensity of anticipated resistance is estimated. It is
useful to recognize in advance whether the information desired would
be threatening or damaging in any way to the interests of the
interrogates. If so, the interrogator should consider whether the
same information, or confirmation of it, can be gained from another
source. Questioning suspects immediately, on a flimsy factual basis,
will usually cause waste of time, not save it. On the other hand, if
the needed information is not sensitive from the subject's viewpoint,

44 [page break]



merely asking for it is usually preferable to trying to trick him
into admissions and thus creating an unnecessary battle of wits.

The preliminary psychological analysis of the subject makes it easier
to decide whether he is likely to resist and, if so, whether his
resistance will be the product of fear that his personal interests
will be damaged or the result of the non-cooperative nature of
orderly-obstinate and related types. The choice of methods to be used
in overcoming resistance is also determined by the characteristics of
the interrogatee.

3. The Interrogation Setting

The room in which the interrogation is to be conducted should be free
of distractions. The colors of walls, ceiling, rugs, and furniture
should not be startling. Pictures should be missing or dull. Whether
the furniture should include a desk depends not upon the
interrogator's convenience but rather upon the subject's anticipated
reaction to connotations of superiority and officialdom. A plain
table may be preferable. An overstuffed chair for the use of the
interrogatee is sometimes preferable to a straight-backed, wooden
chair because if he is made to stand for a lengthy period or is
otherwise deprived of physical comfort, the contrast is intensified
and increased disorientation results. Some treatises on interrogation
are emphatic about the value of arranging the lighting so that its
source is behind the interrogator and glares directly at the subject.
Here, too, a flat rule is unrealistic. The effect upon a cooperative
source is inhibitory, and the effect upon a withholding source may be
to make him more stubborn. Like all other details, this one depends
upon the personality of the interrogatee.

Good planning will prevent interruptions. If the room is also used
for purposes other than interrogation, a "Do Not Disturb" sign or its
equivalent should hang on the door when questioning is under way. The
effect of someone wandering in because he forgot his pen or wants to
invite the

45 [page break]



interrogator to lunch can be devastating. For the same reason there
should not be a telephone in the room; it is certain to ring at
precisely the wrong moment. Moreover, it is a visible link to the
outside; its presence makes a subject feel less cut-off, better able
to resist.

The interrogation room affords ideal conditions for photographing the
interrogatee without his knowledge by concealing a camera behind a
picture or elsewhere.

If a new safehouse is to be used as the interrogation site, it should
be studied carefully to be sure that the total environment can be
manipulated as desired. For example, the electric current should be
known in advance, so that transformers or other modifying devices
will be on hand if needed.

Arrangements are usually made to record the interrogation, transmit
it to another room, or do both. Most experienced interrogators do not
like to take notes. Not being saddled with this chore leaves them
free to concentrate on what sources say, how they say it, and what
else they do while talking or listening. Another reason for avoiding
note-taking is that it distracts and sometimes worries the
interrogatee. In the course of several sessions conducted without
note-taking, the subject is likely to fall into the comfortable
illusion that he is not talking for the record. Another advantage of
the tape is that it can be played back later. Upon some subjects the
shock of hearing their own voices unexpectedly is unnerving. The
record also prevents later twistings or denials of admissions.
[approx. 6 lines deleted] A recording is also a valuable training aid
for interrogators, who by this

46 [page break]



means can study their mistakes and their most effective techniques.
Exceptionally instructuve interrogations, or selected portions
thereof, can also be used in the training of others.

If possible, audio equipment should also be used to transmit the
proceedings to another room, used as a listening post. The main
advantage of transmission is that it enables the person in charge of
the interrogation to note crucial points and map further strategy,
replacing one interrogator with another, timing a dramatic
interruption correctly, etc. It is also helpful to install a small
blinker bulb behind the subject or to arrange some other method of
signalling the interrogator, without the source's knowledge, that the
questioner should leave the room for consultation or that someone
else is about to enter.

4. The Participants

Interrogatees are normally questioned separately. Separation permits
the use of a number of techniques that would not be possible
otherwise. It also intensifies in the source the feeling of being cut
off from friendly aid. Confrontation of two or more suspects with
each other in order to produce recriminations or admissions is
especially dangerous if not preceded by separate interrogation
sessions which have evoked compliance from one of the interrogatees,
or at least significant admissions involving both. Techniques for the
separate interrogations of linked sources are discussed in Part IX.

The number of interrogators used for a single interrogation case
varies from one man to a large team. The size of the team depends on
several considerations, chiefly the importance of the case and the
intensity of source resistance. Although most sessions consist of one
interrogator and one interrogatee, some of the techniques described
later call for the presence of two, three, or four interrogators. The
two-man team, in particular, is subject to unintended antipathies and
conflicts not called for by assigned roles. Planning and

47 [page break]



subsequent conduct should eliminate such cross-currents before they
develop, especially because the source will seek to turn them to his
advantage.

Team members who are not otherwise engaged can be employed to best
advantage at the listening post. Inexperienced interrogators find
that listening to the interrogation while it is in progress can be
highly educational.

Once questioning starts, the interrogator is called upon to function
at two levels. He is trying to do two seemingly contradictory things
at once: achieve rapport with the subject but remain an essentially
detached observer. Or he may project himself to the resistant
interrogatee as powerful and ominous (in order to eradicate
resistance and create the necessary conditions for rapport) while
remaining wholly uncommitted at the deeper level, noting the
significance of the subjects reactions and the effectiveness of his
own performance. Poor interrogators often confuse this bi-level
functioning with role-playing, but there is a vital difference. The
interrogator who merely pretends, in his surface performance, to feel
a given emotion or to hold a given attitude toward the source is
likely to be unconvincing; the source quickly senses the deception.
Even children are very quick to feel this kind of pretense. To be
persuasive, the sympathy or anger must be genuine; but to be useful,
it must not interfere with the deeper level of precise, unaffected
observation. Bi-level functioning is not difficult or even unusual;
most people act at times as both performer and observer unless their
emotions are so deeply involved in the situation that the critical
faculty disintegrates. Through experience the interrogator becomes
adept in this dualism. The interrogator who finds that he has become
emotionally involved and is no longer capable of unimpaired
objectivity should report the facts so that a substitution can be
made. Despite all planning efforts to select an interrogator whose
age, background, skills, personality, and experience make him the
best choice for the job, it sometimes happens that both questioner
and subject feel, when they first meet,

48 [page break]



an immediate attraction or antipathy which is so strong that a change
of interrogators quickly becomes essential. No interrogator should be
reluctant to notify his superior when emotional involvement becomes
evident. Not the reaction but a failure to report it would be
evidence of a lack of professionalism.

Other reasons for changing interrogators should be anticipated and
avoided at the outset. During the first part of the interrogation the
developing relationship between the questioner and the initially
uncooperative source is more important than the information obtained;
when this relationship is destroyed by a change of interrogators, the
replacement must start nearly from scratch. In fact, he starts with a
handicap, because exposure to interrogation will have made the source
a more effective resister. Therefore the base, station, [one or two
words deleted] should not assign as chief interrogator a person whose
availability will end before the estimated completion of the case.

5. The Timing

Before interrogation starts, the amount of time probably required and
probably available to both interrogator and interrogatee should be
calculated. If the subject is not to be under detention, his normal
schedule is ascertained in advance, so that he will not have to be
released at a critical point because he has an appointment or has to
go to work.

Because pulling information from a recalcitrant subject is the hard
way of doing business, interrogation should not begin until all
pertinent facts available from overt and from cooperative sources
have been assembled.

Interrogation sessions with a resistant source who is under detention
should not be held on an unvarying schedule. The capacity for
resistance is diminished by disorientation. The subject may be left
alone for days; and he may be returned to his cell, allowed to sleep
for five minutes, and brought back

49 [page break]



to an interrogation which is conducted as though eight hours had
intervened. The principle is that sessions should be so planned as to
disrupt the source's sense of chronological order.

6. The Termination

The end of an interrogation should be planned before questioning
starts. The kinds of questions asked, the methods employed, and even
the goals sought may be shaped by what will happen when the end is
reached. [approx. 3 lines deleted] If he is to be released upon the
local economy, perhaps blacklisted as a suspected hostile agent but
not subjected to subsequent counterintelligence surveillance, it is
important to avoid an inconclusive ending that has warned the
interrogates of our doubts but has established nothing. The poorest
interrogations are those that trail off into an inconclusive
nothingness.

A number of practical terminal details should also be considered in
advance. Are the source's documents to be returned to him, and will
they be available in time? Is he to be paid? If he is a fabricator or
hostile agent, has he been photographed and fingerprinted? Are
subsequent contacts necessary or desirable, and have recontact
provisions been arranged? Has a quit-claim been obtained?

As was noted at the beginning of this section, the successful
interrogation of a strongly resistant source ordinarily involves two
key processes: the calculated regression of the interrogatee and the
provision of an acceptable rationalization. If these two steps have
been taken, it becomes very important to clinch the new tractability
by means of conversion. In other words, a subject who has finally
divulged the information sought and who has been given a reason for
divulging which salves his self-esteem, his conscience, or both will
often be in a mood to take the final step of accepting the
interrogator' s values and making common cause with him. If
operational use is now

50 [page break]



contemplated, conversion is imperative. But even if the source has no
further value after his fund of information has been mined, spending
some extra time with him in order to replace his new sense of
emptiness with new values can be good insurance. All non-Communist
services are bothered at times by disgruntled exinterrogatees who
press demands and threaten or take hostile action if the demands are
not satisfied. Defectors in particular, because they are often
hostile toward any kind of authority, cause trouble by threatening or
bringing suits in local courts, arranging publication of vengeful
stories, or going to the local police. The former interrogatee is
especially likely to be a future trouble-maker if during
interrogation he was subjected to a form of compulsion imposed from
outside himself. Time spent, after the interrogation ends, in
fortifying the source's sense of acceptance in the interrogator's
world may be only a fraction of the time required to bottle up his
attempts to gain revenge. Moreover, conversion may create a useful
and enduring asset. (See also remarks in VIII B 4.)

51 [page break]

VIII. The Non-Coercive Counterintelligence Interrogation

A. General Remarks

The term non-coercive is used above to denote methods of
interrogation that are not based upon the coercion of an unwilling
subject through the employment of superior force originating outside
himself. However, the non-coercive interrogation is not conducted
without pressure. On the contrary, the goal is to generate maximum
pressure, or at least as much as is needed to induce compliance. The
difference is that the pressure is generated inside the interrogatee.
His resistance is sapped, his urge to yield is fortified, until in
the end he defeats himself.

Manipulating the subject psychologically until he becomes compliant,
without applying external methods of forcing him to submit, sounds
harder than it is. The initial advantage lies with the interrogator.
From the outset, he knows a great deal more about the source than the
source knows about him. And he can create and amplify an effect of
omniscience in a number of ways. For example, he can show the
interrogatee a thick file bearing his own name. Even if the file
contains little or nothing but blank paper, the air of familiarity
with which the interrogator refers to the subject's background can
convince some sources that all is known and that resistance is futile.

If the interrogatee is under detention, the interrogator can also
manipulate his environment. Merely by cutting off all other human
contacts, "the interrogator monopolizes the social environment of the
source."(3) He exercises the powers of an all-powerful parent,
determining when the source will be sent to bed, when and what he
will eat, whether he will be rewarded for good behavior or punished
for being bad. The interrogator can and does make the

52 [page break]



subject's world not only unlike the world to which he had been
accustomed but also strange in itself - a world in which familiar
patterns of time, space, and sensory perception are overthrown. He
can shift the environment abruptly. For example, a source who refuses
to talk at all can be placed in unpleasant solitary confinement for a
time. Then a friendly soul treats him to an unexpected walk in the
woods. Experiencing relief and exhilaration, the subject will usually
find it impossible not to respond to innocuous comments on the
weather and the flowers. These are expanded to include reminiscences,
and soon a precedent of verbal exchange has been established. Both
the Germans and the Chinese have used this trick effectively.

The interrogator also chooses the emotional key or keys in which the
interrogation or any part of it will be played.

Because of these and other advantages, " [approx. 6 lines
deleted] ."(3)


B. The Structure of the Interrogation

A counterintelligence interrogation consists of four parts: the
opening, the reconnaissance, the detailed questioning and the
conclusion.

1. The Opening

Most resistant interrogatees block off access to significant
counterintelligence in their possession for one or more of four
reasons. The first is a specific negative reaction to the
interrogator. Poor initial handling or a fundamental antipathy can
make a source uncooperative even if he has nothing significant or
damaging to conceal. The second cause is that some sources are
resistant "by nature" - i.e. by early conditioning - to any
compliance with authority. The third is that the subject believes
that the information sought will be

53 [page break]



damaging or incriminating for him personally that cooperation with
the interrogator will have consequences more painful for him than the
results of non-cooperation. The fourth is ideological resistance. The
source has identified himself with a cause, a political movement or
organization, or an opposition intelligence service. Regardless of
his attitude toward the interrogator, his own personality, and his
fears for the future, the person who is deeply devoted to a hostile
cause will ordinarily prove strongly resistant under interrogation.

A principal goal during the opening phase is to confirm the
personality assessment obtained through screening and to allow the
interrogator to gain a deeper understanding of the source as an
individual. Unless time is crucial, the interrogator should not
become impatient if the interrogatee wanders from the purposes of the
interrogation and reverts to personal concerns. Significant facts not
produced during screening may be revealed. The screening report
itself is brought to life, the type becomes an individual, as the
subject talks. And sometimes seemingly rambling monologues about
personal matters are preludes to significant admissions. Some people
cannot bring themselves to provide information that puts them in an
unfavorable light until, through a lengthy prefatory rationalization,
they feel that they have set the stage that the interrogator will now
understand why they acted as they did. If face-saving is necessary to
the interrogatee it will be a waste of time to try to force him to
cut the preliminaries short and get down to cases. In his view, he is
dealing with the important topic, the why . He will be offended and
may become wholly uncooperative if faced with insistent demands for
the naked what .

There is another advantage in letting the subject talk freely and
even ramblingly in the first stage of interrogation. The interrogator
is free to observe. Human beings communicate a great deal by non-
verbal means. Skilled interrogators, for example, listen closely to
voices and learn a great deal from them. An interrogation is not
merely a

54 [page break]



verbal performance; it is a vocal performance, and the voice projects
tension, fear, a dislike of certain topics, and other useful pieces
of information. It is also helpful to watch the subject's mouth,
which is as a rule much more revealing than his eyes. Gestures and
postures also tell a story. If a subject normally gesticulates
broadly at times and is at other times physically relaxed but at some
point sits stiffly motionless, his posture is likely to be the
physical image of his mental tension. The interrogator should make a
mental note of the topic that caused such a reaction.

One textbook on interrogation lists the following physical indicators
of emotions and recommends that interrogators note them, not as
conclusive proofs but as assessment aids:

(1) A ruddy or flushed face is an indication of anger or
embarrassment but not necessarily of guilt.

(2) A "cold sweat" is a strong sign of fear and shock.

(3) A pale face indicates fear and usually shows that the
interrogator is hitting close to the mark.

(4) A dry mouth denotes nervousness.

(5) Nervous tension is also shown by wringing a handkerchief or
clenching the hands tightly.

(6) Emotional strain or tension may cause a pumping of the heart
which becomes visible in the pulse and throat.

(7) A slight gasp, holding the breath, or an unsteady voice may
betray the subject.

(8) Fidgeting may take many forms, all of which are good indications
of nervousness.

55 [page break]



(9) A man under emotional strain or nervous tension will
involuntarily draw his elbows to his sides. It is a protective
defense mechanism.

(10) The movement of the foot when one leg is crossed over the knee
of the other can serve as an indicator. The circulation of the blood
to the lower leg is partially cut off, thereby causing a slight lift
or movement of the free foot with each heart beat. This becomes more
pronounced and observable as the pulse rate increases.

Pauses are also significant. Whenever a person is talking about a
subject of consequence to himself, he goes through a process of
advance self-monitoring, performed at lightning speed. This self-
monitoring is more intense if the person is talking to a stranger and
especially intense if he is answering the stranger's questions. Its
purpose is to keep from the questioner any guilty information or
information that would be damaging to the speaker's self-esteem.
Where questions or answers get close to sensitive areas, the pre-
scanning is likely to create mental blocks. These in turn produce
unnatural pauses, meaningless sounds designed to give the speaker
more time, or other interruptions. It is not easy to distinguish
between innocent blocks -- things held back for reasons of personal
prestige -- and guilty blocks -- things the interrogator needs to
know. But the successful establishment of rapport will tend to
eliminate innocent blocks, or at least to keep them to a minimum.

The establishment of rapport is the second principal purpose of the
opening phase of the interrogation. Sometimes the interrogator knows
in advance, as a result of screening, that the subject will be
uncooperative. At other times the probability of resistance is
established without screening: detected hostile agents, for example,
usually have not only the will to resist but also the means, through
a cover story or other explanation. But the anticipation of
withholding increases rather than diminishes, the value of rapport.
In other words,

56 [page break]



a lack of rapport may cause an interrogatee to withhold information
that he would otherwise provide freely, whereas the existence of
rapport may induce an interrogatee who is initially determined to
withhold to change his attitude. Therefore the interrogator must not
become hostile if confronted with initial hostility, or in any other
way confirm such negative attitudes as he may encounter at the
outset. During this first phase his attitude should remain business-
like but also quietly (not ostentatiously) friendly and welcoming.
Such opening remarks by subjects as, "I know what you so-and-so's are
after, and I can tell you right now that you're not going to get it
from me" are best handled by an unperturbed "Why don't you tell me
what has made you angry?" At this stage the interrogator should avoid
being drawn into conflict, no matter how provocatory may be the
attitude or language of the interrogatee. If he meets truculence with
neither insincere protestations that he is the subject's "pal" nor an
equal anger but rather a calm interest in what has aroused the
subject, the interrogator has gained two advantages right at the
start. He has established the superiority that he will need later, as
the questioning develops, and he has increased the chances of
establishing rapport.

How long the opening phase continues depends upon how long it takes
to establish rapport or to determine that voluntary cooperation is
unobtainable. It may be literally a matter of seconds, or it may be a
drawn-out, up-hill battle. Even though the cost in time and patience
is sometimes high, the effort to make the subject feel that his
questioner is a sympathetic figure should not be abandoned until all
reasonable resources have been exhausted (unless, of course, the
interrogation does not merit much time). Otherwise, the chances are
that the interrogation will not produce optimum results. In fact, it
is likely to be a failure, and the interrogator should not be
dissuaded from the effort to establish rapport by an inward
conviction that no man in his right mind would incriminate himself by
providing the kind of information that is sought. The history of
interrogation is full of confessions and other self-incriminations
that were in essence the result of a substitution of the
interrogation world for the world outside. In

57 [page break]



other words, as the sights and sounds of an outside world fade away,
its significance for the interrogatee tends to do likewise. That
world is replaced by the interrogation room, its two occupants, and
the dynamic relationship between them. As interrogation goes on, the
subject tends increasingly to divulge or withhold in accordance with
the values of the interrogation world rather than those of the
outside world (unless the periods of questioning are only brief
interruptions in his normal life). In this small world of two
inhabitants a clash of personalities -- as distinct from a conflict
of purposes -- assumes exaggerated force, like a tornado in a wind-
tunnel. The self-esteem of the interrogatee and of the interrogator
becomes involved, and the interrogatee fights to keep his secrets
from his opponent for subjective reasons, because he is grimly
determined not to be the loser, the inferior. If on the other hand
the interrogator establishes rapport, the subject may withhold
because of other reasons, but his resistance often lacks the bitter,
last-ditch intensity that results if the contest becomes personalized.

The interrogator who senses or determines in the opening phase that
what he is hearing is a legend should resist the first, natural
impulse to demonstrate its falsity. In some interrogatees the ego-
demands, the need to save face, are so intertwined with preservation
of the cover story that calling the man a liar will merely intensify
resistance. It is better to leave an avenue of escape, a loophole
which permits the source to correct his story without looking foolish.

If it is decided, much later in the interrogation, to confront the
interrogatee with proof of lying, the following related advice about
legal cross-examination may prove helpful.

"Much depends upon the sequence in which one conducts the cross-
examination of a dishonest witness. You should never hazard the
important question until you have laid the foundation for it in such
a way that, when confronted with the fact, the witness can neither
deny nor explain it. One often

58 [page break]



sees the most damaging documentary evidence, in the forms of letters
or affidavits, fall absolutely flat as betrayers of falsehood, merely
because of the unskillful way in which they are handled. If you have
in your possession a letter written by the witness, in which he takes
an opposite position on some part of the case to the one he has just
sworn to, avoid the common error of showing the witness the letter
for identification, and then reading it to him with the
inquiry, 'What have you to say to that?' During the reading of his
letter the witness will be collecting his thoughts and getting ready
his explanations in anticipation of the question that is to follow,
and the effect of the damaging letter will be lost.... The correct
method of using such a letter is to lead the witness quietly into
repeating the statements he has made in his direct testimony, and
which his letter contradicts. Then read it off to him. The witness
has no explanation. He has stated the fact, there is nothing to
qualify."(41)

2. The Reconnaissance

If the interrogatee is cooperative at the outset or if rapport is
established during the opening phase and the source becomes
cooperative, the reconnaissance stage is needless; the interrogator
proceeds directly to detailed questioning. But if the interrogatee is
withholding, a period of exploration is necessary. Assumptions have
normally been made already as to what he is withholding: that he is a
fabricator, or an RIS agent, or something else he deems it important
to conceal. Or the assumption may be that he had knowledge of such
activities carried out by someone else. At any rate, the purpose of
the reconnaissance is to provide a quick testing of the assumption
and, more importantly, to probe the causes, extent, and intensity of
resistance.

During the opening phase the interrogator will have charted the
probable areas of resistance by noting those topics which caused
emotional or physical reactions, speech blocks, or other indicators.
He now begins to probe these areas. Every experienced interrogator
has noted that if an interrogatee

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is withholding, his anxiety increases as the questioning nears the
mark. The safer the topic, the more voluble the source. But as the
questions make him increasingly uncomfortable, the interrogatee
becomes less communicative or perhaps even hostile. During the
opening phase the interrogator has gone along with this protective
mechanism. Now, however, he keeps coming back to each area of
sensitivity until he has determined the location of each and the
intensity of the defenses. If resistance is slight, mere persistence
may overcome it; and detailed questioning may follow immediately. But
if resistance is strong, a new topic should be introduced, and
detailed questioning reserved for the third stage.

Two dangers are especially likely to appear during the
reconnaissance. Up to this point the interrogator has not continued a
line of questioning when resistance was encountered. Now, however, he
does so, and rapport may be strained. Some interrogatees will take
this change personally and tend to personalize the conflict. The
interrogator should resist this tendency. If he succumbs to it, and
becomes engaged in a battle of wits, he may not be able to accomplish
the task at hand. The second temptation to avoid is the natural
inclination to resort prematurely to ruses or coercive techniques in
order to settle the matter then and there. The basic purpose of the
reconnaissance is to determine the kind and degree of pressure that
will be needed in the third stage. The interrogator should reserve
his fire-power until he knows what he is up against.

3. The Detailed Questioning

a. If rapport is established and if the interrogatee has nothing
significant to hide, detailed questioning presents only routine
problems. The major routine considerations are the following:

The interrogator must know exactly what he wants to know. He should
have on paper or firmly in mind all the questions to which he seeks
answers. It usually

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happens that the source has a relatively large body of information
that has little or no intelligence value and only a small collection
of nuggets. He will naturally tend to talk about what he knows best.
The interrogator should not show quick impatience, but neither should
he allow the results to get out of focus. The determinant remains
what we need, not what the interrogatee can most readily provide.

At the same time it is necessary to make every effort to keep the
subject from learning through the interrogation process precisely
where our informational gaps lie. This principle is especially
important if the interrogatee is following his normal life, going
home each evening and appearing only once or twice a week for
questioning, or if his bona fides remains in doubt. Under almost all
circumstances, however, a clear revelation of our interests and
knowledge should be avoided. It is usually a poor practice to hand to
even the most cooperative interrogatee an orderly list of questions
and ask him to write the answers. (This stricture does not apply to
the writing of autobiographies or on informational matters not a
subject of controversy with the source.) Some time is normally spent
on matters of little or no intelligence interest for purposes of
concealment. The interrogator can abet the process by making
occasional notes -- or pretending to do so -- on items that seem
important to the interrogatee but are not of intelligence value. From
this point of view an interrogation can be deemed successful if a
source who is actually a hostile agent can report to the opposition
only the general fields of our interest but cannot pinpoint specifics
without including misleading information.

It is sound practice to write up each interrogation report on the day
of questioning or, at least, before the next session, so that defects
can be promptly remedied and gaps or contradictions noted in time.

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It is also a good expedient to have the interrogatee make notes of
topics that should be covered, which occur to him while discussing
the immediate matters at issue. The act of recording the stray item
or thought on paper fixes it in the interrogatee's mind. Usually
topics popping up in the course of an interrogation are forgotten if
not noted; they tend to disrupt the interrogation plan if covered by
way of digression on the spot.

Debriefing questions should usually be couched to provoke a positive
answer and should be specific. The questioner should not accept a
blanket negative without probing. For example, the question "Do you
know anything about Plant X?" is likelier to draw a negative answer
then "Do you have any friends who work at Plant X?" or "Can you
describe its exterior?"

It is important to determine whether the subject's knowledge of any
topic was acquired at first hand, learned indirectly, or represents
merely an assumption. If the information was obtained indirectly, the
identities of sub-sources and related information about the channel
are needed. If statements rest on assumptions, the facts upon which
the conclusions are based are necessary to evaluation.

As detailed questioning proceeds, addition biographic data will be
revealed. Such items should be entered into the record, but it is
normally preferable not to diverge from an impersonal topic in order
to follow a biographic lead. Such leads can be taken up later unless
they raise new doubts about bona fides .

As detailed interrogation continues, and especially at the half-way
mark, the interrogator's desire to complete the task may cause him to
be increasingly business-like or even brusque. He may tend to curtail
or drop the usual inquiries about the subject's well-being with which
he opened earlier sessions. He may feel like dealing more

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and more abruptly with reminiscences or digressions. His interest has
shifted from the interrogatee himself, who jut a while ago was an
interesting person, to the atsk of getting at what he knows. But if
rapport has been established, the interrogatee will be quick to sense
and resent this change of attitude. This point is particularly
important if the interrogatee is a defector faced with bewildering
changes and in a highly emotional state. Any interrogatee has his ups
and downs, times when he is tired or half-ill, times when his
personal problems have left his nerves frayed. The peculiar intimacy
of the interrogation situation and the very fact that the
interrogator has deliberately fostered rapport will often lead the
subject to talk about his doubts, fears, and other personal
reactions. The interrogator should neither cut off this flow abruptly
nor show impatience unless it takes up an inordinate amount of time
or unless it seems likely that all the talking about personal matters
is being used deliberately as a smoke screen to keep the interrogator
from doing his job. If the interrogatee is believed cooperative, then
from the beginning to the end of the process he should feel that the
interrogator's interest in him has remained constant. Unless the
interrogation is soon over, the interrogatee's attitude toward his
questioner is not likely to remain constant. He will feel more and
more drawn to the questioner or increasingly antagonistic. As a rule,
the best way for the interrogator to keep the relationship on an even
keel is to maintain the same quiet, relaxed, and open-minded attitude
from start to finish.

Detailed interrogation ends only when (1) all useful
counterintelligence information has been obtained; (2) diminishing
returns and more pressing commitments compel a cessation; or (3) the
base, station, [one or two words deleted] admits full or partial
defeat. Termination for any reason other than the first is only
temporary. It is a profound mistake to write off a successfully
resistant interrogatee or one whose questioning was ended before his
potential

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was exhausted. KUBARK must keep track of such persons, because people
and circumstances change. Until the source dies or tells us
everything that he knows that is pertinent to our purposes, his
interrogation may be interrupted, perhaps for years -- but it has not
been completed.

4. The Conclusion

The end of an interrogation is not the end of the interrogator's
responsibilities. From the beginning of planning to the end of
questioning it has been necessary to understand and guard against the
various troubles that a vengeful ex-source can cause. As was pointed
out earlier, KUBARK's lack of executive authority abroad and its
operational need for facelessness make it peculiarly vulnerable to
attack in the courts or the press. The best defense against such
attacks is prevention, through enlistment or enforcement of
compliance. However real cooperation is achieved, its existence seems
to act as a deterrent to later hostility. The initially resistant
subject may become cooperative because of a partial identification
with the interrogator and his interests, or the source may make such
an identification because of his cooperation. In either event, he is
unlikely to cause serious trouble in the future. Real difficulties
are more frequently created by interrogatees who have succeeded in
withholding.

The following steps are normally a routine part of the conclusion:

a. [approx. 10 lines deleted]

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d. [approx. 7 lines deleted]

e. [approx. 7 lines deleted]

f. [approx. 4 lines deleted]


C. Techniques of Non-Coercive Interrogation of Resistant Sources

If source resistance is encountered during screening or during the
opening or reconnaissance phases of the interrogation, non-coercive
methods of sapping opposition and strengthening the tendency to yield
and to cooperate may be applied. Although these methods appear here
in an approximate order of increasing pressure, it should not be
inferred that each is to be tried until the key fits the lock. On the
contrary, a large part of the skill and the success of the
experienced interrogator lies in his ability to match method to
source. The use of unsuccessful techniques will of itself increase
the interrogatee's will and ability to resist.

This principle also affects the decision to employ coercive
techniques and governs the choice of these methods. If in the opinion
of the interrogator a totally resistant source has the skill and
determination to withstand any con-coercive method or combination of
methods, it is better to avoid them completely.

The effectiveness of most of the non-coercive techniques depends upon
their unsettling effect. The interrogation situation is in itself
disturbing to most people encountering it for the first time. The aim
is to enhance this effect, to disrupt radically the familiar emotional

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and psychological associations of the subject. When this aim is
achieved, resistance is seriously impaired. There is an interval --
which may be extremely brief -- of suspended animation, a kind of
psychological shock or paralysis. It is caused by a traumatic or sub-
traumatic experience which explodes, as it were, the world that is
familiar to the subject as well as his image of himself within that
world. Experienced interrogators recognize this effect when it
appears and know that at this moment the source is far more open to
suggestion, far likelier to comply, than he was just before he
experienced the shock.

Another effect frequently produced by non-coercive (as well as
coercive) methods is the evocation within the interrogatee of
feelings of guilt. Most persons have areas of guilt in their
emotional topographies, and an interrogator can often chart these
areas just by noting refusals to follow certain lines of questioning.
Whether the sense of guilt has real or imaginary causes does not
affect the result of intensification of guilt feelings. Making a
person feel more and more guilty normally increases both his anxiety
and his urge to cooperate as a means of escape.

In brief, the techniques that follow should match the personality of
the individual interrogatee, and their effectiveness is intensified
by good timing and rapid exploitation of the moment of shock. (A few
of the following items are drawn from Sheehan.) (32)

1. Going Next Door

Occasionally the information needed from a recalcitrant interrogatee
is obtainable from a willing source. The interrogator should decide
whether a confession is essential to his purpose or whether
information which may be held by others as well as the unwilling
source is really his goal. The labor of extracting the truth from
unwilling interrogatees should be undertaken only if the same
information is not more easily obtainable elsewhere or if operational
considerations require self-incrimination.

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2. Nobody Loves You

An interrogatee who is withholding items of no grave consequence to
himself may sometimes be persuaded to talk by the simple tactic of
pointing out that to date all of the information about his case has
come from persons other than himself. The interrogator wants to be
fair. He recognizes that some of the denouncers may have been biased
or malicious. In any case, there is bound to be some slanting of the
facts unless the interrogatee redresses the balance. The source owes
it to himself to be sure that the interrogator hears both sides of
the story.

3. The All-Seeing Eye (or Confession is Good for the Soul)

The interrogator who already knows part of the story explains to the
source that the purpose of the questioning is not to gain
information; the interrogator knows everything already. His real
purpose is to test the sincerity (reliability, honor, etc.) of the
source. The interrogator then asks a few questions to which he knows
the answers. If the subject lies, he is informed firmly and
dispassionately that he has lied. By skilled manipulation of the
known, the questioner can convince a naive subject that all his
secrets are out and that further resistance would be not only
pointless but dangerous. If this technique does not work very
quickly, it must be dropped before the interrogatee learns the true
limits of the questioner's knowledge.

4. The Informer

Detention makes a number of tricks possible. One of these, planting
an informant as the source's cellmate, is so well-known, especially
in Communist countries, that its usefulness is impaired if not
destroyed. Less well known is the trick of planting two informants in
the cell. One of them, A, tries now and then to pry a little
information from the source; B remains quiet. At the proper time, and
during A's absence, B warns the source not to tell A anything because
B suspects him of being an informant planted by the authorities.

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Suspicion against a single cellmate may sometimes be broken down if
he shows the source a hidden microphone that he has "found" and
suggests that they talk only in whispers at the other end of the room.

5. News from Home

Allowing an interrogatee to receive carefully selected letters from
home can contribute to effects desired by the interrogator. Allowing
the source to write letters, especially if he can be led to believe
that they will be smuggled out without the knowledge of the
authorities, may produce information which is difficult to extract by
direct questioning.

6. The Witness

If others have accused the interrogatee of spying for a hostile
service or of other activity which he denies, there is a temptation
to confront the recalcitrant source with his accuser or accusers. But
a quick confrontation has two weaknesses: it is likely to intensify
the stubbornness of denials, and it spoils the chance to use more
subtle methods.

One of these is to place the interrogatee in an outer office and
escort past him, and into the inner office, an accuser whom he knows
personally or, in fact, any person -- even one who is friendly to the
source and uncooperative with the interrogators -- who is believed to
know something about whatever the interrogatee is concealing. It is
also essential that the interrogatee know or suspect that the witness
may be in possession of the incriminating information. The witness is
whisked past the interrogatee; the two are not allowed to speak to
each other. A guard and a stenographer remain in the outer office
with the interrogatee. After about an hour the interrogator who has
been questioning the interrogatee in past sessions opens the door and
asks the stenographer to come in, with steno pad and pencils. After a
time she re-emerges and types material from her pad, making several
carbons. She pauses, points at the interrogatee, and asks the guard
how

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his name is spelled. She may also ask the interrogatee directly for
the proper spelling of a street, a prison, the name of a Communist
intelligence officer, or any other factor closely linked to the
activity of which he is accused. She takes her completed work into
the inner office, comes back out, and telephones a request that
someone come up to act as legal witness. Another man appears and
enters the inner office. The person cast in the informer's role may
have been let out a back door at the beginning of these proceedings;
or if cooperative, he may continue his role. In either event, a
couple of interrogators, with or without the "informer", now emerge
from the inner office. In contrast to their earlier demeanor, they
are now relaxed and smiling. The interrogator in charge says to the
guard, "O.K., Tom, take him back. We don't need him any more." Even
if the interrogatee now insists on telling his side of the story, he
is told to relax, because the interrogator will get around to him
tomorrow or the next day.

A session with the witness may be recorded. If the witness denounces
the interrogatee there is no problem. If he does not, the
interrogator makes an effort to draw him out about a hostile agent
recently convicted in court or otherwise known to the witness. During
the next interrogation session with the source, a part of the taped
denunciation can be played back to him if necessary. Or the
witnesses' remarks about the known spy, edited as necessary, can be
so played back that the interrogatee is persuaded that he is the
subject of the remarks.

Cooperative witnesses may be coached to exaggerate so that if a
recording is played for the interrogatee or a confrontation is
arranged, the source -- for example, a suspected courier -- finds the
witness overstating his importance. The witness claims that the
interrogatee is only incidentally a courier, that actually he is the
head of an RIS kidnapping gang. The interrogator pretends amazement
and says into the recorder, "I thought he was only a courier; and if
he had told us the truth, I planned to let him go. But this is much
more serious. On the basis of charges

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like these I'll have to hand him over to the local police for trial."
On hearing these remarks, the interrogatee may confess the truth
about the lesser guilt in order to avoid heavier punishment. If he
continues to withhold, the interrogator may take his side by
stating, "You know, I'm not at all convinced that so-and-so told a
straight story. I feel, personally, that he was exaggerating a great
deal. Wasn't he? What's the true story?"

7. Joint Suspects

If two or more interrogation sources are suspected of joint
complicity in acts directed against U.S. security, they should be
separated immediately. If time permits, it may be a good idea
(depending upon the psychological assessment of both) to postpone
interrogation for about a week. Any anxious inquiries from either can
be met by a knowing grin and some such reply as, "We'll get to you in
due time. There's no hurry now ." If documents, witnesses, or other
sources yield information about interrogatee A, such remarks as "B
says it was in Smolensk that you denounced so-and-so to the secret
police. Is that right? Was it in 1937?" help to establish in A's mind
the impression that B is talking.

If the interrogator is quite certain of the facts in the case but
cannot secure an admission from either A or B, a written confession
may be prepared and A's signature may be reproduced on it. (It is
helpful if B can recognize A's signature, but not essential.) The
confession contains the salient facts, but they are distorted; the
confession shows that A is attempting to throw the entire
responsibility upon B. Edited tape recordings which sound as though A
had denounced B may also be used for the purpose, separately or in
conjunction with the written "confession." If A is feeling a little
ill or dispirited, he can also be led past a window or otherwise
shown to B without creating a chance for conversation; B is likely to
interpret A's hang-dog look as evidence of confession and
denunciation. (It is important that in all such gambits, A be the
weaker of the two, emotionally and psychologically.) B then reads (or
hears) A's "confession." If B persists in withholding, the

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interrogator should dismiss him promptly, saying that A's signed
confession is sufficient for the purpose and that it does not matter
whether B corroborates it or not. At the following session with B,
the interrogator selects some minor matter, not substantively
damaging to B but nevertheless exaggerated, and says, "I'm not sure A
was really fair to you here. Would you care to tell me your side of
the story?" If B rises to this bait, the interrogator moves on to
areas of greater significance.

The outer-and-inner office routine may also be employed. A, the
weaker, is brought into the inner office, and the door is left
slightly ajar or the transom open. B is later brought into the outer
office by a guard and placed where he can hear, though not too
clearly. The interrogator begins routine questioning of A, speaking
rather softly and inducing A to follow suit. Another person in the
inner office, acting by prearrangement, then quietly leads A out
through another door. Any noises of departure are covered by the
interrogator, who rattles the ash tray or moves a table or large
chair. As soon as the second door is closed again and A is out of
earshot, the interrogator resumes his questioning. His voice grows
louder and angrier. He tells A to speak up, that he can hardly hear
him. He grows abusive, reaches a climax, and then says, "Well, that's
better. Why didn't you say so in the first place?" The rest of the
monologue is designed to give B the impression that A has now started
to tell the truth. Suddenly the interrogator pops his head through
the doorway and is angry on seeing B and the guard. "You jerk!" he
says to the guard, "What are you doing here?" He rides down the
guard's mumbled attempt to explain the mistake, shouting, "Get him
out of here! I'll take care of you later!"

When, in the judgment of the interrogator, B is fairly well convinced
that A has broken down and told his story, the interrogator may elect
to say to B, "Now that A has come clean with us, I'd like to let him
go. But I hate to release one of you before the other; you ought to
get out at the same time. A seems to be pretty angry with you --
feels that you got him into this jam. He might even go back to your
Soviet case officer and say

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that you haven't returned because you agreed to stay here and work
for us. Wouldn't it be better for you if I set you both free
together? Wouldn't it be better to tell me your side of the story?"

8. Ivan Is a Dope

It may be useful to point out to a hostile agent that the cover story
was ill-contrived, that the other service botched the job, that it is
typical of the other service to ignore the welfare of its agents. The
interrogator may personalize this pitch by explaining that he has
been impressed by the agent's courage and intelligence. He sells the
agent the idea that the interrogator, not his old service, represents
a true friend, who understands him and will look after his welfare.

9. Joint Interrogators

The commonest of the joint interrogator techniques is the Mutt-and-
Jeff routine: the brutal, angry, domineering type contrasted with the
friendly, quiet type. This routine works best with women, teenagers,
and timid men. If the interrogator who has done the bulk of the
questioning up to this point has established a measure of rapport, he
should play the friendly role. If rapport is absent, and especially
if antagonism has developed, the principal interrogator may take the
other part. The angry interrogator speaks loudly from the beginning;
and unless the interrogatee clearly indicates that he is now ready to
tell his story, the angry interrogator shouts down his answers and
cuts him off. He thumps the table. The quiet interrogator should not
watch the show unmoved but give subtle indications that he too is
somewhat afraid of his colleague. The angry interrogator accuses the
subject of other offenses, any offenses, especially those that are
heinous or demeaning. He makes it plain that he personally considers
the interrogatee the vilest person on earth. During the harangue the
friendly, quiet interrogator breaks in to say, "Wait a minute, Jim.
Take it easy." The angry interrogator shouts back, "Shut up! I'm
handling this. I've broken crumb-bums before, and I'll break this
one, wide open." He expresses his disgust by spitting on

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the floor or holding his nose or any gross gesture. Finally, red-
faced and furious, he says, "I'm going to take a break, have a couple
of stiff drinks. But I'll be back at two -- and you, you bum, you
better be ready to talk." When the door slams behind him, the second
interrogator tells the subject how sorry he is, how he hates to work
with a man like that but has no choice, how if maybe brutes like that
would keep quiet and give a man a fair chance to tell his side of the
story, etc., etc.

An interrogator working alone can also use the Mutt-and-Jeff
technique. After a number of tense and hostile sessions the
interrogatee is ushered into a different or refurnished room with
comfortable furniture, cigarettes, etc. The interrogator invites him
to sit down and explains his regret that the source's former
stubbornness forced the interrogator to use such tactics. Now
everything will be different. The interrogator talks man-to-man. An
American POW, debriefed on his interrogation by a hostile service
that used this approach, has described the result: "Well, I went in
and there was a man, an officer he was... -- he asked me to sit down
and was very friendly.... It was very terrific. I, well, I almost
felt like I had a friend sitting there. I had to stop every now and
then and realize that this man wasn't a friend of mine.... I also
felt as though I couldn't be rude to him.... It was much more
difficult for me to -- well, I almost felt I had as much
responsibility to talk to him and reason and justification as I have
to talk to you right now."(18)

Another joint technique casts both interrogators in friendly roles.
But whereas the interrogator in charge is sincere, the second
interrogator's manner and voice convey the impression that he is
merely pretending sympathy in order to trap the interrogated. He
slips in a few trick questions of the "When-did-you-stop-beating-your-
wife?" category. The interrogator in charge warns his colleague to
desist. When he repeats the tactics, the interrogator in charge says,
with a slight show of anger, "We're not here to trap people but to
get at the truth. I suggest that you leave now. I'll handle this."

It is usually unproductive to cast both interrogators in hostile
roles.

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Language

If the recalcitrant subject speaks more than one language, it is
better to question him in the tongue with which he is least familiar
as long as the purpose of interrogation is to obtain a confession.
After the interrogatee admits hostile intent or activity, a switch to
the better-known language will facilitate follow-up.

An abrupt switch of languages may trick a resistant source. If an
interrogatee has withstood a barrage of questions in German or
Korean, for example, a sudden shift to "Who is your case officer?" in
Russian may trigger the answer before the source can stop himself.

An interrogator quite at home in the language being used may
nevertheless elect to use an interpreter if the interrogatee does not
know the language to be used between the interrogator and interpreter
and also does not know that the interrogator knows his own tongue.
The principal advantage here is that hearing everything twice helps
the interrogator to note voice, _expression, gestures, and other
indicators more attentively. This gambit is obviously unsuitable for
any form of rapid-fire questioning, and in any case it has the
disadvantage of allowing the subject to pull himself together after
each query. It should be used only with an interpreter who has been
trained in the technique.

It is of basic importance that the interrogator not using an
interpreter be adept in the language selected for use. If he is not,
if slips of grammar or a strong accent mar his speech, the resistant
source will usually feel fortified. Almost all people have been
conditioned to relate verbal skill to intelligence, education, social
status, etc. Errors or mispronunciations also permit the interrogatee
to misunderstand or feign misunderstanding and thus gain time. He may
also resort to polysyllabic obfuscations upon realizing the
limitations of the interrogator's vocabulary.

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Spinoza and Mortimer Snerd

If there is reason to suspect that a withholding source possesses
useful counterintelligence information but has not had access to the
upper reaches of the target organizations, the policy and command
level, continued questioning about lofty topics that the source knows
nothing about may pave the way for the extraction of information at
lower levels. The interrogatee is asked about KGB policy, for
example: the relation of the service to its government, its liaison
arrangements, etc., etc. His complaints that he knows nothing of such
matters are met by flat insistence that he does know, he would have
to know, that even the most stupid men in his position know.
Communist interrogators who used this tactic against American POW's
coupled it with punishment for "don't know" responses -- typically by
forcing the prisoner to stand at attention until he gave some
positive response. After the process had been continued long enough,
the source was asked a question to which he did know the answer.
Numbers of Americans have mentioned "...the tremendous feeling of
relief you get when he finally asks you something you can answer."
One said, "I know it seems strange now, but I was positively grateful
to them when they switched to a topic I knew something about."(3)

The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

It has been suggested that a successfully withholding source might be
tricked into compliance if led to believe that he is dealing with the
opposition. The success of the ruse depends upon a successful
imitation of the opposition. A case officer previously unknown to the
source and skilled in the appropriate language talks with the source
under such circumstances that the latter is convinced that he is
dealing with the opposition. The source is debriefed on what he has
told the Americans and what he has not told them. The trick is
likelier to succeed if the interrogatee has not been in confinement
but a staged "escape," engineered by a stool-pigeon, might achieve
the same end. Usually the trick is so complicated and risky that its
employment is not recommended.

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Alice in Wonderland

The aim of the Alice in Wonderland or confusion technique is to
confound the expectations and conditioned reactions of the
interrogatee. He is accustomed to a world that makes some sense, at
least to him: a world of continuity and logic, a predictable world.
He clings to this world to reinforce his identity and powers of
resistance.

The confusion technique is designed not only to obliterate the
familiar but to replace it with the weird. Although this method can
be employed by a single interrogator, it is better adapted to use by
two or three. When the subject enters the room, the first
interrogator asks a doubletalk question -- one which seems
straightforward but is essentially nonsensical. Whether the
interrogatee tries to answer or not, the second interrogator follows
up (interrupting any attempted response) with a wholly unrelated and
equally illogical query. Sometimes two or more questions are asked
simultaneously. Pitch, tone, and volume of the interrogators' voices
are unrelated to the import of the questions. No pattern of questions
and answers is permitted to develop, nor do the questions themselves
relate logically to each other. In this strange atmosphere the
subject finds that the pattern of speech and thought which he has
learned to consider normal have been replaced by an eerie
meaninglessness. The interrogatee may start laughing or refuse to
take the situation seriously. But as the process continues, day after
day if necessary, the subject begins to try to make sense of the
situation, which becomes mentally intolerable. Now he is likely to
make significant admissions, or even to pour out his story, just to
stop the flow of babble which assails him. This technique may be
especially effective with the orderly, obstinate type.

DEVAMI

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