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The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
PARTIAL EXERPT from FULL AUTHORIZATION ACT
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself, Senator McCain, Bob Kerrey, Bob Smith, Larry Pressler, Chuck Robb, Tom Daschle, and Pat Leahy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry], for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Smith, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Robb, Mr. Daschle, and Mr. Leahy, proposes an amendment numbered 4055.
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Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle E of title VI add the following:
SEC. 643. PAYMENT TO VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS CAPTURED AND INTERNED BY NORTH VIETNAM.
(a) Payment Authorized.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall make a payment to any person who demonstrates that he or she was captured and incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after having entered into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pursuant to operations conducted under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor.
(2) No payment may be made under this Section to any individual who the Secretary of Defense determines, based on the available evidence, served in the Peoples Army of Vietnam or who provided active assistance to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam during the period 1958 through 1975.
(3) In the case of a decedent who would have been eligible for a payment under this section if the decedent had lived, the payment shall be made to survivors of the decedent in the order in which the survivors are listed, as follows:
(A) To the surviving spouse.
(B) If there is no surviving spouse, to the surviving children (including natural children and adopted children) of the decedent, in equal shares.
(b) Amount Payable.--The amount payable to or with respect to a person under this section is $40,000.
(c) Time Limitations.--(1) In order to be eligible for payment under this section, the claimant must file his or her claim with the Secretary of Defense within 18 months of the effective date of the regulations implementing this Section.
(2) Not later than 18 months after the Secretary receives a claim for payment under this section----
(A) the claimant's eligibility for payment of the claim under subsection (a) shall be determined; and
(B) if the claimant is determined eligible, the claim shall be paid.
(d) Determination and Payment of Claims.--(1) Submission and Determination of Claims. The Secretary of Defense shall establish by regulation procedures whereby individuals may submit claims for payment under this Section. Such regulations shall be issued within 6 months of the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) Payment of Claims. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the other affected agencies, may establish guidelines for determining what constitutes adequate documentation that an individual was captured and incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after having entered the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pursuant to operations conducted under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the total amount authorized to be appropriated under section 301, $20,000,000 is available for payments under this section. Notwithstanding Sec. 301, that amount is authorized to be appropriated so as to remain available until expended.
(f) Payment in Full Satisfaction of Claims Against United States.--The acceptance of payment by an individual under this section shall be in full satisfaction of all claims by or on behalf of that individual against the United States arising from operations under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor.
(g) Attorney Fees.--Notwithstanding any contract, the representative of an individual may not receive, for services rendered in connection with the claim of an individual under this Section, more than 10 percent of a payment made under this Section on such claim.
(h) No Right to Judicial Review.--All determinations by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to this Section are final and conclusive, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Claimants under this program have no right to judicial review, and such review is specifically precluded.
(i) Reports: (1) No later than 24 months after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the Congress on the payment of claims pursuant to this section.
(2) No later than 42 months after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a final report to the Congress on the payment of claims pursuant to this section.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this is an amendment that seeks to address yet another painful chapter in the long legacy of painful chapters with respect to Vietnam, and it specifically addresses what some might characterize as our own form of a bureaucratic Phoenix Program that sought to eliminate from existence a group of commandos who served faithfully during the war under our organizational effort and command effort.
This amendment would reimburse this group of commandos for their years of incarceration in North Vietnamese prisons while they served in the mutual cause with us in the war in Vietnam.
What the amendment seeks to do is to authorize $20 million for payment to Vietnamese personnel who infiltrated into North Vietnam to perform covert operations during the Vietnam era and who were captured and incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Under the amendment, a lump-sum payment of $40,000 would be provided to each claimant determined eligible by the Secretary of Defense, and I am pleased to say that the administration has worked very closely in designing this amendment and in signing off on it and now fully supports it, as do, I believe, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
Those of us who offer this amendment recognize that the United States worked with many Southeast Asian forces during the Vietnam war, but our intent here is to only single out for recognition the Vietnamese commandos who participated in a specific program, in OPLAN 34A and its predecessor, and who sought under that program to infiltrate into North Vietnam, who were captured and who were incarcerated in the process.
In designing guidelines for proof of eligibility for payments under this amendment, the Secretary of Defense is to take into account that these claimants, because of the war and the incarceration, may not have complete documentation proving eligibility. But it is our intent that the standard of proof here be set low enough to do justice in this situation.
Mr. President, 30 years ago, Vietnam presented us with a host of questions and difficult contradictions, and now in this situation, we find a new chapter that is a surprise for all of us. In many ways, this chapter is old because we have always known through the centuries that war is cruel. On the other hand, it is new because, as Americans, none of us have ever expected that we would allow something to happen that purposefully or inadvertently attacks or diminishes our own sense of honor.
The truth is that we sent heroic Vietnamese commandos into North Vietnam to do our bidding, risking their lives and even their families' lives, and then we left them there, denied their existence, and walked away leaving them to be imprisoned, tortured or killed.
So we are here today simply to right a wrong, to pay for an injustice and to seek fairness and put this still another disturbing chapter about Vietnam behind us.
These are the quick facts, and I will just run through them very, very quickly.
In the early days of the war, the United States and South Vietnamese Governments initiated a joint covert intelligence-gathering operation against North Vietnam, and recruited were commandos from among Vietnamese civilians and the
Armed Forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
The United States, through the CIA and later through the Defense Department, provided training and funding, including salaries, allowances, bonuses, and death benefits. Together, the United States and South Vietnamese officials determined where and when the commandos, who were organized into teams, would be infiltrated into North Vietnam. Many were dropped by parachute, but some were inserted by land or sea. Some also conducted counterintelligence activities against North Vietnam and against Laos.
ARES, the first team, was inserted in early 1961. By the early 1970's, there were 52 teams comprising nearly 500 commandos who had been inserted behind enemy lines. Initially, the mission was confined to intelligence gathering, but subsequently it grew to include sabotage and psychological warfare.
From the very beginning, Mr. President, it was clear that this operation was a failure. Recently, declassified Defense Department documents show that the teams were killed or captured very shortly after landing and that the CIA and the Defense Department, which took over the operation in early 1964, knew it at that time.
It is now apparent that the missions were compromised and that Hanoi ran a counterespionage operation against us and our South Vietnamese ally by forcing our commandos to radio back the information that they, Hanoi, wanted us to hear.
The preponderance of the evidence that has come to light in the last year leaves little doubt that the United States Government at that time continued to insert Vietnamese commandos behind enemy lines, knowing full well that it was sending them on near impossible missions with little chance of success.
The Defense Department then compounded this tragedy by writing off the lost commandos as dead, apparently in order to avoid paying their monthly salaries.
An example: A six-man team, called Attila, was dropped into Nghe An province on April 25, 1964. The team was immediately captured. Two months later on July 16, Radio Hanoi announced the names and addresses of the six team members, the dates they were captured, and the start of their trials.
Declassified Defense Department documents indicate that we knew the team had been captured, but, nevertheless, by the beginning of 1965, only months later, the Defense Department had declared the entire team dead and paid small death benefits to their next of kin. The process of declaring the commandos dead on paper was reaffirmed in 1969 by the colonel in charge of the operations for MACSOG, the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group. He said:
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We reduced the number of dead gradually by declaring so many of them dead each month until we had written them all off and removed them from the monthly payrolls.
So, Mr. President, after sending these men on these extraordinary missions, after cutting off their pay, we then committed the most egregious act of all. We made no effort to obtain their release, along with the American POW's, during the peace negotiations in Paris. As a result, many of these brave men, who fought alongside us for the same cause, spent years in prison, more than 20 years in some cases.
After their release from prison in the 1970's or 1980's, a number of the commandos made their way to the United States. They are now seeking acknowledgement from our country for their service and payment from the U.S. Government for their period of incarceration.
In a lawsuit, they have asked for $2,000 a year for an average of 20 years spent in captivity. We believe, those of us supporting this amendment, that the United States owes these men a debt that can never be repaid. We can at least give them the recognition that they deserve and the small amount of compensation that they were promised three decades ago.
Speaking for myself, I am not here, nor do I think any of us are here, to try to point fingers at people individually, nor even to find scapegoats or scalps. I do not think any purpose is served by that. But we do want people to understand what happened 25, 30 years ago so that it will not happen again. We are here also to do the right thing. It is clearly important not to compound judgments that were wrong 25 and 30 years ago with judgments that are wrong today. It would be wrong to avoid executing our responsibility today.
So, Mr. President, we can honor their service and make it clear to those who might join us again at any time, now or in the future, in the struggle for freedom and democracy, that we are big enough in our country to admit mistakes when they are made and to move to rectify them, and that while sometimes people may make mistakes, a great country will always honor and thank those who fight with us in a common cause.
Mr. President, I believe the amendment that we are offering today will help to provide that recognition, and I urge its adoption.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to make payments to Vietnamese nationals who were trained and commanded by the United States Government to fight behind enemy lines during the war.
The amendment purposely creates a low standard of proof to be met by the commandos, and it is our intention and hope that it be interpreted liberally. All that those men must prove in order to receive payment for their services is that: First, they entered North Vietnam during the war under an operation called
OPLAN 34A or its predecessor; and second, they were captured and incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a result.
For approximately 7 years, beginning in 1961, the United States apparently contracted with South Vietnamese nationals to conduct covert military operations in North Vietnam. At first under the authority of the CIA and later under the authority of the Defense Department, hundreds of commandos were sent into North Vietnam, and more than 450 were killed or captured.
Those captured were convicted of treason and remained in captivity until 1979, when they began to be released. At a minimum, each served 15 years at hard labor. Many of them suffered through more than 20 years of imprisonment.
A recently declassified study done in 1970 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which oversaw the commando program, indicates that the commandos were funded by DOD and that the majority of them were captured alive and taken prisoner by North Vietnam.
More recently, only weeks ago, 80 boxes of documents were discovered in the National Archives related to the employment of these brave men. These documents, 240,000 in total, include DOD payroll rosters for the commandos and records of death gratuities.
To address this injustice, the amendment provides the commandos with $20 million in back pay, approximately $40,000 each. As the Senator from Massachusetts pointed out, this amounts to about $2,000 for each year each commando spent in prison. We have chosen as the number of commandos the outside estimate of 500. The cost may ultimately be as low as $11 million, but because the number of eligible Vietnamese veterans may increase as time goes by, we thought it important to give the Secretary the spending authority to meet the contingency of more claims.
The administration, until very recently, citing an 1875 Supreme Court case, maintained that it had no obligation to these men because they were employed under a secret contract. I am pleased to report, however, the commandos now have the support of the administration. Senator Kerry and I and Senator Smith, Senator Robb, and other Senators have worked very closely with the administration in formulating this amendment.
The CIA began the program, but later turned it over to the Department of Defense, at which time the numbers of teams and individuals sent into North Vietnam approximately doubled. The late former CIA Director, William Colby, who in 1961, as the chief of the Agency's Far Eastern Division, was tasked with directing the commando program, indicated his support for the commandos' claims and specifically endorsed a legislative solution.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from the current acting CIA Director, George Tenet, also supporting a legislative solution to the problem, and in addition, a letter to me from John F. Sommer, Jr., Executive Director of the American Legion, and a letter to me from Paul A. Spera, Commander in Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, DC, June 18, 1996.
Hon. Arlen Specter,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Director, I welcome the opportunity to provide our views with respect to an amendment to provide relief to those who have come to be called the `Lost Commandos.'
This Administration supports an amendment recognizing the hardships endured by those of the Lost Commandos who were captured and incarcerated during the Vietnam War. Although many of our Vietnamese allies suffered during and after the war, the mission of these Commandos and the suffering they have endured set them apart and make them uniquely deserving of recognition. Whether or not the mission of these Commandos was a mistake is not relevant to our moral obligations to them now. The creed of the Central Intelligence Agency, then as now, is to protect, defend, and compensate its assets for the sometimes mortal risks they take on our behalf. That is the only credible position for a secret intelligence service to take if it is to win and hold the loyalty of its assets. We strongly believe that, in the case of these commandos, the United States Government has a similar, morally based obligation.
Congress, not the courts, is the proper forum for the recognition of such an obligation. I must note that the United States Government is currently the defendant in a lawsuit brought by 281 persons claiming to be among these Lost Commandos. Our position is that their claims are not justiciable and in fact are in the wrong forum. Accordingly, the Government has filed a Motion to Dismiss. Our Motion is based in major part upon the principle, first enunciated in Totten v. United States, that an intelligence service cannot exist if its secret assets--actual or imagined--can sue it publicly for money or benefits. That principle was upheld in 1988 in Vu Duc Guong v. United States, an earlier suit by an individual claiming to be a Lost Commando.
The Totten principle is vital to the ability of this Agency to obtain secrets, run assets, and conduct operations without the threat of blackmail of public exposure through lawsuits for money. Underlying that principle is the necessity that CIA administer its assets fairly and fulfill its obligations meticulously. This we do. I would be pleased to provide any appropriate level of detail on this point in closed session. Underlying the Totten principle as well is the recognition that Congress, not the courts, has oversight responsibility for the conduct of our operations.
I regret that I am unable to provide factual information in an open session to assist in the preparing of an amendment. Doing so, I am advised, could jeopardize the Totten principle and impede the transfer of this issue from the courts to the Congress, where it belongs. Let me repeat, however, that I am pleased to support legislative relief for these brave, deserving men. That relief will be more than a measure of their suffering: It will be a measure as well of our commitment to our former allies.
Sincerely,
George J. Tenet,
Acting Director.
The American Legion,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
Hon. John McCain,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
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Dear Senator McCain: The American Legion most certainly supports the amendment to provide payments to former South Vietnamese Commandos or their survivors. America's obligation to the commandos, who were written off by our government, must be fulfilled to recognize their honorable service, their commitment to the principles of freedom and their personal sacrifices.
History has shown that the wages of war go on long after the guns are silenced, the treaties are signed and the parades are over. This issue warrants serious reexamination of America's national policy on service personnel who are prisoners-of-war and missing-in-action. If our government places young men and woman in harms way, it has a moral and ethical obligation for the repatriation of each and every one of them. Equally as important is the fact the families of these military personnel must be cared for by a grateful Nation.
The American Legion applauds the purpose of this amendment, as it reflects a good-faith effort to recognize the sacrifices of our former allies. However, nothing can erase this terrible chapter of the Vietnam War. We trust there are lessons learned from this travesty of justice.
Sincerely,
John F. Sommer, Jr.,
Executive Director.
of the United States,
Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
Hon. John McCain,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McCain: I am writing in support of your amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act seeking back pay for Vietnamese commandos captured and interned by the Vietnamese.
We believe, as you do, that these Vietnamese who performed dangerous and covert operations as part of our secret war in Indochina and who suffered as a consequence of these operations should be recompensed for their service and sacrifice.
For too long, these brave men, once declared dead by our Government, lived in limbo, unrecognized for their achievements and their hardships.
Now we find out that our own Government, knowing they were in captivity, systematically wrote them off as dead in order to avoid paying them their salaries. In good conscience, we believe this was wrong and strongly support your amendment to provide back pay to these brave men.
Please advise your colleagues in the Senate of our strong support for the Kerry-McCain Amendment.
Sincerely,
Paul A. Spera,
Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. McCAIN. I point out, Mr. President, the amendment has the support of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion.
All of the details and legalities aside, one thing is clear; these men sacrificed for a cause, the same cause for which all veterans of the Vietnam war sacrificed--a free Vietnam. And they suffered horribly for their commitment. For many years United States immigration policy has provided programs which ease the process for those Vietnamese associated with the United States war effort. We do so because it is our obligation to our wartime allies. All that the cosponsors of this amendment are asking is that we similarly honor the full extent of our obligations to the commandos and correct this gross injustice.
One of the commandos is quoted in Saturday's New York Times as saying, `They didn't want to remember us because we represent the failure of the United States in Vietnam.' I have always made the case that as a nation, and as individuals, we must put the Vietnam war behind us. To continue to deny the service of these men is not the way to do it.
I also strongly subscribe to the words of President Reagan who said it as succinctly and coherently as possible when he stated that: `The Vietnam veterans who served, served in a noble cause.' I repeat, `a noble cause,' as did these South Vietnamese commandos.
Mr. President, we send a bright signal by passing this legislation today: The United States of America lives up to its agreements with its friends because it is a nation of honor and a nation of laws.
Mr. President, I strongly urge the adoption of this amendment. I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join with my colleagues in cosponsoring this particular amendment. The case for support has been eloquently stated by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, the distinguished Senator from Arizona, and could be made by others. I will not repeat it.
I will simply say that what was done in the name of the United States in the instance of these particular commandos is appalling and unconscionable. This is clearly the right thing to do to atone for the actions that were taken some time ago and without the knowledge of apparently very many people in the Government at that particular time. In any event, I applaud my colleagues for taking this particular action.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, it is my understanding with respect to the amendment before the Senate, there is no objection from either side. The Senator from New Hampshire may wish to comment. If he does not, I ask that the Senate proceed to take action on that amendment by voice vote at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith, is recognized.
Mr. SMITH. There is no objection on this side, and we have no objection to voice voting. I do have a few remarks I will make. Subsequent to that, we can proceed to do that.
Prior to that, Mr. President, in regard to the previous unanimous consent for a vote at 2:15, there are some Members who apparently are tied up at a White House meeting. I ask unanimous consent that the vote which was previously scheduled for 2:15 now occur at 2:30 today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Kerry, the Senator from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, and the Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, in offering this amendment. It is an amendment that needs to be offered. It is one of those very painful chapters in American history that occasionally we have to deal with. It is a great tribute, I think, to America that when we find a wrong, that we do have the capacity to admit that wrong and to right it.
Over 35 years ago, the United States Government asked the Republic of Vietnam to provide some South Vietnamese military personnel for special commando missions into North Vietnam. The best figures that we have, and there is some variation here, but approximately 350 of these commandos were trained by U.S. Government agencies.
They were inserted into North Vietnam by our military forces, and, as has already been said, they were captured by the Communist forces and forced to spend the next 20 to 30 years in reeducation camps. The term `reeducation camp' does not really, Mr. President, accurately define what exactly these men went through. We know they were tortured. So reeducation is hardly the correct word.
For the record, Mr. President, it is clear that these commandos knew what they were doing. They knew they were taking great risks. Indeed, many of their fellow comrades died during these very operations, and some died after the missions while they were in North Vietnam. They also knew what was at stake with the Communist aggression if we did not contain the Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
More importantly, the United States certainly was aware of the dangers involved with these missions. That is why I believe
a solemn commitment was made to these commandos and their families that they would be compensated for the sacrifices they made.
It is interesting, these Vietnamese worked for the CIA and the United States military in, basically, a doomed effort to infiltrate North Vietnam between 1961 and 1969. They were dropped behind enemy lines by parachute. Some secretly swam ashore after being taken there in speedboats, and then they were captured.
It is clear that as we stand here now, the United States has yet to live up to that commitment that was made to these South Vietnamese commandos in the 1960's. In point of fact, a cold and uncaring bureaucracy was allowed to write these men off, literally, as dead three decades ago, even though there was convincing evidence that many had been captured. To put it bluntly, their families were told they were dead when, in fact, they were alive.
It is a documented historical fact that in 1969, in then secret testimony before the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a DOD official stated: `We reduced the number of commandos on the payroll gradually by declaring so many of them dead each month until we had written them all off and removed them from the monthly payroll.'
It is really bizarre to think these kinds of things do happen in our Government, but, as I said earlier, the fact that we right these wrongs is perhaps a better comment about what America is like. The families were paid a very small token of death gratuity, and that was it. Knowing these men were alive, the DOD official told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we were writing them off as dead, and the widows and surviving family members were paid a small stipend and then informed that these
people were dead when, in fact, we knew they were not.
The majority of those men had put their lives on the line for the United States' national interests. They were not Americans, but they put their lives on the line for America, and they were shackled in North Vietnamese prisons, and our Government knew it and our Government never told the families.
The amendment that my colleagues are offering today, along with me, will authorize back pay, very simply, for the men who participated in these daring missions. It is a bit late, for sure, but it comes out to about $2,000 per commando for each year spent in North Vietnamese prisons. It is the least we can do.
I note as a comparison that our distinguished colleague from Arizona and many others who were captured by the North Vietnamese and imprisoned and tortured, they received full pay, as they should have, during the time they were in Communist activity. So there is certainly a well-established precedent for this amendment. There is nothing dramatic about it. It is just the right thing to do.
Let me also point out after a year of fighting this case in U.S. claims court, the administration has decided that granting this back pay to these commandos is the right thing to do. I think we should give credit to National Security Adviser Tony Lake, because he has been very supportive and very helpful in getting this done.
I think that the tragedy which befell these commandos was only made worse by the initial attitude of the Justice Department and DOD and the CIA in the claims court. Again, we had to drag them kicking and screaming in to right the wrong, but the wrong is righted. I commend, again, Tony Lake for reversing this attitude and coming out in support of the amendment.
Finally, Mr. President, as we continue to seek answers about the fate of our own missing American servicemen from the Vietnam war, I think it is imperative for the administration to assure that each of these South Vietnamese commandos has been interviewed for any information they might possess on any missing American, dead or alive.
This is very important. Some of these men have been in prison in North Vietnam for 20 years. Who knows what they might know. They all should be debriefed thoroughly. This would include making arrangements to speak to all of them who are reportedly still in Vietnam awaiting approval for departure to the United States.
Let me commend my colleagues, again, who served with me on the Senate committee in 1992, including the Senator from Virginia, who is here on the floor, for working with me on this amendment. We were all concerned when we saw the news accounts, and we were all committed to doing something about it. We reacted quickly. I am proud to be an original cosponsor, and I urge all of my colleagues to support it.
Mr. President, I might say that there is no one on our side that I know of who wishes to speak on the amendment. I yield to the Senator from Virginia to move the amendment.
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Mr. ROBB. I know of no one else who has requested an opportunity to speak on this amendment. I, therefore, urge adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 4055) was agreed to.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. ROBB. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid, is recognized.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, what is the order of business now before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Grams amendment has been postponed until 2:30.
END of PARTIAL EXCERPT