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12.
Karl Popper: Criticism of Materialism and Epiphenomenalism;
the Theory of Three Worlds
Materialism/Epiphenomenalism and
Rationality
Karl Popper argued
that materialism/epiphenomenalism, though it claims to be rational, makes the
idea of rationality devoid of any sense.
Any discussion makes sense only
insomuch as we assume that there are arguments, that they may be logically
valid or invalid, more or less weighty, and that we are capable to understand
arguments and to estimate their validity and weightiness.
Materialists/epiphenomenalists believe that their position is rational, that is
supported by rational argumentation that is weightier than argumentation of
their opponents. However, if materialism/epiphenomenalism is true, this belief has
no sense. For from the point of view of materialism all our thoughts are nothing
but physical (chemical) structures and processes in our brains, and from the
point of view of epiphenomenalism they are but passive by-products of the functioning
of the brain. From both points of view, our thoughts and beliefs are entirely
determined by the physical structures and processes (that occur automatically
according to physical laws) of the brain; so the force of the arguments has
absolutely nothing to do with it.
From the point of view of
materialism, all the real difference between the materialist and the opponent
of materialism is a difference of physical structures and processes in their
brains. It is just that in the brain of the materialist there are some specific
physical structures (there occur some specific physical processes) that are
subjectively perceived as the opinion that materialism is true, that there are
arguments in its favour, and that they are weightier than the arguments against
it. And in the brain of the opponent of materialism there are somewhat different
specific physical structures (specific physical processes) that are
subjectively perceived as the opinion that materialism is false, that there are
arguments against it, and that they are weightier than the arguments in its favour.
And this subjective perception has no influence whatever. The situation
is principally the same from the point of view of epiphenomenalism; we
need only to replace “physical structures and processes in the brain … are
subjectively perceived as an opinion” with “physical structures and processes
in the brain … generate, as a passive by-product, an opinion”.
But if it is so, the idea that there
are arguments – logically valid or invalid, more or less weighty – and that we
can choose between theories by estimating the weightiness of the arguments pro and contra, is a pure illusion. In fact, all our opinions and thoughts are
entirely products of automatic interactions of atoms and other microparticles
of our brains according to physical laws. Physical structures and processes cannot
be logically correct or incorrect, rationally weighty or weak.
Popper formulates
this argument using the term "determinism" (he means physical
determinism as a theory that everything in the world is causally
predetermined by physical events), that can be replaced by "materialism or
epiphenomenalism":
“For according to determinism, any theories – such as, say, determinism
– are held because of a certain physical structure of the holder (perhaps of
his brain). Accordingly we are deceiving ourselves (and are physically so
determined as to deceive ourselves) whenever we believe that there are such
things as arguments or reasons which make us accept determinism. Or in other
words, physical determinism is a theory, which, if it is true, is not arguable,
since it must explain all our reactions, including what appear to us as beliefs
based on arguments, as due to purely
physical conditions. Purely physical conditions, including our physical environment,
make us say or accept whatever we say or accept… But this means that if we
believe that we have accepted a theory like determinism because we were swayed
by the logical force of certain arguments, then we are deceiving ourselves, according
to physical determinism; or more precisely, we are in a physical condition
which determines us to deceive ourselves.”[1]
Conclusion: Materialism,
epiphenomenalism, and all other “philosophies which try to rescue the causal
completeness or self-sufficiency of the physical world … are self-defeating in
so far as their arguments establish – unintentionally, of course, – the
non-existence of arguments.”[2]
The
Machine Argument
Let us take a
thermometer. As well as any other thing, it reacts in a certain manner on
external conditions. A thermometer reacts by some changes of its own states that
we interpret as showing the temperature. We need to notice at once, however,
that the description of such an event as the thermometer’s reactions on
external conditions may be misleading, because it naturally raises an
association with the reaction in the human sense, that is, the conscious
reaction. In fact, there is nothing of the sort in the case of a thermometer. A
thermometer’s "reaction" is nothing but changes in
physical states of the thermometer caused (according to physics laws) by physical
changes in an environment.
There are more complicated
devices that may not only show temperature, but write it down. But it is clear
that the thermometer, as well as the more complicated device, has no intention to do this and is not aware of what it does – it has
no consciousness. So, “we don’t attribute the responsibility for the
description to it; we attribute it to its maker. Once we understand this
situation, we see that it does not describe, any more than my pen does: like my
pen it is only an instrument for describing.”[3]
It is important to note that the situation “is fundamentally the same for all
physical machines, however complicated”[4]
We can imagine a machine-computer that
can be asked various questions and can answer them. We can even imagine a supercomplicated
machine-computer with which it is possible to have a "discussion":
when it receives, as an input, our arguments, it generates, as an output, some ‘counterarguments’.
But can we argue with such a machine in real earnest? We can, but only if we
mistakenly take it for a being with consciousness – a being that understands
the meaning of what we are saying and what it says, and that has the
intention to understand and to explain us something. If we understand
that it only reacts on an input according to some very complicated program,
without any understanding and intention, the discussion will at once lose any
serious sense for us. We can, of course, continue the "discussion" for
the sake of fun or out of curiosity – to know what the answers and arguments are
on which the machine is programmed. But we would not try to persuade it on something
and would not attribute to it the responsibility for the answers and arguments
it generates. We will attribute this responsibility to the author of the
program.
No degree of
complexity will make a machine different in kind from a thermometer. Just as with
a thermometer, all that a machine can do is determined by its physical
structure and physics laws. “We don’t argue with a thermometer.”[5]
But from the point of view of materialism we are ourselves but very complicated
thermometers.
The
Higher Functions of Language and Intentionality
Popper has
developed Karl Bühler's theory that distinguished three major
functions of language – expressive, signal, and descriptive. The expressive
function consists in that a speech act expresses physical or mental states
of a speaker. The signal function consists in that a speech act can
influence behaviour of others, serve for them as a signal. The descriptive
function consists in that a speech act can describe certain situations,
facts, states of things, to make statements about something. (Let us recollect
the concept of intentionality, Section
5.) Popper has added to this list the argumentative function: we can
state different arguments, adduce reasons for or against a certain idea, theory, decision, etc.
The main functions are divided into the
lower (expressive and signal) and the higher (descriptive and argumentative).
As statements fulfil the descriptive function, they are characterized as true
or false. As statements fulfil the argumentative function, they are characterized
as weighty or weak, logically valid or invalid, sound or unsound.
Various changes in physical systems, the
modes of behaviour of living beings, can be considered as a language that fulfils
the lower functions. For example, the fact that a thermometer shows a certain
temperature expresses its physical state (the expressive function) and
influences behaviour of people (the signal function). A cry of an animal
expresses some its physical and mental state, and can serve as a signal (e.g., for a flight) to other animals. If
a fan at a stadium shouts “Hurrah!”, this expresses her mental state (joy) and
can affect behaviour of surrounding people; however, this exclamation does not fulfil
the descriptive and argumentative functions, that is, it does not describe any
facts or events and does not contain any arguments. It cannot be characterized
as true or false (as about the descriptive statement), or as argumentatively
weighty or weak. It makes no sense to describe it as true or false,
argumentatively weighty or weak.
Popper argued that a purely
physical realization of the higher functions of language is impossible. Any
theory of language based on materialistic assumptions should “neglect all that
is characteristic of human language in contradistinction to animal language:
its ability to make true and false statements, and to produce valid and invalid
arguments.”[6]
The reason is the property of meaningful
statements we are already familiar with – intentionality (aboutness). This does
not mean that physical models of the descriptive function are
impossible. Such models are possible, but they do not realize the descriptive
function completely.
Let us consider
the simplest case of a realization of the descriptive function – naming: we see
some thing or being and we utter its name. A physical model of this process can
be a computer connected with a system of light sensors and a loudspeaker, and
programmed so that when a cat known as Mike passes before it, the loudspeaker produces
the sounds 'm'-'a'-'j'-'k'. This will be a physical model-imitation of the
descriptive function. But Popper contended that this will not be a physical
realization of the descriptive function. For this, the described physical
system (the computer, the light sensors, and the loudspeaker) lacks one "trifle"
– understanding (awareness) that the succession of states of the physical
system (of sounds) that a person comprehends as the word "Mike" is the
name of the cat. Realization of the descriptive function is possible only if the
physical states and processes are supplemented with their interpretation –
in this case, the mental state of understanding (awareness) of the
meaning of the succession of sounds, – for example, when a person who watches the
experiment understands that the sounds produced by the loudspeaker mean the
name of the cat that has passed in front of the computer.[7]
The
Nightmare of Physical Determinism
If materialism/epiphenomenalism is true, then all that occurs in the
world and, in particular, with our bodies is either entirely determined by
physical causes and laws (this point of view is called physical
determinism) or is partially determined by physical causes and laws,
and partially is not caused by anything at all, is just fortuitous (indeterminism). Materialism/epiphenomenalism
excludes the possibility of any other kind of causality except the physical.
Popper describes this as the nightmare of physical determinism:
“I have called physical determinism a nightmare. It is
a nightmare because it asserts that the whole world with everything in it is a
huge automaton, and that we are nothing but little cog-wheels, or at best sun-automata,
within it.
It thus destroys, in particular, the idea of creativity.
It reduces to a complete illusion the idea that in preparing this lecture I have
used my brain to create something new. There was no more in it,
according to physical determinism, than that certain parts of my body put down
black marks on white paper: any physicist with sufficient detailed information[8]
could have written my lecture by the simple method of predicting the precise
places on which the physical system consisting of my body (including my brain,
of course, and my fingers) and my pen would put down those black marks.
Or to use a more impressive example: if physical
determinism is right, then a physicist who is completely deaf and who has never
heard any music could write all the symphonies and concertos written by Mozart
or Beethoven, by the simple method of studying the precise physical states of
their bodies and predicting where they would put down black marks on their lined
paper. And our deaf physicist could do even more: by studying Mozart’s or
Beethoven's bodies with sufficient care he could write scores which were never actually
written by Mozart or Beethoven, but which they would have written had certain
external circumstances of their lives been different: if they had eaten lamb, say,
instead of chicken, or drunk tea instead of coffee.
And
this could be done by our deaf physicist if supplied with a sufficient knowledge
of purely physical conditions. There would be no need for him know anything
about the theory of music – though he might be able to predict what answers Mozart
or Beethoven would have written down under examination conditions if presented
with questions on the theory of counterpoint.
I believe
that all this is absurd; and its absurdity becomes even more obvious, I think,
when we apply this method of physical prediction to a determinist. …a well-trained physicist who does not know
any French, and who has never heard of determinism, would be able to predict
what a French determinist would say in a French discussion on determinism; and
of course also what his indeterminist opponent would say.”[9]
This fragment talks about physical determinism. Let us note that
materialism is, in principle, also compatible with indeterminism as the supposition
about the existence of genuine fortuity (that
is supported in modern science by quantum mechanics). But if the only alternative
to physical determination is sheer chance,
this alternative is hardly any better: it means that the acceptance of these or
those ideas and theories, our thoughts and actions are – insomuch as they are
not determined physically – just fortuitous. For example: as a matter of sheer
chance, Mozart has written some sequence of musical signs, although he could have
written some other sequence instead; I have written this text because my hand has
put down (or because my brain has made it to put down), as a
matter of sheer chance, this, and not some other, sequence of ink marks on a
sheet of paper, etc.
To avoid this absurdity, we need to suppose
that besides physical causality and chance there is also a third alternative –
nonphysical causality (more precisely, situations when a nonphysical cause evokes
physical effects[10]).
But this supposition means the negation of materialism and other theories that assume
the causal completeness (self-sufficiency) of physical reality.
The
Solution of "the Problem of Interaction”
See subsection
“Karl Popper about the Problem of Interaction” in Section 10.
The
Theory of Three Worlds
Popper argued that the idea of
rationality makes sense only if we admit the existence of at least three realms
of reality: 1) the physical world (World-1); 2) the mind, the world of human
subjectivity, of thinking and emotions, a mental inner world of a person (World-2);
3) the world of ideas, theories, arguments, meanings, and logical relations (World-3).
World-3 is the world of ideas and
meanings expressed in language and culture (in particular, the content of
scientific theories). Popper's important thesis is that World-3 is irreducible both
to World-1, as it has to do not with physical objects, but with meanings and
logical relations, and to World-2, as these meanings and logical relations are
independent of any mind, that is, objective.
For example,
Einstein's theory (World-3) and my understanding of Einstein’s theory (World-2)
is not the same thing. Einstein's theory has a certain meaning irrespective of
whether I understand it, and whether I understand it correctly (the very
possibility of incorrect understanding of a theory proves the difference
between a theory and its understanding); it stands in certain logical relations
with other theories irrespective of whether someone (anyone) knows about these
relations or not. My understanding of Einstein’s theory can be correct or incorrect,
that is, to stand in the relation of
(full or partial) conformity or discrepancy with Einstein's theory. Moreover, a
theory (objectively) contains (as its logical consequences) many implications of
which even its author was (subjectively) unaware. Or the author could mistakenly
draw from the theory some conclusions that really do not follow logically from
it. So there is a difference also between a theory (its objective content) and
understanding of this theory by its author.
Contents of
theories are irreducible both to their material carriers (World-1) and to mental
states, thinking of persons (Worlds-2). Despite both materialism and a more usual
commonsense (basically, dualistic) understanding (Popper calls it ‘mentalism’),
Popper argues that cognitive problems, ideas, and theories should be considered
as specific semantic realities, such that their contents are neither in books
(as paper bearers), nor in heads (materialism), nor even in minds of persons (mentalism),
but ... in the ideas and theories themselves. Although ideas and theories (World-3)
are created by people, by human thinking (World-2), but once created, they obtain
to a great extent independent (autonomous) existence and objective properties.
Objective properties of a theory – its meaning, contents, internal logical
relations, and logical relations with other theories – are neither physical
properties (World-1) nor subjective states of minds (World-2); they are something
of a third kind that demands entirely different ways of understanding – World-3.
Theories
created by people get embodied in books and other material bearers (World-1),
but they are not identical with these bearers and are not reducible to them. These
bearers are just things in which contents of theories, existing before and
independently of these bearers, are "encoded", represented
symbolically. To understand some idea or theory we should in our thinking (World-2)
comprehend its content, and we do this with the help of material bearers (first
of all, books) that symbolically represent this content; but this content is autonomous
both from our thinking that strives to comprehend it and from material bearers that
symbolically represent it. If content of ideas and theories was identical with
our thinking, there would be no problem of its comprehension, no possibilities of
(partially) mistaken or incomplete understanding of ideas and theories. This
problem and possibilities exist only so far as our thinking and its content is
one thing, whereas the content of the ideas and theories that we try to
comprehend in our thinking is another thing. Content of ideas and theories is
also something different from their physical bearers (World-1): it is not
contained in them physically, but is represented in them symbolically; the process
of comprehension of a book’s meaning is not a processing of physical
information about the book, but a process of interpretation of symbols;
if we do not know the language in which the book is written, no amount of
physical information about the book and no analysis of such information will
help us.
Popper emphasizes
that without the assumption of the autonomy of World-3 relative to World-1 and World-2,
it is impossible to understand the scientific activity. In particular, it is
impossible to understand this activity in keeping with behaviourism: behaviour
of scientists may be understood only as aimed at the understanding and discovery
of objective relations that hold in World-3 (the abstract world of
theories):
“… if we do admit
problems and theories as the objects of study and of criticism, then we shall never
understand the behaviour of scientists. Admittedly, of course, theories are the
products of human thought (or, if you like, of human behaviour – I will not quarrel
about words). Nevertheless, they have a certain degree of autonomy: they
may have, objectively, consequences of which nobody so far has thought, and
which may be discovered; discovered in the same sense in which an existing
but so far unknown plant or animal may be discovered. One may say that World-3
it man-made only in its origin, and that once theories exist, they begin to have
a life of their own: they produce previously invisible consequences, they
produce new problems.”[11]
Any number of examples may be adduced from
different sciences. For example, from arithmetic:
“A number system may be said
to be the construction or invention of men rather than their discovery. But the
difference between even and odd numbers, or divisible and prime numbers, is a
discovery: these characteristic sets of numbers are there, objectively, once
the number system exists, as the (unintended) consequences of constructing the
system; and their properties may be discovered. ... The situation with respect
to every scientific theory is similar. It has, objectively, a huge set of important
consequences, whether or not these have as yet been discovered. ... It is the
objective task of the scientist – an objective World-3 task which regulates his
"verbal behaviour" qua
"scientist" – to discover the relevant logical consequences of the new
theory, and to discuss them in the light of existing theories. In this way,
problems may be discovered rather then invented... Examples are
An important argument in favour of the thesis
about the autonomy of World-3 is the existence of objects of World-3 that are
neither physically embodied (have no correspondence in World-1), nor present in
minds (have no correspondence in World-2). Such objects are problems, logical
consequences, proofs, methods, solutions that exist, objectively belong to World-3
(the world of contents of theories, logical relations between them, problem
situations, states of discussions), although noone has discovered them as yet:
“… It is important to realize that the objective
and unembodied existence of these problems precedes their conscious discovery
in the same way as the existence of Mount Everest preceded its discovery;
and it is important that the consciousness of the existence of these problems
leads to the suspicion that there may exist, objectively, a way to their
solution, and to the conscious search for this way: the search cannot be
understood without understanding the objective existence (or perhaps
non-existence) of as yet undiscovered and unembodied methods and solutions.”
Mathematicians “think in terms of discovered, and thus pre-existent, and also
of undiscovered problems and solutions – of problems and solutions yet to be
found.”[13]
Popper adduces a characteristic example of an eminent
philosopher-logician, G.Frege, who, after he had written one of his books and
it was partly published, has discovered that it is based on a self-contradictory
assumption. It was an objective logical fact that existed long before its discovery.
The self-contradictory assumption did underlay the theory of Frege from the
moment of its (the theory’s) creation, but this objective fact was not realized
by anyone throughout several years and was physically unembodied − no representation
of this fact existed whether in the physical World-1 or in any person’s mind (in one of personal Worlds-2). This
fact, unembodied and of which no mind was aware, had place only in World-3.[14]
Frege could just as well discover this fact many years after the publication;
or some other philosopher could discover
it 100 years after the publication
of the book; or it could so happen that nobody would ever discover this fact. Independently
of which of these possible scenarios (belonging to Worlds-2 and World-1) would
be the case, it would be (is) an objective fact that the theory is based on the
self-contradictory assumption.
******
The idea of rationality makes sense
only if human minds (Worlds-2) are capable to comprehend objective (i.e., independent of these minds) meanings
of ideas, theories, and the objective logical relations between them, and to judge
validity and weightiness of arguments. In turn, we (minds) can invent new ideas,
theories, and arguments that, when expressed in language, get objectivated
("get alienated" from our minds) and become parts of World-3. That
is, the idea of rationality necessarily presupposes the interaction between World-2
and World-3.
On the other hand, the mind
influences the physical world, by evoking movements of the human body. And vice versa, the physical world, through
mediation of the human body, influences the mind. So the interaction between World-2
and World-1 has place.
Also, through mediation of the human
mind (World-2), ideas and theories (World-3) – get embodied-represented in
physical bearers (World-1) – books, electronic bearers, sound vibrations of
air, radio signals, neural networks of the brain.
So the physical world is not
self-sufficient: some its events have non-physical causes: “If we act through
being influenced by the grasp of an abstract relationship,[15]
we initiate physical causal chains which have no sufficient physical causal antecedents. We are then
‘first movers’, or creators of a physical ‘causal chain’.”[16]
Substance
Dualism and “the Talk of 'Substances'”
Popper's
views about the nature of consciousness can be qualified as quasi-substance
dualism-emergentism. In his intellectual autobiography, Unended Quest, Popper writes: “It seemed to me quite obvious that
we are embodied selves or minds or souls”[17].
At the same time, Popper repeatedly stated his aversion to “the talk of 'substances'”, and suggested that “we are psycho-physical processes rather
than substances”[18].
Popper considered as mistaken the very idea of substance as some constant base that
"stands behind" those processes and changes that occur to it and
between it and other substances; he contended that all existing are processes.
On the other hand, Popper pointed out an important feature that makes
his views close to substantial dualism: “I nevertheless believe in something
that may be called the quasi-essential (or quasi-substantial) nature of the
self. The self is linked with what is usually called character or personality.”[19] When discussing Gilbert Ryle's views[20],
Popper states his disagreement with Ryle’s denial of “the (Socratic and
Platonic) idea of the mind as the pilot of a ship − the body; a simile
which I regard as in many ways excellent and adequate; so much so that I could
say of myself: ‘I believe in the ghost in the machine’.”[21]
In the
section “Of Clouds and Clocks” of the book Objective
Knowledge (1972), Popper explains his position so: “… I am almost a
Cartesian[22],
in so far as I reject the thesis of the physical completeness of all living
organisms (considered as physical systems), that is to say, in so far as I
conjecture that in some organisms mental states may interact with
physical states. … however... I have no sympathy with the Cartesian talk of a
mental substance or thinking substance
– no more than with his material substance or extended substance.
I am Cartesian only in so far as I believe in the existence of both, physical states and mental states (and, besides, in even more abstract things such as states
of a discussion).”[23]
He confirms
this position in Unended Quest
(1974): “I think that I was always a Cartesian dualist (although I never
thought that we should talk about 'substances'); and if not a dualist, I was
certainly more inclined to pluralism than to monism.”[24]
“The talk of 'substances' arises from the problem of change (‘What
remains constant in change?’) and from the attempt to answer what-is?
questions. … ‘What is mind? … What is matter?..’ … Better ask: ‘What does mind?’”[25]
In this respect, my position
essentially diverges from Popper's. The divergence concerns not so much with
the evaluation of “the talk of 'substances'” (in Section 9, I discuss negative
aspects of this terminology, although I think that we have no better), as with
the motives for such an evaluation.
In particular, I do not consider as an argument against “the talk
of 'substances'” the fact what it “arises from the
problem of change (‘What remains constant in changes?’) and from the attempt to
answer the what-is? question ‘What is mind?’”. I do not see anything bad
in such an origin. For the mind to be able to do something, there must be
a mind. The problem of change (“What remains constant in changes?”) – is a real
and important problem, even more so in the case of "a thinking substance”
than in the case of a material one.
Even more so, I
think that no problem is more real and important for a person than the problem
of his self – as something that remains the same (his own) self throughout (at least) life (and,
perhaps, beyond this life). There should be something that makes
someone's subjective experiences and thoughts (mental states) someone's.
I think that it is absolutely nonsensical to talk about noone's experiences
and thoughts. It is absolutely nonsensical to talk about mental and physical
states as states of nothing/noone. There should be something or someone,
which/whose states they are. If there is a Cheshire cat’s smile, there should
be a Cheshire cat. As far as I understand it, this is what is meant by the
concept of substance.
“The problem of change (‘What remains
constant in changes?’)” with respect to our own selves is exactly what imparts
the discussions about the relation of the mind and the body with such vital
importance. I would say that of all philosophical (worldview) issues, the most
naturally exciting and vital is this: what is that something
−
that we call I, me,
myself, self;
− that experiences and has awareness of all my (your)
sensations, emotions, thoughts, desires throughout my (your) life as his own;
−
in virtue of which, all my (your)
sensations, emotions, thoughts, and desires throughout my (your) life (and
perhaps also “beyond”) are mine (yours), not someone else’s;
−
that must remain the same “thing”, the same self in order that all that I experience
and am aware of as my sensations, emotions, desires, and thoughts
throughout my life were really mine;
−
that is me throughout my life,
despite all the changes in my body, mental states, memories, etc.?
Popper was ill-disposed to questions
of the form “what-is?” because they associated for him with repugnant
essentialism, disputes about words and their meanings instead of discussions
about real things. In The Self and Its
Brain, Popper writes that
questions of the form “what-is?” “are connected with the idea of essences ... and so with the very
influential philosophy which I have called 'essentialism' and which I regard as
mistaken. ‘What is’ questions are liable to degenerate into verbalism – into a
discussion of the meaning of words or concepts, or into a discussion of
definitions. But, contrary to what is still widely believed, such discussions
and definitions are useless.”[26]
In my opinion, here Popper confuses
different questions:
(1) “What is Õ?” in the
essentialist sense “What is the essence of X?” (that implicitly presupposes the
metaphysical theory that names of things represent some special metaphysical
realities – essences – something of the kind of Plato's Ideas-Forms);
(2) “What is Õ?” in the
purely verbal sense (disputes about meanings of words and definitions);
(3) “What is Õ?” in the sense of
questions about the identity/nonidentity of Õ with some Y, the commonness/difference
of their natures, etc.; in most
general cases, such questions are ontological ("metaphysical")
questions about the general nature and structure of reality.
It seems that with
Popper, the defensible rejection of (1) and repugnance for (2) passes into a
mistaken bias against (3).
It is worthy to pay attention also to
Popper's interesting remark about the idea of essence: “… the idea of an
essence is indeed taken from our idea of the self (or the soul, or the mind);
we experience that there is a responsible, controlling centre of ourselves, of
our persons; and we speak about essences (the essence of vanilla) or spirits
(the spirit of wine) by analogy with these selves. These extensions may be
rejected as anthropomorphisms. But there is no objection to being
anthropomorphic in discussing man (as Hayek has reminded us).”[27]
In the context of the mind-body problem,
the “what-is?” question has a quite "legitimate", important,
nonverbalist sense[28]
– as the question about the nature of reality and its most important (for
people) elements – our selves, I-s: whether I, my self, my mind – as a
subject who subjectively experiences sensations, emotions, and desires, and who
thinks and is aware of himself and his sensations, emotions, desires, and thoughts
– is the same thing as my body (brain)? Or they are two different "things"
of entirely different nature (a soul and a body)?
I think that Popper's objections
against “the talk of 'substances'” has also a deeper motive than the repugnance
for verbalism; it displays certain views about the nature of mind (self) – viz., emergentism – and a certain
attitude toward the prospect of personal immortality.
Popper believed that nature creates
genuinely new phenomena that are irreducible to what existed earlier. In
this respect, his treatment of the nature of mind is somewhat ambiguous. On the
one hand, it may suggest that the mind is one of the many natural emergent
phenomena. However, on the other hand, it is not accidental that Popper
distinguishes the mind into a separate nonphysical "world" (World-2),
whereas all other natural phenomena remain within the physical realm. The
reason of this ambiguity is easy to understand if we take into account what was
explained in Section 6 about the difference between quantitative (nomic)
emergence and radical qualitative emergence: even if we assume (and this
assumption is debatable) that in nature, at higher levels of the organization
of physical systems, really new (more precisely, structurally dependent) laws
of nature come into effect, and new properties appear that correspond to these
laws and are logically irreducible to properties at the lower levels;
then, all these laws and properties, at all levels, are conceptually
reducible to externally observable physical movements, the spatial dynamics
of various physical bodies in space. In these cases, emergence-irreducibility,
if it has a place, is but quantitative.
Unlike this, the mind (consciousness)
is, relative to the physical, something radically qualitatively
different (irreducible) – a personal realm of subjectivity. If the concept of
mind (consciousness) meant only some new aspects of the dynamics and the laws
of physical movements, it would belong to the realm of the physical, but this
concept means something entirely different, and this "something" (the
mind as a personal realm of subjectivity) exists alongside the physical world,
interacting with it.
From Popper’s point of view, the mind
(self) is an emergent nonphysical quasi-substance (process) that emerges
("pops up into existence") – when certain physical conditions hold –
out of nothing.[29]
For me, this idea does not seem
plausible (see Section 6). I am more prone to think that if something appears
and disappears in the perspective accessible to our cognitive possibilities,
this does not mean that it first emerges out of nothing and then becomes
nothing. Rather, it appears from somewhere no one knows where (i.e., from
somewhere outside the limits of the perspective that is accessible to us) and
disappears somewhere no one knows where. That is, it does not "pop up into
existence" and does not become nonexistent but passes from some “beyond” –
relative to the perspective that is accessible to us – reality into this
reality and vice versa. (For the human
self, the “beyond” reality may be some parallel world or a reincarnation in
this world.)
I have already explained (Section 6) that in the case of so-called
emergent laws and properties within physical reality, if they exist,
(quantitative emergence), the situation is entirely different. In this case,
"novelty" is not quite genuine because the so-called emergent laws, that
is, structurally dependent laws of nature, do not emerge with the
formation of corresponding structures but come into action. Hence, the
so-called emergent properties, although they are irreducible to the basis of
lower-level laws and properties, are
reducible to the broadened basis that includes, besides the lower-level laws
and properties, higher-level structurally dependent laws. Thus, in the sense
of the reduction to something already existing, nothing principally new emerges in such cases.
In fact, we can
find, in what modern physics tells us about physical reality, closer analogues to
the radical (qualitative) emergence of the mind. Thus, modern quantum mechanics
tells about appearance and
disappearance of microparticles in
vacuum. Moreover, modern astrophysics
tells about the beginning of our whole universe at the moment of the Big Bang. However,
on my opinion, it is very doubtful whether in these situations something
emerges out of nothing.
As for
microparticles, we need to
notice that their purported appearance and
disappearance occur in such a manner
that the total amount of matter (mass-energy) remains constant; therefore, these occurrences are some transformations (that
we do not understand well enough) rather than the emergence/annihilation of
matter. Also, all microparticles may be considered as specific physical states
of microscopic areas or points of space; in that case, everything that occurs
in the physical universe (including what, at a certain level of scrutiny, looks as the emergence and the disappearance of microparticles) will be but the dynamics of
changes of properties of different areas and points of space. Besides, quantum
mechanics is a domain in which there is no clear understanding and agreement between
scientists (including the most eminent ones) about the physical character of
explored phenomena (to be distinguished from the corresponding mathematical
equations, which “work” very well but need physical interpretation). In fact, what
really happens on this level is unknown; it cannot be directly observed. It is
just that certain theoretical models thought up by physicists well agree with the
observable results of complicated experiments and enable physicists to predict
these results with sufficiently (often wonderfully) high accuracy.
The theory about
the beginning of the universe at the moment of the Big Bang, if it is
understood in the radically literal sense – that the universe did emerge out of
nothing – is even more dubious. First, the Big Bang theory is a result of
rather unreliable extrapolations of the theories of physics that were developed
for the explanation of modern observable phenomena on events that are supposed to happen billions years ago in
conditions that were very radically different from any conditions that exist in
the modern universe or can be created experimentally. When the Big Bang theory
is discussed, the question inevitably arises: what has exploded and why? The
answer according to the radically literal interpretation of the Big Bang theory
is: “nothing without any cause”. This answer can hardly be acknowledged
satisfactory. It is better to admit that we do not know, and modern science has
no satisfactory answer to this question. (In more details, this theme is
discussed it Section 7, subsection “Colin McGinn's Idealistic Hypothesis”.)
Incidentally, it
may be said about the mind (the self) as it was said about the “emergent” laws:
that it does not emerge
but "comes into action", that is, gets embodied, when certain
conditions hold; however, this would be not emergentism but eternalism (the
supposition about the eternal existence
of the soul as the process of reincarnations) or creationism (the supposition
about the creation of souls by God).
For a final
touch, I think that motives
why Popper prefers emergentism and objects against “the talk of 'substances'” have a psychological
foundation. The key may be found in the attitude that Popper confesses to share
with John Beloff, who wrote: “I have no craving for personal immortality;
indeed I would think the poorer a world in which my ego was to be a permanent
fixture.”[30]
Well, tastes are
not things to debate about. Nevertheless, I think that it will not be superfluous to remind
another utterance that Popper adduces, by his namesake Josef Popper-Lynkeus:
“every time a man dies, a whole universe is destroyed”. Karl Popper adds to it:
“(One realizes this when one identifies oneself with that man.) Human beings
are irreplaceable...”[31]
If so, the
question seems appropriate: Which
world would be better: a world where human
universes are routinely destroyed and irreplaceable human beings are routinely
replaced, or a world where they
continue to exist in some way of
which we do not know?
[1]
Popper K. Of Clouds and Clocks. – pp. 223-224.
[2]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – pp. 398-399.
[3]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p.399
[4]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p.399
[5]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p.401
[6]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – p. 59.
[7]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – pp.401-402
[8]
and powerful enough means of computing – D.S.
[9]
Popper K.Of clouds and hours. – p.222-224
[10]
Compare with Popper’s quotation below (in the subsection “The Theory of Three
Worlds”) about “physical causal chains which have no sufficient physical causal antecedents” that “we
initiate” “if we act through being influenced by the grasp of an abstract
relationship”.
[11]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ð. 40.
[12]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ðð. 40-41.
[13]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ðð. 41-42.
[14]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ðð. 56-57.
[15]
for example, influenced by our understanding of some theory
[16]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p. 402.
[17]
Popper K. Unended Quest. – p. 219
[18]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ð. 105.
[19]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ð. 105.
[20] G.Ryle was the most influential philosopher-behaviourist who
strived to release psychology and the philosophy of mind from the idea of self,
which he dubbed “the Cartesian myth”.
[21]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ð. 105.
[22]
Cartesians – followers of Descartes, who was the author of the classical theory
of substance dualism.
[23]
Popper K. Of Clouds and Clocks. – p. 231.
[24]
Popper K. Unended Quest. – p. 218.
[25]
Popper K. Unended Quest. – p. 278.
[26]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ð.100.
[27]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – p.105.
[28] Although I also think that materialism is based on
ignoring or “forgetting” the major – subjective – aspect of the meanings of
such concepts as 'mind', 'consciousness', 'thinking', 'sensation', 'pain', and
so on. However, this does not make
the mind-body problem linguistic. The problem is ontological, even although
it has linguistic aspects – how certain (mistaken) semantic strategies are often used for the defence
of unsatisfactory theories. Using certain words with the loss of essential
aspects of their meanings is in fact the strategy of ignoring or negation of the
reality that these words usually mean. Hence, clear definition of the meanings
of the concepts and appeal to them can counteract such strategies. It can also
help to elucidate and put in order our ideas, and to avoid considerable part of
confusion in our theories – confusion that is quite usual in discussions about
the mind-body problem.
[29]
Let us pay attention to the statement of one of the most prominent followers
and a close collaborator of Popper, W.W.Bartley: “the basic theme of Karl
Popper’s philosophy – that something can come from nothing.” (Popper K. Quantum
Theory and the Schism in Physics. – p. xiii)
[30]
Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – p. 101.