02/02/1991
GEORGIA, SOVIET UNION: SOUTH OSSETIAN CITY OF TSKHINVALI IN TURMOIL BECAUSE OF ETHNIC UNREST Email page Print
Story
Soviet Interior Ministry patrols attempting to control the restive Ossetia area of Georgia are under constant threat of ambush.

The South Ossetian Autonomous Republic, an ethnic enclave within Georgia, declared itself a full-fledged republic in December, setting off a dispute with Georgia, which itself is seeking independence from the Soviet Union.

Georgian lawmakers voted to nullify the South Ossetian autonomy declaration and declared a state of emergency in the region.

President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in turn, nullified both the Ossetian and Georgian declarations.

A spokesman for the republic's Interior Ministry told Tass that the South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali was in turmoil because of ethnic unrest.

Houses have been set ablaze, local residents believe, by provocateurs who are former criminals both of Georgian and Ossetian nationality.

31/01/1991
SOVIET UNION: GEORGIAN POLICE AND SOVIET INTERIOR MINISTRY TROOPERS PATROL STREETS OF TSKHINVALI Email page Print

Story
Georgian police and Soviet Interior Ministry troopers patrolled the streets of Tskhinvali in South Ossetia on Wednesday (January 30), despite protests from the Russian Federation government.

At least 20 people have died in fighting between Georgians and mainly Moslem Ossetians in the past few weeks. The Soviet interior and defence ministries said the military patrols were necessary to counter a rising tide of crime. A bullet-riddled body was found on Wednesday in Tskhinvali and bullet holes were visible across town.

South Ossetia wants to secede from Georgia because of the republic's declared intention to secede from the Soviet Union. Georgia has rejected an order by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to restore the area's autonomy.

The Russian Federation government has denounced the deployment of Soviet soldiers in Tskhinvali as a gross violation of the sovereignty of the Georgian republic. It said the patrols could destabilise the political situation and it demanded that the Soviet government put a stop to the plan.

შავლეგოს კომენტარი ამ კომენტარზე
ეს ძალზე საინტერესო ცნობაა და კარგად უჩვენებს ავტორის ტვინის მოწყობა-გაწყობას განსაკუთრებით: „between Georgians and mainly Moslem Ossetians“ -- თურმე ყოფილ „სამხრეთ ოსეთოს აო“-ში მცხოვრები ოსების უდიდესი ნაწილი მუსლიმი ყოფილა... ეგეთი ტვინი მართავდა და მართავს ანტიქართულ ისტერიას მთელს მსოფლიოში...

SOVIET UNION: GEORGIANS DEFY MOSCOW'S ORDERS TO PULL POLICE OUT OF TROUBLED SOUTH OSSETIA Email page Print
Story
About 5,000 people rallied outside the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi on Thursday (January 10) in support of their government's defiance of Moscow's orders to pull police out of the Moslem enclave of South Ossetia.

The Georgian parliament voted unanimously on Wednesday (January 9) to defy Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's order to remove police from the troubled territory.

The parliamentary said any attempt to enforce the ban would be tantamount to "an act of war".

The largely-Moslem area of South Ossetia wants to secede from Georgia but has had its autonomy abolished by the republic's parliament.

Several people have been killed in clashes between Georgians, who have a Christian tradition, and Ossetians. Moscow has despatched Soviet Interior Ministry troops to the Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, to help keep the peace.

The Defence Ministry on Monday (January 7) also included Georgia among seven areas were it said military force would be used to ensure compliance with conscription orders.

მე მაქვს საშუალება მოგაწოდოთ რუსული პრესის მასალები ბატონ ზვიადზე, თუ საიტის ადმინისტაცია არ არის წინააღმდეგ.

შავლეგოს პასუხი:
ძალიან კარგი - მოგვაწოდეთ

01/02/1991
SOVIET UNION: PRESIDENT OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA SAID THE DECISION NOT TO ALLOW SOVIET TROOPS TO PATROL CITY STREETS WAS A MARK OF THE REPUBLIC'S INDEPENDENCE. Email page Print
Story
The President of the Soviet Republic of Georgia said on Thursday (January 31) that the Republic's decision not to allow Soviet troops to patrol city streets was made as a sign of political independence.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia said the Soviet constitution did not work any more, so the Georgian Parliament was rescinding Soviet laws which contradicted the republic's statutes.

As about 1500 protestors gathered to oppose the presence of the Soviet troops, Gamsakhurdia called on the United States (US) to fight wars on two fronts - against Iraq in the Gulf and for human rights in the Soviet Union.

Soviet troops were due to patrol city streets throughout the Soviet Union from Friday (February 1) following ethnic unrest in Transcaucasia and elsewhere.

The patrols are officially designed only to help fight crime on the streets, but opposition leaders said the move was to suppress resistance to looming economic and political reforms.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.
Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.
Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (3)
Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.
Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Footnotes :

The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.

On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.

13 October 2006
Security Council
SC/8851

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Security Council

5549th Meeting* (AM)

SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS GEORGIA MISSION UNTIL 15 APRIL 2007,

UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1716 (2006)

Urging both parties in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to act to reduce renewed tensions in the region, the Security Council this morning extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 April 2007.

By the unanimous adoption of resolution 1716 (2006), the Council, acknowledging that the “new and tense situation” resulted, at least in part, from the Georgian special operation in the upper Kodori Valley, urged the country to ensure that no troops unauthorized by the Moscow ceasefire agreement were present in that area.

It urged the leadership of the Abkhaz side to facilitate the dignified, secure return of refugees and internally displaced persons and to reassure the local population in the Gali district that their residency rights and identity will be respected.

Calling on both parties to follow up on dialogue initiatives, it further urged them to comply fully with all previous agreements regarding non-violence and confidence-building, in particular those concerning the separation of forces.

Regarding the disputed role of the peacekeepers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Council stressed the importance of close, effective cooperation between UNOMIG and that force and looked to all sides to continue to extend the necessary cooperation to them.

The Council meeting began at 10:28 a.m. and ended at 10:31 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1716 (2006) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1666 of 31 March 2006 (S/RES/1666),

“Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) of 28 September 2006,

“Supporting the sustained efforts of the Secretary-General and of his Special Representative with the assistance of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator, as well as of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),

“Regretting the continued lack of progress on key issues of a comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict,

“Acknowledging with concern the observation of the Secretary-General that a new and tense situation has emerged between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides, in particular as a result of the Georgian special operation in the upper Kodori Valley,

“1. Reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, and supports all efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General which are guided by their determination to promote a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict only by peaceful means and within the framework of the Security Council resolutions;

“2. Recalls, with a view to achieving a lasting and comprehensive settlement, its support for the principles contained in the “Paper on Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi” and welcomes additional ideas that the sides would be willing to offer with a view to conducting creatively and constructively a political dialogue under the aegis of the United Nations;

“3. Having in mind the relevant Security Council resolutions containing an appeal to both sides to refrain from any action that might impede the peace process, expresses its concern with regard to the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Valley in July 2006, and to all violations of the Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces of 14 May 1994, and other Georgian-Abkhaz agreements concerning the Kodori Valley;

“4. Urges the Georgian side to ensure that the situation in the upper Kodori Valley is in line with the Moscow agreement and that no troops unauthorized by this agreement are present;

“5. Notes with satisfaction the resumption of joint patrols in the upper Kodori Valley by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force and reaffirms that such joint patrols should be conducted on a regular basis;

“6. Urges both parties to comply fully with previous agreements and understandings regarding ceasefire, non-use of violence and confidence-building measures, and stresses the need to strictly observe the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and the Separation of Forces in the air, on the sea and on land, including in the Kodori Valley

“7. Acknowledges the important role of the CIS peacekeeping force and of UNOMIG in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, stresses the importance of close and effective cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force as they currently play a stabilizing role in the conflict zone, looks to all sides to continue to extend the necessary cooperation to them and recalls that a lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict will require appropriate security guarantees;

“8. Once again urges the Georgian side to address seriously legitimate Abkhaz security concerns, to avoid steps which could be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant rhetoric and provocative actions, especially in upper Kodori Valley;

“9. Urges the Abkhaz leadership to address seriously the need for a dignified return of IDPs and refugees, including their security and human rights concerns, publicly reassure the local population, particularly in the Gali district, that their residency rights and identity will be respected, and move without delay on implementing past commitments relating to United Nations police advisers, a United Nations human rights sub-office and the language of instruction;

“10. Urges both parties to finalize without delay the package of documents on the non-use of violence and on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons for the Gali district and to undertake necessary steps to secure the protection and dignity of the civilian population including the returnees;

“11. Commends the presentation by both sides of ideas as a basis for dialogue and calls on the two sides to resume this dialogue by using all existing mechanisms as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to come to a peaceful settlement;

“12. Calls on both parties to follow up on their expressed readiness for a meeting of their highest authorities without preconditions and to maintain open channels of communication to build confidence, and encourages further contacts between representatives of civil society;

“13. Calls on the Secretary-General to explore with the sides ways and means to build confidence, in particular by improving welfare and security of the inhabitants of Gali and Zugdidi districts;

“14. Supports all efforts by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to engage constructively in economic cooperation as envisaged in the Geneva meetings and complemented by the working groups established in Sotchi in March 2003, including, security conditions permitting, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and welcomes the intention expressed by Germany to host a meeting on economic cooperation and confidence-building measures, pending progress in the conflict resolution process;

“15. Underlines that it is the primary responsibility of both sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure the freedom of movement of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and other international personnel and calls on both sides to fulfil their obligations in this regard;

“16. Welcomes the efforts being undertaken by UNOMIG to implement the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“17. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 15 April 2007;

“18. Requests the Secretary-General to include detailed information on developments in the Kodori Valley and on the progress on efforts for return of refugees and IDPs particularly to the Gali district into his next report on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia;

“19. Strongly supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and calls on the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General to continue giving him their steadfast and unified support;

“20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Background

The Security Council had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, which discusses new tensions in the long-running dispute between Georgian authorities and Abkhaz separatists, and reviews the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in the country.

The Secretary-General says that the new tensions stemmed in part from an operation by Georgian special forces in the Kodori Valley on 25 July, after which the Abkhaz side questioned the usefulness of attempting to reach further agreements in the framework of the settlement process.

The report notes that the Government of Georgia has made it known that it considered the current settlement process ineffective and has called urgently for its restructuring around the principles of direct dialogue between the two sides and greater international involvement.

In the report, the Secretary-General urges dialogue between the two sides, which fought each other 14 years ago, adding that a resumption of violence would be the worst possible outcome. He also urges both sides to strictly observe the Moscow agreement that ended the fighting, particularly the provisions on transparency in movement of armed forces, maintenance of communication channels and monitoring of the Kodori Valley.

Citing the increased tension in the region, he recommends that UNOMIG’s mandate be extended for another six months beyond its current deadline of 15 October.

The conflict in Abkhazia, strategically located on the Black Sea, began with social unrest and attempts by the local authorities to separate from the Republic of Georgia. It escalated into a series of armed confrontations in the summer of 1992. A ceasefire agreement was concluded later that year, but was never fully implemented and the fighting that followed forced nearly 300,000 refugees to flee their homes.

UNOMIG was set up in August 1993 and currently has 121 military observers and 12 civilian police officers.

The 5547th & 5548th Meetings were closed.

13 October 2006
Security Council
SC/8851

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Security Council

5549th Meeting* (AM)

SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS GEORGIA MISSION UNTIL 15 APRIL 2007,

UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 1716 (2006)

Urging both parties in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to act to reduce renewed tensions in the region, the Security Council this morning extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 April 2007.

By the unanimous adoption of resolution 1716 (2006), the Council, acknowledging that the “new and tense situation” resulted, at least in part, from the Georgian special operation in the upper Kodori Valley, urged the country to ensure that no troops unauthorized by the Moscow ceasefire agreement were present in that area.

It urged the leadership of the Abkhaz side to facilitate the dignified, secure return of refugees and internally displaced persons and to reassure the local population in the Gali district that their residency rights and identity will be respected.

Calling on both parties to follow up on dialogue initiatives, it further urged them to comply fully with all previous agreements regarding non-violence and confidence-building, in particular those concerning the separation of forces.

Regarding the disputed role of the peacekeepers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Council stressed the importance of close, effective cooperation between UNOMIG and that force and looked to all sides to continue to extend the necessary cooperation to them.

The Council meeting began at 10:28 a.m. and ended at 10:31 a.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1716 (2006) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 1666 of 31 March 2006 (S/RES/1666),

“Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) of 28 September 2006,

“Supporting the sustained efforts of the Secretary-General and of his Special Representative with the assistance of the Russian Federation in its capacity as facilitator, as well as of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),

“Regretting the continued lack of progress on key issues of a comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict,

“Acknowledging with concern the observation of the Secretary-General that a new and tense situation has emerged between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides, in particular as a result of the Georgian special operation in the upper Kodori Valley,

“1. Reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, and supports all efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General which are guided by their determination to promote a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict only by peaceful means and within the framework of the Security Council resolutions;

“2. Recalls, with a view to achieving a lasting and comprehensive settlement, its support for the principles contained in the “Paper on Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi” and welcomes additional ideas that the sides would be willing to offer with a view to conducting creatively and constructively a political dialogue under the aegis of the United Nations;

“3. Having in mind the relevant Security Council resolutions containing an appeal to both sides to refrain from any action that might impede the peace process, expresses its concern with regard to the actions of the Georgian side in the Kodori Valley in July 2006, and to all violations of the Moscow agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces of 14 May 1994, and other Georgian-Abkhaz agreements concerning the Kodori Valley;

“4. Urges the Georgian side to ensure that the situation in the upper Kodori Valley is in line with the Moscow agreement and that no troops unauthorized by this agreement are present;

“5. Notes with satisfaction the resumption of joint patrols in the upper Kodori Valley by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force and reaffirms that such joint patrols should be conducted on a regular basis;

“6. Urges both parties to comply fully with previous agreements and understandings regarding ceasefire, non-use of violence and confidence-building measures, and stresses the need to strictly observe the Moscow Agreement on Ceasefire and the Separation of Forces in the air, on the sea and on land, including in the Kodori Valley

“7. Acknowledges the important role of the CIS peacekeeping force and of UNOMIG in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone, stresses the importance of close and effective cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force as they currently play a stabilizing role in the conflict zone, looks to all sides to continue to extend the necessary cooperation to them and recalls that a lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict will require appropriate security guarantees;

“8. Once again urges the Georgian side to address seriously legitimate Abkhaz security concerns, to avoid steps which could be seen as threatening and to refrain from militant rhetoric and provocative actions, especially in upper Kodori Valley;

“9. Urges the Abkhaz leadership to address seriously the need for a dignified return of IDPs and refugees, including their security and human rights concerns, publicly reassure the local population, particularly in the Gali district, that their residency rights and identity will be respected, and move without delay on implementing past commitments relating to United Nations police advisers, a United Nations human rights sub-office and the language of instruction;

“10. Urges both parties to finalize without delay the package of documents on the non-use of violence and on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons for the Gali district and to undertake necessary steps to secure the protection and dignity of the civilian population including the returnees;

“11. Commends the presentation by both sides of ideas as a basis for dialogue and calls on the two sides to resume this dialogue by using all existing mechanisms as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions in order to come to a peaceful settlement;

“12. Calls on both parties to follow up on their expressed readiness for a meeting of their highest authorities without preconditions and to maintain open channels of communication to build confidence, and encourages further contacts between representatives of civil society;

“13. Calls on the Secretary-General to explore with the sides ways and means to build confidence, in particular by improving welfare and security of the inhabitants of Gali and Zugdidi districts;

“14. Supports all efforts by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to engage constructively in economic cooperation as envisaged in the Geneva meetings and complemented by the working groups established in Sotchi in March 2003, including, security conditions permitting, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and welcomes the intention expressed by Germany to host a meeting on economic cooperation and confidence-building measures, pending progress in the conflict resolution process;

“15. Underlines that it is the primary responsibility of both sides to provide appropriate security and to ensure the freedom of movement of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force and other international personnel and calls on both sides to fulfil their obligations in this regard;

“16. Welcomes the efforts being undertaken by UNOMIG to implement the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“17. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a new period terminating on 15 April 2007;

“18. Requests the Secretary-General to include detailed information on developments in the Kodori Valley and on the progress on efforts for return of refugees and IDPs particularly to the Gali district into his next report on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia;

“19. Strongly supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and calls on the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General to continue giving him their steadfast and unified support;

“20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.”

Background

The Security Council had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, which discusses new tensions in the long-running dispute between Georgian authorities and Abkhaz separatists, and reviews the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in the country.

The Secretary-General says that the new tensions stemmed in part from an operation by Georgian special forces in the Kodori Valley on 25 July, after which the Abkhaz side questioned the usefulness of attempting to reach further agreements in the framework of the settlement process.

The report notes that the Government of Georgia has made it known that it considered the current settlement process ineffective and has called urgently for its restructuring around the principles of direct dialogue between the two sides and greater international involvement.

In the report, the Secretary-General urges dialogue between the two sides, which fought each other 14 years ago, adding that a resumption of violence would be the worst possible outcome. He also urges both sides to strictly observe the Moscow agreement that ended the fighting, particularly the provisions on transparency in movement of armed forces, maintenance of communication channels and monitoring of the Kodori Valley.

Citing the increased tension in the region, he recommends that UNOMIG’s mandate be extended for another six months beyond its current deadline of 15 October.

The conflict in Abkhazia, strategically located on the Black Sea, began with social unrest and attempts by the local authorities to separate from the Republic of Georgia. It escalated into a series of armed confrontations in the summer of 1992. A ceasefire agreement was concluded later that year, but was never fully implemented and the fighting that followed forced nearly 300,000 refugees to flee their homes.

UNOMIG was set up in August 1993 and currently has 121 military observers and 12 civilian police officers.

The 5547th & 5548th Meetings were closed.

Regions and territories: Abkhazia
Situated in the north-western corner of Georgia with the Black Sea to the south-west and the Caucasus mountains and Russia to the north-east, Abkhazia was once known as a prime holiday destination for the Soviet elite.

It was also an important tea, citrus fruit and tobacco growing area.

Abkhazia's battle for independence from Georgia since the collapse of the USSR has reduced the economy to ruins. The only things to thrive are the atmosphere of instability and Russo-Georgian rivalry for influence, although Russian tourists are beginning to return.

OVERVIEW


OVERVIEW | FACTS | LEADERS | MEDIA


Once part of the ancient Greek and Roman empires, Abkhazia adopted Christianity in the sixth century. With the rise of the Ottoman empire 500 years later, Islam gained increasing influence.

The ethnic Abkhaz people have close historical, linguistic and cultural ties with the peoples of the Russian North Caucasus which put up fierce resistance to Moscow's expansionism in the first half of the 19th century.


Abkhazia was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1810 as a protectorate and finally annexed in 1864. Many Abkhaz fled and many Russians and Georgians arrived in the years which followed.

After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Abkhazia gained a measure of autonomy until Stalin, who liked to holiday there, incorporated it into Georgia in 1931.

It was still called an autonomous republic but there was very little sign of genuine autonomy while Stalin was alive. Georgian became the official language and the Abkhaz language and cultural rights were repressed. Many Georgians were resettled there. The repression eased substantially after Khrushchev came to power in the Kremlin.

KEY DATES
1810 - Russia declares Abkhazia a protectorate
1864 - Russia annexes Abkhazia
1921 - Abkhazia declared Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
1931 - Soviet authorities incorporate Abkhazia into Georgia
1991 - Georgia declares independence
1992 - Georgia sends troops to quell calls in Abkhazia for break with Georgia and closer ties with Russia
1993 - Fierce fighting ends with Georgian forces being expelled from Abkhazia
1994 - Independence declared, ceasefire agreed, CIS peacekeepers arrive, nearly all Russian. Vladislav Ardzinba becomes president
2005 - Sergei Bagapsh becomes president

At the time of the collapse of the USSR in 1991, less than a fifth of the people of Abkhazia were ethnic Abkhaz while the rest of the population was made up largely of Georgians.

When Georgia became independent, supporters of a break with Tbilisi in favour of independence and closer ties with Russia became more vociferous. Tension rose and in 1992 Georgia sent troops to enforce the status quo.

In late 1993, they were driven out amidst fierce fighting. Several thousand people were killed. About 250,000 Georgians became refugees and are still unable to return. Most of those who remained have since left too.

Abkhazia declared independence early in 1994. It has never been recognised by a single country and the price has been high indeed. An economic embargo remains in force and Abkhazia is isolated in just about every sense of the word except from Russia which maintains a border crossing and has re-opened the railway line to Sukhumi.

Moscow has further infuriated Tbilisi by making it easy for people in Abkhazia to gain Russian citizenship. Most now hold Russian passports.

Georgia insists, and many observers tend not to disagree, that Russia supported the campaign to expel Georgian forces in 1993. Incongruously, the Abkhaz forces also had help from Chechen fighters, their traditional Caucasus allies and at the same time the sworn enemies of Moscow.


The rivalries became still more complex in 2001 when the Kremlin accused Tbilisi of allowing Chechen fighters to take refuge from Russian forces in the Pankisi Gorge, home of their kinspeople, the Kists. Anyone criticised by Russia is likely to rise in Chechen estimation. The accusation forged a new Chechen bond with Georgia.

There were fears of renewed fighting and perhaps wider conflagration across the Caucasus in the autumn of 2001 when Georgian partisans and new allies from among the Chechen fighters were reported to have fought their way through Abkhaz lines.

Moscow agreed in 1999 to the closure of its base at Gudauta in the conflict zone, pledging that henceforth it would be for the sole use of peacekeepers. Georgia still alleges that it is used to offer military support to pro-independence forces and, because it says it has been unable to gain access to inspect it, still expresses doubts about whether the base is genuinely used purely for peacekeeping purposes.

The fragile peace is maintained by UN military observers and CIS, in effect Russian, peacekeepers. The UN patrols the buffer zone which keeps the Abkhaz and Georgian sides apart. There are sporadic shootings and kidnappings with the potential for violent explosion never far beneath the surface.

UN efforts to mediate have got nowhere. Abkhazia, turning increasingly towards Moscow, insists there can be no settlement until Georgia recognises its independence, something which Tbilisi has sworn it will never do. There is no sign that a way out of this volatile impasse will soon be found.

FACTS


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Status: Republic within Georgia
Population: (1991) 550,000 (2003) approximately 250,000
Capital: Sukhumi
Major languages: Russian, Georgian, Abkhaz
Currency: Rouble
Major religions: Christianity, Islam
Natural resources: Agricultural, primarily citrus fruit, tobacco, tea, timber; some coal, hydro-electric power
LEADERS


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President: Sergei Bagapsh

Sergei Bagapsh was elected president in January 2005.


The vote was a rerun of the previous October's election which was surrounded by controversy, with allegations of widespread irregularities.

At that time, a divided Abkhaz electoral commission declared Mr Bagapsh the winner over the Kremlin-backed candidate, Raul Khadzhimba. This brought turmoil, with the Supreme Court first upholding Mr Bagapsh but changing its mind after supporters of Mr Khadzhimba rampaged through the court building.

In the end, Mr Bagapsh and Mr Khadzhimba, both strong supporters of Abkhaz independence, agreed to campaign on a joint ticket in the January 2005 rerun, with Mr Bagapsh standing as president and Mr Khadzhimba as vice president.

Mr Bagapsh has said that relations with Tbilisi must be sorted out through negotiations between "two sovereign states". He pledges to build integration with Russia and rules out compromise with the Georgian authorities on sovereignty.

Mr Bagapsh was Abkhaz prime minister between 1997 and 2001. He has a Georgian wife.

Vice President Khadzhimba was prime minister until immediately after the October 2004 elections

MEDIA


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The government operates radio and TV networks and publishes the main newspapers. The broadcasting infrastructure is poor; much of it was destroyed during the civil war.

Private radio and TV stations are not permitted to broadcast news and political programmes. Newspaper and magazine publishing is hindered by a lack of money and the scarcity of paper and printing facilities.

Georgian and Russian TV and radio stations can be received across much of Abkhazia.

The press

Respublika Abkhazia
Apsny
Ekho Abikhazii - weekly
Nuzhnaya Gazeta - weekly
Television

Abkhaz State TV and Radio Company
Radio

Abkhaz State TV and Radio Company
News agency

Apsnypress - official

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3261059.stm

Published: 2006/04/05 16:24:26 GMT

© BBC MMVI

No: 43(308)
Date: 26-10-99


В новое тысячелетие человечество входит с новым оружием. Давно уже расходятся самые противоречивые слухи об экспериментах, испытаниях и боевом использовании психотронного оружия, принципиально новых систем ПВО и о многом другом.
Рассказать корреспонденту газеты "Завтра" о новейших видах вооружений, которые, возможно, будут определять лицо глобальных военно-политических противостояний нового столетия, согласился один из разработчиков психотронного и плазменного оружия Юрий Юрьевич ЛЕОНОВ.
ЛЕОНОВ Юрий Юрьевич родился в Москве. В 1963 году закончил МГУ, работал преподавателем в школе, был лидером Всероссийского объединения рабочих профсоюзов "Защита", в 1993 году в составе фракции КПРФ стал депутатом Государственной думы.

КОРРЕСПОНДЕНТ. К нам в редакцию приходит множество людей, которые жалуются на некие таинственные манипуляции, которым они якобы подвергаются. В результате изменяется их сознание, развивается бессонница, психические расстройства, даже соматические заболевания. Настораживает то, что, скажем, еще в первой половине ХX века мании и прочие психические заболевания носили другой характер. Такого технотронного, электронного бреда не было. Какая доля реальности стоит или может стоять за подобными жалобами? Что такое зомбирование, что такое психотронное воздействие на психику?
Юрий ЛЕОНОВ. Надо сказать, что сегодня существуют разработки, в принципе позволяющие осуществлять подобные воздействия. Почти все, о чем вы говорили, на что в последнее время жалуются люди, реально существует и активно разрабатывается российскими органами безопасности. Я должен доложить, что в руках ельцинской власти это оружие выглядит очень страшным. 20 лет назад в Советском Союзе проводились аналогичные разработки, но они имели гораздо меньший уровень технологического развития. Тогда это оружие не могло ни в коей мере использоваться против народа, против видных политических деятелей. Сегодня мы можем с уверенностью утверждать, что разработки, о которых идет речь, — это реально существующее нейрофизическое оружие. Оно активно используется против политических и экономических лидеров, в том числе против лидеров оппозиции. Это, собственно, и заставило меня прийти в вашу газету.
Корр. На коллективе газеты "Завтра" сказывается большая ответственность за печатное слово. Мы постоянно работаем с людьми. Тем не менее, мы не чувствуем на себе воздействие импульсов этого оружия, хотя прекрасно воспринимаем массу всяческих воздействий: и внутренних, и внешних. Противнику, по идее, не мешало бы подавить этот очаг духовного сопротивления, сделать нас безумными. Но этого не происходит. Почему?
Ю.Л. Здесь можно сказать следующее. Во-первых, люди с сильной волей гораздо менее подвержены энергетическим воздействиям. Они могут просто не достигать цели. Зомбировать можно не каждого человека. Но некоторыми, даже большинством людей, вполне можно управлять. В случае с убийством генерала Рохлина я могу с уверенностью сказать, что были все возможности организовать воздействие на его жену, создать у нее временное помутнение сознания и даже вызвать галлюцинации. Особенность психотронного воздействия состоит еще и в том, что сознание не только помутняется, оно становится управляемым. То есть мало того, что объект выводится из состояния психического равновесия, у тех, кто осуществляет так называемое "зомбирование", есть все возможности направлять человека практически на любые действия, вплоть до самоубийства или убийства.
Корр. Ну а как это выглядит технически? Есть, например, ружье с оптикой: ставишь прицел, нажимаешь спуск — и башка разлетается. Я знаю, что такое "Шмель"… А как происходит то, о чем вы говорите? Что, подкатывается машина-фургон, в машине сидит человек и внушает?
Ю.Л. Здесь есть два основных способа воздействия. Первый. Людей, которые этим занимаются, можно назвать гипнотизерами. Это люди, которые обладают соответствующими способностями и прошли определенную школу. Гипнотизера для простых акций, при наличии у него природных данных, можно подготовить всего за месяц. И есть второй способ — технологический. Существуют определенные частоты волн, которые воздействуют на психику человека совершенно определенным образом. У вас в одном из номеров газеты был такой материал. Говорилось о том, что в начале 60-х годов американцы, а чуть позже и наши, начали разрабатывать психотронное оружие, но оно было очень примитивным. В каком плане? Находились частоты, которые действовали только на очаги сознания, регулирующие простейшие действия, например: спать, есть, размножаться, убивать. Дальше этого дело не продвигалось. Сегодняшние возможности, в том числе технологические, позволяют оперировать человеческой психикой и мотивацией человеческих поступков в гораздо более широком диапазоне. Сегодня созданы приборы, которые создают волны на таких частотах, которые позволяют варьировать более сложные психические реакции. При этом надо учитывать, что такие приборы способны действовать на очень большом расстоянии, то есть облучатель может находиться в полукилометре от вас, он может пробивать бетонные заграждения и так далее.
Корр. Вы в свое время разрабатывали это оружие. Как выглядит лаборатория, как выглядит эксперимент? Насколько высок процент эффективности действия психотронного оружия, и каким образом он учитывается?
Ю.Л. Это оружие уже несколько лет — самая настоящая боевая реальность. Эксперименты проводились и в КГБ на ничего не подозревающих людях. КГБ использовал совершенно одиноких людей, в основном пожилых, это в каком-то смысле можно было назвать гуманным. Сегодня происходит определенный беспредел. ФСБ настолько загорелась разработкой такого заманчивого для нее вооружения, что эксперименты проводятся практически на всех людях. Достаточно того, что вы, допустим, живете на девятом этаже двенадцатиэтажного дома. На чердаке устанавливается специальный облучатель, который и обеспечивает проведение эксперимента над вами и вашими соседями. И надо сказать, что уровень технологии, уровень умений и знаний специального отдела ФСБ позволяют давать до 95% "положительных" результатов. Даже человек с сильной волей наверняка почувствует на себе это воздействие. Его воля будет сопротивляться. Но в любом случае воздействие скажется на его психическом состоянии. Когда сильная воля противостоит каким-то воздействиям, это обычно выражается в усталости, раздражительности. Вы об этой усталости говорили.
Корр. В России полтора миллиона людей исчезает ежегодно. Нормальный человек вполне справляется с непрерывными стрессами на работе. Если его облучают микроволнами — это сложнее. Если человек просто смотрит НТВ, где 90 процентов сюжетов специально подобраны — смерть, насилие, разврат, у него возникают, конечно, усталость, злоба, раздражительность, но тем не менее, он все-таки психически самостоятелен. Психотронное оружие способно наносить больший урон психике, чем стрессы и телевизор?
Ю.Л. Берем второй аспект действия этого оружия. Это аспект сознательно наведенного воздействия того, что у нас в литературе очень удачно названо популярным словом "зомбирование". Но нужно учесть то, что сегодня ФСБ обладает методикой полного считывания мыслей, просмотра самой потаенной информации человека. Это представляется еще большей опасностью при работе опять-таки с деятелями оппозиции, с депутатами Госдумы. ФСБ сегодня способно считывать внутреннюю психическую информацию человека. Эффект телепатии только лишь кажется загадочным. Еще недавно Вольф Мессинг демонстрировал чудеса телепатии. Но это был феномен, это были единичные случаи. Сегодня телепатические технологии, в частности, те, что находятся в руках ФСБ, позволяют считывать внутреннюю информацию практически у любого человека.
Корр. В чем физика этого явления?
Ю.Л. Информация по этим экспериментам достаточно закрытая, но специалисты ее все равно уже знают, а рядовым гражданам это будет очень интересно. Существует эффект голографии. Как известно, первая голограмма была получена в Советском Союзе в начале 60-х годов. Физика этого явления состоит в том, что существуют предметная и опорная волна. Предметная волна — это, допустим, вы сами, человек, который подвергается воздействию определенного излучения, излучения определенной частоты. Далее достаточно создать опорную волну, которая потом воссоздаст изображение, и это будет голограмма. То есть ключом к пониманию этих процессов с точки зрения физики является голография. Наше сознание действует по принципу голограммы. Раньше говорили, что мозг знают только двое: это — девственность и Бог. Сегодня можно сказать, что принципы устройства человеческого мозга и человеческой психики знают и российская ФСБ, и спецслужбы ряда других государств.
Корр. Грубо говоря, человеческая голова помещается в некое навязанное ей поле, и это поле модулируется этой головой и снимается потом.
Ю.Л. Модулируется, но если создать определенную постоянную частоту опорной волны, то информация, которая создается в человеческом мозге, может быть считана, то есть может быть выведена за пределы вашей психики. А если она может быть выведена за пределы вашей психики, то она само собой может быть считана, это уже дело техники.
Корр. Иногда кажется, что президент России зомбирован. Это уже расхожий аргумент, он даже смешным не кажется, мы видим перед собой анормального человека. Причем не просто человека с разрушенной психикой, а человека, который управляется в деструктивном направлении. Вы — специалист, который, конечно же, наблюдал за подобными явлениями. Вам это приходит в голову?
Ю.Л. Налицо все признаки воздействия на президента Ельцина, именно такого воздействия, о котором мы сейчас с вами говорим. Мы понимаем прекрасно, что твердые доказательства тому — дело будущего, но все признаки именно такого воздействия налицо. При этом нужно учитывать, что все гениальное просто. Почему я заинтересовался разработкой нейрофизического эффекта? Мне показалось это грандиозным. Это действительно было чем-то из третьего тысячелетия. При этом я подчеркиваю, что постоянному воздействию объект не подвергается. Достаточно включать все эти механизмы, о которых мы говорили, создавать необходимое соотношение объема волн в определенное время. В определенном состоянии мне навязывают такие примитивные реакции психики, как есть, спать, размножаться и тому подобное. Но бывают и гораздо более сложные манипуляции. Внушить президенту отставку, допустим, очередного премьер-министра, совершенно элементарно. Причем это происходит на уровне сознания таким образом, что человек воспринимает эту идею как собственную, как свою.
Корр. Президент окружен несколькими кольцами охраны. Среди его телохранителей есть преданные профессионалы, не ставящие своей целью эксплуатировать его психику, его волю. Эти опричники, наоборот, пресекают все формы воздействия извне. Все-таки, значит, удается преодолеть эти кольца обороны той агентуре, которая хочет управлять президентской психикой? Что это за агентура? Кто они: члены семьи, Дьяченко, Абрамович, Березовский? Где в Барвихе можно поставить этот генератор, как приблизить к Ельцину гипнотизера настолько, чтобы он мог воздействовать на его психику?
Ю.Л. Здесь можно сказать о том, что фамилию исполнителя вы, разумеется, найдете. Одним из штатных гипнотизеров Ельцина при Коржакове был придворный составитель гороскопов. Это генерал Рогозин. Это человек, который обладает всеми возможностями, чтобы воздействовать на президента Ельцина. Кстати, на Коржакова тоже. Это первое. Второе: сложно создать для человека первичный предмет отражения, предметную волну и организовать определенную опорную волну, которая будет потом воссоздавать на "экране" психику объекта. Нам известно — и, кстати, ваша газета об этом писала, что Ельцин неоднократно оперировался в иностранных клиниках. Можно предположить, что иностранные разведки, а они тоже владеют подобными технологиями, имели возможность организовать такое воздействие. И, наконец, третье. Никакое кольцо охраны, учитывая современные возможности радиоэлектронных средств, не может предотвратить воздействие на психику президента на больших расстояниях. Когда я бросал эту тему, уходил из этой игры, расстояния воздействия составляли уже километр для радиосредств. Поскольку эта наука развивается бешеными темпами, то сегодня можно говорить о гораздо большем расстоянии. Я помню, был такой факт: кто-то из доброжелателей Бориса Николаевича Ельцина в октябре 93-го года предлагал облучить защитников "Белого дома" такими волнами, которые сделали бы их послушными и заставили бы сдаться. Но аппаратура, которую предлагал этот человек, весила, по словам Коржакова, около трех тонн. Она уже была, но это были еще достаточно примитивные воздействия, побуждающие просто успокоиться, расслабиться, подчиниться. В данном случае сегодня аппарат-генератор излучения, который предназначен для условного зомбирования, будет занимать значительно меньший объем и намного меньше весить. При этом фокусировка сигнала, его направленность обеспечивают действие на больших расстояниях, причем через защищенный объект. Мало кто знает, что бетон совершенно прозрачен для таких волн, поэтому никакая охрана не может защитить президента от воздействия со стороны. Таким образом, мы назвали, по крайней мере, три источника воздействия. Иностранные разведки во время тех операций, когда Ельцин был в бессознательном состоянии. Люди в личном окружении президента. Наконец, какие-то определенные третьи силы, которые заинтересованы в таком воздействии на президента.
Корр. Все это логично и заманчиво выглядит, но есть одно сомнение. Всемогущее ФСБ обладает финансовым, материальным, технологическим ресурсом слежения, внушения и подавления. Тогда мы должны видеть в лице ФСБ крупного политического менеджера, который создает новый социум и строит новую страну. На самом деле ФСБ разгромлено, охвачено деструктивными процессами, немощно, занимается выклянчиванием денег у банкиров, все ее военные операции на поле боя проиграны, никакого нового социума нет. И по существу, нет ни одной крупной политической инициативы, за которой стояло бы ФСБ, которая привела бы к желаемым результатам.
Ю.Л. Да, ФСБ, в том числе по свидетельствам бывшего ее председателя Ковалева, по сути дела, разгромлена. Но, естественно, не стоит сбрасывать эту организацию со счетов, потому что сегодня это великолепно организованная, достаточно хорошо оснащенная, на высоком уровне подготовленная организация. Другое дело, что люди, которые там сегодня работают, работают или на олигархов, или на собственный карман. И у меня есть все основания, возвращаясь к нашей теме, говорить о том, что развитие психотронного оружия, после того, как я уходил из его разработки, попало полностью под контроль одного из олигархов, именно Березовского. Похоже, люди Березовского взяли развитие психотронных технологий под свой контроль. В частности, я не сомневаюсь, если, не дай Бог, выберут Лужкова, то через полгода мы получим подтверждающую информацию, что именно охранные структуры Березовского занимались секретными разработками. То есть ФСБ — это мощная организация, которая находится под контролем таких людей, как Березовский и другие олигархи, со всеми вытекающими отсюда последствиями.
Давно пора и необходимо поставить использование психотронного оружия внутри страны вне закона. Этим должно заниматься только государство и только в интересах своего народа.
Частоты, на которых облучают психику человека,— совершенно особые частоты. Они не возникают ни от электромагнитного поля, ни от определенного расположения компьютера. А воздействия, которые распределяются на психику, имеют определенную характеристику частот и не фиксируются ни в коем случае обычными приборами. Сама частота известна, и определять ее достаточно просто.
Корр. А человек, простой человек, может обороняться от этого, или же он абсолютно бессилен?
Ю.Л. Первое условие самообороны — это воля, самоконтроль. Второе условие — это, что называется, личный психологический фактор. Само знание того, что подобное воздействие возможно, позволит людям мобилизовать свою психику на борьбу против такой обработки. Никакой паники, никакого страха перед этими излучениями быть не должно. Самое главное — держать себя под контролем. И, наконец, существуют технические средства подавления этих наведенных частот и излучений.
Корр. Я был на одной из лекций по эзотерике. Там говорили о борьбе белых и черных магов. Если вот такие злые демоны из ФСБ наводят порчу на население, то, может, существуют и белые ангелы, патриотические, которые могут такими же методами снять эту порчу? То есть, возможна такая технотронная или психотронная борьба за отдельно взятый мозг?
Ю.Л. Дело в том, что любая борьба за мозг, к сожалению, ведет к разрушению этого мозга. В данном случае правильной параллелью здесь могло быть то, что воздействия, о которых мы говорим, очень схожи с воздействием, допустим, таких наркотиков, как ЛСД. И надо сказать, что будь то белый маг или черный маг, он в любом случае разрушает человеческое мышление. Так или иначе, своим воздействием, защищая вас или, наоборот, уничтожая, все равно он подчиняет вас. В этом плане могу сказать, что Илюхин будет прав, если примет законопроект, регулирующий подобную деятельность, потому что любое воздействие на этих частотах ведет к шизофрении, к неустойчивому состоянию психики. Кстати говоря, шизофрения появляется зачастую именно в результате психотронного воздействия.
Корр. Мы коснулись аспекта такого фантастического оружия, оружия XXI века, в который мы входим. Экзотический вид вооружения, может, станет абсолютно тривиальным и обычным через 15 лет, когда все это будет внедрено на общенародном уровне. Вы занимаетесь оружием будущего. Это оружие будущего, построенное на неких новых физических эффектах. Еще 10 лет тому назад они не были известны, а сейчас находятся на стадии воплощения.
Я хочу вас спросить о еще одном сверхновом виде вооружений. Новый принцип, который вы разрабатываете, принцип обнаружения абсолютно невидимых объектов, создание ПВО, тотально прикрывающей столицу, штаб, ракетные базы. Что это за феномен, что это за оружие?
Ю.Л. Идейная основа той системы ПВО, о которой я расскажу, как ни парадоксально, очень близка к психотронным технологиям. Речь идет о так называемом плазменном оружии, об улавливаемых нами сигналах, которые раньше просто не фиксировались. Мало того, что сигналы любого летящего объекта улавливают специальные наземные средства, эти же средства, отражая сигнал, мгновенно их разрушают. Подвергаясь турбулентному воздействию, объект просто разрывается на куски. Мы разработали систему ПВО, это, без всякого сомнения, оружие будущего, которое позволяет тотально закрыть небо от любого вмешательства летающих объектов, будь то противотанковый снаряд, крылатая ракета или же метеорит. И здесь я должен сказать, что деятельность ФСБ, в частности касающаяся меня и нашей фирмы, была направлена на то, чтобы такое оружие не появилось. Хотя у нас организация в достаточной степени коммерческая, мы готовы были предоставить государству все материалы, все необходимые разработки совершенно бесплатно. Сегодня мы вынуждены предлагать эти разработки таким странам, как Ирак, Сирия, Китай. Там существует гигантский интерес к этому делу, тем более, что наша фирма дает стопроцентную гарантию полной закрытости границы. Через границу не пролетит ничто.
Корр. Летит, скажем, крылатая ракета. Что она излучает такого нового, что дает вам возможность фиксировать ее не с помощью радиолокации, не с помощью звуковых сигналов, что от нее идет такого, что позволяет ее засечь?
Ю.Л. Никакой военной тайны в принципе здесь нет. Известно, что всякий летящий объект перед собой испускает опережающий сигнал. Это можно назвать состоянием холодной плазмы, излучением холодной плазмы. Любой летящий объект перед собой несет информацию о своем полете, о направлении своего пути.
Корр. Значит, объект "тревожит" среду, в которой он пролетит через какое-то время?
Ю.Л. Совершенно верно. Любой объект, летящий со скоростью выше звуковой, несет впереди себя информацию о своей массе, о своем направлении, и я здесь, конечно, немножечко мистифицирую о своих намерениях. Он эту информацию никогда никоим образом не спрячет, она всегда опережает его. Масштаб этой информации таков, что она не способна быть определена с помощью традиционных радиолокационных средств. Мы просто отражаем полученный опережающий сигнал, и это приводит к полному разрушению летящего объекта.
Корр. Скажем, Ирак, Россия или там Мальта построили такую систему ПВО. Как она визуально может выглядеть?
Ю.Л. Эта информация является полностью секретной. Но надо сказать, что это очень небольшое сооружение, не больше поверхности столика, за которым мы сейчас сидим. Суть самого детектора в том, что он же является отражателем сигнала. Он способен улавливать частоты совершенно нового порядка.
Обычно турбулентность понимается как то, что остается сзади движущегося объекта. Кстати говоря, американцы, когда поняли, что мы работаем над этим, взялись создавать систему "Стелс", рассчитанную на то, чтобы защитить корпус летящего объекта от внешних воздействий. Внешним воздействием в данном случае является радиолокация. Вы посылаете какой-то луч на корпус объекта, он возвращается к вам, вы получаете всю информацию об этом объекте. Сегодня американские ученые, а еще раньше наши, научились защищать корпус объекта от подобных воздействий, рассеивать "запрашивающий луч" в пространство. Президент Клинтон выделил 12 миллиардов долларов, если не ошибаюсь, для того, чтобы бороться с обнаружением и радиолокацией своих воздушных объектов. Но эта задача, с точки зрения современной физики, невыполнима, американцы, как всегда, демонстрируют свою тупость в решении важнейших технологических задач. Они тратят очень большие деньги и пытаются бороться с явлениями природы, с которыми бороться в принципе нельзя. Любой летящий объект оставляет за собой турбулентность. Мы сделали прорыв дальше, в следующее тысячелетие. Мы определяем летящий объект, находим его и сбиваем его с помощью опережающего, подчеркиваю, опережающего сигнала. Мы научились эту силу встречного враждебного удара направлять против самого врага, возвращать ему его энергию для полного разрушения противника. Как говорится, плюс на минус…
Корр. А по карману ли такая система стране вроде Ирака, который не обладает суперресурсами?
Ю.Л. Все гениальное просто. Без ложной скромности могу сказать, что эти разработки чрезвычайно дешевы. Если брать установки, которые сейчас в основном используются на поражение, например — "земля-воздух", то наши системы в десятки раз дешевле. А об эффективности я уже говорил — стопроцентная гарантия.
Корр. Скажите, какую вы почувствовали реакцию на эту вашу работу? Какие у вас были отношения с нашими разведчиками?
Ю.Л. Вы знаете, поначалу я, человек, воспитанный советской школой, относился к КГБ с величайшим уважением. Даже в 1995 году я по-прежнему верил, что ФСБ — организация, которая грудью стоит на защите интересов Родины. Но очень быстро разочаровался. За несколько лет Ельцину и его команде удалось практически разрушить все то прекрасное, что было. Я почувствовал на себе противодействие со стороны представителей ФСБ, в частности управляющего техническим отделом московского управления ФСБ, достаточно молодого и очень странного человека. Что касается наших выходов на такие страны, как Ирак, Сирия и Китай, то была проведена определенная кампания по нашей дискредитации. Грубо говоря, нас ставили перед выбором: или мы даем заработать чинам ФСБ какие-то деньги лично себе в карман, чтобы эти разработки каким-то образом продвинуть у нас в стране, или же нас будут поливать грязью. ФСБ обладает серьезными возможностями, чтобы противодействовать любым коммерческим выходам за рубеж. Я не знаю, каким образом ФСБ сейчас действует, но дискредитировать идею, дискредитировать разработчиков каким-то образом пытаются. Я приведу такой факт. Мы обратились с разработками по вакуумной технике, по организации принципиально нового типа взрыва, который до сих пор не разработан в России. Это был сверхмощный взрыв для Северной Кореи. Мы предложили нашим северокорейским друзьям проект разработки, они очень заинтересовались. Но в конце концов отказались от сотрудничества, и у меня есть все основания предполагать, что они были подвергнуты давлению со стороны российских спецслужб.
Корр. В связи с этой разработкой не чувствуете ли вы угрозы для себя? Сейчас вы высказываете какое-то обвинение в адрес ФСБ. Вы становитесь ее противником.
Ю.Л. Я несу полную ответственность за свои слова. Другое дело, что информация об этом станет открытой только через какое-то время. Поскольку я был одним из разработчиков психотроннного эффекта, я обладаю всеми средствами для того, чтобы негативно воздействовать на работу против меня со стороны спецслужб...
Корр. Советский Союз в недрах своей цивилизации накопил колоссальные теоретические знания, которые превращались в технологию. Разрушение СССР и последующий ужас "реформ" прекратили существование этого технократического авангарда Советского Союза. По-видимому, там были накоплены серьезные знания, частью которых является ваше представление, они существуют в нашем центре в виде авангарда наших ученых. И они либо увянут и исчезнут, либо они перезимуют — и когда наступит весна, они будут реализованы. Каково ваше представление об этой советской суперцивилизации, которой не дали реализоваться?
Ю.Л. К сожалению, приходится констатировать, что наши первоклассные ученые вынуждены зарабатывать деньги за рубежом. Идет колоссальная утечка той информации, которая была накоплена Советским Союзом. Американцы, шведы, итальянцы приглашают наших ученых каким-то образом участвовать в своих программах. ФСБ безмолвствует. Люди, которые были пожизненно невыездными, которые обладают особыми знаниями, действительно могли бы перезимовать и потом быть востребованы новой возрожденной Россией. Но эти люди сегодня уезжают за рубеж в командировки и там неизвестно чем занимаются. Запад платит не пресловутые 300 долларов, которые сейчас платят, например, в Арзамасе-16. И в результате гигантские объемы информации утекают сегодня за рубеж. Я расскажу о таком случае. Кстати, это будет великолепная иллюстрация того, как в принципе действует система перекачки мозгов из России. Может, это еще и покажет, что все-таки психотронные воздействия иногда приводят к позитивным результатам. Вы наверняка слышали о том, что каким-то образом в "Интернете" появился список агентурной сети британских разведчиков, вся резидентура — свыше ста человек. Такое могло быть совершено только советским специалистом, эта информация могла быть перехвачена нейрофизическим оружием. То есть, с точки зрения нашей контрразведки, есть позитивная тенденция. А история такова. Два полицейских не ищут обычно никаких приключений в Лондоне, патрулируют улицы, сидя в своей машине. Один из этих полицейских слышит внутренний голос совершенно четко. "5 минут назад на соседней улице была угнана машина. Злоумышленник через несколько секунд появится в этом районе". Этот полицейский был совершенно в шоке. И он сказал своему напарнику: "Знаешь, сейчас услышал информацию, что он скоро тут проедет". И каково было их удивление, когда они по рации слышат: "На улице такой-то угнана машина такого-то цвета",— а цвет был тоже назван внутренним голосом. И они через несколько секунд видят этот автомобиль. Задержание преступника было делом техники. Таким образом этот полицейский прославился. Дальше с ним стали происходить невероятные вещи. В течение ближайших двух месяцев он раскрыл пять удивительных криминальных дел. И каждый раз ему в этом помогал внутренний голос. Полицейский получил гигантскую славу. Кончилось дело тем, что его назначили начальником сети охраны Ее величества. Но при этом я могу с уверенностью сказать, что это — способ контроля над разными службами Британии. Он заключается в следующем: в различные службы, как бы специально, заслали таких людей с помощью средств, о которых я рассказал. А наличие внутреннего голоса прямо говорит о том, что на человека осуществляется психическое воздействие с помощью матрицы его нейрофизических лучей. Вы видите, каким образом можно было это все организовывать, если сама Ее величество королева получила себе в охранники такого человека, который, по сути дела, является передатчиком информации о том, что делает королева, куда она идет, куда направляется для каких-то определенных сил. Если Великобритании приходится признать, что все-таки существует более или менее демократическое общество, то сегодня эти эффекты, о которых мы говорим, находятся под контролем , я в этом не сомневаюсь, людей типа Березовского. Это очень страшно для нас.
Корр. Хочу поблагодарить вас за интереснейший разговор. То, о чем вы рассказали, действительно, поражает воображение и создает картину войн будущего, совсем не похожую на привычные нам военные кампании уходящего тысячелетия.

თავდაცვის მინისტრი ირაკლი ოქრუაშვილი მიესალმა საქართველოსა და რუსეთს შორის სამხედრო ბაზებისა და სხვა რუსული ობიექტების 2008 წლის ბოლომდე გაყვანისა და სამხედრო ტრანზიტის შესახებ დღეს გაფორმებულ შეთანხმებებს და ხაზი გაუსვა იმ კომპრომისებს, რომელზეც ქართული მხარე წავიდა.

“ჩვენი მხრიდან კომპრომისი იყო მხოლოდ და მხოლოდ [ბაზების გაყვანის]ვადა ანუ სამი წელი მაშინ, როცა რეალურად ამ ბაზების გაყვანას არ ჭირდება ამხელა დრო, მაგრამ ჩვენ მივიღეთ მათი მხრიდან წარმოდგენილი არგუმენტები“, – განაცხადა დღეს გამართულ ბრიფინგზე თავდაცვის მინისტრმა და აქვე დასძინა, რომ "ამ სამი წლის განმავლობაში, როცა რუსეთის სამხედრო ბაზები გაყვანის რეჟიმში იქნებიან, მათ მოუწევთ, დაახლოებით იგივე რაოდენობის ღვინის მოხმარება, რაც ჩვენს ქართულ კომპანიებს რუსეთის ბაზარზე უნდა გაეყიდათ“.

მინისტრის განცხადებით, რუსული მხარე სამი წლის განმავლობაში შეინარჩუნებს რუსეთის სამხედრო ძალების შტაბს თბილისში, "იმისათვის, რომ ეს პროცესი მართონ და ორგანიზება მოახდინონ“.

გარდა ამისა, ოქრუაშვილის განცხადებით, ერთობლივი გამოყენება მოხდება კოჯორში არსებული კავშირგაბმულობის საშუალებების, რომელიც "ფაქტობრივად გადმოეცა ქართულ მხარეს“ და ასევე გონიოს პოლიგონის, რათა შეეწყოს ხელი გაყვანის პროცესს "და არა სასროლეთის მოსაწყობად“.

ოქრუაშვილის განცხადებით, "გარკვეულწილად“ ქართული მხარის კომპრომისი იყო სამხედრო ტვირთებისა და პერსონალის ტრანზიტის შესახებ შეთანხმებაზე თანხმობა, რაც რუსეთს საშუალებას აძლევს საქართველოს გავლით დაუკავშირდეს გიუმრის რუსულ სამხედრო ბაზას სომხეთში.

"სომხეთში რუსული სამხედრო ბაზების ტრანზიტი შეუძლებელია გარკვეული მიზეზების გამო აზერბაიჯანიდან, ასევე თურქეთიდან და ბუნებრივია, რომ ერთადერთი გზა რჩებოდათ მათ საქართველოს მეშვეობით... თუმცა, ბუნებრივია, ჩვენ არ აღმოვჩნდებით ისეთ სიტუაციაში, როდესაც რაიმე ისეთი სახის ტვირთი შეიძლება იქნეს საქართველოს ტერიტორიაზე გატარებული, რომელმაც შეიძლება რეგიონში გარკვეული საფრთხე შექმნას“, – განაცხადა ირაკლი ოქრუაშვილმა.

Date: 24 Apr 1996
Order Ref: 605301789

Story

INTRO: Chechen separatists on Wednesday mourned the death of their leader Dzhokhar Dudayev but his successor Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev quickly made clear the fight for independence from Russia will go on without letup.
------------------------------------------------------------- Chechens on Wednesday (April 24) mourned their leader Dzhokhar Dudayev with prayers and Moslem ceremonies.

One of his closest aides, Akhmed Zakayev, led the ceremony in the village of Shalazhi encouraging people to fight on for independance from Russia.
In the village of Gekhi-Chu, where Dudayev was killed by a rocket explosion on Sunday, various shell and rocket debris covered the ground.

Dudayev, who defied Moscow by declaring the southern region independent in 1991 and has been resisting the might of the Russian armed forces for more than 16 months, was laid to rest in an unspecified village cemetery, Itar-Tass news said.
Dudayev's government said he had been killed by a rocket attack from the air at the village of Gekhi-Chu, about 30 km (20 miles) south-west of the capital Grozny, as he stood in an open field speaking by satellite telephone.

Yandarbiyev, widely regarded as a hardliner, on Wednesday called for a complete withdrawal of the Russian troops sent into Chechnya some 16 months ago to crush the oil region's three-year independence drive.

Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

OUSTED GEORGIAN PRESIDENT ZVIAD GAMSAKHURDIA IN NEIGHBOURING CHECHEN VOWS TO REGAIN PRESIDENCY.
Date: 18 Feb 1992
Order Ref: 604100399

Story
Georgia's ousted president, speaking from the safety of the neighbouring Chechen region, on Tuesday (February 18) vowed to regain government from what he said was the mafia-dominated opposition led by Eduard Shevardnadze.
Zviad Gamsakhurdia told a news conference in the Chechen capital Grozny that the driving force behind his opponents was Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister and one-time Communist Party chief of Georgia.
He said the opposition, led by his one-time associates, represented "the mafia, the mob and the Transcaucasian military district" of the former Soviet Union.
Shevardnadze, who also served as Georgia's KGB boss, once had Gamsakhurdia arrested for nationalist activities. The two men remain bitter rivals.
Gamsakhurdia said he was not seaking political asylum but visiting a friendly state as Georgia's legitimate president.

Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

GEORGIAN PRESIDENT ZVIAD GAMSAKHURDIA SAYS IN FIRST INTERVIEW SINCE FLEEING GEORGIA THAT HE HAS NOT RESIGNED AND WILL FIGHT ON

Date: 08 Jan 1992
Order Ref: 604090173

Story

Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia said on Wednesday (January 8) he had fled Tbilisi to stop the bloodshed and had not resigned.

"We shall continue our fight for legitimacy and justice, for the establishment of constitutional power in Georgia," he told Armenian reporters in his first interview since leaving his beseiged parliamentary stronghold on Tuesday. "We shall mobilise public opinion and draw the world's attention." Gamsakhurdia was speaking in the Armenian border town of Idzhevan, where he is staying while the rebels who overthrew him negotiate his future with the Armenian government.
He fled after two weeks of fighting that killed at least 90 people, wounded several hundred others and battered the centre of Tbilisi.

He denounced the opposition, saying: "The mafia has prevailed...they are leading Georgia to catastrophe and we cannot allow the Georgian precedent to spread to other republics." Gamsakhurdia was elected last May with 87 per cent of the vote and has consistently denied opposition charges that he imposed a dictatorship. "Perhaps I was too soft on the so-called opposition," he said on Wednesday. All the time I tried to settle my disputes with them through peaceful means."

Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

MEMORIAL CEREMONY HELD FOR FORMER GEORGIAN PRESIDENT ZVIAD GAMSAKHURDIA IN BREAKAWAY REPUBLIC OF CHECHNYA
Date: 22 Feb 1994
Order Ref: 605040377

Story
A memorial ceremony for former Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose body was dug up last week to confirm his identity, was held in the Chechnya breakaway republic on Tuesday (February 22).
Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first elected president, died in unclear circumstances after returning from exile in Chechnya, a breakaway region in southern Russia, to lead an unsuccessful armed revolt late last year.
The body, which has a bullet-wound in the head, was buried in a barn in western Georgia.
Before the memorial ceremony, the coffin containing Gamsakhurdia's body was placed at his residence in the Chechnya capital Grozny, where he spent nearly two years in exile following the victory of his opposition.
The service was attended by Gamsakhurdia's widow Manana Arivadze and supporters from Georgia and north Caucasus.
Gamsakhurdia was forced into exile in January 1992 by an armed rebellion just eight months after a landslide election victory.

Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

BODY OF OUSTED PRESIDENT ZVIAD GAMSAKHURDIA EXHUMED

Date: 17 Feb 1994
Order Ref: 605040301

Story
The body of ousted Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was dug up on Thursday (February 17) from a shallow grave in western Georgia for reburial in southern Russia.
The corpse, dressed in a black suit and tie and white shirt and gloves and with a bullet wound in the head, was identified by journalists and an investigative commission before being flown to southern Russia for reburial. The decaying body, with the hands crossed on the chest, was displayed briefly at the airport in the west Georgian town of Senaki. It was later flown to the territory of Chechnya across the Caucasus mountains in southern Russia for reburial.
Gamsakhurdia's wife Manana said in January that he had committed suicide on December 31, after an armed rebellion had collapsed. But mystery had continued to surround his fate, with conflicting reports of how or even whether he had died.
The face showed a bullet entry-hole in the right temple and an exit wound in the left. Georgian Deputy Security Minister Avtandil Ioseliani said it was impossible to confirm the suicide without an autopsy.
But under a deal between the Georgian authorities and Chechnya, where Gamsakhurdia spent almost two years in exile, the body was flown away for reburial after only visual identification by the commission.
It was found in a respectable chestnut casket in a shallow grave in the corner of a snow-covered barn in the village of Jikhaskari, some 25 km (15 miles) north of Senaki. The place was piled high with maize stalks and chickens pecked around.
A small group of villagers gathered as the body was brought out and some people wept. The corpse was taken by helicopter to Senaki and, after an hour's haggling between the Chechen and Georgian sides, flown to Chechnya in a Tupolev 134 jet.

Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

BOMB EXPLOSION KILLS TWO PEOPLE

Date: 07 Mar 1995
Order Ref: 605170277

Story

Two people were killed and two others wounded on Tuesday (March 7) when a powerful bomb ripped through the local headquarters of the Georgian "Mhedrioni" paramilitary group.

The explosion occurred in the town of Rustavi, 25 km (12 miles) from the capital, Tbilisi.
"Mhedrioni", which means "horse-rider" in Georgian, is one of the country's most influential political groups.

Three days ago 150 armed Mhedrionis broke into the mayor's office in Rustavi. It is thought the explosion may be in response to this earlier attack.


Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

TIMUR DALAKHADZE OF MKHEDRIONI PARAMILITARY GROUP IS KILLED IN BOMB BLAST AT RUSTAVI

Date: 28 Jan 1994
Order Ref: 605030484

Story
The deputy leader of the Georgian paramilitary group the Mkhedrioni (Horsemen), Timur Dalakhadze, died in a bomb blast at Rustavi on Friday (January 28).

Dalakhadze was killed by a radio-controlled bomb which exploded while he was visiting a hairdresser's shop.

Three people, including the hairdresser, died in the attack in the centre of Dalakhadze's stronghold of Rustavi, east of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.
Dalakhadze is the second deputy commander of the Mkhedrioni to be killed in two months. In December another deputy commander, Zaza Vebkhvadze, was shot dead in Tbilisi. There have been several unsuccessful attempts on the life of Jaba Ioseliani, leader of the Mkhedrioni.

The Mkhedrioni's 3,000 armed members are nominally loyal to Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, through their opposition to Georgia's first democratically-elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who died at the beginning of January.

There have been reports that the Mkhedrioni recently mounted a campaign of political killings in Gamsakhurdia's stronghold of Mingrelia and Friday's explosion may have been planned by Gamsakhurdia's supporters.

Script is copyright Reuters Limited. All rights reserved.

SOVIET TROOPS STORM HEADQUARTERS OF UNOFFICIAL "MKHEDRIONI" MILITIA IN SOVIET REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA
Date: 20 Feb 1991
Order Ref: BGY603290951

Story

Soviet troops stormed the headquarters of a rebel militia group in the Soviet republic of Georgia on Monday (February 18) and arrested its leader the next day.

Witnesses said the troops, supported by tanks and armoured vehicles, stormed the unofficial Mkhedrioni (horsemen) militia, near Tbilisi in the early hours of Monday morning.

The Mkhedrioni, which backs Georgian independence, is one of a number of unofficial militia groups that have sprung up in southern Soviet republics in open defiance of President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Rebels claimed three of their men had been injured in the raid while the Soviet Defence Ministry said army reconnaissance officers were fired at by members of an "extremist" group and two were wounded. Defence ministry officials added that firearms, explosives, stolen vehicles and false documents were taken from the rebels and more than 20 were arrested.

Police arrested Djaba Iosseliani, the leader of the paramilitary group on Tuesday just 24 hours after he denounced the state's nationalist leader President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and vowed to form a rival political party.

http://207.218.249.154/geo/article.php?id=12170

სააკაშვილი ციხის ბუნტზე კომენტარს აკეთებს და პოლიციას აქებს

27 მარტს ეროვნული უშიშროების საბჭოს საგანგებო სხდომაზე გამოსვლისას პრეზიდენტმა სააკაშვილმა განაცხადა, რომ ციხის ბუნტის აღკვეთით საქართველომ თავიდან აიცილა მასობრივი უწესრიგობების და დესტაბილიზაციის საფრთხე.

მან გაიხსენა 90-იანი წლების დასაწყისში მომხდარი გაქცევა თბილისის იმავე ციხიდან და განაცხადა, რომ ამას მოყვა სამოქალაქო ომი და სამხედრო ამბოხება საქართველოს გარდაცვლილი პრეზიდენტის ზვიად გამსახურდიას წინააღმდეგ 1992 წელს.

ქვემოთ მოცემულია პრეზიდენტის ოდნავ შემოკლებული სიტყვა:

"ჩვენ დაუნდობელი ბრძოლა გამოვუცხადეთ ორგანიზებულ დანაშაულს და ქურდების ინსტიტუტს საქართველოში... ბოლო ოთხი თვის განმავლობაში დაიწყო ორგანიზებული ბრძოლა კანონიერი ქურდების წინააღმდეგ. ჩვენ ყოველდღიურად ვიღებთ მუქარას, რომ მოხდება გამოსვლები, მასობრივი გაქცევები და მასობრივი არეულობები.

ციხეს და მთელ საქართველოს ბოლო 15 წლის განმავლობაში მართავდნენ ქურდები და ბანდიტები. ქურდები აკონტროლებდნენ ეკონომიკას, ენერგეტიკას, ხალხის მოძრაობას, ჩვენს ქუჩებს და ეზოებს.

მე და ჩემმა მეგობრებმა დავიწყეთ ამათთან ბრძოლა, როცა მე ვიყავი იუსტიციის მინისტრი და [თავდაცვის მინისტრი ირაკლი] ოქრუაშვილი ჩემი მოადგილე იყო, სამწუხაროდ მაშინ პოლიციის წინააღმდეგობის გამო არც დრო გვქონდა და არც საშუალებები, რომ ეს ბრძოლა რაღაც ლოგიკურ დასასრულამდე მიგვეყვანა. ვარდების რევოლუციის შემდეგაც დაგვჭირდა პერიოდი იმისათვის, რომ სერიოზულად მოგვეკიდა ამ უბედურებისთვის ხელი. ამისთვის საჭირო იყო ახალი საპატიმრო დაწესებულებები, პერსონალის გამოცვლა, პენიტენციალური დეპარტამენტის ახალი თავმჯდომარე დაინიშნა, რომელიც განსხვავდება იმ ხალხისგან, რომელიც მანამდე მართავდა ციხეს ქურდების მეშვეობით. გარეთ სერიოზულად მოვკიდეთ ამ ბანდიტებს ხელი.

როგორც ჩანს, ბოლო დროს, როდესაც მოვკიდეთ ქურდებს ხელი, დავიწყეთ პროცესები ქონების ჩამორთმევის, მივიღეთ ძალიან სერიოზული კანონები და აქ პარლამენტის დამსახურება ძალიან დიდია - მათ აღარ ჰყავთ დიდი ლობი პარლამენტში, თუმცა დღესაც გამოჩნდნენ ზოგიერთები [პრეზიდენტი სავარაუდოდ ოპოზიციის ზოგიერთ ლიდერს გულისხმობდა] და ისინი ძალიან სერიოზულად განერვიულდნენ. ეტყობა იფიქრეს, რომ ვინაიდან მათ აქვთ გარკვეული ძალების მხარდაჭერა ტელეეკრანიდან, პარლამენტის ტრიბუნიდან, ქუჩებიდან, მიდის მუდმივი ლანძღვა-გინება საქართველოს პოლიციის - იფიქრეს, რომ ეხლა არის კარგი მომენტი გარეთ გასასვლელად. ნურას უკაცრავად პატივცემულო ბანდიტებო, ქურდებო, საზოგადოების ხორცმეტებო, მათო მხარდამჭერებო.

მინდა ყველამ იცოდეს, რა საფრთხის წინაშე იყო ღამე საზოგადოება - და ამაზე კარგად ილაპარაკა ნინო ბურჯანაძემ - თბილისში ღამით შეიძლება გასულიყო 4,000 თავზეხელაღებული, გააფთრებული, საშიში დამნაშავე. ეს ნიშნავდა ასობით გატაცებულ ავტომანქანას, ასობით გაუპატიურებულ ადამიანს, ასობით გაქურდულ სახლს, ასობით მკვლელობას და სხვა უბედურებას და არეულობას.

მე მინდა გაიხსენოს ჩვენმა საზოგადოებამ, გამსახურდიას დროს შემოდგომაზე ამავე იზოლატორიდან გაიპარა ასობით კრიმინალი და საქართველოში დაიწყო სამოქალაქო ომი, დაიწყო არეულობა, ქურდობა, ძარცვა...

მერე მოხდა გადატრიალება, რის შედეგადაც ხელისუფლებაში მოვიდნენ ბანდიტები და ისინიც კი, ვინც დარჩენილი იყვნენ, გამოუშვეს. ეს იყო გაუბედურებული სამეგრელო, სადაც ერთი სახლიც კი არ დაუტოვებიათ, საიდანაც მანქანა არ წაიყვანეს...

მე მინდა დიდი მადლობა მოვუხადო იუსტიციის სამინისტროს თანამშრომლებს და საქართველოს პოლიციას, რომელმაც უკიდურესად პროფესიონალურად იმოქმედა, იმისათვის, რომ ჩვენ ყველას აგვაცილა ეს უბედურება. არავის არ უხარია ადამიანის მსხვერპლი - რა ადამიანიც არ უნდა იყოს - მაგრამ საზოგადოებას, კანონიერებას და წესრიგს ჩვენ დავიცავთ ყველა ხელთ არსებული საშუალებებით კანონის ფარგლებში...

დღეს საქართველო არის სახელმწიფო, რომელსაც ჰყავს მოტივირებული, კარგად ანაზღაურებადი და მაღალი დონის პროფესიონალებით დაკომპლექტებული პოლიცია და რეფორმების პროცესში მყოფი იუსტიციის სამინისტრო. და ამ სამინისტროს აქვს ჩვენი სრული მხარდაჭერა. ნუ შეგეშინდებათ სატელევიზიო შანტაჟის, რადგან ჩვენი საზოგადოება არის ძალიან გონიერი ხალხით დაკომპლექტებული და ასჯერ რომ უთხრათ ტელევიზიით რომ შავი თეთრია, მათ იციან რომ შავი შავია და თეთრი არის თეთრი ...

ჩვენ გამოვაცხადეთ დანაშაულის ნულოვანი მოთმენის პოლიტიკა და უნდა გავაგრძელოთ ეს, უნდა შევყაროთ ყველა ციხეებში კანონის ფარგლებში. სისხლის სამართლის კოდექსი ისე უნდა შევცვალოთ, რომ არავინ პირობითი სასჯელით არ გადიოდეს... ჩვენ ამ კოდექსს შევცვლით, რათა ბოლო მოვუღოთ წვრილმან დანაშაულს... იქნება სრული ნულოვანი მოთმენა...

მინდა რომ იცოდეს ორგანიზებულმა დანაშაულმა და მისმა მხარდამჭერებმა, რა ხმაურიც არ უნდა მოაწყონ, რისი მცდელობაც არ უნდა ჰქონდეთ, რა შანტაჟიც, რა დისკრედიტაციაც არ უნდა გამოიყენონ ... რა ფული და გავლენაც არ უნდა ჰქონდეთ მათ პატრონებს, ბოლომდე მივწვდებით ყველა ორგანიზებული დანაშაულის წევრს, მონაწილეს, დანაშაულის ჩამდენს და მათ მფარველებს. აქ არ არის ველური დასავლეთი, სადაც დიდი ფულით იყიდება სამართალი...

მინდა დავპირდე ყველას, რომ გავაგრძელებთ ყველა ღონისძიებას... ჩვენ წლის ბოლომდე უნდა დავამთავროთ ახალი დიდი იზოლატორის მშენებლობა გლდანში. ეს ორთაჭალის ციხე არის დასანგრევი, რადგანაც ტექნიკურად იქ ბოლომდე უსაფრთხოების უზრუნველყოფა პრაქტიკულად შეუძლებელია და ამ სიტუაციაში ამგვარი ციხის არსებობა ქალაქის ცენტრში დიდი საფრთხე არის...

აშკარაა, რომ ორგანიზებულმა დანაშაულმა ბოლოჯერ გაიბრძოლა, კოდორში აფეთქება და მცდელობა, რომ საქართველო დატოვონ დენის გარეშე არის ამის კლასიკური ნიმუში... არანაირი მოლაპარაკება ბანდიტებთან არ იქნება; ჩვენ გვაქვს ყველა საშუალება, რომ დავამყაროთ წესრიგი...

რადგან ამ ხალხმა გადაწყვიტა ჩვენი გამოწვევა, ჩვენ ამ გამოწვევას ვიღებთ. იცოდეს ყველამ, კრიმინალებმა და მათმა პოლიტიკურმა და სხვა სახის მფარველებმა - სულ რომ ყირაზე დადგნენ, ჩვენ საქართველოში დავამყარებთ კანონიერებას და წესრიგს, ხალხი ივლის ქუჩაში უსაფრთხოდ, ბიზნესები გაიხსნება რეკეტის გარეშე... ჩვენი ქუჩები გაიწმინდება კრიმინალური ნაგვისგან კანონის და დემოკრატიის ყველა მოთხოვნის დაცვით“.

Georgia Retakes Port With Apparent Russian Help
[Home Edition]

Los Angeles Times (pre-1997 Fulltext) - Los Angeles, Calif.
Author: ALEXIS ROWELL
Date: Oct 26, 1993
Start Page: 4
Section: PART-A; Foreign Desk
Text Word Count: 456
Document Text
(Copyright, The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles Times 1993all Rights reserved)

Government troops recaptured the Black Sea port of Poti on Monday in a significant reversal for rebels loyal to former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, amid indications that Russian troops played an important role in the victory.

The retaking of the port, which is the main entry point for food and other essential supplies for Georgia, was a major gain for Georgian leader Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

With the capture of Poti, the railway from the Black Sea to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, and through to Armenia can now be reopened.

In an interview for national radio, Shevardnadze took a hard line against Gamsakhurdia, whom he blamed for Georgia's loss last month of the breakaway province of Abkhazia.

"He is the black force," the Georgian leader said, "a person responsible for the betrayal in Abkhazia, for the betrayal of Georgian unity."

Gamsakhurdia's troops, he said, "have two ways out: They can be destroyed or they can lay down their arms."

The government capture of Poti is also meaningful for the role played by the Russians, who have been trying to enhance their influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union without becoming too directly embroiled in local conflicts.

There is mounting evidence that Russian troops provided Shevardnadze with concrete assistance for the first time since the Georgian leader, a former Communist Party chief here and a onetime Soviet foreign minister, returned to power in his native land.

"Russian troops tightened their grip on key installations in Poti just before Shevardnadze's troops entered the town," said a source close to the Georgian government. "The Russians did not fight, they simply made a show of strength, and the Zviadists (the rebels) had no choice but to pull out.

"The government offensive was planned by the Russians," the source continued. "They gave Shevardnadze tanks, artillery and the men to operate them."

Russian interests in the Caucasus region are manifest.

"The rendering of military aid to the Shevardnadze government is not pure charity," said political analyst Yevgeny Kiselev on the Russian television news program "Itogi" this week. "A return to power by the notoriously anti-Russian-inclined Gamsakhurdia and his supporters would hardly be in the interests of the local Russian-speaking population."

The Russian government so far has not conceded that it has even fulfilled a pledge to guard key transportation corridors in Georgia, an indication of the sensitivity of the Russian presence in the region.

A Defense Ministry spokesman in Moscow said Monday that the troops would not go into action until joined by military units from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, all with a vital interest in keeping the arteries open.

For all that, Russia's clear support of Shevardnadze in the latest conflict is likely to end Gamsakhurdia's bid to return to power.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

Georgia Leader Appeals for Russian Peacekeeping Force
[Home Edition]

Los Angeles Times (pre-1997 Fulltext) - Los Angeles, Calif.
Author: RICHARD BOUDREAUX
Date: Oct 19, 1993
Start Page: 6
Section: PART-A; Foreign Desk
Text Word Count: 482

Document Text

(Copyright, The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles Times 1993all Rights reserved)

Georgian leader Eduard A. Shevardnadze, his army disintegrating along with his country, asked Russia on Monday for a peacekeeping force to help stave off an armed rebellion that threatens to topple him.

Shevardnadze sent his prime minister to Moscow a day after rebels loyal to a former president seized the western city of Samtredia and severed the last rail link between the capital, Tbilisi, and Georgia's Black Sea coast.

The appeal underscored new respect for Moscow's power to settle regional disputes since President Boris N. Yeltsin used the Russian army to crush an internal rebellion two weeks ago.

It marked an about-face for Shevardnadze, who had opposed the idea of Russian peacekeepers on his soil because he feared that they would covertly aid his enemies.

Some Russian army officers have never forgiven Shevardnadze for "losing" Eastern Europe in the late 1980s when he was foreign minister under Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Russian troops were widely suspected of helping armed separatists three weeks ago expel the Georgian army from Abkhazia, a western Georgian province that wants to join Russia, after more than a year of fighting.

Desperate for Yeltsin's help, Shevardnadze this month enrolled his nation in the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States, which now groups 12 former Soviet republics. That move-similar to one made by war-weary Azerbaijan-meant that Shevardnadze had abandoned two years of nationalist policies aimed at taking Georgia out of Moscow's political and economic orbit.

The talks in Moscow between the Georgian and Russian prime ministers is the first test of how Georgia will benefit from the new alliance.

"I pin definite hopes on Russia," Shevardnadze told Georgian radio Monday in disclosing Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia's mission in Moscow. "We must decide how to cooperate."

He said Patsatsia was asking Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin for a joint force made up of troops from Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to protect the embattled rail line and stop the fighting.

Russia gave no official report on the talks. But Russia's Interfax news agency, quoting unnamed sources, said Moscow promised "all possible assistance in settling the situation in Georgia, excluding military intervention."

Unlike the Abkhazian separatists, the rebels now fighting Shevardnadze's army threaten to advance on the capital and overthrow him. They have captured at least nine towns in the western Georgian region of Mingrelia, including the Black Sea port of Poti.

The rebels are led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, an intellectual from Mingrelia who became Georgia's first democratically elected president in 1991.

Ousted in a January, 1992, military coup, he lived in exile in southern Russia until his return to Georgia last month.

Shevardnadze said in his radio address that the Georgian army "has practically disintegrated" in the face of the rebel offensive.

He ordered all troops to defend Kutaisi, Georgia's second-largest city, 20 miles northeast of Samtredia and 150 miles west of Tbilisi.

[Illustration]
PHOTO: Eduard A. Shevardnadze / Reuters


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

BBC World Service

Wednesday, 1 April, 1998, 12:22 GMT 13:22 UK

Georgian kidnapper killed in shoot-out with police

Police in Georgia say they have shot and killed a leader of the opposition group that took four United Nations military observers hostage last month.

He died in a shoot-out that began as police tried to arrest him.

The man, Gocha Esebua, was also suspected of involvement in the attempted assasination of the Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze, in February.

From the newsroom of the BBC World Service

BBC News Online: World: Europe

Five killed at Georgia funeral

Monday, April 6, 1998 Published at 07:02 GMT 08:02 UK

Five killed at Georgia funeral

A funeral procession for Gocha Esebua, an opposition leader, was attacked on Sunday.

Five people were killed and eight wounded in the gun and grenade attack in Zugdidi. Among the dead was their assumed target, another of the UN kidnappers, Zurab Shonia.

The motive for the attack is unknown and Georgian police said they had no idea who the gunmen were.

Esebua an assassination suspect

Esebua was suspected of involvement in a February assassination attempt on the Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Shortly afterwards, he led a gang that took four UN soldiers hostage in an attempt to have arrested colleagues freed.

The hostages were freed after a week and he escaped, but was shot and killed after police surrounded a house where he was staying.

BBC News Online: World: Europe

UN hostages freed in Georgia

Wednesday, February 25, 1998 Published at 15:29 GMT

Gunmen in western Georgia are reported to have released the remaining UN military observers and six civilians that they were holding hostage.
The announcement came on Wednesday from Vakha Jikea, a Georgian deputy involved in the negotiations between President Eduard Shevardnadze and a political representative of kidnappers.

Four UN observers had been held in a farmhouse in western Georgia by supporters of the former President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

They were seized on February 19.

The gunmen released their first hostage on Sunday and a second ahead of Wednesday's negotiations.




The remaining two captives were released after the talks began, as pledged by the leader of the group, Gocha Esebua.

Several members of his group are reported to have surrendered to the Georgian authorities who had surrounded the farmhouse. Esebua is said to have escaped.

The UN observers are part of a 100-strong team monitoring a ceasefire in Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia.

Talks were earlier held in Moscow between the Georgian ambassador there, Vazha Lortkipanidze, and a representative of the hostage-takers, Nemo Burchuladze.

Call for release of assassination suspects

In addition to talks with the Georgian president, the kidnappers had demanded the release of a number of associates arrested in connection with an assassination attempt against President Shevardnadze earlier this month.

The gunmen deny any involvement in the assassination attempt.

The atmosphere between the kidnappers and their hostages has appeared relaxed, even amicable.

Georgian television showed footage of the gunmen eating at a table with some of their captives.

One of the hostages, a Czech officer, said they were satisfied with the way they had been treated.

Georgia's first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was toppled in a bloody 1992 coup that led to Mr Shevardnadze coming to power.

Gamsakhurdia, who inspired a cult-like following, died in mysterious circumstances in 1993, although some of his most ardent supporters refuse to accept that he is dead.

RFE/RL Newsline®

1 APRIL 1998

GEORGIAN AUTHORITIES KILL ALLEGED HOSTAGE-TAKER
Georgian law enforcement agencies have killed Gocha Esebua in the Zugdidi region, ITAR-TASS reported on 1 April. Esebua, who was accused of kidnaping four UN military observers as hostages and of participating in the assasination attempt against President Eduard Shevardnadze, refused to surrender and was shot after he opened fire. Three of his accomplices surrendered and are now in custody. Also on 31 March, some 1,000 supporters of former Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia demonstrated against Shevardnadze in Tbilisi.

Thursday, February 26, 1998.

Georgian Hostage Takers Give Up

By COMBINED REPORTS

ZUGDIDI, Georgia -- Gunmen loyal to late Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia surrendered to security officials Wednesday after a weeklong hostage drama, and a missing Czech UN observer who had been among the hostages was found safe.

Georgian security forces detained eight of about 15 kidnappers who had been holding four UN military observers hostage along with six Georgian civilians in a remote mountain village.

Eight suspects were seen being brought to the local police station in Zugdidi, the headquarters for the crisis unit set up to handle the hostage-taking.

Earlier, four of the gunmen had given themselves up to the authorities, while another three, including ringleader Gocha Esebua, were allowed to flee by the security forces.

"There are 12 people in total who have given themselves up, and that's it, except for the three that have fled," said the head of local security forces, Temur Gabunya.

The authorities had previously calculated the number of gunmen to be around 20.

Security force officials said that the Czech observer, Jaroslav Kulisek, had managed to escape before an end to the crisis was negotiated, unaware that his release was imminent.

The gunmen had threatened to kill the hostages, held in an isolated farmhouse in the village of Dzhikhaskari, unless a three-point list of demands was met.

Soso Tkebuchava, deputy spokesman for the presidential press service, said the Czech hostage was found by security forces on the outskirts of the village shortly after nightfall.

Earlier, Gabunya said the Czech officer had contacted the local UN office by radio to say he was safe. Three other UN observers were released earlier -- one Sunday and two on Tuesday.

The hostage crisis ended after Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze met supporters of late president Zviad Gamsakhurdia to discuss the situation.

The four UN observers -- the Czech, a Swede, and two Uruguayans -- were seized last Thursday from their headquarters in Zugdidi, where they had been monitoring a cease-fire between Georgia and its breakaway province of Abkhazia.

The gunmen claimed to be supporters of Gamsakhurdia, who was ousted in a 1992 coup and died in mysterious circumstances a year later. They had demanded negotiations between the Georgian authorities and opposition representatives.

In addition to the talks, the kidnappers had demanded the release of Gamsakhurdia supporters who were arrested after a bloody Feb. 9 assassination attempt on Shevardnadze, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the ex-Soviet republic.

Shevardnadze, 70, who came to prominence in the West as Soviet foreign minister during the late 1980s, emerged from his shattered limousine unscathed after the assassination bid.

The Georgian leader has blamed Gamsakhurdia supporters for the attack, which left two of his bodyguards and one assailant dead.

At the start of the hostage standoff, Esebua said the gunmen had been forced to take hostages after the Georgian authorities launched "massive repression" against Gamsakhurdia supporters in the aftermath of the attack on Shevardnadze.

He denied any connection with the failed assassination attempt, but threatened to kill the hostages if his group's demands were not met.

Tbilisi had threatened to launch an assault to free the hostages,but bowed to pressure from Sweden and the Czech Republic to resolve the standoff peacefully.

Georgian officials had accused "forces in Moscow" of having a hand in the kidnapping as well as the Feb. 9 attempt on Shevardnadze's
life and an attack on him in August 1995.

Addressing a ruling party congress Sunday, Shevardnadze said the latest assassination attempt was planned in Moscow, "not by President [Boris] Yeltsin but by others," sparking an official protest Tuesday.

He suggested that those behind the attack wanted to keep Caspian Sea oil reserves from passing through Georgia en route to western European markets.

Two weeks ago Georgia said it was renewing its appeal to Russia to extradite Igor Giorgadze, the former head of the Georgian secret services suspected of organizing the August 1995 attack. Tbilisi claims Giorgadze is believed to be hiding in or near the Russian capital.

Until recently Moscow had denied Giorgadze was on Russian territory, although last week a Yeltsin aide said the Russian security forces would do their utmost to arrest him.




© Copyright 1998 The Moscow Times. All rights reserved.

GEORGIA 1992: Elections and Human Rights

British Helsinki Human Rights Group
www.bhhrg.org
22 St. Margaret's Road, Oxford OX2 6RX,
Electronic mail: [email protected], telephone: +44 1865 439483, FAX: +44 1865 439483
GEORGIA 1992: Elections and Human Rights

Six members of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group visited the Republic of Georgia between 7th and 13th October, 1992, in order to observe the elections for the Speakership of the Parliament and its members called by the State Council for 11th October. Members of the delegation observed the voting in various parts of Georgia, but also visited Tbilisi Central Prison (twice), hospitals and other institutions. They talked with supporters and opponents of the State Council as well as non-political observers.


From Communism to the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia

The violent overthrow of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia between 22nd December l99l and 6th January l992 coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The events in Moscow overshadowed the violence in Tbilisi, but many Georgians felt that they were not unrelated since the former Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, found himself an alien in Russia and needed a political base in his home republic of Georgia if he wished to continue in public life.

Already before the formal disintegration of the USSR, Georgia's Parliament, the Supreme Soviet, had declared the republic's independence on 9 April 1991. This was an assertion of Georgia's ancient separate identity. However, it was only the de facto collapse of Soviet power after August l991 which gave any concrete chance to Georgia or other Soviet republics of reasserting their independence.

On 26 May l99l Zviad Gamsakhurdia won the first contested direct election for the presidency of any Soviet republic, obtaining 86.5% of the votes cast. Valerian Advadze came second with 7%. The other 3 candidates obtained insignificant percentages.

Although newspapers opposed to Gamsakhurdia's candidacy were still published and distributed in May l99l, Georgian radio and television was controlled by Gamsakhurdia's supporters and biased in his favour. But there was little violence during the campaign and no evidence of interference with the polls. Gamsakhurdia's critics complain that his behavior became autocratic after his direct election to the executive presidency.

Undoubtedly, the appointment of prefects to direct the local administration with an elected local assembly upset many former office holders who found their authority questioned. It also shattered many cosy links between the former Soviet officials and black marketeers and local mafias.

One of the main criticisms of Gamsakhurdia's government was that it was intolerant towards the non-Georgian population. The situation in South Ossetia remained unstable and clashes between supporters of the Ossetian demands for autonomy and links with North Ossetia and official Georgian forces were recurrent in l990-91.

From the Moscow Putsch to the Tbilisi Coup

It was the attempted hardline coup in Moscow and other parts of the Soviet Union from 19-21 August l99l, which brought opposition to Gamsakhurdia's rule among Georgians into the open. The events of August are hotly disputed but the following seems to have happened.

Gamsakhurdia insisted that what went on in a "foreign country" (i.e. the coup in Moscow) was nothing to do with Georgia, but he nonetheless ordered that the National Guard led by Tengiz Kitovani be subordinated to the Interior Ministry. Gamsakhurdia justified this action by saying that it reduced the risk of a clash between Georgian forces and the Soviet troops stationed in the Republic. Kitovani was bitterly offended by the loss of power and prestige implied by the subordination of his men to the MVD.

Both sides justified their reaction to the August events by reference to their patriotism and accused the other of siding with Moscow and serving the interests of the KGB. Certainly the evident collapse of Soviet power in August l99l speeded up the process of national self-assertion in Georgia. For instance, after the failure of the coup, Georgian radio began to broadcast in Georgian rather than Russian.

The slogan of the anti-Gamsakhurdia demonstrators from 2 September was "Ceausescu" an apparent reference to the Romanian Communist tyrant overthrown on 22 December, l989. The attempt to compare Gamsakhurdia with Ceausescu mystified many Georgians but its repetition at the time of the coup in l99l, the second anniversary of the Romanian dictator's dramatic fall, suggests that the organisers of the coup were determined to fix in the minds of Western television viewers the stereotype of the Georgian events as a popular anti-dictatorial revolution on the Romanian model. Unfortunately, by that time the idea that Ceausescu had been overthrown by a popular revolt rather than a carefully staged putsch was discredited in the West.

Demonstrations and barricade-building marked the next three months. On 5 October, there were the first fatalities in Tbilisi. Although Gamsakhurdia's opponents accused his supporters of initiating the gunfire, the two dead were both supporters of the President. A stand-off followed because Kitovani's armed supporters withdrew to the outskirts of Tbilisi where they remained until they returned in force on 22 December l99l to begin the final onslaught against Gamsakhurdia.

For Gamsakhurdia's opponents, the failure of the deputies in the Supreme Soviet to support their demand for the President's resignation presented them with a dilemma. In the absence of a constitutional way of removing Gamsakhurdia they took two months before they resorted to a military coup which began on 22 December. Whatever the flaws of Gamsakhurdia's government, the inability of his opponents either to detach a majority of deputies from his side or to show clear evidence of widespread popular support through mass strikes or a petition nullifying Gamsakhurdia's election suggests that by the end of 1991 Gamsakhurdia's enemies had given up hope of deposing him either constitutionally or peacefully.

The New Order

The flight of Gamsakhurdia did not end the violence. Firstly because his supporters outside Tbilisi, especially in Western Georgia, continued to defy the new State Council until its well-equipped forces "pacified" them in late January/February, l992. In Tbilisi itself there were repeated incidents recorded on video of supporters of the new rеgime opening fire on unarmed demonstrators complaining about the coup. Such violent attacks on protestors continued intermittently (i.e. as often as crowds summoned up the courage to demonstrate) over the next six months.

Sometimes more subtle methods of crowd control were used. When it appeared impolitic to shoot at demonstrators, such as when Western statesmen visited Tbilisi to renew acquaintanceship with their old colleague, Eduard Shevardnadze, after his return in March l992, the forces of Ioseliani and Kitovani set German shepherd dogs on the crowds seeking to petition the representatives of Western democracy. After the first such incident in April, l992 when dogs were set on elderly women trying to see the German foreign minister, Hans- Dietrich Genscher, local wags started calling German shepherd dogs "Genschers" in ironic tribute to the major effect of his visit. Later, after even more violent clashes during US Secretary of State, James Baker's visit on 26 May, there was some dispute as to whether name the dogs or the.76 callibre bullets used by the regime's gunmen "Bakers".

Undoubtedly, James Baker's apparent indifference to the violent suppression of would-be petitioners seeking his help in finding out where their relatives had disappeared to, confused many Georgians who regarded the USA as the champion of democracy and human rights. The well-publicized comments of the US State Department's spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, that "we strongly support Chairman Shevardnadze and the State Council of Georgia in their efforts to bring democracy and free markets to Georgia did little to bolster US prestige among critics of the rеgime.

In June 1992 two violent incidents took place which many opponents of the current government in Georgia regarded as provocations. On 13 June, a bomb exploded shortly after a motorcade containing the deputy-chairman of the State Council, Dzhaba Ioseliani, passed the spot. Five people were killed but Mr. Ioseliani was uninjured.

Then, on 24 June, the television station in Tbilisi announced that it had been occupied by supporters of the deposed president and called upon all its adherents in Tbilisi to rally there against the now ousted rеgime of Shevardnadze.

Some people, probably naively, certainly foolishly, went to the television station where they were arrested. Others were arrested at home or in their workplaces accused of supporting or endorsing this coup. The number of people arrested is unknown - the government does not produce figures - but in addition to the 100 or so people captured at the television station, about another fifty names are given in Tbilisi of people who disappeared around 24 June.

The State Council established after the overthrow of President Gamsakhurdia and headed since March by Eduard Shevardnadze was anxious to legitimize its standing in the eyes of the outside world by holding elections. But it was only in the late summer of 1992 that their control of the political situation was sufficiently complete for them to contemplate holding an election.

Ironically, by August 1992, the State Council had embarked on policies which mirrored some of those which they alleged had made Gamsakhurdia's rеgime insupportable. Far from joining the new Commonwealth of Independent States, which Gamsakhurdia had alleged was simply a continuation of Soviet or Russian imperialism under a new name, the new authorities in Tbilisi accused the Russian authorities, especially the Russian military and other "dark forces" of interfering in Georgia and promoting ethnic unrest. At the same time, the new rеgime imposed strict control over South Ossetia and went to war in Abkhazia to prevent the implementation of separatist demands there.

The rhetoric of the post-Gamsakhurdia government and the official media has become intensely chauvinist. Not only does this put non-Georgian citizens in the position of being publicly abused as virtual traitors but it also makes criticism of the rеgime's policies towards the non-Georgian minorities tantamount to treason. The often almost hysterical appeal to patriotism combined with the reality of civil war in the north-west creates an atmosphere incompatible with democracy and public debate.

Human Rights abuses including torture in Georgia today

"The penitentiary system in a totalitarian state
has its horrifying features, and it is beyond
the power of one man to reform it..."
Eduard Shevardnadze
The Future Belongs to Freedom

Although the conditions in the Central Tbilisi Prison for normal prisoners on remand after sentence seem comparable with the upper end of recent Soviet practice and the uniformed guards in the prison appear to behave correctly towards the inmates, the prison is still a deeply alarming place. It contains prisoners who show evidence of severe torture and also armed men in plain-clothes who do not appear subordinated to the prison's uniformed governor. Both these circumstances give rise to deep concern.

Torture admitted by Eduard Shevardnadze

The case of Zaza Tsiklauri is a cause cеlеbre in Georgia. Irakli Batiashvili, the Minister of Intelligence and Information (the former KGB), has resigned in protest against the torture of Tsiklauri and his incapacity to stop it. These facts were confirmed by Mr. Shevardnadze at his press conference on 12th October when he was asked by a British Helsinki Group representative to permit human rights activists, journalists, diplomats and elections observers to see the condition of prisoners in prisoners in Tbilisi Central Prison. Although Mr. Shevardnadze gave his permission, none of those present took up the offer and it was left to four members of the British group to visit Zaza Tsiklauri the next morning.

Tsiklauri, Zaza - b.14 October, 1961; married with 2 children. Lecturer in Physics at the Technical University, Tbilisi. His brother was prefect of Kazbeki under Gamsakhurdia. Michael Ochs of the US Congressional Helsinki Commission had already visited some detainees accused of "terrorism" in the Tbilisi Central Prison, but he was the only other observer to have shown any direct interest in human rights issues.

Mr. Ochs also questioned Eduard Shevardnadze about human rights abuses and his attitude towards his political opponents at his press conference on 12 October. Other observers showed no apparent concern about the issues raised, though the German chargе d'affaires, Hans-Peter Nielsen, complained to Mark Almond that his question about the detention and mistreatment of Zaza Tsiklauri, was an "inappropriate intrusion on the separation of powers", adding "You would not put such a question to Chancellor Kohl, would you?"

Some indication of the political conflicts within the current Georgian rеgime was given by the difficulty which we had in arranging to see Zaza Tsiklauri despite President Shevardnadze's agreement. One official told us that Mr. Tsiklauri was such a dangerous terrorist that it would be impossible for us to risk seеing him.

We had also asked to see Lia Beruashvili, a journalist editing the samizdat newspaper Kartuli Azri (Georgian Thought) who was arrested a few days before the election on a charge of terrorism, but despite Mr. Shevardnadze's permission it proved impossible to see her.

Our arrival at the Tbilisi Central Prison on the morning of 13 October in the company of the procurator investigating the Tsiklauri case, Ansor Bangashvili, seemed to cause some consternation, since the prison gates were first opened, then shut again, before reopening to let us enter. In addition to the uniformed prison guards, we were eyed as we entered by a group of young men in plain-clothes armed with guns or staves. The nature of the relationship between these young men and the prison authorities was unclear. More alarming was the impression that they gave of having authority over the prisoners which was not subject to official control.

The four members of the Group (Christine Stone, Dr. Richard Latcham, Mark Almond and Alastair Macleod, who acted as interpreter) met Zaza Tsiklauri in the office of the prison governor on the morning of 13 October. Despite our request to speak to Mr. Tsiklauri alone in the absence of officials, Procurator Bangashvili, insisted on remaining in the room although two other officials did leave. His presence undoubtedly inhibited Mr. Tsiklauri's behavior and answers to our questions. Furthermore it was clear that he had not been informed of whom he was to meet or the purpose of our visit. He was clearly apprehensive on entering the room and unsure of our purpose. We were, he told us, the first non-Georgians whom he had seen since his capture on 7 August.

When we met Tsiklauri he was still able to walk only with the aid of crutches. The doctor in our group, Richard Latcham, M.D., was unable to give him a full examination but noted the poor setting of his broken ankles and fractured left-arm. He also had a recent scar over his right eye and burns/scaldings on his lower legs. (The rest of his body was covered and it is impossible to say in what condition the clothed parts of his body were in.) It was clear that he could not rest weight on his left leg. Dr. Latcham found the bandaging of the ankle clean but the setting of the fracture inadequate.

Such was Zaza Tsiklauri's poor physical and mental condition that there could be no doubt about his mistreatment. Ironically, although the torture of Mr. Tsiklauri had already been admitted by the Georgian authorities , he himself was so intimidated by his experiences and unsure of the conditions and purpose of our visit that he insisted that his injuries were the result of a car crash in which he was involved while attempting to evade arrest! He was unwilling to be photographed so we were unable to have pictorial evidence of his physical condition. In reply to the question where he lived, Tsiklauri was unable to remember his home address and replied that he lived in the prison. His only request was that he should be moved to the prison hospital.

Tsiklauri was still being interrogated though "now mainly during the day". He was not able or willing to pass on information about the conduct of his interrogations, but there is a general admission by the authorities that it had been particularly brutal in its early phases.

Such was Mr. Tsikaluri's condition that we wondered whether it was the result of the use of drugs that had reduced him to this state of lassitude. Dr. Latcham had visited the prison the day before and had been able to see what drugs were available in the prison hospital store. The only drugs available in any quantities were Benzodiazepines (tranquillisers), but Tsiklauri showed none of the symptoms of tranquilliser abuse. He showed the only drugs which he was then taking - Valerian, an old-fashioned sedative. He was not taking sufficient quantities to have reduced him to his depressed condition. Dr. Latcham was led to the conclusion that Tsiklauri's cowed and depressed state was not the result of the forced administration of mind-altering drugs, but of his physical maltreatment over the preceding weeks.

Tsiklauri has yet to be charged with any crime. When we asked the Procurator what he had done, we were told that that was what the investigation would find out. Informally, the accusation against him is of third degree terrorism, i.e., neither that he planned a terrorist outrage nor that he carried out an outrage, but that Tsiklauri was associated in an as yet to be defined way with people responsible for first or second degree terrorism. The procurator suspected him of being involved in some way in the plot to blow up Dzhaba Ioseliani on 13 June, 1992.

A number of others have been accused of participating in the bomb attack against Mr. Ioseliani in June. Among them was the journalist, Tamara Ebralidze, of the Free Georgian newspaper, who fled to Moscow after armed men came to her home in search of her. It is alleged that two of her associates - a husband and wife were taken to the State Council building, where others are held, and were pressured to give information on Ebralidze's whereabouts. Mock executions were prepared (nooses around their necks) among other methods of extracting information.

We received several reports of arrests taking place during our stay. On 7 October, Valeria Novodvorskaya, a deputy of the Russian Parliament, and a human rights activist with a special interest in Georgian and Abkhaz affairs, was arrested by plainclothes policemen. Along with two Georgian women, Dali Abuladze and Isolda Kareli, Valeria Novodvorskaya had unfurled a banner protesting against the unrepresentative nature of the elections.

It is difficult to be precise about the numbers under arrest or who have "disappeared" because of the absence of a free flow of information, but at his press conference on 12 October, Mr. Shevardanadze mentioned a figure of 60 individuals awaiting trial: "These people fight the state...They are terrorists." The newly-elected president also admitted that about 100 people had been detained before the elections for "security reasons." Samizdat lists of the arrested and disappeared also circulate: they suggest in Tbilisi alone that at least 250 named individuals have been arrested or "disappeared".

Press Freedom

Although a number of different newspapers are on sale in Tbilisi, journalists opposed to the State Council or associated with would-be independent newspapers complain that it is impossible for them to publish.

We visited the offices of Iberia Spectrum which had been ransacked on four occasions after June, 1992. Typewriters had been smashed to pieces and the newspaper's archive ripped to shreds.

Three nights before the elections, Georgian television devoted an hour or more (we gave up watching) to a programme glorifying Jaba Ioseliani and the Mkedrioni. At a briefing for CSCE observers, an American diplomat praised the "fairness" of the division of television time among the 46 parties, saying each had been allocated the same number of advertising slots for their party political broadcasts. When it was pointed out that Mr. Ioseliani (an independent non-party candidate) had received so much television time so soon before the election, the US diplomat replied by suggesting that either Mr. Ioseliani had chosen to save up any time allotted to him for just one programme or had "bought time from the station which no-one else wanted." We were reminded that this happened in the United States.

Who opposes Eduard Shevardnadze?

Despite the huge scale of his electoral victory (96% of votes cast) and the fact that all parties had supported his candidacy, at his press conference on 12 October, the newly- elected President admitted that his rеgime had opponents. He singled out doctors and medical workers saying that they often supported the former president, providing him with money. Mr. Shevardnadze added that although the authorities knew who these people were - "we can find them and punish them, but we don't"- but "nothing" was being done to them because they were being given "the chance to adjust to the situation."

Why members of the medical profession should be so hostile to the new rеgime is at first sight baffling. But conversations with medical practitioners brought out concrete reasons in addition to hostility towards a rеgime brought to power by the violent overthrow of the elected president.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia had repeatedly accused his opponents of involvement in drug-pushing. His charges were generally discounted and taken as evidence of mental instability. However, the evidence of doctors and hospitals in Georgia suggests that there is both an enormous problem of drug-abuse there and that the supporters of Mr. Ioseliani, the deputy chairman of the State Council, in particular, are in effective control of a drugs racket which involves them in stealing medical supplies, especially morphine, from, hospitals.
Dr. Latcham's inquiries revealed a level of heroin abuse very much higher than in the worst effected parts of the United Kingdom. For instance, 25% of beds were set aside in the psychiatric wards of Tbilisi hospitals visited for heroin addicts. In the worst affected parts of Britain, the proportion would be about 4-5% (Dr. Latcham was also told that the tranquilliser, Benzodiazepine, which is one of the few medicines widely available, was used by drug addicts in conjunction with heroin.)

The confiscation of medical supplies by the Mkhedrioni from hospitals and their depredations and the intimidation of the population might well explain why hospital staff were less than enthusiastic for the candidate who received 96% of the votes cast on 11 October. Mr. Shevardnadze's admission that doctors supported many oppositionists confirmed our impression of the dissidents: they are drawn from the intelligentsia. It has been widely reported that Mr. Gamsakhurdia had forfeited the support of all but the uneducated by December 1991 - as if the votes of the non-intellectual carried less weight than those of the intelligentsia - but all the critics of the current rеgime whom we met were highly educated people. Interference, often violent, with press freedom which disappeared in Georgia, explains why classic "intelligents" like journalists, other than those working for the official media, are privately critical of the new government. To say that many intellectuals are willing to express their opposition to Mr. Shevardnadze to Westerners is not, of course, to deny the possibility that the uneducated are opposed to the rеgime too.

The widespread display of firearms on the streets of Tbilisi by the supporters of Mr. Shevardnadze naturally discourages demonstrations of opposition. They have been used repeatedly to disperse his critics when they have taken to the streets. But the atmosphere of violence appears calculated. Despite official claims that terrorists are active in the city, planning inter alia to bombard the Metechi Palace Hotel with rockets and to kidnap the international observers, there was no evidence of armed resistance to the rеgime in the capital. The observers were warned by the US and German diplomats to be prepared for kidnapping and to take large sums of US dollars with them to bribe any would-be kidnapper whom they might meet. In fact, these tales seem designed to discourage the international observers from straying from their police escorts when observing the voting.

The state of war in Abkhazia is used propagandistically to justify the rеgime's clamp down on criticism far from the fighting front. Opponents of Mr. Shevardnadze can be stamped as "traitors" in league with enemies, who as Muslims conform to the traditional stereotype of the Georgians' national enemy. (Ironically, only a year ago, Mr. Shevardnadze criticised Gamsakhurdia and his supporters for narrow-minded chauvinism.) During their visit to Sukhumi, Dr. Malcolm and Alastair Macleod heard reports of atrocities by both sides which may well be true.

In the bulk of Georgia not directly affected by the fighting in Abkhazia, the new government has no justification for the methods used to suppress its opponents' political dissent. The widespread abuse of human rights may not be directed by Mr. Shevardnadze and may be instigated by others in the rеgime, but if his election as president is to have any legitimizing effect, he must now take responsibility for these abuses and stop them. Otherwise, the international community, especially CSCE member-states, will have to conclude that the Georgian government is not fulfilling its international treaty obligations under the Helsinki Agreement (and the Geneva Convention) in Abkhazia.


The conduct of the elections

Most other observers seem to have given the conduct of the elections on 11th October a clean bill of health. That was the view of the largest single group of observers, from the US National Democratic Institute (NDI). The German chargе d'affaires, Hans-Peter Nielsen, at a pre-election briefing for CSCE observers even went so far as to state that the purpose of our visit was to "legitimize" the elections.

Unlike the observers from the National Democratic Institute, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group observers could not regard the conduct of the elections as likely to "confer democratic legitimacy upon the new government." The "open and orderly" conduct of the elections witnessed by the NDI has to be set against the political and human rights background already described. To say that the election regulations were debated openly among an inclusive, albeit non-elected State Council,begs too many questions about the nature of the rеgime established at the beginning of 1992.

The absence of representatives of the deposed President's supporters from these discussions is evidence enough of their restricted nature. The fact that Gamsakhurdia's supporters were not permitted to stand for election speaks for itself about the willingness of his successors to test their popularity in a real election.

In addition to the fact that there was no competition for the key position of Speaker of Parliament - which was immediately renamed President with executive functions after Mr. Shevardnadze's victory - there was no evidence of divisions on the key contentious issues in Georgian politics among the parties allowed to present candidates at the election. The electoral law adopted on 3 August 1992 prescribed a combination of direct mandates and party lists as the way in which MPs were to be elected.

Immediately after the adoption of the electoral law, 32 new parties were registered in addition to the existing 14. All endorsed the candidacy of Eduard Shevardnadze. (At his press conference in the Academy of Sciences on 9 October, Mr. Shevardnadze expressed his regret that no alternative candidate had presented himself. On the same occasion, he thanked the academicians for their "unanimous" endorsement of his candidacy, noting that in the past the members of the Academy had not always been so united in support of him.) Candidates for the Speakership were not allowed to be members of a political party. The parties represented on the State Council had complained that if someone as popular as Mr. Shevardnadze stood on behalf of any other party, all the others would be disadvantaged.

The pre-coup parties which presented themselves at the elections on 11 October 1992 had obtained 6% of the votes in the elections held on 28 October 1990. The other parties (32 in number) set up within two weeks of 3 August had no track record, although some of their leading members seem to have been drawn from the former Communist Party. Some former supporters of Gamsakhurdia, like Giorgi Chanturia, who opposed him since the summer of 1991, also took part in the elections. Little information was available (in Georgian or Russian) about these parties or their programmes. It was, however, clear that all supported Mr. Shevardnadze, all condemned Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and all supported the State Council's conduct of affairs with regard to Abkhazia and relations with Russia.

The British observers watched the voting in Sukhumi (Dr. Malcolm and Alastair Macleod) and in the region from Tbilisi to Kazbeki in the north (Mrs. Stone, Mrs. Walsh, Dr. Latcham and Mark Almond), splitting into pairs en route, studying 30 polling stations over a widely scattered area. In the case of Sukhumi, the fighting hindered the possibilities for Dr. Malcolm and Mr. Macleod to see more than ten polling stations.

The NDI preliminary report remarks on the "inexperience" of the chairmen of electoral commissions as a cause of the few irregularities which it notes. In our observation when asked about their previous experience in organising the polls, the chairmen proudly recounted their record. The chairman at Tbilisi Number Two polling station (Mr. Shevardnadze's own) said that he had supervised voting in 1980 and 1985 for instance. Like many others he said that the voting on 11 October was proceeding "normally". What normality he had in mind can only be guessed at, but since the election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in May 1991 was the only previous election for president and it was a multi-candidate election unlike this one, it seems fair to take "normal" to mean pre-glasnost in style.

Precautions to prevent people voting more than once were inadequate. While it is understandable that in a country at war, provision had to be made on an ad hoc basis for refugees to vote, the fact that no clear control was made over whomsoever appeared at polling stations clutching a special card requiring registration as an "additional voter" laid the polls open to abuse. That it was possible to vote twice or more often if supplied with enough "additional voter cards" is clear. Since to cast a vote for the only candidate for Speaker a voter had only to drop an unmarked ballot into the box the possibility for fraud when observers were not present is obvious: a clutch of ballot papers could simply be dropped into the box. (This procedure of course is identical to that used under the Communist rеgime when to vote "no" required the ballot to be dropped into the box.)

Fear of a boycott of the polls by opponents of the State Council gave it or supporters of it every incentive to abuse the "additional list" or to exploit unused or extra ballots. It should be remembered that in the "normal" elections held in Georgia before 1989 as well as in the freer atmosphere between 1989 and 1991 a very high turn-out (90% plus) was commonplace so the relatively low poll, 74.7% may indicate widespread boycotting of the polls.
Our impression was nonetheless of a substantial turnout with over 90% in many places possible though not verifiable. Fear of the consequences of being known not to have voted may have motivated people to turn out. We were told of cases where directors of factories or other places of work threatened to sack employees who did not vote. Certainly many voters were remarkably indifferent to the secrecy of the ballot and wandered around inside polling stations with their ballot papers marked and visible to all before stuffing them into the ballot-box. The fact that Eduard Shevardnadze was the only candidate and the choice between the 46 parties was so slight as to be meaningless may well have encouraged many voters to treat the whole procedure with indifference.

Other voters seemed genuinely to hope that Mr. Shevardnadze would restore peace to Georgia and use his international respectability to obtain desperately needed Western aid. Some who said that they had voted for Zviad Gamsakhurdia last time, explained their vote for Mr. Shevardnadze as a reflection of their disappointment with Gamsakhurdia's failure to improve the quality of life. They did not accuse the former president of tyranny but incompetence and ineffectiveness. Perhaps they had exaggerated expectations in the period 1990-1991 of what could be achieved. If so, they do not seem to have lost them now. In so far as Mr. Shevardnadze can claim genuine support at this election, it may come from impatient people expecting rapid improvements in their still declining quality of life, to be produced by the former Soviet foreign minister's extensive Western contacts.

Interestingly enough, none of the voters with whom we spoke showed any interest in the many parties on the second ballot paper or the districts' individual candidates on the third. They spoke only of their support for the candidate for the Speakership.

However the unanimity of the expressions of support for Mr. Shevardnadze were uncanny and certainly unlike any expression of public opinion in societies conventionally accepted as democratic. One reason for the anxiety of voters to assure us of how they had voted may have been given by the chairman of one polling station who remarked that the observers had come "to support Eduard Shevardnaze". If that was the impression given to Georgians as to the object of the election observers then it is in itself testimony to the distance Georgia has to travel to achieve democracy.

Members of our group saw no open intimidation at the polling stations but the atmosphere in Tbilisi especially was far from wholesome. In one Tbilisi polling station, the voting actually took place in the basement of a police station next to the cells. Gangs of young men in leather jackets and jeans, the virtual uniform of the supporters of Shevardnadze, Ioseliani,hung around polling stations, sometimes as official observers on behalf of the parties, at others without any explanation of their presence or role.

In a polling station in Tbilisi where Mary Walsh and Dr. Latcham observed the count, they noticed that many of the presidential ballots had handwritten messages on them. They were assured that these did not invalidate the ballot as they expressed support for Mr. Shevardnadze. People to whom members of the Group had spoken in Tbilisi before polling day said that radio and television had suggested that it would be a good idea for voters to endorse their ballots for Mr. Shevardnadze with such personal messages of support.

This is both most unusual advice from a state broadcasting system and an unusual practice in the voting booth. The writing of messages might indicate genuine enthusiasm for the sole candidate but it might also have been promoted by fear: rumour had it that the authorities would not only be able to identify who had voted on 11 October but how people had voted. If such a rumour was believed, then people might have been persuaded (by the media propaganda among other souces of influence) to scribble their personal endorsement on the ballot. In any case, it is an undesirable practice since it confuses the issue of spoilt ballots.

Why we have come to a different conclusion

The members of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group are aware that they have come to very different conclusions than the other observer missions about the credibility of the elections in Georgia on 11th October 1992, and the nature of the political and human rights situation there. The reasons why these divergences of opinion have arisen are worthy of reflection as an understanding of them might contribute both to more effective election monitoring by international observers in the future and to more insight into the reality of individual governments' political and human rights policies.

In order to assess whether an election has been fairly conducted or not, it is insufficient to attend polling stations and judge whether fraud or intimidation is taking place on the spot - though that is of course essential. Background knowledge of the political situation is essential. It should be based on some experience either of the country or region concerned. It is not enough simply to take a briefing from officials with a vested interest in a particular outcome. These may be diplomats as much as representatives of the local government (as was the case in Georgia).

Observer missions should make an effort to get out and about among the people and not only on election day itself. No amount of briefing can substitute for chance encounters and on-the-spot impressions. Many observer-missions tend to stay cooped up in hotels for much of their time dutifully listening to briefings which could have been provided before departure rather than seeing for themselves what life is like. Anyone who did not take a metro ride or try to buy food in Tbilisi but relied on the services of the 5-Star Metechi Palace Hotel would get a very distorted view of reality in the Georgian capital.

Unlike all other Western election observers, the members of the British Helsinki Group did not stay in the Hotel Metechi Palace, an Austro-Georgian joint-venture costing $170 per night. Since our original choice the Intourist Hotel Iveria was completely occupied by refugees from the war in Abkhazia, we were allocated rooms in the Hotel Adjara. Staying in a hotel with intermittent services, including no food after breakfast for the last three days of our stay, and two armed guards on our floor plus other armed and disruptive visitors, gave us a different perspective on life in Georgia today. Gunfire was heard every night during our stay in the Hotel Adjara.

What both hotels open to Westerners in Tbilisi at the moment have in common is that few Georgians without official connections dare to enter them. Our efforts to persuade unofficial people whom we met to come to our hotel were uniformly unsuccessful. The presence of armed plainclothes policemen (as they identified themselves at the end of our stay) as well as of gunmen from the Mkhedrioni, an officially-sponsored militia led by Dhzaba Ioseliani, one of Eduard Shevardnadze's deputies in the State Council, seems to have deterred them from coming closer than 50 yards to the Hotel Adjara even at night.

Our personal experience of the unsettling impact of nightly gunfire, screams and the barking of dogs accounts in part for the radically different impression that we have formed of the legitimacy of the elections held on 11th October and the human rights situation in Georgia. Travelling around Tbilisi after dark is a dangerous experience: typical of the intimidating features of life in the darkened city are the barricades manned by armed men in civilian dress who do not condescend to show any warrant for their demands for cigarettes or cash to permit people to pass. Even on the morning of election day, we witnessed an example of lawless intimidation when a Mercedes with Georgian number-plates accompanied by a Lada stopped another Lada and men got out removing guns from the boot of the Mercedes and proceeded to take a package from the driver of the car which they had stopped. It was not an auspicious start to election day.

Unlike other observers with whom we spoke (with the exception of Michael Ochs and Aila Niinimaa-Keppo from Finland), the British Helsinki Group arranged meetings with unofficial groups and dissidents. Their fear of detection and reprisal was palpable. They all knew of people who had been arrested or disappeared. We were shown samizdat videos of the violence used by supporters of the State Council to break up pro-Gamsakhurdia or anti-Shevardnadze demonstrations: this included the use of fire-arms against unarmed demonstrators. These videos also contained harrowing scenes of the brutalised and battered bodies of people who had fallen into the hands of supporters of the new rеgime and had only been returned to their families after the payment of bribes.

Talking with such people confirmed our impression of the visible anxiety on the faces of ordinary people in the street or on the metro. Life in Georgia today is unhappy and this state of affairs is not solely the result of war and economic hardship. Insecurity and the absence of the rule of law gnaw away at people. If we had not spoken with a dozen or so dissidents, the scenes of "ordinary" voting on 11th October might well have led us to conclude that the elections were basically sound rather than an elaborate irrelevance to the well-being of Georgia.

A Swiss observer complained that we should not have mixed election observing and investigation of the human rights situation in Georgia - a strange self-denying approach to acquiring understanding of what was really going on on election day. The failure of any other group to take up the opportunity to visit Tbilisi Central Prison offered by Mr. Shevardnadze and to speak with a prisoner whose abuse has been admitted was striking. We regret that we could not speak to others in detention.

საქართველოს დამოუკიდებლობის აქტი, რომელიც კანონიერმა, საქართველოს უზენაესმა საბჭომ მიიღო, დიდი ხანია დავიწყებას მიეცა ჩვენი ამჯამინდელი და წინა ხელისუფლების გადამკიდე.
ხომ არ აჯობებდა, ამ საიტზე ეს აქტიც დადებულიყო? ვფიქრობ, ამდენი დოკუმენტური მასალის გვერდით, ასეთი სერიოზული და ოფიციალური დოკუმენტაციის ონლაინ-ვერსიის არსებობა აუცილებელიცაა.

საითს გააჩნია სტუმართა წიგნი, რომელშიც შესაძლებელია მკითხველთა მოსაზრებების ჩაწერა. ჩანაწერები გამოჩნდება ადმინისტრატორის მიერ დადასტურების შემდეგ.