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Critical Rationalism, Comprehensiveness and Extra-rational Judgements*

by Dmitry Sepety

Zaporizhzhya State Medical University, Ukraine

[email protected]

                                             

I know Popper and Bartley agreed that they disagreed; I don’t know on what.

Joseph Agassi (Agassi 2012, 48)

 

0. Introduction

This article is an attempt to elucidate the relationship between Karl Popper’s general conception of rationality, critical rationalism (CR), and conception of his pupil and close corroborator William Bartley – comprehensively critical rationalism (CCR) or pancritical rationalism.

As far as I know, the most informative discussion of these matters up to the present moment is Mariano Artigas’ book The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s Theory of Knowledge. One thing which makes it of special interest is that it publishes the only Popper’s own explicit public comment on the issue, his speech at Workshop in Kyoto, Japan, 1992. The largest part of the book is explanatory comments of Artigas, provided for each fragment of Popper’s speech in Kyoto. Though this book may be much helpful, it is obviously biased. Artigas opposes Bartley’s position to Popper’s, and completely takes sides with Popper. He hardly notices anything valuable on the opposite side. I propose a different evaluation.

 

1. A Confused Situation

Relationships between Popper and Bartley have come through three periods. First, there were relations of admired teacher and the best and favourite pupil. Then there was a sharp conflict which has resulted in the break of communication for 9 years[1]. Finally, a good relationship was restored, and there was the closest and very fruitful collaboration.

The conflict was not directly about CCR, but Bartley’s paper which had triggered it was a continuation of attempt of critical revision of CR, made 3 year before in Bartley’s book "The Retreat to Commitment". In that book, Bartley proposed CCR in a sharp opposition both to traditional comprehensive justificationist rationalism and to CR. He charged CR with fideism and "operating within a justificationist context", interpreted and criticized it as limited rationalism which makes some "basic" positions exempt from criticism. (Bartley 1984, 104)

Popper’s position about CCR is not clear.

In a new, fourth edition of The Open Society and Its Enemies (the book where he first introduced the conception of CR) Popper made only very slight corrections to some formulations in chapter 24 (which was the target of Bartley’s criticism). At the same time, he added an Addendum which is very “Bartleyan”. The footnote on its starting page says: “I am deeply indebted to Dr. William W. Bartley’s incisive criticism which not only helped me to improve chapter 24 of this book (especially page 231) but also induced me to make important changes in the present Addendum.” (Popper 1977, 399) And in the text Popper twice alludes with approval to “the principle that nothing is exempt from criticism”, “the principle that everything is open to criticism (from which this principle itself is not exempt)” (Popper 1977, 408-409) – the précis of CCR.

Later, Bartley explained Popper’s position as follows:

"…in 1960 I discussed these matters with him, and suggested how the problem could be dealt with within the general framework of his own approach, in terms of my distinction between justification and criticism… In response, Popper altered the terminology of chapter 24 of The Open Society and Its Enemies (fourth and subsequent English editions) to mute its fideism, and introduced a polemical addendum on relativism. In Conjectures and Refutations, chapter 10, and in his Realism and the Aim of Science, part 1, section 2, he introduces my distinction between justification and criticism, and this distinction is now routinely presented as a feature of Popperian thought. Despite these alterations, Popper’s earlier fideistic approach has been corrected only in a patchwork manner, dropping some of the old notions, but retaining the old terminology – "critical rationalism", for instance – and the old slogans. This results in a confused situation." (Bartley 1984, 105)

Yet later Bartley redescribed it in a reconciliatory manner:

"These early {Popper’s} fideistic remarks are relatively unimportant; they play no significant role in Popper’s early thought and none at all in his later thought, but are superfluous remnant of justificationism, out of line with the main thrust and intent of his methodology, empty baggage carried over from the dominant tradition. When, in 1960, I proposed to contrast justificationist and nonjustificationist theories of criticism as a generalisation of his own distinction between verification and falsification, Popper dropped this remaining fideism, and adopted instead the approach that I am about to describe, thereby considerably improving his position in consistency, clarity, and generality. … The alternative approach, which Popper continues to call "critical rationalism" and which I prefer to call "comprehensively critical" or "pancritical" rationality …" (Bartley 1990, 237)

But it seems that "later" Popper was not of quite the same thought. His only public comment on this point was made in Kyoto, Japan, 1992 (after Bartley’s death). This “break of silence”[2] was evoked by the article of prof. Kamino which “explains Popper’s critical rationalism and discusses Bartley’s attempt at extending it through his 'pancritical rationalism'.” (Artigas 1999, 35) In his impromptu speech Popper praised the article as “extremely good” (Artigas 1999, 29) and remarked that “Professor Kamino seems to be fundamentally on my side” (Artigas 1999, 33). Also, Popper rejected Bartley’s attribution of fideism to his early works, especially, The Open Society and Its Enemies.

Mariano Artigas also brings to attention Popper’s statement in Introduction to the collection The Myth of Framework:

“there was also an attempt to replace my critical rationalism by a more radically critical and more explicitly defined position. But because this attempt bore the character of definition, it led to endless philosophical arguments about its adequacy.” (Popper 1994, xii)

Artigas suggests that "these words can only refer to Bartley. There is no other possible explanation" (Artigas 1999, 52).

On the other hand, Artigas quotes a letter from Popper to Bartley of year 1982, where Popper unambiguously states his agreement with Bartley’s reply to Watkins’ and Post’s criticism of CCR:

“I have read your Pan-rationalism paper. Of course I agree. But I still don’t like the discussion… I agree very much with your tendency statement.” (Artigas 1999, 91)

What does this confusion mean?

 

2. CR vs. Irrationalism and Comprehensive (Uncritical) Rationalism

Popper has introduced a name 'critical rationalism' in The Open Society and Its Enemies to designate his general conception of rationality and rational attitude (rationalism). This conception is meant to be a viable alternative to both irrationalism and traditional rationalism, which Popper calls 'uncritical' and 'comprehensive'.

Comprehensive (uncritical) rationalism is described by the principle:  any assumption which cannot be supported either by argument or by experience is to be discarded”. (Later, Bartley has coined a designation for this demand – 'justificationism'.) Rationalism so understood was crushingly criticized by irrationalists, because its demand is both unfeasible (“Since all argument must proceed from assumptions, it is plainly impossible to demand that all assumptions should be based on argument”) and self-defeating (“since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or by experience, it implies that it should itself be discarded”) (Popper 1977, 230). In this, Popper agrees with irrationalists.

But, against irrationalists, Popper advocated rationalism as "faith in reason", the attitude which attaches high value to reason and arguments.[3] This attitude needs not to be identified with self-defeating principle of comprehensive (uncritical) rationalism.

Popper proposes to call the alternative − “modest and self-critical rationalism which recognizes certain limitations” (Popper 1977, 230) − 'critical rationalism'. Popper proposes that critical rationalists must

(1)   admit that the justificationist demand is unfeasible and self-defeating;

(2)   identify rationality not with the justificationist demand, but with the critical attitude "I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth";

(3)   admit that rational attitude is based on "irrational faith in reason", has its origin in "an irrational decision" (and, hence, to admit "to that extent, … a certain priority of irrationalism”). (Popper 1977, 231-232)

The last point is what made Bartley to charge CR with fideism and that it "seems to operate within a justificationist context foreign to the dominant themes of his {Popper’s} own thought" (Bartley 1984, 104).

3. Bartley’s solution to the Problem of Limits of Rationality

Bartley proposed comprehensively critical rationalism (CCR) as a solution for the problem of limits of rationality. The problem is: asserted by many philosophers logical necessity to dogmatize some 'basic' positions (make them exempt from criticism) to avoid justificatory infinite regress or vicious circle.

CCR is nothing but refutation of the following "fideist" contention:

(F)    As any attempt to demonstrate truth of any position involves us in infinite regress or vicious circle, we have no choice but to commit themselves to some “basic” positions and principles, and then use them in justifications and criticisms of other positions. Such commitment means that “basic” positions and principles are accepted dogmatically, as such that 1) can’t be justified and need no justification and 2) can’t be criticized (there can be nothing to criticize them with, for they are basic); are exempt from criticism.

This contention is what Bartley calls "the retreat to commitment".

Bartley contends that (F) is mistaken as far as criticism is concerned. He agrees with F that we can’t 'justify' (in the sense of demonstrating truth, or even high probability) anything as demanded by justificationism, and, so, must accept some (many) positions without justification. (Hence, all other positions aren’t justified as justificationism demands; they may be 'justified' only relative to some unjustified positions.) But, contrary to F, Bartley contends that this does not mean that we must dogmatize something, make some positions exempt from criticism. We can hold all our beliefs, however basic, open to (not exempt from) criticism. I.e. we can consider all our beliefs as tentative, admitting that possibly we are mistaken and that critical discussion can reveal this mistake; and we can be willing to enter into such discussions to find out our mistakes and eliminate them.

4. CCR vs. CR?

Bartley agrees with Popper’s criticism of uncritical (comprehensive) rationalism. But he interprets CR itself as conception of rationality which finally appeals to commitment. To support this interpretation he quotes the fragment from The Open Society and Its Enemies in which "Popper’s fideism is prominently displayed":

whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, without reasoning, some proposal or decision, or belief, or habit, or behaviour, which therefore in its turn must be called ‘irrational’. Whatever it may be, we can describe it as an irrational faith in reason. …the fundamental rationalist attitude is based upon an irrational decision, or upon faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We are free to choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, and its basis in an irrational decision (and so far, a certain priority of irrationalism).” (quot. by Bartley 1984, 104)[4]

Generally, Bartley uses name 'critical rationalism' to signify different conceptions of rationality (he discusses under this name conceptions of Alfred Ayer, Morton White and Karl Popper) which, on his view, have in common the following points:

"(1) They concede that rationality is limited in the sense that some matters, such as the principles and standards of rationality, cannot be justified… (2) They claim that this concession is unimportant, or at least not important enough to give any consolation to irrationalism. (3) If challenged, they tend to ground or justify rationalist position in personal or social commitment to standards which are beyond challenge." (Bartley 1984, 97)

Bartley clearly accepts (1) and (2), and the strengthen (1) by emphasizing that nothing can be justified as demanded by justificationism. So, Bartley’s criticism of CR is about (3). But it is far from obvious that Popper was guilty of (3). Popper didn’t write that rationalist position is grounded in personal or social commitment to standards which are beyond challenge. Also, Popper disagreed that his statement that rationality is based on faith in reason is "fideist". As he did explain in Kyoto:

“Critical Rationalism … is not a theory, therefore it is also not a faith in the sense of fideism. Now how does fideism, according to Bartley, … come in? This {Critical Rationalism} is an attitude which I recommend to my readers in my book. … If I recommend this attitude to my readers, I must believe in the possible goodness of this attitude. This is the end of it. Belief in English is also called faith, and faith is the same word, the same root, as fideism. But while for fideist fideism is very important and is written with a capital F so to speak, it is a philosophical thesis… My critical rationalism is an answer to fideism. It is not a philosophical thesis, it admits that in the end we may really not know… And in spite of knowing so little, I do recommend this attitude, at least for trial to my readers. But I must say and admit, why do I do so? Because it is a good attitude to try out or even adopt. … Very important here is what critical discussion means. … What is being discussed are theories, propositions and so on. Critical Rationalism is only open-mindedness to discuss these things… Fideism doesn’t come in. Only my belief that it is a good attitude to try out, or perhaps to adopt, but fideism is the thesis that all our theories, all our opinions must be ultimately based on faith. I hope you see that these two things are totally different.” (Artigas 1999, 30-31)

I have omitted from this quotation two sentences which look like making moral attitudes exempt from critical discussion. I will discuss them later. For a while, let us suppose, that when proposing CR Popper did mean by "irrational faith in reason" only the belief that reason is a good thing, though this belief can’t be correctly "justified" ("supported either by argument or by experience") because any attempt to justify it would be begging the question (appeal to argument or experience makes sense only if we have already adopted rationalist attitude that arguments and experience are to be believed). Suppose, by "irrational faith in reason" Popper did not mean that this faith is to be dogmatic, exempt from critical discussion.

It is to be remarked that in this sense it is true that not only rationalism, but “all our opinions must be ultimately based on faith”, and this faith may be described as “irrational” (though I think it would be better described as “extra-rational”) in the sense that it is not “justified” or supported by further arguments. Critical rationalists (as well as pancritical) must admit it, as well as irrationalists-fideists. The principal difference is that for critical rationalists this faith is tentative and open to critical discussion faith-belief, while for fideist it is dogmatic, exempt from critical discussion Faith.

If this is Popper’s meaning, it is astonishing that Popper and Bartley failed to attain full mutual understanding and agreement on the problem discussed. Both could do better than they did.

Popper could make more essential corrections to chapter 24 of The Open Society and Its Enemies, which really would make his position stronger and more consistent. He would need only to redescribe 'uncritical' rationalism not as 'comprehensive' but as 'justificationist' (for, as Bartley argued, critical rationalism can be comprehensive in its own terms, and Popper himself, in Addendum to forth edition, have approved “the principle that everything is open to criticism (from which this principle itself is not exempt)”) and to replace in the fragment which provoked most Bartley’s criticisms 'irrational' with 'unjustified'.

Bartley would do better if he didn’t oppose CCR to CR but presented it as a correction to some "unhappy and misleading formulations" of CR in The Open Society and Its Enemies[5] and as critical rationalist solution to the problem of limits of rationality. And he would do better if he didn’t mind to Popper’s “retaining the old terminology – "critical rationalism", for instance”, – for Popper had good reasons to defend this name, and it was exactly fitting to Bartley’s own aim of separating justification and criticism; while the adjective 'comprehensive' could be attached whenever in was needed to emphasize comprehensiveness and self-subsumption of critical (≡rational) attitude. To Bartley’s credit, in his latest book, Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth, published in the year of his death, 1990, he did exactly this.

 

5. Are Attitudes Open to Critical Discussion?

In the previous big quotation I have omitted two sentences which bring back the confusion. For in them Popper seems to say that moral attitudes are exempt from critical discussion. And this, surely, contradicts CCR. These sentences are:

"An attitude cannot be formulated in form of sentence, a thesis, a definition or anything like that, but one can believe that this attitude, for example, makes friends of people rather than enemies. … Critical discussion means discussing not attitude or such things, but problems, and solutions of these problems, therefore theories, propositions, positions and so on." (Artigas 1999, 30-31)

How are we to understand these statements? As for first sentence, Popper surely couldn’t mean that “an attitude cannot be formulated in form of sentence, a thesis, a definition or anything like that”. As he did recommend some attitudes (for example, critical rationalism), he could not do this without formulating those attitudes “in form of sentence, a thesis, a definition or something like that”. I conjecture that Popper did mean by first sentence that we may hold some attitude without formulating it.

Now if some attitude is explicitly stated (formulated) and recommended for adoption, it is as well open to critical discussion as any other statement, theory or proposition. Recommending the attitude A for adoption equals to supposition that A is good (better than all alternatives known). Now, you can be questioned why you think that A is good. You may just state: I think A good just because it seems to me so. But probably it will be very unconvincing. To convince, you may propose some reasons. You opponents, in their turn, can propose some reasons why they think A is not good or why they think that some alternative B is better. May be, they will succeed to convince you and you change your attitude. Or, otherwise, you can find their reasons unconvincing and explain (give reasons) why you think so. And so on. But it is exactly how any critical discussion (about any “theories, propositions, positions and so on”) goes.

Surely, as Popper emphasized in Kyoto, it is well possible that it may not lead to agreement. But this, again, is a general situation with any critical discussion. Really, as a matter of fact, we are usually more likely to arrive, as result of critical discussion, to agreement in the case of factual statements (theories) than in the case of moral statements (attitudes). But logical situation is the same. In whatever case, there is no final "justification", and nothing to guarantee final agreement. You may always disagree and you may always find reasons to do so.

Really, you can always present critical discussion of moral attitude as if you are not arguing in favour of some attitude against alternative attitudes, but only explore the consequences of accepting each of alternatives, and leave for readers to make their choice. Here are attitudes A, B, C, and this is what follows from A, B, C; here are criticisms of A, B, C, and here are possible answers to these criticisms; now it is for you to judge which is better. But, again, it is a general situation with any critical discussion. You can always make the same with any “theories, propositions, positions and so on”. Here are alternative theories A, B, C, and this is what follows from A, B, C; here are criticisms of A, B, C, and here are possible answers to these criticisms; now it is for you to judge which is really the case.

 

So, as far as I see it, there is nothing so special about moral attitudes which would make them improper objects for critical discussion. And, really, Popper’s own works, such as The Open Society and Its Enemy are very much critical discussions of moral attitudes, such as rationalism, irrationalism, liberalism, authoritarianism etc. Moreover, at the end of the speech in Kyoto Popper had made another statement which seems hardly consistent with the view that moral attitudes aren’t proper objects for critical discussion: “Now ethical discussions … I felt that in all moral matters one should never be abstract.”[6] (Artigas 1999, 32-33)

So, there seem to be deplorable ambitendency, vacillations in Popper’s view about critical discussion of moral attitudes, and this may be a reason why Bartley had charged critical rationalism with a tendency “to ground or justify rationalist position in personal or social commitment to standards which are beyond challenge".

 

6. Bartley’s Criticism of Popper’s Solution to Fries’ Trilemma

One subsidiary point, on which Bartley did criticize Popper, is Popper’s proposed solution to Fries’ trilemma.

 

Fries’ trilemma can be considered as a particular case of the problem of limits of rationality.[7] It concerns with the problem of "justification" of statements of science. Fries posed this problem in the form of trilemma “dogmatism vs. infinite regress vs. psychologism”:

either (1) we accept a statement dogmatically, without justification

or (2) we try to justify it by other statements and get involved into infinite regress

or (3) justification is based on "immediate knowledge" of perceptual experience which need no further justification.

Popper’s solution is that scientific theories aren’t "justified", but tested by "basic statements"; these testings are attempts of refutation; if the theory passes all such attempts up to present moment it is (tentatively) accepted as true.

Now the question is: how about "basic statements" themselves? Popper answer is that any "basic statements" can be tested itself; so there is no natural ultimate foundation of "immediate knowledge"; to avoid infinite regress we need to stop somewhere; and we stop on such observational statements on which we agree. This have something in common with all three options of trilemma: 1) our choice of stopping points id "unjustified" ("dogmatism"); 2) there is potential infinite regress, for any basic statements can always, if need be, be tested further; 3) basic statements are suggested by perceptual experience and may even be called "immediate knowledge" ("psychologism"). Elements of all three options become innocuous when tempered by a stipulation: "basic statements" can always, if needed, be subjected to further testing; but we need not really test them if we see no need.

"Dogmatism" becomes innocuous – and not really dogmatism – because we aren’t dogmatic about "basic statements"; though we accept them without justification, we keep them open for further testing. Infinite regress becomes innocuous, for it is only potential, not actual: we can make testing of "basic statements" infinite, but we needn’t. "Psychologism" becomes innocuous because we admit that "immediate knowledge" of perceptual experience is fallible, and though it needs no "justification", it may be tested and revised in the light of this testing.

As above described, Popper’s solution of Fries’ "trilemma" is quite in agreement with Bartley’s solution of the problem of limits of rationality: basic statements aren’t "justified", but are held open to critical discussion. But, Popper describes this solution in terms that provoke Bartley’s vigorous criticism:

“…Popper concedes that basic statements are accepted dogmatically. He goes on to explain that the scientist must, through a free act, decide by agreement to accept basic statements as satisfactory and sufficiently tested. Such a decision is necessary, he argues, for otherwise, unless we reach a statement which we decide to accept, our test will have led nowhere. Thus "It is our decisions which settle the fate of theories" (p.108). Popper also concedes a similarity to conventionalism here, as well as a difference, in that the conventionalist tends to accept universal, not singular statements by agreement – and does so for reasons of aesthetics, not of testability.” (Bartley 1984, 213)

Bartley qualifies all three Popper’s "concessions" – to dogmatism, infinite regress and psychologism – as “unnecessary and extremely misleading”. But he explains this judgment only about the first:

“The first step in Popper’s reply to Fries sounds suspiciously like the dogmatic justification by decision or commitment which is familiar in fideism and in various forms of irrationalism and existentialism, and which I have challenged throughout this book.” (Bartley 1984, 214)

Next, Bartley discusses Popper’s answer, in Replies to My Critics, to Alfred Ayer’s objection that “such decisions may be arbitrary – which possibility, of course, bring back the specter of irrationality.” (Bartley 1984, 214) Bartley describes Popper’s answer as "quite unclear" and self-contradictory. Bartley points out that Popper through 5 pages makes 4 statements which seem to contradict one another: first Popper writes that the assumption that every decision or convention must be arbitrary is mistaken (p.1110); on the next page he writes that decisions he discusses may be called arbitrary, but aren’t “totally arbitrary” (p.1111); after yet three pages he states that decisions on the acceptance or rejection of proposition involve “no element of arbitrariness at all”; and on the same page states that decisions about acceptance of basic statements are “somewhat arbitrary” (p.1114). (Bartley 1984, 214)

This seems very confusing. But, really, there is not so much confusion in Popper’s article as Bartley sees. If we check the text, we will see that on p.1111 Popper distinguishes arbitrariness “from a purely logical point of view” and arbitrariness in a wider sense; then Popper gives some scientifically important examples and concludes:

“In all theses cases, the decision may be called "arbitrary" in the logical sense mentioned; but it is far from being "totally arbitrary": in all these cases it is motivated by search for truth.” (Popper 1974, 1111)

On p.1114 Popper writes about some decisions which, from his viewpoint, involve “no element of arbitrariness at all”, and about some other decisions, which are “somewhat arbitrary” (Popper 1974, 1114). So, confusion is not in Popper’s article, but in Bartley’s exposition of it. But Bartley misattributes this confusion to “Popper’s unfortunate tendency to demand convention or irrational decision whenever some point is reached which cannot be justified”. (Bartley 1984, 214)

Now let me discuss what have provoked Bartley’s criticism at first instance – Popper’s description of his solution of Fries’ trilemma in The Logic of Scientific Discovery.

L   “…Popper concedes that basic statements are accepted dogmatically.” (Bartley 1984, 213)

It is important to understand in what sense Popper concedes it. As Fries identifies "dogmatism" with acceptance of a statement without justification, Popper’s solution (just as well as Bartley’s solution of the problem of limits of rationality) is "dogmatism" in this sense. But it is not dogmatism in a more usual sense – of holding some positions as dogmas, exempt from critical discussion. Surely, Popper could (and possibly better would) explain this explicitly. But it is impossible to explain everything which can be possibly misunderstood.

L   “He goes on to explain that the scientist must, through a free act, decide by agreement to accept basic statements as satisfactory and sufficiently tested.” (Bartley 1984, 213)

Again, we need to consider what exactly Popper says, in what context and, hence, what he means. Let us begin with "decide through a free act". What Popper really writes is:

“And I differ from the positivist in holding that basic statements are not justifiable by our immediate experiences, but are, from the logical point of view, accepted by an act, by a free decision. (From the psychological point of view this may perhaps be a purposeful and well-adapted reaction.)” (Popper 2002, ……)

I think the key phrase here is "from the logical point of view" (as distinct from “the psychological point of view”). I think that Popper’s statement that “basic statements … from the logical point of view, accepted by an act, by a free decision” is just unhappy formulation to mean: “acceptance of basic statements is not logically forced”.

Now about “agreement to accept basic statements as satisfactory and sufficiently tested”. Popper’s explanation that we stop with testing of basic statements when we are satisfied and when we reach an agreement is really absolutely innocuous and sensible, and has nothing to do with conventionalism. It may be called “consensualism”, for agreement about acceptance of basic statements is not arbitrary convention; it is consensus of opinions as to what is observed. If scientists agree on this point, then basic statements may be accepted (in Bartley’s terms, as "unproblematic"), and we may need no further testing. If they disagree, then further testing is required. The same with “sufficiently tested”. If all scientists agree that a hypothesis was “sufficiently tested” then they may, for a while, stop testing and devote their time to other problems. If some aren’t satisfied and think that testing was insufficient, they continue testing.

L   {Popper writes that} “…otherwise, unless we reach a statement which we decide to accept, our test will have led nowhere...” (Bartley 1984, 213)

Surely, if we accept no basic statement, we have nothing to test theories with.

So, for a while, Bartley’s criticism of Popper’s solution to Fries’ trilemma seems to miss the mark.

 

7. "Decisions" Which are Not Decisions but Judgments

In a sense, Bartley may be right in his criticizing “Popper’s unfortunate tendency to demand convention or irrational decision whenever some point is reached which cannot be justified” (Bartley 1984, 214). But, on my view, it is not so much "unfortunate tendency to demand" as unfortunate tendency to describe as conventions and decisions what would be better described as agreement-consensus and judgements. And I may agree with Bartley that that unfortunate talk may "sound suspiciously like the dogmatic justification by decision or commitment which is familiar in fideism and in various forms of irrationalism", − though its real meaning is quite different.

This is connected with the point made by A.Musgrave in the article "Can I Decide What to Believe?" (Musgrave 2009) and by R.S.Percival in the book The Myth of Closed Mind (Percival 2012). The point is: we never do – and can’t – decide what to believe; our beliefs aren’t matter of our decisions. If I don’t believe that X is the case, I can’t decide that from now (or from tomorrow) on I will believe that X is the case, and fulfil this decision. Our beliefs are a matter of evidences and arguments which persuade us into believing some things and disbelieving some other things.

Our adoptions and rejections of basic statements, scientific theories and other positions is believing them to be true/false (or, in the case of scientific theories, it may be believing that they are the best/not the best approximations to truth, comparing with known alternatives).[8] So, I think that, our adoptions and rejections of hypotheses (or, in Miller’s terms "classifying" them as true or false) would be better described not as "decisions", but as (logically unforced) judgements.

The same with "conventions" and "agreements". Scientists needn’t make conventions about acceptance of basic statements or scientific theories; they reach (or not reach) an agreement-consensus, as a matter of what they believe to be the case.

This is applicable also to moral attitudes, which are beliefs about what is morally good/bad. So, Popper’s statement that “the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith – from faith in reason”, and that rationalism has “its origin in an irrational decision” is a misdescription which is to be corrected by replacing “an act of faith” with “a state of belief” and “irrational decision” with “extra-rational judgement”.

If Bartley’s criticism of Popper was aimed at replacement of talk in terms of "conventions" and "decisions" with talk in terms of "agreement-consensus" and "judgements", I would agree. But, this is not Bartley’s proposition.

 

8. Can We Do Without Acceptances and Rejections? Conjecturing "X" and Conjecturing That X

Bartley’s proposition is different. He piles together "decisions, agreements, conventions, acceptance, and justification" and proposes to get rid of them all. In particulars, observational reports to play the role of "basic statements" need not “to be backed up by "decisions" and "acceptances"”. All we need is "to state how theory and report stand, hypothetically, in relation to one another" (Bartley 1984, 216):

“The test statements are intended to be hypothetical, and criticizable and revisable, just like everything else in the system; there is no justification, no proof, no fixed point anywhere. There is nothing "basic" about basic statements… If such statements happen to be incompatible with a theory, then the theory is false relative to them; and they are false relative to the theory. There is no question of theory proving reports wrong, or reports proving theory wrong. Both could be wrong: neither is "basic".” (Bartley 1984, 215)

And Bartley generalizes:

“Any theory is refuted only relative to critical arguments incompatible with it, which are themselves open to criticism by testing of their own consequences. This in turn are criticizable forever.” (Bartley 1984, 216)

I contend that though in purely logical sense this is right, it is far from making cognitive judgements (acceptances and rejections) redundant. On the contrary, we need cognitive judgements exactly because pure logics can say us nothing about real truth and falsity, only about “relative falsity” which is not falsity but contradiction.

Though it can be said that statements X and Y are false relative one another, – this is just brain-muddling relativistic way of saying that X and Y contradict one another, – and this says nothing about which one is really true and which is really false. But all cognition, science included, are aimed at finding out what is – and what isn’t – the case really; what is really true and really false. The questions of contradiction (“relative falsity”) are subservient; they are means, not aims of cognition.

In other words, as David Miller writes:

“Without such decisions, not just in the case of basic statements, but throughout our knowledge, our criticisms are impotent, leaving their trace only in metalinguistic reports to the effect that this has been criticized by that. We need more if we are to accomplish (even fallibly) the task of separating truth from falsehood.” (Miller, 93)

 

Really, Bartley makes some remarks which can be taken as proposing substitutes for cognitive "decisions". First, he makes an appeal to “reports unproblematic at the moment”. Second, he states that “one may go on to conjecture about which of the reports are accurate: but this is a conjecture, not a decision, and may be tested accordingly”. Both can be generalized: first, as an appeal to statements unproblematic at the moment; second, as suggestion that conjecture about truth of some set of statements is not a "decision", and may be subjected to further critical discussion. I contend that, far from making acceptances and rejections redundant, both are impossible without such cognitive judgements.

As for the first, there is nothing in statements (including empirical reports) themselves which makes them unproblematic at the moment. It is just our taking them as unproblematic, – and this is acceptance, logically unforced judgement. Really, whenever we discover that two sets of statements are in collision, logically both are problematized in the light of each other.

As for the second, there is much of ambiguity in the use of the word "conjecture". Its meaning may be either non-judgemental, when we conjecture some hypothesis without making judgement as to whether it is true, or judgemental, when "conjecture" already incorporates tentative judgement (acceptance/rejection). I propose to distinguish these meaning by designations conjecturing “X” and conjecturing that X.

Now suppose that conjecture is non-judgemental conjecturing “X”, i.e. doesn’t incorporate acceptances/rejections. In this sense, every conjecture comes in a pair with its negation, counter-conjecture. Suppose there is conjecture (X) that A is true. This provides us with counter-conjecture (not-X) that A is false. To ignore not-X would be just uncritical (without even taking into account its alternative) acceptance of X. X and not-X are on equal terms. It wouldn’t help to supplement X and not-X with the meta-conjecture Y that X, rather then not-X is true. For if Y is non-judgemental, then it comes in pair with not-Y – the meta-conjecture that not-X, rather then X is true. Now we have alternatives of X and not-X, Y and not-Y (and we can produce further hypotheses and counter-hypotheses on higher meta-levels ad-infinitum). If we make any preference, it will be (tentative) acceptance on one side and (tentative) rejection on the other. If we don’t make any preference, then all we can do is just to amass endlessly all possible non-self-contradictory statements and their negations without making any (however tentative) judgments about their truth. It is hard to imagine more senseless occupation. And such occupation would surely have nothing to do with science or knowledge generally.

But really it is obvious that "conjecture about which of the reports are accurate", or conjecture about truth/falsity of statements is the second kind of "conjecture". Such conjecturing that X, far from making cognitive judgements (acceptances/rejections) redundant, is itself nothing but tentative cognitive judgement, tentative acceptance/rejection of statement (report) that X is the case.

Now about the remark that conjectures “may be tested accordingly”. Without unjustifiable cognitive judgements (acceptances/rejections), such testing can do nothing except adding new report R in pair with its negation not-R, – with no possible preference. And this is absolutely useless.

 

9. Rationality and Extra-rational Judgements

Critical thinkers … question and test the beliefs that others take for granted. In so doing, they oftentimes clarify how some of their beliefs are based upon others. But this basing of beliefs one upon another must ultimately end. And if you are a critical thinker, then you will, somewhere in the course of your tests, inevitably come upon statements that you believe for no other reason than that they seem true – to you. In such a case, it would be more accurate to say not that such statements are justified, but that they seem, in your judgment, to be true. But if this is true, then the very least that a critical thinker should do is to say so.

Mark Notturno (Notturno 1999, 147)

The need of logically unforced judgements (acceptances, rejections) is not something peculiar to “basic statements”; it is general, omnipresent for cognition – or belief-acquiring – about anything.

Cognition is selective process aimed at retaining better (supposedly true or well nearing the truth) propositions and declining worse ones. But such selection is never logically forced. It is always (tentative) acceptance of some propositions for true and (tentative) rejection of other propositions as false. As ultimate justification is never possible, ultimate refutation is never possible too. Logically, without preliminary acceptance of some positions, all positions are neither justifiable, nor refutable.

Reasoning, by itself, as a matter of pure logics, can’t demonstrate that some statement is true or false, except in relatively unimportant cases of tautologies or self-contradictory statements. Neither can it demonstrate how probable (in the objective sense of probability calculus) is truth of whatever non-tautilogical and non-selfcontradictory statement. What reasoning does is giving us deeper and fuller understanding of the meaning of the statement under discussion – what it implies (and, hence, what it forbids). It leaves to us to judge (tentatively) if this statement – with all its implications we know about – is true or false. These – truth/falsity attributing – judgements are made without providing further reason, – there is “no other reason than that they seem true – to you”. In this sense, they may be called irrational, though I would prefer calling them extra-rational (extra-logical) – for they are not opposing (defying) reason (as irrationalism does) but supplement it. They are extra-rational in the sense that they are not result of reasoning, but no effective reasoning can do without them.

This must be clear on considering a general logical situation.

 

Suppose that we have N (two or more) alternative (i.e., mutually contradictory) statements. (They may be complex statements-theories, consisting of a number of simpler statements.) We need to make judgement which one is true, or to be accepted, or preferred. To make this judgement as reasonable as possible, we look for arguments and evidences which support some alternatives against other. So, we supplement each initial statement (theory) with statements of all arguments and evidences we can find which support this initial statement (theory) against its alternatives. This will give us N sets of statements which are logically mutually exclusive. How are we to decide which of them is to be accepted (even if tentatively) as true? Logics gives no answer. It can’t make a judgement for us.

It can be said that we can decide by following some methodological rules, but such answer doesn’t really solve the problem – it just shifts it on methodological level. For we can propose different, alternative methodological rules; and we can supplement each with arguments supporting it against its alternatives. Now instead of N sets of statements centered around N alternative initial statements, we have to do with M sets of statements centered around M alternative methodological rules. 

 

We can redescribe this situation in “negative” terms of criticisms:

1) We can sensibly use some statements as reasons, arguments, criticisms etc. (let us signify them as R1) only on supposition of their soundness, i.e. (besides validity of inference) truth of their premises. (If you suppose that statement S is false or some argument A is unsound, you can’t honestly use them to criticize other statements.)

2) This supposition of truth, soundness is either unreasoned (unsupported by any reasons) or reasoned, supported by some further (deeper) reasons, arguments, criticisms (let us signify them as R2).

3) We can sensibly use R2 as reasons, arguments, criticisms only on supposition of their soundness (truth of their premises), and this supposition is either unreasoned or reasoned, supported by some further (deeper) reasons (R3).

4) In the same manner we move from R3 to R4, from R4 to R5  etc. As in the real process of cognition this regress can’t be infinite, it stops somewhere – on some assumptions (premises) we judge to be true without any further reasons.

 

We are never logically forced to reject a statement (theory), whatever criticisms are brought against it (except relatively uninteresting cases when statements under discussion are self-contradictory).

Claim for truth of any statement as well as claim for soundness of any argument (truth of its premises) is just as hypothetical as any other, and can’t be demonstrated logically. So, whenever the statement S runs against some criticism C (which is nothing but set of statements), this doesn’t mean that S is false; this means the alternative:

either C is sound and statement S is refuted by it,

or statement S is true and criticism C is unsound (some of its premises is/are false).

And it is for you to judge which is the case. Logically, there is no reason whatever to prefer one over another, – except that one, rather then another “seem, in your judgment, to be true”. Or if you find some further reason, you merely add it on one or other scale of your judgemental balances. But balancing-judgement is still yours.

For example, suppose you find a reason R to favour criticism C rather then statement S. Now, statement S is opposed with augmented criticism C1=C+R. Though criticism is strengthened, logical situation remains the same as it was:

either C1 is sound and statement S is refuted by it,

or statement S is true and criticism C1 is unsound (some of its premises is/are false).

And it is for you to judge which is the case. Logically, there is no reason whatever to prefer one over another, – except that one, rather then another “seem, in your judgment, to be true”. Or if you find some further reason, you merely add it on one or other scale of your judgemental balances. But balancing-judgement is still yours.

Each statement used in criticism is hypothetical, unjustifiable, possibly false, criticisable by other statements which are as well hypothetical, unjustifiable, possibly false. As far as we keep inside the realm of logics and abstain from unreasoned ("unjustified") judgements (preferences, acceptances) we can’t get anywhere. All we can do is, as Bartley proposed in the fragments criticized above, just state that X is refuted relative to Y, and Y is refuted relative to X, without any (however tentative) preferential judgement: if X is true rather than Y or vice versa. Now, to repeat what was said in previous section, this would replace cognition with endless and senseless occupation of amassing non-self-contradictory statements and their negations without making any (however tentative) truth-judgments, without any attempt to find out what is true and what is false. In D.Miller’s words, this would make all criticisms “impotent, leaving their trace only in metalinguistic reports to the effect that this has been criticized by that. We need more if we are to accomplish (even fallibly) the task of separating truth from falsehood”.

This “more” we need are judgements resulting in acceptance/rejection or preference. They are extra-rational, unreasoned in the sense that no further reason is provided. Reasoning starts with such tentative extra-rational judgements and (temporarily) ends with them.

It is to be emphasized, that such extra-rational judgements needn’t be irrational in Bartley’s meaning of commitment, exempting from criticism. Though we can’t avoid accepting some positions without providing further reasons, this doesn’t mean that we have to consider such positions as ultimate, uncriticizable (exempt from criticism), that we need to make commitment to some such positions. On my view, Bartley was absolutely right in his criticism of commitment and in his defence of the view that we can keep all our views open to criticism.

The deepest level of positions accepted on unreasoned, extra-rational judgements is not given once and forever, it is just the deepest level we have dug down to. It is possible, that if we continue digging, we will get deeper. It is also possible that we will be unable to get deeper. We never know how deep we can dig. But however deep we dig, we have to stop somewhere at least for a while, and on this level our cognitive judgements are unavoidably unreasoned, extra-rational.

 Really, Bartley states nearly the same in The Retreat to Commitment:

“… pancritical rationalist, like other people, holds countless unexamined presuppositions and assumptions, many of which may be false... When one belief is subjected to criticism, many others, of course, have to be taken for granted – including those with which the criticism is being carried out. The latter are used as the basis of criticism not because they are themselves justified or beyond criticism, but because they are unproblematical at present. … We stop criticizing – temporarily – not when we reach uncriticizable authorities, but when we reach positions against which we can find no criticisms.[9] If criticisms of these are raised later, the critical process then continues.” (Bartley 1984, 121-122)

I think that this explanation is good enough. But it would be mistaken to consider this as doing away with extra-rational cognitive judgements (acceptances/rejections). As I have already remarked, there is a problem with “unproblematic” (even if “for a present”) beliefs. Logically, the situation with problematization is the same as with refutation: whenever we discover the conflict between beliefs or statements, both sides of conflict can be considered problematic. If X conflicts with Y, and we consider Y as unproblematic, then we consider X refuted (successfully criticized). But we can always do the other way round: to consider X as unproblematic and Y as false. Logically, there is no forcedness to prefer one way over another. To repeat, there is nothing in statements themselves which makes them intrinsically unproblematic. It is we who consider some statements unproblematic while other problematic. And this is a judgement (acceptance) of the same sort as discussed above. So, we can’t do without unreasoned, extra-rational judgements (acceptances).

 

10. The Problem of Arbitrariness

Some philosophers infer that, as such judgements ("decisions") aren’t logically forced (justified) they are arbitrary. As we have seen, Bartley did attribute to Popper “confusion” about this arbitrariness, but he seems to fail to attend to Popper’s distinction between arbitrariness “from a purely logical point of view” and arbitrariness in a wider sense: what “may be called "arbitrary" in the logical sense” may be “far from being "totally arbitrary"” if it “is motivated by search for truth.” (Popper 1974, 1111)

The problem with “arbitrariness” arises out of the dilemma: either "decision" is logically forced (justified) or it is arbitrary. I suggest that the dilemma is spurious. The choice between logical forcedness (ultimate justification) and arbitrariness is not logically necessary. There may be – and, I suppose, is – third alternative. Cognitive judgements (acceptances/rejections, "decisions") made in sincere search for truth are neither logically forced (justified) nor arbitrary. Neither they are irrational if rationality is understood (as Both Popper and Bartley proposed) as openness to criticisms.

D.Miller, when criticizing Bartley proposition to get rid of “decisions” (acceptances), makes the same point:

“…there is no question of such a decision’s being irrational … On the contrary, such a decision – which is always taken in the light of what we think is true – is itself open to criticism, emendation, and even reversal... … there is no danger that the decisions we make about what to accept or reject are arbitrary. They are constrained throughout by our desire to discover the truth, to separate it from falsehood.” (Miller, 92-93)

I quite agree, but think that this explanation needs further explanation. Surely, if we accept, as convention, Bartley’s proposition to define rationality as openness to criticism, on this definition "decisions" open to criticism are not irrational. But this is not enough. Definitions never solve real problems. We can formulate the problem without using terms 'rational' and 'irrational'. The problem is:

As all criticisms are based on cognitive judgements which are on the deepest level unavoidably unreasoned, extra-rational, how openness to criticism does away with the “danger that the decisions we make about what to accept or reject are arbitrary”?

My answer is: There is no guarantee against such danger. Rather, we run necessary, unavoidable risk of cognitive judgement-making under supposition-hope that this process, when tempered by critical discussion, has sort of inherent tendency toward truth; under supposition-hope that eventually it turns out conductive to truth.

On certain suppositions we can hope that our cognitive judgements ("decisions") are not arbitrary, but truth-tended. Now I will attempt to make these suppositions explicit.

 

To start with, let us consider some spectrum of "decisions" which grade from a less to a more reasoned.

Suppose I have a statement S, and have to judge if it is true. How can I do it? And how can I make my judgement more reasoned?

The least reasoned way is to do without any reasons whatever. I can judge S true (or false) just because it seems true (or false) to me. I can call it extra-rational judgement or intuition or gut-feeling or informal understanding. [10]

Let us notice, that on Bartley’s definition, such judgment is not irrational, for it can be tentative, open to further criticism. (Really, most views we hold are acquired in such way, pre-critically, and are subjected – if subjected – to criticisms afterwards.) But, it can be properly called unreasoned and, in terms I propose, extra-rational.

Now, if we hold rational (critical) attitude, we hold our judgment (or its result – belief) open to criticism and possible revision. We consider various criticisms and make judgments on their soundness; we consider various criticisms on criticisms and make judgments on their soundness too, etc. As a result, after considering some multitude of criticisms and criticisms on criticisms and criticisms on criticisms on criticisms etc., we can possibly renounce our initial judgment or retain it as undamaged by criticisms or even as positively supported by some reasons. This process of critical reassessment of our initial (extra-rational) judgment necessarily involves great many other extra-rational judgments. So, it turns out that rational (critical) process is, necessarily, transition from belief based on single extra-rational judgement to belief based on the multitude of extra-rational judgements!

Generally, our reasoning – whether it is criticism or search for some positive, supporting reasons – is thoroughly permeated by extra-rational judgements.

In other words, development of knowledge is the process of research-interaction with the world, generating and exchanging new ideas and criticisms, making extra-rational judgements and their constant re-alignment with one another.

Now the question is: if this process gets us nearer the truth? The answer of (comprehensively) critical rationalist must be positive, though it is unjustifiable. It is belief based, directly or with some intermediaries, on extra-rational judgments.

So, (pan)critical rationalism implies some presuppositions about extra-rational judgments:

1) Extra-rational cognitive judgments, being necessary constituents of knowledge, though they aren’t logically forced, aren’t arbitrary either. They are conductive for truth. This truth-conductiveness isn’t to be taken for too much. It is neither guarantee nor high probability. It is enough if extra-rational cognitive judgments are (even if just a bit) more conductive to truth that purely arbitrary "decisions". It is enough if our cognitive judgments (what seems true to us) are, by and large, nearer the truth, then if they were replaced by "decisions" made by throwing coin and seeing if it falls on tails or heads.

2) Complex interaction (realignments) of many extra-rational cognitive judgements in the process of rational (critical) discussion is much more conductive for truth than isolated extra-rational cognitive judgments. The more intensive is rational (critical) discussion, the more truth-conductive it is.

3) There is nothing more conductive for truth at our disposal.

On my view, these presuppositions are inalienable for (comprehensively) critical rationalism, – if criticized, they stand (if criticisms fail) or fall (if criticisms succeed) together.

 

11. Conclusion

It is possible, that the tension and partial misunderstanding between Popper and Bartley was rooted in the lack of clear appreciation and explicit statement of the role of extra-rational judgements in cognition.

Popper did recognize the necessity of "irrational decisions" (which, on my view would be more adequately described as extra-rational moral judgments) as far as moral attitudes (including critical rationalism) are concerned. In epistemological context, he did recognize necessity of methodological decisions which are “arbitrary in purely logical sense”, but aren’t “totally arbitrary” in some wider sense. This, I think, is to be understood as: they are neither logically forced, nor arbitrary, but “motivated by search for truth” and, hopefully, conductive to truth. But he didn’t generalize these recognitions. If he did, he would notice the fact that what he calls "irrational decisions", as well as all other aspects of knowledge (beginning from construing our observational experiences into observational statements such as “The door is open”, “The apple is red”, “The needle of ammeter points at "6"”), are permeated with extra-rational cognitive judgments (including informal understanding). And he would notice that in this respect moral reasoning (which has to do with moral attitudes) is highly analogous with reasoning aimed at factual knowledge, science included.

He would see that, in the sense in which critical rationalism is based on “faith in reason”, all our theories, all our opinions must be ultimately based on some sort of faith-belief originated in unreasoned, extra-rational judgements. Such judgements are necessary prerequisites for any reasoning to start and to arrive at some (tentative) result (belief). Moral attitudes are saturated with extra-rational moral judgements in the same way as other theories and opinions are saturated with extra-rational cognitive judgements. And this is neither commitment nor irrationality in Bartley’s meaning, – for all those attitudes, theories, opinions can be held open to criticism.

Bartley attempted – and succeeded – to show that holding rational attitude needn’t be irrational (may be rational) on critical rationalism’s own terms. And Bartley did attempt – mistakenly – to get rid of "decisions, agreements, conventions, acceptance", whether moral or cognitive, piling them together with "justification".

Both Popper and Bartley fail to make explicit distinction between irrational as defying reason and extra-rational as that which is not result of reasoning (whether positive – justification or negative – criticism) but originates from some other source (human psychics in interaction with the world). Both don’t notice that this extra-rational is all-permeating, that it permeates all reasoning – whatever it is about.

 

Irrationalism as defying reason is a bad choice. But denying self-sufficiency of reason (as process of arguing) is right and has not to be labelled "irrationalism". Admitting that reason is not self-sufficient and needs unreasoned (extra-rational) judgements (suggested by senses, feelings, intuitions etc.) – for cognitive purposes as well as for moral attitudes – is not renouncing rationalism.

It is not the case that reason and unreason have to fight each other for domineering.

It is also not the case that reason and irrational has each its own domain proper.

The case is that both reason and extra-reasonable (feelings, intuitions, experiences, judgements) are unlimited (comprehensive) and they are complementary. They needn’t fight or expel each other; they are to cooperate everywhere and permeate each other.

It is cooperation and interpermeating of extra-reasonable (senses, feelings, intuitions, judgments) with reason which makes for civilised humanity. There is no pure reason. Reason without feelings and intuitions is dead abstraction or computer. Feelings and intuitions without reason make for barbarity and pre-human animal life. Due to reason, humans are more than beasts. Due to feelings and intuitions, humans are more than computers. Neither computer nor beast serves proper character for us to aspire.

We are to renounce search for proper delimitation between rational and irrational. There is no such delimitation, no separate realms proper for rational and irrational. We are to replace the picture of conflict of rational and irrational with that of cooperation of rational and extra-rational. Both reason and extra-rational are comprehensive. Reason is comprehensive in the meaning that we can hold all our views and attitudes open for critical examination and discussion. Extra-rational is comprehensive in the sense that all our reasoning is necessarily soaked with it. They are not to wage a war for frontiers, they are to cooperate throughout all our knowledge and life.

 

Bibliography

Agassi, J., 2012. Critical Rationalism, Comprehensive or Qualified: The Popper-Bartley Dispute. In G.Franco, ed., Der Kritische Rationalismus als Denkmethode und Lebensweise: Festscrhift zum 90. Geburtstag von Hans Albert. Klagenfurt: Kitab, 34-55

Artigas, M. 1999. The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s Theory of Knowledge. Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Wien: Peter Lang.

Bartley, W.W. 1984. The Retreat to Commitment. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Bartley, W.W., III. 1990. Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Collins, R., 1989, Sociology: proscience or antiscience?
American Sociological Review.
Volume 54, Issue I: 124-39.

Miller, D. 1994. Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Musgrave, A. 2009. "Can I Decide What to Believe?", in A.Musgrave, Secular Sermons.  Otago University Press.

Notturno, M. 1999. Science and the Open Society. Central European University Press.

Percival, R. S. 2012. The Myth of Closed Mind. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Popper, K. 1974. Replies to My Critics. In P.A.Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Popper, K. 1977. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge, 1977, vol.2

Popper, K. 1994. The Myth of Framework. London and New York: Routledge.

Popper K., 2002. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge.

Radnitzky G., 1993. In Defense of Self-Applicable Critical Rationalism. In G.Radnitzky, W.W.Bartley, III, eds., Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Wikipedia. W.W. Bartley, III // http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W.W._Bartley,_III

 

[Return to Dmitry Sepety’s Personal Page]



* I thank Joseph Agassi, Mark Notturno and Alan Musgrave for helpful comments and discussions on earlier draft of this article

[1] This is an account of event from Wikipedia:

“…at the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science at Bedford College, University of London, July 11–17, 1965... Bartley had presented a paper 'Theories of demarcation between science and metaphysics' and had attacked Popper in it sharply. He accused Popper of a positivist attitude in his early works and proposed that Popper's demarcation criterion was not as important as Popper thought. Popper took this as a personal attack, and Bartley took his reply as ignorant towards his criticism. Their friendship was not restored until 1974…”

And this is how Popper did explain it at Workshops in Kyoto, Japan, 1992:

"By criticism I always understood, and it was always understood among my pupils, that criticism cannot be a personal criticism. Criticism is a criticism of problems and proposed solutions to problems… Then Bartley, in the huge meeting, an international meeting, attacked me personally, and partly he attacked a thesis of mine, my proposed solution of the problem of demarcation which he attacked only by saying – not saying that my solution was false – but that my problem was unimportant. What shall one answer to such a thing? It was important for me and I had shown that it was important for Immanuel Kant, after all a great philosopher. Now if one says this problem is unimportant, therefore what I have done is nothing, and so on. All right, but it was a personal criticism, not one word in this talk of Bartley was he saying why he felt anything I had said was false." (Artigas 1999, 32)

[2] The silence itself Popper did explain as follows:

“I had made it a principle of mine not to discourage my pupils by criticizing them, except personally in a meeting of two people. There I would criticize them, but never in public. A principle which I carried through.” (Artigas 1999, 31)

[3] Popper defines rationalism as “an attitude that seeks to solve as many problems as possible by an appeal to reason, i.e. to clear thought and experience, rather than by an appeal to emotions and passions” (Popper 1977, 225). He describes it also “in terms of practical attitudes or behaviour”:

“…rationalism is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’. It is an attitude which does not lightly give up hope that by such means as argument and careful observation, people may reach some kind of agreement on many problems of importance; and that, even where their demands and their interests clash, it is often possible to argue about the various demands and proposals, and to reach – perhaps by arbitration – a compromise which, because of its equity, is acceptable to most, if not to all. In short, the rationalist attitude, or, as I may perhaps label it, the ‘attitude of reasonableness’, is very similar to the scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search for truth we need co-operation, and that, with the help of argument, we can in time attain something like objectivity.” (Popper 1977, 225)

Yet one important feature of rationalistic approach is that it “considers the argument rather than the person arguing” (Popper 1977, 226).

Popper also proposes to “distinguish between a true rationalism and a false or a pseudo-rationalism”:

“What I shall call the 'true rationalism' is … the awareness of one’s limitations, the intellectual modesty of those who know how often they err, and how much they depend on others even for this knowledge. It is the realization that we must not expect too much from reason; that argument rarely settles a question, although it is the only means for learning – not to see clearly, but to see more clearly than before.

What I shall call 'pseudo-rationalism' is the intellectual intuitionism… It is the immodest belief in one’s superior intellectual gifts, the claim to be initiated, to know with certainty, and with authority.” (Popper 1977, 227-228)

[4] In fourth edition Popper has made slight changes to this formulation, but they hardly meet Bartley’s criticism. The corrected formulation runs:

“whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, consciously or unconsciously, some proposal, or decision, or belief, or behaviour; an adoption which may be called ‘irrational’. Whether this adoption is tentative or leads to a settled habit, we may describe it as an irrational faith in reason. … the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith – from faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We may choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its origin in an irrational decision (and which, to that extent, admits a certain priority of irrationalism).” (Popper 1977, 231-232)

[5] G.Radnitsky, one of prominent Popperians who supported Bartley in discussions about comprehensiveness, took this stand:

“…from the context it is clear that "irrational decision" was merely an unhappy and misleading formulation… What Popper should have said about his position … is that the decision in question was "a nonrational decision".” (Radnitzky 1993, 302)

I think that it would be more correct to say that it is “extra-rational judgement” – for it is not decision at all (see section 7 “"Decisions" Which are Not Decisions but Judgments” below).

[6] Popper also had stated that this was one of reasons why he didn’t took part in discussions about comprehensiveness between Bartley and some other of Popper’s pupils: "the discussion was on extremely abstract level".

[7] By the way, Bartley did describe CCR as generalization of Popper’s falsificationism. I think it is mistaken description, for falsificationism is concerned with a very different problem (of induction) and very different logical situation. But I think it would be right to describe CCR as generalization of Popper’s solution to Fries’ trilemma.

[8] Really, it may be not the case with adoptions and rejections of scientific hypotheses by those scientists who support instrumentalism – the theory that scientific theories aren’t really true or false, that they are just more or less efficient instruments to produce predictions. But even instrumentalists about science can hardly extend instrumentalism beyond science on all beliefs.

[9] I think it is obvious that when saying that "we stop criticizing … when we reach positions against which we can find no criticisms", Bartley didn’t mean by 'criticism' of X any statement which contradicts X (such criticisms are always easily found for any X); surely, he did mean only plausible criticisms – those Ys which we (tend to) believe to be true. 

[10] In a way of acknowledgement. The conception of extra-rational judgements, as expounded in this article, was suggested to me, to a great extent, by Randall Collins’ formulation:

The notion of a complete and rigid formalization in a scientific theory is a chimera. There are informal concepts and intuitive leaps at several points. These intuitive or informal leaps … are not illegitimate. That is simply the way the world is. They don’t undermine our ability to have a science, for all sciences have these places where there are intuitive leaps. If physical scientists sometimes forget this and talk in crude positivistic terms as if they report “nothing but the facts”, that is because they have been successful at making the right intuitive leaps as their scientific procedures have cumulated, so that they now have workable models that they know intuitively how to apply to most of the things they study. …a successful science is possible even incorporating areas of fundamental uncertainty, dealt with by tacit and informal understandings. the best validated theory is the one maximally grounded to the empirical world via the various explanatory submodels it incorporates. An extreme, all-or-nothing empiricism is impossible; but a flexible empiricism, working with imprecisions and intuitive concepts where necessary, and making a great deal of room for theoretical work that ties things together, is a central part of science…(Collins, 128-129) (Italics mine.)