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Critical Rationalism,
Comprehensiveness and Extra-rational Judgements*
by Dmitry Sepety
I know
Popper and Bartley agreed that they disagreed; I don’t know on what.
Joseph
Agassi (Agassi 2012, 48)
0. Introduction
This article is an attempt to elucidate
the relationship between Karl Popper’s general conception of rationality,
critical rationalism (CR), and conception of his pupil and close corroborator William
Bartley – comprehensively critical rationalism (CCR) or pancritical
rationalism.
As far as I know, the most informative
discussion of these matters up to the present moment is Mariano Artigas’ book The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s Theory
of Knowledge. One thing which makes it of special interest is that it
publishes the only Popper’s own explicit public comment on the issue, his
speech at Workshop in
Relationships between Popper and
Bartley have come through three periods. First, there were relations of admired
teacher and the best and favourite pupil. Then there was a sharp conflict which
has resulted in the break of communication for 9 years[1]. Finally, a good relationship was
restored, and there was the closest and very fruitful collaboration.
The conflict was not directly about
CCR, but Bartley’s paper which had triggered it was a continuation of attempt
of critical revision of CR, made 3 year before in Bartley’s book "The
Retreat to Commitment". In that book, Bartley proposed CCR in a sharp
opposition both to traditional comprehensive justificationist rationalism and
to CR. He charged CR with fideism and "operating within a justificationist
context", interpreted and criticized it as limited rationalism which makes
some "basic" positions exempt from criticism. (Bartley 1984, 104)
Popper’s position about CCR is not
clear.
In a new, fourth edition of The Open Society and Its Enemies (the
book where he first introduced the conception of CR) Popper made only very slight
corrections to some formulations in chapter 24 (which was the target of Bartley’s
criticism). At the same time, he added an Addendum which is very “Bartleyan”.
The footnote on its starting page says: “I am deeply indebted to Dr. William W.
Bartley’s incisive criticism which not only helped me to improve chapter 24 of
this book (especially page 231) but also induced me to make important changes
in the present Addendum.” (Popper
1977, 399) And in the text Popper twice alludes with approval to “the principle that nothing is exempt from criticism”, “the principle that everything
is open to criticism (from which this principle itself is not exempt)” (Popper 1977, 408-409) – the précis of CCR.
Later, Bartley explained Popper’s
position as follows:
"…in 1960 I discussed these matters with him, and suggested how the
problem could be dealt with within the general framework of his own approach,
in terms of my distinction between justification and criticism… In response,
Popper altered the terminology of chapter 24 of The Open Society and Its Enemies (fourth and subsequent English
editions) to mute its fideism, and introduced a polemical addendum on
relativism. In Conjectures and
Refutations, chapter 10, and in his Realism
and the Aim of Science, part 1, section 2, he introduces my distinction
between justification and criticism, and this distinction is now routinely
presented as a feature of Popperian thought. Despite these alterations, Popper’s
earlier fideistic approach has been corrected only in a patchwork manner,
dropping some of the old notions, but retaining the old terminology –
"critical rationalism", for instance – and the old slogans. This
results in a confused situation." (Bartley 1984, 105)
Yet later Bartley redescribed it in
a reconciliatory manner:
"These early {Popper’s} fideistic remarks are relatively
unimportant; they play no significant role in Popper’s early thought and none
at all in his later thought, but are superfluous remnant of justificationism,
out of line with the main thrust and intent of his methodology, empty baggage
carried over from the dominant tradition. When, in 1960, I proposed to contrast
justificationist and nonjustificationist theories of criticism as a
generalisation of his own distinction between verification and falsification,
Popper dropped this remaining fideism, and adopted instead the approach that I
am about to describe, thereby considerably improving his position in
consistency, clarity, and generality. … The alternative approach, which Popper
continues to call "critical rationalism" and which I prefer to call
"comprehensively critical" or "pancritical" rationality …"
(Bartley 1990, 237)
But it seems that "later" Popper
was not of quite the same thought. His only public comment on this point was
made in
Mariano Artigas also brings to attention Popper’s statement in Introduction to the collection The Myth of Framework:
“there was also an attempt to replace my critical rationalism by a more
radically critical and more explicitly defined position. But because this
attempt bore the character of definition, it led to endless philosophical
arguments about its adequacy.” (Popper 1994, xii)
Artigas suggests that "these
words can only refer to Bartley. There is no other possible explanation"
(Artigas 1999, 52).
On the other hand, Artigas quotes a
letter from Popper to Bartley of year 1982, where Popper unambiguously states
his agreement with Bartley’s reply to Watkins’ and Post’s criticism of CCR:
“I have read your Pan-rationalism paper. Of course I agree. But I still
don’t like the discussion… I agree very much with your tendency statement.”
(Artigas 1999, 91)
What does this confusion mean?
2. CR vs. Irrationalism and
Comprehensive (Uncritical) Rationalism
Popper has introduced a name
'critical rationalism' in The Open
Society and Its Enemies to designate his general conception of rationality
and rational attitude (rationalism). This conception is meant to be a viable
alternative to both irrationalism and traditional rationalism, which Popper
calls 'uncritical' and 'comprehensive'.
Comprehensive (uncritical)
rationalism is described by the principle:
“any assumption
which cannot be supported either by argument or by experience is to be
discarded”. (Later,
Bartley has coined a designation for this demand – 'justificationism'.) Rationalism
so understood was crushingly criticized by irrationalists, because its demand
is both unfeasible (“Since all
argument must proceed from assumptions, it is plainly impossible to demand that
all assumptions should be based on argument”) and self-defeating (“since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument
or by experience, it implies that it should itself be discarded”) (Popper 1977, 230). In this,
Popper agrees with irrationalists.
But, against irrationalists, Popper advocated
rationalism as "faith in reason", the attitude which attaches high
value to reason and arguments.[3] This attitude needs not to be
identified with self-defeating principle of comprehensive (uncritical)
rationalism.
Popper proposes to call the
alternative − “modest and self-critical rationalism which recognizes
certain limitations” (Popper 1977, 230) − 'critical rationalism'. Popper
proposes that critical rationalists must
(1)
admit that the justificationist demand is unfeasible and self-defeating;
(2) identify rationality not with the justificationist
demand, but with the critical attitude "I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get
nearer to the truth";
(3) admit that rational attitude is
based on "irrational faith in reason", has its origin in "an irrational
decision" (and, hence, to admit "to that extent, … a certain priority of irrationalism”). (Popper 1977, 231-232)
The last point is what made Bartley
to charge CR with fideism and that it "seems to operate within a
justificationist context foreign to the dominant themes of his {Popper’s} own
thought" (Bartley 1984, 104).
3. Bartley’s solution to the Problem of Limits
of Rationality
Bartley proposed comprehensively
critical rationalism (CCR) as a solution for the problem of limits of rationality. The problem is: asserted by
many philosophers logical necessity to dogmatize some 'basic' positions (make
them exempt from criticism) to avoid justificatory infinite regress or vicious
circle.
CCR is nothing but refutation of the
following "fideist" contention:
(F) As
any attempt to demonstrate truth of any position involves us in infinite
regress or vicious circle, we have no choice but to commit themselves to some
“basic” positions and principles, and then use them in justifications and
criticisms of other positions. Such commitment means that “basic” positions and
principles are accepted dogmatically, as such that 1) can’t be justified and
need no justification and 2) can’t be criticized (there can be nothing to
criticize them with, for they are basic); are exempt from criticism.
This contention is
what Bartley calls "the retreat to commitment".
Bartley contends that (F) is mistaken
as far as criticism is concerned. He
agrees with F that we can’t 'justify' (in the sense of demonstrating truth, or
even high probability) anything as demanded by justificationism, and, so, must
accept some (many) positions without justification. (Hence, all other positions
aren’t justified as justificationism demands; they may be 'justified' only relative to some unjustified positions.)
But, contrary to F, Bartley contends that this does not mean that we must dogmatize something, make some positions
exempt from criticism. We can hold
all our beliefs, however basic, open to (not exempt from) criticism. I.e. we
can consider all our beliefs as
tentative, admitting that possibly we are mistaken and that critical
discussion can reveal this mistake; and we can be willing to enter into such
discussions to find out our mistakes and eliminate them.
4. CCR vs.
CR?
Bartley agrees with Popper’s
criticism of uncritical (comprehensive) rationalism. But he interprets CR
itself as conception of rationality which finally appeals to commitment. To
support this interpretation he quotes the fragment from The Open Society and Its Enemies in which "Popper’s fideism is
prominently displayed":
“whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so
because he has adopted, without reasoning, some proposal or decision, or
belief, or habit, or behaviour, which therefore in its turn must be called
‘irrational’. Whatever it may be, we can describe it as an irrational faith in reason. …the fundamental rationalist attitude is based upon
an irrational decision, or upon faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is
open. We are free to choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or
comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of
rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, and its basis in an
irrational decision (and so far, a certain priority of irrationalism).” (quot. by Bartley 1984, 104)[4]
Generally, Bartley uses name
'critical rationalism' to signify different conceptions of rationality (he
discusses under this name conceptions of Alfred Ayer, Morton White and Karl
Popper) which, on his view, have in common the following points:
"(1) They concede that rationality is limited in the sense that some matters, such as the principles
and standards of rationality, cannot be justified… (2) They claim that this
concession is unimportant, or at least not important enough to give any consolation
to irrationalism. (3) If challenged, they tend to ground or justify rationalist
position in personal or social commitment to standards which are beyond
challenge." (Bartley 1984, 97)
Bartley clearly accepts (1) and (2),
and the strengthen (1) by emphasizing that nothing can be justified as demanded
by justificationism. So, Bartley’s criticism of CR is about (3). But it is far
from obvious that Popper was guilty of (3). Popper didn’t write that
rationalist position is grounded in personal or social commitment to standards
which are beyond challenge. Also, Popper disagreed that his statement that
rationality is based on faith in reason is "fideist". As he did
explain in
“Critical Rationalism … is not a theory, therefore it is also not a
faith in the sense of fideism. Now how does fideism, according to Bartley, …
come in? This {Critical Rationalism} is an attitude which I recommend to my
readers in my book. … If I recommend this attitude to my readers, I must
believe in the possible goodness of this attitude. This is the end of it.
Belief in English is also called faith, and faith is the same word, the same
root, as fideism. But while for fideist fideism is very important and is
written with a capital F so to speak, it is a philosophical thesis… My critical
rationalism is an answer to fideism. It is not a philosophical thesis, it
admits that in the end we may really not know… And in spite of knowing so
little, I do recommend this attitude, at least for trial to my readers. But I
must say and admit, why do I do so? Because it is a good attitude to try out or
even adopt. … Very important here is what critical discussion means. … What is
being discussed are theories, propositions and so on. Critical Rationalism is
only open-mindedness to discuss these things… Fideism doesn’t come in. Only my
belief that it is a good attitude to try out, or perhaps to adopt, but fideism
is the thesis that all our theories, all our opinions must be ultimately based
on faith. I hope you see that these two things are totally different.” (Artigas
1999, 30-31)
I have omitted from this quotation
two sentences which look like making moral attitudes exempt from critical
discussion. I will discuss them later. For a while, let us suppose, that when proposing
CR Popper did mean by "irrational faith in reason" only the belief
that reason is a good thing, though this belief can’t be correctly "justified"
("supported either by argument or by
experience")
because any attempt to justify it would be begging the question (appeal to
argument or experience makes
sense only if we have already adopted rationalist attitude that arguments and
experience are to be believed). Suppose, by "irrational faith in reason" Popper did not
mean that this faith is to be dogmatic, exempt from critical discussion.
It is to be remarked that in this
sense it is true that not only rationalism, but “all our opinions must be
ultimately based on faith”, and this faith may be described as “irrational”
(though I think it would be better described as “extra-rational”) in the sense
that it is not “justified” or supported by further arguments. Critical
rationalists (as well as pancritical) must admit it, as well as irrationalists-fideists.
The principal difference is that for critical rationalists this faith is tentative
and open to critical discussion faith-belief, while for fideist it is dogmatic,
exempt from critical discussion Faith.
If this is Popper’s meaning, it is astonishing
that Popper and Bartley failed to attain full mutual understanding and
agreement on the problem discussed. Both could do better than they did.
Popper could make more essential
corrections to chapter 24 of The Open
Society and Its Enemies, which really would make his position stronger and
more consistent. He would need only to redescribe 'uncritical' rationalism not
as 'comprehensive' but as 'justificationist' (for, as Bartley argued, critical
rationalism can be comprehensive in its
own terms, and Popper himself, in Addendum to forth edition, have approved
“the principle that everything is open to criticism (from which this
principle itself is not exempt)”) and to replace in the fragment
which provoked most Bartley’s criticisms 'irrational' with 'unjustified'.
Bartley would do better if he didn’t
oppose CCR to CR but presented it as a correction to some "unhappy and
misleading formulations" of CR in The
Open Society and Its Enemies[5] and as
critical rationalist solution to the problem of limits of rationality. And he would do better if he didn’t mind
to Popper’s “retaining the old terminology – "critical rationalism",
for instance”, – for Popper had good reasons to defend this name, and it was
exactly fitting to Bartley’s own aim of separating justification and criticism;
while the adjective 'comprehensive' could be attached whenever in was needed to
emphasize comprehensiveness and self-subsumption of critical (≡rational)
attitude. To Bartley’s credit, in his latest book, Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth, published in the year of
his death, 1990, he did exactly this.
5. Are Attitudes Open to Critical Discussion?
In the previous big quotation I have
omitted two sentences which bring back the confusion. For in them Popper seems
to say that moral attitudes are exempt from critical discussion. And this,
surely, contradicts CCR. These sentences are:
"An attitude cannot be formulated in form
of sentence, a thesis, a definition or anything like that, but one can believe
that this attitude, for example, makes friends of people rather than enemies. …
Critical discussion means discussing not attitude or such things, but problems,
and solutions of these problems, therefore theories, propositions, positions
and so on." (Artigas 1999, 30-31)
How are we to understand these
statements? As for first sentence, Popper surely couldn’t mean that “an
attitude cannot be formulated in form of sentence, a thesis, a definition or
anything like that”. As he did recommend some attitudes (for example, critical
rationalism), he could not do this without formulating those attitudes “in form
of sentence, a thesis, a definition or something like that”. I conjecture that
Popper did mean by first sentence that we may hold some attitude without
formulating it.
Now if some attitude is explicitly
stated (formulated) and recommended for adoption, it is as well open to
critical discussion as any other statement, theory or proposition. Recommending
the attitude A for adoption equals to supposition that A is good (better than
all alternatives known). Now, you can be questioned why you think that A
is good. You may just state: I think A good just because it seems to me
so. But probably it will be very unconvincing. To convince, you may propose
some reasons. You opponents, in their turn, can propose some reasons why they
think A is not good or why they think that some alternative B
is better. May be, they will succeed to convince you and you change your
attitude. Or, otherwise, you can find their reasons unconvincing and explain
(give reasons) why you think so. And so on. But it is exactly how any critical discussion (about any
“theories, propositions, positions and so on”) goes.
Surely, as Popper emphasized in
Really, you can always present
critical discussion of moral attitude as if you are not arguing in favour of
some attitude against alternative attitudes, but only explore the consequences
of accepting each of alternatives, and leave for readers to make their choice.
Here are attitudes A, B, C, and this is what follows from A, B, C; here are
criticisms of A, B, C, and here are possible answers to these criticisms; now
it is for you to judge which is better. But, again, it is a general situation
with any critical discussion. You can always make the same with any “theories,
propositions, positions and so on”. Here are alternative theories A, B, C, and
this is what follows from A, B, C; here are criticisms of A, B, C, and here are
possible answers to these criticisms; now it is for you to judge which is
really the case.
So, as far as I see it, there is
nothing so special about moral attitudes which would make them improper objects
for critical discussion. And, really, Popper’s own works, such as The Open Society and Its Enemy are very
much critical discussions of moral attitudes, such as rationalism,
irrationalism, liberalism, authoritarianism etc. Moreover, at the end of the
speech in Kyoto Popper had made another statement which seems hardly consistent
with the view that moral attitudes aren’t proper objects for critical
discussion: “Now ethical discussions … I felt that in all moral matters one
should never be abstract.”[6] (Artigas 1999, 32-33)
So, there seem to be deplorable
ambitendency, vacillations in Popper’s view about critical discussion of moral
attitudes, and this may be a reason why Bartley had charged critical
rationalism with a tendency “to ground or justify rationalist position in
personal or social commitment to standards which are beyond challenge".
6. Bartley’s Criticism of Popper’s Solution to Fries’ Trilemma
One subsidiary point, on which
Bartley did criticize Popper, is Popper’s proposed solution to Fries’ trilemma.
Fries’ trilemma can be considered as
a particular case of the problem of limits of rationality.[7] It concerns with the problem of
"justification" of statements of science. Fries posed this problem in
the form of trilemma “dogmatism vs. infinite
regress vs. psychologism”:
either (1) we accept a statement
dogmatically, without justification
or (2) we try to justify it by other
statements and get involved into infinite regress
or (3) justification is based on "immediate
knowledge" of perceptual experience which need no further justification.
Popper’s solution is that scientific
theories aren’t "justified", but tested by "basic
statements"; these testings are attempts of refutation; if the theory
passes all such attempts up to present moment it is (tentatively) accepted as
true.
Now the question is: how about
"basic statements" themselves? Popper answer is that any "basic
statements" can be tested itself; so there is no natural ultimate foundation of "immediate knowledge"; to
avoid infinite regress we need to stop somewhere; and we stop on such
observational statements on which we agree. This have something in common with
all three options of trilemma: 1) our choice of stopping points id
"unjustified" ("dogmatism"); 2) there is potential infinite regress, for any
basic statements can always, if need be, be tested further; 3) basic statements
are suggested by perceptual experience and may even be called "immediate
knowledge" ("psychologism"). Elements of all three options become
innocuous when tempered by a stipulation: "basic statements" can always, if needed, be subjected to further testing; but we need not really
test them if we see no need.
"Dogmatism" becomes
innocuous – and not really dogmatism – because we aren’t dogmatic about
"basic statements"; though we accept them without justification, we keep
them open for further testing. Infinite regress becomes innocuous, for it is
only potential, not actual: we can make testing of "basic
statements" infinite, but we needn’t.
"Psychologism" becomes innocuous because we admit that
"immediate knowledge" of perceptual experience is fallible, and
though it needs no "justification", it may be tested and revised in
the light of this testing.
As above described,
Popper’s solution of Fries’ "trilemma" is quite in agreement with Bartley’s
solution of the problem of limits of rationality: basic statements aren’t
"justified", but are held open to critical discussion. But, Popper
describes this solution in terms that provoke Bartley’s vigorous criticism:
“…Popper concedes that basic statements are accepted dogmatically. He
goes on to explain that the scientist must, through a free act, decide by agreement to accept basic statements as satisfactory
and sufficiently tested. Such a decision is necessary, he argues, for
otherwise, unless we reach a statement which we decide to accept, our test will
have led nowhere. Thus "It is our decisions which settle the fate of
theories" (p.108). Popper also concedes a similarity to conventionalism
here, as well as a difference, in that the conventionalist tends to accept
universal, not singular statements by agreement – and does so for reasons of
aesthetics, not of testability.” (Bartley 1984, 213)
Bartley qualifies all three Popper’s
"concessions" – to dogmatism, infinite regress and psychologism – as
“unnecessary and extremely misleading”. But he explains this judgment only
about the first:
“The first step in Popper’s reply to Fries sounds suspiciously like the
dogmatic justification by decision or commitment which is familiar in fideism
and in various forms of irrationalism and existentialism, and which I have
challenged throughout this book.” (Bartley 1984, 214)
Next, Bartley discusses Popper’s
answer, in Replies to My Critics,
to Alfred Ayer’s objection that “such decisions may be arbitrary – which
possibility, of course, bring back the specter of irrationality.” (Bartley
1984, 214) Bartley describes Popper’s answer as "quite unclear" and
self-contradictory. Bartley points out that Popper through 5 pages makes 4
statements which seem to contradict one another: first Popper writes that the
assumption that every decision or convention must be arbitrary is mistaken
(p.1110); on the next page he writes that decisions he discusses may be called
arbitrary, but aren’t “totally arbitrary” (p.1111); after yet three pages he
states that decisions on the acceptance or rejection of proposition involve “no
element of arbitrariness at all”; and on the same page states that decisions
about acceptance of basic statements are “somewhat arbitrary” (p.1114).
(Bartley 1984, 214)
This seems very confusing. But,
really, there is not so much confusion in Popper’s article as Bartley sees. If
we check the text, we will see that on p.1111 Popper distinguishes
arbitrariness “from a purely logical point of view” and arbitrariness in a
wider sense; then Popper gives some scientifically important examples and
concludes:
“In all theses cases, the decision may be called "arbitrary"
in the logical sense mentioned; but it is far from being "totally
arbitrary": in all these cases it is motivated by search for truth.”
(Popper 1974, 1111)
On p.1114 Popper writes about some decisions
which, from his viewpoint, involve “no element of arbitrariness at all”, and
about some other decisions, which are
“somewhat arbitrary” (Popper 1974, 1114). So, confusion is not in Popper’s
article, but in Bartley’s exposition of it. But Bartley misattributes this
confusion to “Popper’s unfortunate tendency to demand convention or irrational
decision whenever some point is reached which cannot be justified”. (Bartley
1984, 214)
Now let me discuss what have provoked Bartley’s
criticism at first instance – Popper’s description of his solution of Fries’
trilemma in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery.
L “…Popper
concedes that basic statements are accepted dogmatically.” (Bartley 1984, 213)
It is important to understand in what sense Popper concedes it. As
Fries identifies "dogmatism" with acceptance
of a statement without justification, Popper’s solution (just as well as
Bartley’s solution of the problem of limits of rationality) is
"dogmatism" in this sense.
But it is not dogmatism in a more usual sense – of holding some positions as dogmas,
exempt from critical discussion. Surely, Popper could (and possibly better
would) explain this explicitly. But it is impossible to explain everything
which can be possibly misunderstood.
L “He
goes on to explain that the scientist must, through a free act, decide by agreement to accept basic statements as satisfactory
and sufficiently tested.” (Bartley 1984, 213)
Again, we need to consider what exactly Popper
says, in what context and, hence, what he means. Let us begin with "decide through a free act". What Popper
really writes is:
“And I differ from the positivist in holding that basic statements are
not justifiable by our immediate experiences, but are, from the logical
point of view, accepted by an act, by a free decision. (From the psychological
point of view this may perhaps be a purposeful and well-adapted reaction.)”
(Popper 2002, ……)
I think the key phrase here is
"from the logical point of view" (as distinct from “the psychological
point of view”). I think that Popper’s statement that “basic statements … from
the logical point of view, accepted by an act, by a free decision” is just unhappy
formulation to mean: “acceptance of basic statements is not logically forced”.
Now about “agreement to accept basic
statements as satisfactory and sufficiently tested”. Popper’s explanation that
we stop with testing of basic statements when we are satisfied and when we
reach an agreement is really absolutely innocuous and sensible, and has nothing
to do with conventionalism. It may be called “consensualism”, for agreement
about acceptance of basic statements is not arbitrary convention; it is consensus
of opinions as to what is observed. If scientists agree on this point, then
basic statements may be accepted (in Bartley’s terms, as
"unproblematic"), and we may need no further testing. If they
disagree, then further testing is required. The same with “sufficiently tested”.
If all scientists agree that a hypothesis was “sufficiently tested” then they
may, for a while, stop testing and devote their time to other problems. If some
aren’t satisfied and think that testing was insufficient, they continue
testing.
L {Popper
writes that} “…otherwise, unless we reach a statement which we decide to
accept, our test will have led nowhere...” (Bartley 1984, 213)
Surely, if we accept no basic
statement, we have nothing to test theories with.
So, for a while, Bartley’s criticism
of Popper’s solution to Fries’ trilemma seems to miss the mark.
7. "Decisions" Which are Not Decisions but Judgments
In a sense, Bartley may be right in
his criticizing “Popper’s unfortunate tendency to demand convention or
irrational decision whenever some point is reached which cannot be justified”
(Bartley 1984, 214). But, on my view, it is not so much "unfortunate
tendency to demand" as unfortunate tendency to describe as conventions and
decisions what would be better described as agreement-consensus and judgements.
And I may agree with Bartley that that unfortunate talk may "sound
suspiciously like the dogmatic justification by decision or commitment which is
familiar in fideism and in various forms of irrationalism", − though
its real meaning is quite different.
This is connected with the point
made by A.Musgrave in the article "Can I Decide What to Believe?"
(Musgrave 2009) and by R.S.Percival in the book The Myth of Closed Mind (Percival 2012). The point is: we never do
– and can’t – decide what to believe;
our beliefs aren’t matter of our decisions. If I don’t believe that X is the
case, I can’t decide that from now (or from tomorrow) on I will believe that X
is the case, and fulfil this decision. Our beliefs are a matter of evidences
and arguments which persuade us into believing some things and disbelieving
some other things.
Our adoptions and rejections of basic
statements, scientific theories and other positions is believing them to be
true/false (or, in the case of scientific theories, it may be believing that
they are the best/not the best approximations to truth, comparing with known
alternatives).[8] So, I think that, our adoptions and rejections
of hypotheses (or, in Miller’s terms "classifying" them as true or
false) would be better described not as "decisions", but as
(logically unforced) judgements.
The same with
"conventions" and "agreements". Scientists needn’t make
conventions about acceptance of basic statements or scientific theories; they
reach (or not reach) an agreement-consensus, as a matter of what they believe
to be the case.
This is applicable also to moral
attitudes, which are beliefs about what is morally good/bad. So, Popper’s statement
that “the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative)
act of faith – from faith in reason”, and that rationalism has “its origin in
an irrational decision” is a misdescription which is to be corrected by
replacing “an act of faith” with “a state of belief” and “irrational decision”
with “extra-rational judgement”.
If Bartley’s criticism of Popper was
aimed at replacement of talk in terms of "conventions" and "decisions"
with talk in terms of "agreement-consensus" and "judgements",
I would agree. But, this is not Bartley’s proposition.
8. Can We Do Without Acceptances and Rejections?
Conjecturing "X" and Conjecturing That X
Bartley’s proposition is different.
He piles together "decisions, agreements, conventions, acceptance, and
justification" and proposes to get rid of them all. In particulars,
observational reports to play the role of "basic statements" need not
“to be backed up by "decisions" and "acceptances"”. All we
need is "to state how theory and report stand, hypothetically, in relation
to one another" (Bartley 1984, 216):
“The test statements are intended to be hypothetical, and criticizable
and revisable, just like everything else in the system; there is no
justification, no proof, no fixed point anywhere. There is nothing
"basic" about basic statements… If such statements happen to be
incompatible with a theory, then the theory is false relative to them; and they are false relative to the theory. There is no question of theory proving
reports wrong, or reports proving theory wrong. Both could be wrong: neither is "basic".” (Bartley 1984,
215)
And Bartley generalizes:
“Any theory is refuted only relative to critical arguments incompatible
with it, which are themselves open to criticism by testing of their own
consequences. This in turn are criticizable forever.” (Bartley 1984, 216)
I contend that though in purely logical sense this is right, it
is far from making cognitive judgements (acceptances and rejections) redundant.
On the contrary, we need cognitive judgements exactly because pure logics can
say us nothing about real truth and
falsity, only about “relative falsity” which is not falsity but contradiction.
Though it can be said that
statements X and Y are false relative one
another, – this is just brain-muddling relativistic way of saying that X
and Y contradict one another, – and this says nothing about which one is really true and which is really false. But all cognition, science
included, are aimed at finding out what is – and what isn’t – the case really; what is really true and really false.
The questions of contradiction (“relative falsity”) are subservient; they are
means, not aims of cognition.
In other words, as
David Miller writes:
“Without such decisions, not just in the case
of basic statements, but throughout our knowledge, our criticisms are impotent,
leaving their trace only in metalinguistic reports to the effect that this has
been criticized by that. We need more if we are to accomplish (even fallibly)
the task of separating truth from falsehood.” (Miller, 93)
Really, Bartley makes some remarks
which can be taken as proposing substitutes for cognitive
"decisions". First, he makes an appeal to “reports unproblematic at
the moment”. Second, he states that “one may go on to conjecture about which of
the reports are accurate: but this is a conjecture, not a decision, and may be
tested accordingly”. Both can be generalized: first, as an appeal to statements unproblematic at the moment;
second, as suggestion that conjecture
about truth of some set of statements is not a "decision", and may be
subjected to further critical discussion. I contend that, far from making
acceptances and rejections redundant, both are impossible without such
cognitive judgements.
As for the first, there is nothing
in statements (including empirical reports) themselves which makes them
unproblematic at the moment. It is just our
taking them as unproblematic, – and this is acceptance, logically
unforced judgement. Really, whenever
we discover that two sets of statements are in collision, logically both are
problematized in the light of each other.
As for the second, there is much of ambiguity
in the use of the word "conjecture". Its meaning may be either
non-judgemental, when we conjecture some hypothesis without making judgement as
to whether it is true, or judgemental, when "conjecture" already
incorporates tentative judgement (acceptance/rejection). I propose to
distinguish these meaning by designations conjecturing
“X” and conjecturing that X.
Now suppose that conjecture is
non-judgemental conjecturing “X”,
i.e. doesn’t incorporate acceptances/rejections. In this sense, every conjecture comes in a pair with its
negation, counter-conjecture. Suppose there is conjecture (X) that A is true. This provides us with counter-conjecture (not-X) that A is false. To ignore not-X would be just uncritical (without even
taking into account its alternative) acceptance of X. X and not-X are on equal
terms. It wouldn’t help to supplement X and not-X with the meta-conjecture Y
that X, rather then not-X is true. For if Y is non-judgemental, then it comes
in pair with not-Y – the meta-conjecture that not-X, rather then X is true. Now
we have alternatives of X and not-X, Y and not-Y (and we can produce further
hypotheses and counter-hypotheses on higher meta-levels ad-infinitum). If we make any preference, it will be (tentative)
acceptance on one side and (tentative) rejection on the other. If we don’t make
any preference, then all we can do is just to amass endlessly all possible
non-self-contradictory statements and their negations without making any
(however tentative) judgments about their truth. It is hard to imagine more
senseless occupation. And such occupation would surely have nothing to do with
science or knowledge generally.
But really it is obvious that "conjecture
about which of the reports are accurate", or conjecture about
truth/falsity of statements is the second kind of "conjecture". Such conjecturing that X, far from making cognitive judgements
(acceptances/rejections) redundant, is itself nothing but tentative cognitive judgement,
tentative acceptance/rejection of statement (report) that X is the case.
Now about the remark that
conjectures “may be tested accordingly”. Without unjustifiable cognitive
judgements (acceptances/rejections), such testing can do nothing except adding
new report R in pair with its negation not-R, – with no possible preference.
And this is absolutely useless.
9. Rationality and Extra-rational Judgements
Critical thinkers … question and test the beliefs that others take for granted. In so doing, they
oftentimes clarify how some of their beliefs are based upon others. But this
basing of beliefs one upon another must ultimately end. And if you are a
critical thinker, then you will, somewhere in the course of your tests,
inevitably come upon statements that you believe for no other reason than that
they seem true – to you. In such a
case, it would be more accurate to say not that such statements are justified,
but that they seem, in your judgment,
to be true. But if this is true, then the very least that a critical thinker
should do is to say so.
Mark
Notturno (Notturno 1999, 147)
The need of logically unforced
judgements (acceptances, rejections) is not something peculiar to “basic
statements”; it is general, omnipresent for cognition – or belief-acquiring –
about anything.
Cognition is selective process aimed at retaining better (supposedly true or
well nearing the truth) propositions and declining worse ones. But such
selection is never logically forced. It is always (tentative) acceptance of some propositions for true
and (tentative) rejection of other
propositions as false. As ultimate justification is never possible, ultimate
refutation is never possible too. Logically, without preliminary acceptance of
some positions, all positions are neither justifiable, nor refutable.
Reasoning, by itself, as a matter of
pure logics, can’t demonstrate that some statement is true or false, except in
relatively unimportant cases of tautologies or self-contradictory statements. Neither
can it demonstrate how probable (in the objective sense of probability
calculus) is truth of whatever non-tautilogical and non-selfcontradictory statement.
What reasoning does is giving us deeper and fuller understanding of the meaning
of the statement under discussion – what it implies (and, hence, what it
forbids). It leaves to us to judge (tentatively) if this statement – with all
its implications we know about – is true or false. These – truth/falsity
attributing – judgements are made without providing further reason, – there is
“no other reason than that they seem true – to
you”. In this sense, they may be called irrational, though I would prefer
calling them extra-rational (extra-logical) – for they are not opposing (defying)
reason (as irrationalism does) but supplement it. They are extra-rational in
the sense that they are not result of reasoning, but no effective reasoning can
do without them.
This must be clear on considering a
general logical situation.
Suppose that we have N (two or more)
alternative (i.e., mutually contradictory) statements. (They may be complex
statements-theories, consisting of a number of simpler statements.) We need to
make judgement which one is true, or to be accepted, or preferred. To make this
judgement as reasonable as possible, we look for arguments and evidences which
support some alternatives against other. So, we supplement each initial
statement (theory) with statements of all arguments and evidences we can find
which support this initial statement (theory) against its alternatives. This
will give us N sets of statements which are logically mutually exclusive. How
are we to decide which of them is to be accepted (even if tentatively) as true?
Logics gives no answer. It can’t make a judgement for us.
It can be said that we can decide by
following some methodological rules, but such answer doesn’t really solve the
problem – it just shifts it on methodological level. For we can propose
different, alternative methodological rules; and we can supplement each with
arguments supporting it against its alternatives. Now instead of N sets of
statements centered around N alternative initial statements, we have to do with
M sets of statements centered around M alternative methodological rules.
We can redescribe this situation in “negative”
terms of criticisms:
1) We can sensibly use some
statements as reasons, arguments, criticisms etc. (let us signify them as R1)
only on supposition of their soundness, i.e. (besides validity of inference)
truth of their premises. (If you suppose that statement S is false or some
argument A is unsound, you can’t honestly use them to criticize other
statements.)
2) This supposition of truth,
soundness is either unreasoned (unsupported by any reasons) or reasoned,
supported by some further (deeper) reasons, arguments, criticisms (let us
signify them as R2).
3) We can sensibly use R2
as reasons, arguments, criticisms only on supposition of their soundness (truth
of their premises), and this supposition is either unreasoned or reasoned,
supported by some further (deeper) reasons (R3).
4) In the same manner we move from R3
to R4, from R4 to R5 etc. As in the real process of
cognition this regress can’t be infinite, it
stops somewhere – on some assumptions
(premises) we judge to be true without any further reasons.
We are never logically forced to reject
a statement (theory), whatever criticisms are brought against it (except relatively
uninteresting cases when statements under discussion are self-contradictory).
Claim for truth of any statement as
well as claim for soundness of any argument (truth of its premises) is just as
hypothetical as any other, and can’t be demonstrated logically. So, whenever
the statement S runs against some criticism C (which is nothing but set of
statements), this doesn’t mean that S is false; this means the alternative:
either C is sound and statement S is
refuted by it,
or statement S is true and criticism
C is unsound (some of its premises is/are false).
And it is for you to judge which is the case. Logically,
there is no reason whatever to prefer one over another, – except that one,
rather then another “seem, in your judgment,
to be true”. Or if you find some further reason, you merely add it on one or
other scale of your judgemental balances. But balancing-judgement is still
yours.
For example, suppose you find a
reason R to favour criticism C rather then statement S. Now, statement S is
opposed with augmented criticism C1=C+R. Though criticism is
strengthened, logical situation remains the same as it was:
either C1 is sound and
statement S is refuted by it,
or statement S is true and criticism
C1 is unsound (some of its premises is/are false).
And it is for you to judge which is the case. Logically,
there is no reason whatever to prefer one over another, – except that one,
rather then another “seem, in your
judgment, to be true”. Or if you find some further reason, you merely add
it on one or other scale of your judgemental balances. But balancing-judgement
is still yours.
Each statement used in
criticism is hypothetical, unjustifiable, possibly false, criticisable by other
statements which are as well hypothetical, unjustifiable, possibly false. As
far as we keep inside the realm of logics and abstain from unreasoned
("unjustified") judgements (preferences, acceptances) we can’t get
anywhere. All we can do is, as Bartley proposed in the fragments criticized
above, just state that X is refuted relative to Y, and Y is refuted relative to
X, without any (however tentative) preferential judgement: if X is true rather
than Y or vice versa. Now, to repeat what was said in previous section, this
would replace cognition with endless and senseless occupation of amassing
non-self-contradictory statements and their negations without making any
(however tentative) truth-judgments, without any attempt to find out what is
true and what is false. In D.Miller’s words, this would make all criticisms
“impotent, leaving their trace only in metalinguistic reports to the effect
that this has been criticized by that. We need more if we are to accomplish
(even fallibly) the task of separating truth from falsehood”.
This “more” we need are judgements
resulting in acceptance/rejection or preference. They are extra-rational, unreasoned in the sense that no further
reason is provided. Reasoning starts with such tentative extra-rational
judgements and (temporarily) ends with them.
It is to be emphasized, that such
extra-rational judgements needn’t be irrational in Bartley’s meaning of
commitment, exempting from criticism. Though we can’t avoid accepting some
positions without providing further reasons, this doesn’t mean that we have to
consider such positions as ultimate, uncriticizable (exempt from criticism),
that we need to make commitment to some such positions. On my view, Bartley was
absolutely right in his criticism of commitment and in his defence of the view
that we can keep all our views open to criticism.
The deepest level of positions
accepted on unreasoned, extra-rational
judgements is not given once and forever, it is just the deepest level we have
dug down to. It is possible, that if we continue digging, we will get deeper.
It is also possible that we will be unable to get deeper. We never know how deep we can dig. But however deep we dig, we have to
stop somewhere at least for a while, and on this level our cognitive
judgements are unavoidably unreasoned, extra-rational.
Really, Bartley states nearly the same in The Retreat to Commitment:
“… pancritical rationalist, like other people, holds countless
unexamined presuppositions and assumptions, many of which may be false... When
one belief is subjected to criticism, many others, of course, have to be taken
for granted – including those with which the criticism is being carried out.
The latter are used as the basis of criticism not because they are themselves
justified or beyond criticism, but because they are unproblematical at present. … We stop criticizing – temporarily –
not when we reach uncriticizable authorities, but when we reach positions
against which we can find no criticisms.[9] If criticisms of these are raised
later, the critical process then continues.” (Bartley 1984, 121-122)
I think that this explanation is
good enough. But it would be mistaken to consider this as doing away with extra-rational
cognitive judgements (acceptances/rejections). As I have already remarked,
there is a problem with “unproblematic” (even if “for a present”) beliefs.
Logically, the situation with problematization is the same as with refutation:
whenever we discover the conflict between beliefs or statements, both sides of
conflict can be considered problematic. If X conflicts with Y, and we consider Y
as unproblematic, then we consider X refuted (successfully criticized). But we
can always do the other way round: to consider X as unproblematic and Y as false.
Logically, there is no forcedness to prefer one way over another. To repeat,
there is nothing in statements themselves which makes them intrinsically
unproblematic. It is we who consider some statements unproblematic while other
problematic. And this is a judgement (acceptance) of the same sort as discussed
above. So, we can’t do without unreasoned,
extra-rational judgements (acceptances).
10. The Problem of Arbitrariness
Some philosophers infer that, as
such judgements ("decisions") aren’t logically forced (justified)
they are arbitrary. As we have seen, Bartley did attribute to Popper
“confusion” about this arbitrariness, but he seems to fail to attend to
Popper’s distinction between arbitrariness “from a purely logical point of
view” and arbitrariness in a wider sense: what “may be called
"arbitrary" in the logical sense” may be “far from being "totally
arbitrary"” if it “is motivated by search for truth.” (Popper 1974, 1111)
The problem with “arbitrariness”
arises out of the dilemma: either "decision"
is logically forced (justified) or it is arbitrary. I suggest that the
dilemma is spurious. The choice between
logical forcedness (ultimate justification) and arbitrariness is not logically
necessary. There may be – and, I suppose, is – third alternative. Cognitive judgements (acceptances/rejections,
"decisions") made in sincere search for truth are neither logically
forced (justified) nor arbitrary. Neither they are irrational if
rationality is understood (as Both Popper and Bartley proposed) as openness to
criticisms.
D.Miller, when criticizing Bartley
proposition to get rid of “decisions” (acceptances), makes the same point:
“…there is no question of such a decision’s being irrational … On the
contrary, such a decision – which is always taken in the light of what we think
is true – is itself open to criticism, emendation, and even reversal... … there
is no danger that the decisions we make about what to accept or reject are
arbitrary. They are constrained throughout by our desire to discover the truth,
to separate it from falsehood.” (Miller, 92-93)
I quite agree, but think that this
explanation needs further explanation. Surely, if we accept, as convention,
Bartley’s proposition to define rationality as openness to criticism, on this
definition "decisions" open to criticism are not irrational. But this
is not enough. Definitions never solve real problems. We can formulate the
problem without using terms 'rational' and 'irrational'. The problem is:
As all criticisms are based on
cognitive judgements which are on the deepest level unavoidably unreasoned, extra-rational, how openness
to criticism does away with the “danger that the decisions we make about what
to accept or reject are arbitrary”?
My answer is: There is no guarantee against such danger. Rather,
we run necessary, unavoidable risk of cognitive judgement-making under
supposition-hope that this process, when tempered by critical discussion, has
sort of inherent tendency toward truth; under supposition-hope that eventually it
turns out conductive to truth.
On certain suppositions we can hope that our
cognitive judgements ("decisions") are not arbitrary, but truth-tended.
Now I will attempt to make these suppositions explicit.
To start with, let us consider some
spectrum of "decisions" which grade from a less to a more reasoned.
Suppose I have a statement S, and
have to judge if it is true. How can I do it? And how can I make my judgement
more reasoned?
The least reasoned way is to do
without any reasons whatever. I can judge S true (or false) just because it
seems true (or false) to me. I can call it extra-rational judgement or intuition
or gut-feeling or informal understanding. [10]
Let us notice, that on Bartley’s
definition, such judgment is not irrational, for it can be tentative, open to
further criticism. (Really, most views we hold are acquired in such way,
pre-critically, and are subjected – if subjected – to criticisms afterwards.) But,
it can be properly called unreasoned and, in terms I propose, extra-rational.
Now, if we hold rational (critical) attitude,
we hold our judgment (or its result – belief) open to criticism and possible
revision. We consider various criticisms and make judgments on their soundness;
we consider various criticisms on criticisms and make judgments on their soundness
too, etc. As a result, after considering some multitude of criticisms and
criticisms on criticisms and criticisms on criticisms on criticisms etc., we
can possibly renounce our initial judgment or retain it as undamaged by
criticisms or even as positively supported by some reasons. This process of
critical reassessment of our initial (extra-rational) judgment necessarily
involves great many other extra-rational judgments. So, it turns out that rational
(critical) process is, necessarily, transition from belief based on single extra-rational
judgement to belief based on the multitude of extra-rational judgements!
Generally, our reasoning – whether it is criticism or search for some positive,
supporting reasons – is thoroughly permeated by extra-rational judgements.
In other words, development of
knowledge is the process of research-interaction with the world, generating and
exchanging new ideas and criticisms, making extra-rational judgements and their
constant re-alignment with one another.
Now the question is: if this process
gets us nearer the truth? The answer of (comprehensively) critical rationalist must
be positive, though it is unjustifiable. It is belief based, directly or with
some intermediaries, on extra-rational judgments.
So, (pan)critical rationalism
implies some presuppositions about extra-rational judgments:
1) Extra-rational cognitive judgments,
being necessary constituents of knowledge, though they aren’t logically forced,
aren’t arbitrary either. They are conductive for truth. This
truth-conductiveness isn’t to be taken for too much. It is neither guarantee nor
high probability. It is enough if extra-rational cognitive judgments are (even
if just a bit) more conductive to truth that purely arbitrary "decisions".
It is enough if our cognitive judgments (what seems true to us) are, by and large, nearer the truth, then if they
were replaced by "decisions" made by throwing coin and seeing if it
falls on tails or heads.
2) Complex interaction
(realignments) of many extra-rational cognitive judgements in the process of
rational (critical) discussion is much more conductive for truth than isolated extra-rational
cognitive judgments. The more intensive is rational (critical) discussion, the
more truth-conductive it is.
3) There is nothing more conductive
for truth at our disposal.
On my view, these presuppositions
are inalienable for (comprehensively) critical rationalism, – if criticized,
they stand (if criticisms fail) or fall (if criticisms succeed) together.
11. Conclusion
It is possible, that the tension and
partial misunderstanding between Popper and Bartley was rooted in the lack of clear
appreciation and explicit statement of the role of extra-rational judgements in
cognition.
Popper did recognize the necessity
of "irrational decisions" (which, on my view would be more adequately
described as extra-rational moral
judgments) as far as moral attitudes (including critical rationalism) are
concerned. In epistemological context, he did recognize necessity of
methodological decisions which are “arbitrary in purely logical sense”, but
aren’t “totally arbitrary” in some wider sense. This, I think, is to be
understood as: they are neither logically forced, nor arbitrary, but “motivated
by search for truth” and, hopefully, conductive
to truth. But he didn’t generalize these recognitions. If he did, he would notice
the fact that what he calls "irrational decisions", as well as all
other aspects of knowledge (beginning from construing our observational
experiences into observational statements such as “The door is open”, “The
apple is red”, “The needle of ammeter points at "6"”), are permeated
with extra-rational cognitive judgments (including informal understanding). And he would
notice that in this respect moral reasoning (which has to do with moral
attitudes) is highly analogous with reasoning aimed at factual knowledge, science
included.
He would see that, in the sense in
which critical rationalism is based on “faith in reason”, all our theories, all
our opinions must be ultimately based on some sort of faith-belief originated
in unreasoned, extra-rational judgements. Such judgements are necessary
prerequisites for any reasoning to start and to arrive at some (tentative)
result (belief). Moral attitudes are saturated with extra-rational moral judgements in the same way as other theories
and opinions are saturated with extra-rational cognitive judgements. And this
is neither commitment nor irrationality in Bartley’s meaning, – for all those
attitudes, theories, opinions can be held open to criticism.
Bartley attempted – and succeeded –
to show that holding rational attitude needn’t be irrational (may be rational)
on critical rationalism’s own terms. And Bartley did attempt – mistakenly – to
get rid of "decisions, agreements, conventions, acceptance", whether
moral or cognitive, piling them together with "justification".
Both Popper and Bartley fail to make
explicit distinction between irrational
as defying reason and extra-rational
as that which is not result of reasoning (whether positive – justification or
negative – criticism) but originates from some other source (human psychics in interaction
with the world). Both don’t notice that this extra-rational is all-permeating, that it permeates all reasoning – whatever it
is about.
Irrationalism as defying reason is a
bad choice. But denying self-sufficiency of reason (as process of arguing) is
right and has not to be labelled "irrationalism". Admitting that
reason is not self-sufficient and needs unreasoned (extra-rational) judgements (suggested
by senses, feelings, intuitions etc.) – for cognitive purposes as well as for
moral attitudes – is not renouncing rationalism.
It is not the case that reason and unreason
have to fight each other for domineering.
It is also not the case that reason
and irrational has each its own domain proper.
The case is that both reason and extra-reasonable
(feelings, intuitions, experiences, judgements) are unlimited (comprehensive)
and they are complementary. They needn’t fight or expel each other; they are to
cooperate everywhere and permeate each other.
It is cooperation and
interpermeating of extra-reasonable (senses, feelings, intuitions, judgments)
with reason which makes for civilised humanity. There is no pure reason. Reason
without feelings and intuitions is dead abstraction or computer. Feelings and
intuitions without reason make for barbarity and pre-human animal life. Due to
reason, humans are more than beasts. Due to feelings and intuitions, humans are
more than computers. Neither computer nor beast serves proper character for us
to aspire.
We are to renounce search for proper
delimitation between rational and irrational. There is no such delimitation, no
separate realms proper for rational and irrational. We are to replace the
picture of conflict of rational and irrational with that of cooperation of
rational and extra-rational. Both reason
and extra-rational are comprehensive. Reason is comprehensive in the
meaning that we can hold all our views and attitudes open for critical
examination and discussion. Extra-rational is comprehensive in the sense that
all our reasoning is necessarily soaked with it. They are not to wage a war for
frontiers, they are to cooperate throughout all our knowledge and life.
Bibliography
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J., 2012. Critical Rationalism,
Comprehensive or Qualified: The Popper-Bartley Dispute. In G.Franco,
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Festscrhift zum 90. Geburtstag von Hans Albert.
Artigas, M. 1999. The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s Theory
of Knowledge.
Bartley, W.W. 1984. The Retreat to Commitment.
Bartley, W.W., III. 1990. Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth.
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R., 1989, Sociology: proscience or antiscience?
American Sociological Review. Volume 54, Issue I: 124-39.
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* I thank Joseph Agassi, Mark Notturno and Alan
Musgrave for helpful comments and discussions on earlier draft of this article
[1] This is an account
of event from Wikipedia:
“…at the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of
Science at
And this is how Popper did
explain it at Workshops in
"By criticism I always
understood, and it was always understood among my pupils, that criticism cannot
be a personal criticism. Criticism is a criticism of problems and proposed
solutions to problems… Then Bartley, in the huge meeting, an international
meeting, attacked me personally, and partly he attacked a thesis of mine, my
proposed solution of the problem of demarcation which he attacked only by
saying – not saying that my solution was false – but that my problem was
unimportant. What shall one answer to such a thing? It was important for me and
I had shown that it was important for Immanuel Kant, after all a great
philosopher. Now if one says this problem is unimportant, therefore what I have
done is nothing, and so on. All right, but it was a personal criticism, not one
word in this talk of Bartley was he saying why he felt anything I had said was
false." (Artigas 1999, 32)
[2] The silence itself Popper did
explain as follows:
“I had made it a principle of
mine not to discourage my pupils by criticizing them, except personally in a
meeting of two people. There I would criticize them, but never in public. A
principle which I carried through.” (Artigas 1999, 31)
[3] Popper defines
rationalism as “an attitude that seeks to solve as many problems as possible by
an appeal to reason, i.e. to clear thought and experience, rather than by an
appeal to emotions and passions” (Popper 1977, 225). He describes it also “in
terms of practical attitudes or behaviour”:
“…rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to
critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an
attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an
effort, we may get nearer to the truth’. It is an attitude which does not
lightly give up hope that by such means as argument and careful observation,
people may reach some kind of agreement on many problems of importance; and
that, even where their demands and their interests clash, it is often possible
to argue about the various demands and proposals, and to reach – perhaps by arbitration
– a compromise which, because of its equity, is acceptable to most, if not to
all. In short, the rationalist attitude, or, as I may perhaps label it, the
‘attitude of reasonableness’, is very similar to the scientific attitude, to
the belief that in the search for truth we need co-operation, and that, with
the help of argument, we can in time attain something like objectivity.”
(Popper 1977, 225)
Yet one important feature of rationalistic approach is that it
“considers the argument rather than the person arguing” (Popper 1977, 226).
Popper also proposes to “distinguish between a true rationalism and a
false or a pseudo-rationalism”:
“What I shall call the 'true
rationalism' is … the awareness of one’s limitations, the intellectual modesty
of those who know how often they err, and how much they depend on others even
for this knowledge. It is the realization that we must not expect too much from
reason; that argument rarely settles a question, although it is the only means
for learning – not to see clearly, but to see more clearly than before.
What I shall call
'pseudo-rationalism' is the intellectual intuitionism… It is the immodest
belief in one’s superior intellectual gifts, the claim to be initiated, to know
with certainty, and with authority.” (Popper 1977, 227-228)
[4] In fourth edition Popper has made slight
changes to this formulation, but they hardly meet Bartley’s criticism. The
corrected formulation runs:
“whoever
adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously,
some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be
called ‘irrational’. Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled
habit, we may describe it as an irrational faith in reason. … the fundamental
rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith – from
faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We may choose some form of
irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to
choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in
an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of
irrationalism).” (Popper 1977, 231-232)
[5] G.Radnitsky, one
of prominent Popperians who supported Bartley in discussions about comprehensiveness,
took this stand:
“…from the context it is clear
that "irrational decision" was merely an unhappy and misleading
formulation… What Popper should have said about his position … is that the
decision in question was "a nonrational decision".” (Radnitzky 1993,
302)
I think that it
would be more correct to say that it is “extra-rational judgement” – for it is
not decision at all (see section 7 “"Decisions" Which are Not
Decisions but Judgments” below).
[6] Popper also had stated that this was one of
reasons why he didn’t took part in discussions about comprehensiveness between
Bartley and some other of Popper’s pupils: "the discussion was on
extremely abstract level".
[7] By the way, Bartley did describe CCR as
generalization of Popper’s falsificationism. I think it is mistaken
description, for falsificationism is concerned with a very different problem
(of induction) and very different logical situation. But I think it would be
right to describe CCR as generalization of Popper’s solution to Fries’ trilemma.
[8] Really, it may be not the case with adoptions
and rejections of scientific hypotheses by those scientists who support
instrumentalism – the theory that scientific theories aren’t really true or
false, that they are just more or less efficient instruments to produce
predictions. But even instrumentalists about science can hardly extend
instrumentalism beyond science on all beliefs.
[9] I think it is
obvious that when saying that "we stop criticizing … when we reach
positions against which we can find no criticisms", Bartley didn’t mean by
'criticism' of X any statement which contradicts X (such criticisms are always
easily found for any X); surely, he did mean only plausible criticisms – those Ys which we (tend to) believe to be
true.
[10] In a way of acknowledgement. The conception of extra-rational judgements, as expounded in this
article, was suggested to me, to a great extent, by Randall Collins’
formulation:
“The notion of a complete and rigid formalization … in a scientific
theory is a chimera. There are informal
concepts and intuitive leaps at
several points. These intuitive or
informal leaps … are not illegitimate. That is simply the way the world is. They don’t undermine our
ability to have a science, for all sciences have these places where there are intuitive leaps. If physical scientists sometimes
forget this and talk in crude positivistic terms as if they report “nothing but
the facts”, that is because they have been successful at making the right intuitive leaps as their scientific
procedures have cumulated, so that they now have workable models that they know intuitively how to apply to most of
the things they study. …a successful science is possible even incorporating
areas of fundamental uncertainty,
dealt with by tacit and informal understandings. …the best validated theory is the one
maximally grounded to the empirical world via the various explanatory submodels
it incorporates. An extreme, all-or-nothing empiricism is impossible; but a flexible empiricism,
working
with imprecisions and intuitive concepts
where necessary, and making a great deal of room for theoretical work that ties
things together, is a central part of science…” (Collins, 128-129) (Italics mine.)