Sam Rahberg

08/08/03

Paper #2

Augustine: On Free Will

For human will to be legitimate and authentic it must be free. Will must be free to be creative and enable humans to select their own course of action. In a sense, it is a freedom of choice. Yet when one considers that all acts are foreknown by the omniscient Creator, one might think that humanity's free will is not truly independent. Perhaps God's foreknowledge actually dictates the course of everyone's will, thereby nullifying its freedom. One might argue that free will under an all-knowing Creator is a farce. Free will may even be a detriment to humanity, if it could be proved that free will was responsible for sinfulness. Augustine defiantly upholds the integrity and essential nature of humanity's free will within the realm of divine foreknowledge. He argues that free will is truly legitimate because it is given intentionally by the grace of God, is purposeful and is necessary.

Augustine's weighty argument for the legitimacy of free will rests on three presuppositions: free will is given intentionally, is purposeful, and is necessary. He initiates his argument on the grounds that God gave humanity free will intentionally. It was not an accident or an oversight as if free will were a flaw in God's creative plan. Free will is a gift to humanity as language is a gift to a child. Great good would be missed if a child were not taught language for the minor fear that the child would one day curse. Withholding free will from humanity for fear of sin would have been a great depravity. God's intentional grace of free will is a gift that opens the door to creation's good potential. This potential is the ability to choose to live aright. Free will is the tool to do so: "Moreover…it can be known that man also comes from God. For man, so far as he is man, is good because he can live aright if he chooses to do so" (Placher, 107). The obvious difficulty is that humanity does not always choose to live aright. Here enters God's justice, "it is just that sinners should be punished and well-doers rewarded" (106). Right and wrong testify that free will is purposeful. If the purpose of free will is the ability to live aright, then God's justice, by punishment or reward, clarifies what right living entails, "because it condemns sins and honours righteous actions" (107). Free will affords humanity the opportunity to choose good actions in any given situation. Augustine is clear that the purpose of free will remains good even when humanity chooses sinful actions, "Because he also sins through having free will, we are not to believe that God gave it to him for that purpose." The ability to voluntarily live aright is such a noble purpose that justice guards it. If will is subject to justice, then it must be free. Without free will, justice would not matter: "An action would be neither sinful nor righteous unless it were done voluntarily." So free will is actually necessary within God's system of justice.

Having established that free will is intentional, purposeful and necessary, it follows that it must be truly legitimate, even within God's foreknowledge. Augustine poses a series of arguments that both preserve God's foreknowledge and affirm humanity's power to will. He clearly states the difficulty,

It is clear that God does foreknow all things. The question at hand is whether that foreknowledge dictates a future outcome. Augustine suggests that future outcome cannot be dictated by foreknowledge or God himself would not possess free will, "…if all things of which God has foreknowledge are done by necessity and not voluntarily, his own future acts will be done not voluntarily, but by necessity" (109). Humanity's will follows the pattern of God's free will. God demonstrates the ability to intervene by his free will and such is also the case with humanity. Although all events are foreknown by God, humanity has the power to intervene through the act of free will. If this were not the case, then God would be ultimately responsible for both the good and the sinful acts of humanity. Naturally, the thought of God being responsible for sinful actions is irreconcilable with the notion of a good God. Perhaps there would not even be a differentiation between good and evil. The aspect that is most persuasive, however, is the power of humanity to exercise free will and intervene. Augustine says, "Our will would not be will unless it were in our power. Because it is in our power, it is free." Further, if God possesses foreknowledge of all that is to come, that foreknowledge does not hinder free will, but actually reassures it, "My power is not taken from me by God's foreknowledge. Indeed I shall be more certainly in possession of my power because he whose foreknowledge is never mistaken, foreknows that I shall have the power" (111). God's foreknowledge does not impose necessity upon humanity's free will. Humanity has the power to intervene and as long as free will remains in it's power, it is free.

Augustine balances well the due respect for God's foreknowledge with humanity's freedom and responsibility embodied in free will. To under-emphasize God's foreknowledge is to underestimate the Maker. To under-emphasize free will, making it a puppet to God's foreknowledge, is to under-appreciate God's gift of legitimate freedom. At stake are the elements of healthy independence and creativity that flow from the dynamic relationship of Creator and creature. Ensuring its legitimacy, Augustine articulates humanity's free will as the intentional, purposeful, and necessary gift of God. In the words of Augustine's companion, "I no longer deny that whatever God has foreknown must necessarily come to pass, nor that he has foreknowledge of our sins, but in such a way that our wills remain free and within our power" (111).