To cite this article: Niebrój L., Man, work,language: The Joseph Tischner's philosophy of work, [in:] Niebrój L., Kosińska M., Unemployment and Health Care, Katowice: Wyd. SAM 2004, p. 17-21

Home    Eukrasia vol. 5 - Contents

Lesław Niebrój MAN, WORK, LANGUAGE: THE JOSEPH TISCHNER’S PHILOSOPHY OF WORK Joseph Tischner (1931–2000) is listed among the most brilliant Polish philosophers [1]. There are no doubts that he should be also listed among the most influential philosophers in the crucial times for contemporary Polish as well as the whole Central and Eastern European history. Tischner graduated theology from the Jagiellonian University, probably the most prestigious university in Poland, and one of the oldest universities in the world. Next he studied philosophy at the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw. In 1963, Tischner took his doctor’s degree on the Jagiellonian University. What should be underlined, his doctorate thesis had been written under the direction of Roman Ingarden, a phenomenologist, whom master had been Edmund Husserl. In this way Tischner received a very wide and many-sided philosophical education: from traditional Thomism (thought during his both theological and philosophical studies), through existentialism, to phenomenology which opened his mind to the contemporary currents of philosophical thinking and to the so called ‘philosophy of dialogue’ in particular. However, the phenomenon of Tischner’s philosophy would not be probably understandable only on the basis of his academic preparation. The key element of his philosophy is its orientation or even engagement into the daily practice of human life. Tischner wrote his works not so much for philosophers but for “common” people who had experienced hopelessness of their economical, social but first of all ‘spiritual’ situation under the totalitarian communist regime [2]. His philosophy tended to express the dignity of human person understood as an individual being, arguing in this way with Marxism, which subordinated an individual person to the dialectical rules of the social development. No wonder that in Tischner’s philosophy the problem of human work occupies one of the very central places. The concept of work on the one hand seems to be strictly related to the idea of human dignity, on the other hand it is crucial for Marxism. The aim of this article is to describe the fundamental elements of Tischner’s philosophy of work. It is assumed that better philosophical understanding of the role which work plays in the human world could introduce interesting insights into studies on the relationship between the people’s unemployment and health status. The assumption accepted in this article is the thesis that the problem of unemployment cannot be fully understood only in the light of economical or social disadvantage. This problem takes a human person in his/her the most fundamental, philosophical constitution. Can the process of work be compared with language? In this matter Tischner’s opinion is very clear [3]. Such a comparison is not only possible but even more it is (a) essential to a through understanding of what work is (‘ontology’ of human work) and (b) could be useful to explain the ethos of work (‘ethics’ of human work). From Tischner’s point of view both this aspects are in fact inseparable. Work is defined as a special kind of conversation between human beings which serves to sustain and develop the human life [4:23]. There are two crucial elements of this definition which should be the subject of the more careful reflection: “special kind of conversation” and “human life”. Any conversation could be understood as a form of exchanging something between the people taking part in it. ‘Normal’ conversation takes place when the subjects of such an exchange are words. Words are defined as sounds filled with a meaning. The grammar of language permits to join single words in sentences, and these in turn in the whole narrations. Intrasubjective meaning of the words and the use of understandable rules of grammar makes possible for the participants of any conversation to achieve an agreement. The essence of any ‘normal’ conversation is built up upon three elements: (a) words, i.e. subjects of the exchange, (b) grammar, i.e. rules of the exchange and (c) agreement, i.e. the purpose of the exchange. The human work as a special kind of conversation assumes these three elements, or rather elements which could be comprised with words, grammar and purpose of ‘normal’ conversation. In fact, it is a rare situation that words themselves are the product of human work but any pieces of such work have the same structure as words. The latter are the synthesis of some empirical material (for instance: sound) and the meaning [4:24]. The same may be told about all the products of human work. Any of these is constituted in their nature of empirical material of which they are made and the meaning achieved by that material in the process of work. Each particular piece of work, like each particular word, exists in the context of other, adequately, products of work or words. The former are included in the relationships with the whole world of effects of human work. That occurs in the same way, in which particular words are joined into sentences or narrations. The existence of an assumed agreement between the participants of the dialogue about how to include words or pieces of work into their proper context is necessary in any sort of conversation. Accepted rules of grammar create such a preliminary agreement between the interlocutors of ‘normal’ conversation. Tischner observes that comparable rules are assumed by the participants of the dialogue of work. What is more, the process of specialization of work, when many different people take part in creation of the ultimate product of work, has let to the extraordinary complication of the rules of work’s ‘grammar’. Using of the words according to the rules of grammar is the way to convey certain information to other people. The ultimate purpose of communication is, from the ethical point of view could be said “should be”, to make the interlocutor the participant of certain truth. The truth, which itself leads to achieving the wisdom. Tischner states that work has its own inner wisdom [4]. Anyone must know what he or she should do to contribute his or her share of work which serves the ultimate aim of certain process of work. This wisdom leads people to understand their own ‘place’ in both, i. e. horizontal and vertical, dimensions of the process of work. Working includes people in conversation whose participants are all of these who contemporary are engaged to produce a certain thing (horizontal dimension), but at the same time it should be underlined that the participants of this conversation are also these people who worked over the same material in the past and these who will do it in the future (vertical dimension). In both these dimensions human work gains particular moral status: it should be seen in the perspective of ‘responsibility’ and this specific kind of responsibility which could be named ‘faithfulness’. Any sort of human work makes its agent responsible in the face of all people engaged to achieve the same ultimate products of work. In the case of vertical dimension of the work this responsibility could be understood as faithfulness in particular way. Man taking up any kind of work uses the heritage of the pieces of work of the past generations and prepares the material of work for the future ones. To be a heir of the past who himself/herself enriches what it to be passed on to those who will undertake this heritage in the future. From the ethical point of view this process must be seen as an obligation to faithfulness. The dimensions of human work indicate the ‘space’ of the responsibility: all the people taking part in the process of work. This makes it possible to determine the subjects before whom, or better about whom any certain person engaged in the work’s conversation is responsible. The responsibility has also its object. Tischner’s definition of work points at to serving to sustain and develop of human life as an object of responsibility. Tischner is aware of the lack of clarity in the common understanding of what the human life is [4]. But he underlines that there exists, however, intuitional knowledge about the value of human life. Especially in the situations when life is menaced by death, the fundamental value of life appears in the very clear way. The ‘fundamental’ does not mean the highest value. The experience of the situation when life is threatened convinces that there are values much more precious that this of life. Man is ready to sacrifice life to obtain or preserve the values which are evaluated as higher then life in itself. But on the other hand in such a situation it becomes obvious that life permits us to achieve all other values, both those which ought to be subordinate to life and those to which life should be subordinated. Work serves life in the double way: by sustaining and developing it in its biological existence and by giving it sense. Tischner excludes any such human activities which do not serve life from the conception of work [4]. It does not matter if this activity is related to receiving a payment or requires human physical or mental effort. The relationship between life and work, so close that inseparable, permits us to accept the existence of similar relationship between the value of life and of work [4]. It could even be said that human work achieves its dignity from human life in the serve of which the certain work is engaged. The conception of ‘dignity of human work’ includes in itself the fundamental ethical obligation. Ethics of work It seems necessary to clarify the very understanding of what ethics is, before the considerations about ethics of human work will be undertaken. Tischner’s phenomenological analysis justify considering ethics not merely as a question of good or bad human conduct [5]. They permit to understand ethics as an inquiry into the sense of human life. Such an approach to the essence of ethics is not particularly characteristic for Tischner’s philosophy only. One could easily find out that a very similar opinion is shared by different authors, even these whose philosophical roots differ very much from Tischner’s [6]. The originality of moral philosophy developed by Tischner arises when considering what ‘sense of life’ means for him. Sharing Emmanuel Levinas anthropological conception [7], Tischner finds the ultimate sense of human life in – an almost theologically understood – salvation [5]. However, salvation and damnation are not considered as a kind of God’s juridical action, at least in the meaning which assumes “juridical action” in the practice of human courts sentences. In fact, to salve or to damn does not mean for God to create any new situation for man. This constitutes the fundamental difference between courts’ sentences, which change life of the judged person in an obvious way and God’s salvation/damnation which does not change anything but only recognize a given person’s situation. Last Judgment, when it is viewed in this way, consists in “simply” recognition if a certain person is able to accept an Ultimate Good. The human ability to accept it is developed during the whole human life, by choosing voluntarily more or less important goods. In the figurative and probably rather imprecise way, it could be said that humans being, choosing good or rejecting it, create themselves. People not so much choose different things but rather create themselves by choosing such things, which always means choosing between good and evil. To choose a good or to refuse accepting it is a question of responsibility. And the experience of responsibility is given to human beings when they enter a relationship with another person. Any such relation assumes some form of dialogue [5]. Work – as it has been shown before – is a form of conversation, i.e. essential kind of human dialogue, so that plays a crucial role in the realization of the ‘sense of life’. Work does not only helps people to have more, but – what is more important – to be more [8]. The man participating in the process of work becomes not only an owner of things, but becomes more of a person. The two latest statements are deeply rooted in the teaching of John Paul II expressed especially in his encyclical “Laborem Exercens” [8]. Work could be viewed as a tool which serves to humanizing the man. However, like any tool, work may be used properly or it may be misused. Tischner names the notion of misused work using the term “exploitation” [3,4]. Exploitation takes place when the process of work is related to an unjustified suffering of the working man. Tischner assumes distinction between natural (justified) suffering which, although in different ways, is present in every work, and an unjustified one [4]. The former is the consequence of “natural resistance of the material” of human work. The latter is in direct or indirect way caused by other people somehow related with the man who undertakes the work. This suffering is in most cases experienced by a working man, but some times it may concern the person who uses the “fruit” of the others men’s work [4]. The exploitation could appear when the work does not suit the social needs, which Tischner named “the fundamental project of work”, or when in the relationship between employers and employees, the principle of justice is not held [3,4]. What is more, the exploitation could take place also in the relationship between employees themselves, and also between them and the users of their work’s products. In each of these situations, the exploitation may be defined as “a disorder of structure of dialogue of work”, and named “moral exploitation of the work” [3,4]. The structure of any dialogue is based on truth [9]. Fallacy makes the real human dialogue impossible and/or pointless. Tischner revokes the myth of the tower of Babel, where the lack of the mutual understanding occurs, i.e. where the truth is not communicating between human being, any cooperation is not possible and the relations of human work turn into the relations of moral exploitation of the work [3]. Conclusion It is obvious that the status of being unemployed should not be understood as an exclusion of the unemployed person form the process of work. Employment is only one, among others, way in which human participating in the process of work is realized. On the other hand, however, it should be emphasized that it is socially the most formal way of such participation. Undoubtedly, unemployed people do not experience an absolute exclusion from the process of work, but – according to a different social study [10] – it could be stated that they experience such an exclusion, and even more, that they experience an important form of it. Participating in the process of work means to have a possibility to create ourselves as human beings, to create our humanity. The exclusion from this process makes it difficult or even impossible for us to develop on human beings, i.e. actualize our human nature. The unemployment should be considered as a threat of to human dignity of jobless people. However, the phenomenon of unemployment is not ethically dangerous only for these in the certain society who are jobless. As a social phenomenon it creates particularly favorable conditions for developing moral exploitation of work of these who are employed. In fact, unemployment in itself proves the existence of errors in the fundamental project of work. It makes employees particularly vulnerable to exploitation by their employers who are – using Tischner’s words – in the situation when “evil is in the dialogue of temptation” [5]. What is more employees themselves are no more participants of “community of the work” but rather competitors at the work market. Finally, the exploitation appears in relation to those who consume products of work. The phenomenon of unemployment deprived economically people who are no more able to use fruits of the process of work of others. If it is an agreement that people, as an subjects of health care should be recognized not only in their strictly ‘biological’ but also psychological, social an spiritual dimensions 11–13], it will be necessary to take into account philosophical understanding of human work and such an understanding of the unemployment when discussing the relationship or influence of this phenomenon on the health status of particular person and entire societies. Tischner’s analysis seems to give interesting insights into this problem. References [1] Bobko A.: Wstęp. Józefa Tischnera myślenie o człowieku, [w:] Tischner J.: O człowieku. Wybór pism filozoficznych, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 2003, s. V-L. – [2] Tischner J.: Spór o człowieka, czyli komunizm i chrześcijaństwo w Polsce po drugiej wojnie światowej, [w:] Tischner J. (red.), Filozofia współczesna, ITKM, Kraków 1989, s. 242–259. – [3] Tischner J.: Refleksje o etyce pracy, [w:] Tischner J. (wyd.), Świat ludzkiej nadziei, Znak, Kraków 1994, s. 70–90. – [4] Tischner J.: Etyka solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus, Znak, Kraków 1992. – [5] Tischner J.: Filozofia dramatu, Editions du Dialogue, Paris 1990. – [6] Elliot C.: Bioethics, Culture and Iden-tity: A Philosophical Disease, Routledge, New York, London 1999. –  [7] Tischner J.: Śladami Nie-skończonego. W kręgu myśli E. Levinasa, [w:] Tischner J. (red.), Filozofia Współczesna, ITKM, Kraków 1989, s. 409–430. – [8] Tischner J.: Przesłanie o człowieku i jego pracy. W związku z en-cykliką Jana Pawła II »Laborem Exercens«, [w:] Tischner J., Polska jest ojczyzną: w kręgu filozofii pracy, Editions du Dialogue, Paris 1985, s. 15–30. – [9] Tischner J.: Prawda i sprawiedliwość, [w:] Tischner J. (red.): Filozofia współczesna, ITKM, Kraków 1989, s. 320–329. – [10] Ratajczak Z. (red.): Bezrobocie. Między bezradnością a nadzieją, Wydawnictwo UŚl, Katowice 2001. –  [11] Niebrój L.: Podstawy filozofii pielęgniarstwa, wyd. ŚAM, Katowice 2001. – [12] Niebrój L. Kosińska M.: Redefinicja koncepcji zdrowia: od relacjonizmu do harmonizmu, [w:] Bulicz E. red.: Potęgowanie zdrowia. Czynniki, mechanizmy i strategie zdrowotne, wyd. ITE Radom 2003, s. 48–52. – [13] Bulicz E., Murawow I.: Istota i struktura zdrowia w świetle współczesnych osiągnięć nauk przyrodniczych, Annales UMCS, Sectio D, vol. LVIII Supl. XIII: poz. 28 (149–153).