AN
EXAMINATION OF JONATHAN EDWARDS' ANALYSIS
OF THE
ARMINIAN OBJECTIONS
TO
MORAL NECESSITY
May 1995
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION
…………………………………………………………………..1
The Subject of this Study
The Need for this Study
The Procedure for this Study
The Historical and Theological Setting
The Theological Problem
2. EDWARDS ON THE WILL
…………………………………………………………17
The Will
Motive
Cause
Freedom or Liberty
Natural and Moral Necessity
Natural and Moral Inability
Concluding Remarks
3. EDWARDS' ANALYSIS OF THE
ARMINIAN OBJECTIONS
TO MORAL NECESSITY …………………………..………………………………..46
Necessity Consistent with Praiseworthiness
Necessity Consistent with Blameworthiness
Necessity and Theodicy
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ………………………………..………………..78
BIBLIOGRAPHY
………………………………………………………...……………..80
CHAPTER
1
INTRODUCTION
Jonathan
Edwards' intellectual life and theological achievement have earned him the
status as being one of America's greatest theologians. His writings have
commanded a hearing by theologians, philosophers, historians, and the like.
Edwards' profound pursuit and commitment to theological truth provided him with
the foundation in which he could confidently and boldly delineate his doctrinal
positions, not to mention refute positions which he felt threatened the fabric
of Christianity. Ralph G. Turnbull writes:
There
is no name more worthy of a place in the evangelical succession of truth than
that of Jonathan Edwards. No one was more thoroughly imbued with the
evangelical spirit and convinced that his view of doctrine was true. By every
test he stands out as one of the most vital and challenging, yet mysterious,
figures in the life and work of the Christian church.[1]
Edwards was a scientist, an exegetical
preacher, a polemicist, a philosopher, and a metaphysician seeking to
understand the deepest truths of life. He is known for his Augustinian view of
human sinfulness and his reverence for the sovereignty of God. These views can
be observed throughout his writings. Edward H. Davidson writes:
Over and over again Edwards stressed the
absolute Importance of a man's belief in the sovereignty of God. It was a
doctrine he made into a keystone of his own theology, and it was one that, when
he became a minister, he drilled into his hearers as the primary necessity for
their salvation.[2]
Among
the numerous works written by Edwards, his timeless treatise, Freedom of
Will,[3]
stands as one of his greatest accomplishments. In this classic work, Edwards
sought to analyze, theologically and philosophically, the enduring problem
surrounding human freedom and the sovereignty of God.
The
emphasis of this thesis is on the nature of responsibility. More specifically,
this paper will examine Edwards' analysis of the Arminian objections concerning
the nature of responsibility, a theme which weighs heavily in his
treatise. C. Samuel Storms writes the
following concerning this theme:
Edwards'
treatise on free will deals fundamentally with the issue of moral
responsibility. The thrust of the argumentation is a denial and refutation of
the Arminian notion as to what constitutes responsibility, or that upon which
it rests.[4]
Many Arminians argued that, in order for
mankind to be truly responsible, choices must be made apart from causal forces.
In other words, mankind must be able to choose one thing instead of another
without any antecedent causal relation. Such choices are said to be
'self-determined'.
Though
this thesis will address the issue of the will, the emphasis of this study will
be centered around Edwards' analysis and refutation of the Arminian objections
to moral necessity. More precisely, this thesis will examine the Arminian
objections concerning praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and theodicy.
The
perennial problem concerning the sovereignty of God and the will of mankind is
a mystery which is unlikely to be resolved this side of glory;[5]
nonetheless, there is much to be learned by continued reflection and scholarly
debate. It should also be noted that whether we agree with the conclusions of
Edwards' treatise, or whether we beg to differ, we should all concede that it
provides an excellent medium for continued dialogue. Furthermore, we should
recognize that the call to faith is, at the same time, a call to contemplate,
to reason, to compare, and to investigate, for it is anti-intellectual to
affirm and embrace that which we have not taken the time to examine and
understand. Brian Davies appropriately writes:
Christianity
rests on faith, but it also has content. It teaches and proclaims a distinctive
and challenging view of reality. It naturally encourages reflection. It is
something
to think about, something about which one might even have second thoughts.[6]
In a similar vein of thought, Edwards
writes:
Of
all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the
knowledge of ourselves, are the most important. As religion is the great
business, for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends; and as
a religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker; and so
has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and
we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful
in order to true religion.[7]
If there is any truth to the above, it
follows that an examination of Edwards' work is of great value as the student
of the Word of God defines and refines his or her theological positions,
particularly in the area of soteriology and related matters.
To
this day, Arminian complaints against Calvinistic conclusions are not unlike
those in Edwards' era. Robert W. Jenson writes the following concerning the
Arminianism of Edwards' day:
Broadly, "Arminianism" was New
England's name for a kind of religion that appears in all times and places of
the church, and has other times been known as "semi-Pelagianism,"
"synergism," etc.
"Arminianism" is our inevitable self-serving interpretation of
human responsibility over against God's mercy, according to which, if we are
blessed it is at least partly because we have chosen and labored to be, while
when we suffer, God is suddenly invoked for our unilateral rescue.[8]
Arminianism sought to retain the responsibility
of mankind, though it allegedly did so at the expense of the sovereignty and
mercy of God. In other words, Arminians desire to retain mankind's freedom to
accept or reject the grace and mercy of God's offer in Jesus Christ. In the
opinion of many Arminians, Calvinism stripped mankind of responsibility and
rendered the idea of divine reward and/or punishment as senseless. In other
words, because of the deterministic features of Calvinism, it is argued that
mankind deserves neither blame nor praise as a result of people doing that
which they could not avoid. These same complaints are still put forth against
those with Calvinistic tendencies.
It
is interesting to note that despite the fundamental differences between the two
theological camps, respective constituents are not always distinctively
divided. David Basinger appropriately writes:
Christians,
however, cannot be divided into two camps: those who emphasize divine
predestination in their lives and those who emphasize human responsibility.
There is also a tendency for Christians to switch back and forth
between
an emphasis on divine sovereignty and free will as they face different issues.[9]
This all too common practice of switching
back and forth between an emphasis on divine sovereignty and free will seems to
demonstrate the inherent difficulty of the issue. Randall Basinger
appropriately writes, "In view of the fact that these issues presuppose
some of the most thorny and divisive metaphysical issues (e.g., freedom and
determinism), it is not surprising that consensus is not easy to come by."[10]
Nonetheless, this study is important if we are going to live consistently with
respect to our theological convictions.
The
burden of this paper is not a detailed explanation of Edwards' polemic on the
nature of the will, but rather his arguments against the Arminian objections to
moral necessity. Nonetheless, Edwards' position concerning responsibility
cannot be divorced from his position concerning the nature of the will. In
other words, Edwards' views on the nature of the will and freedom come directly
into play with respect to his convictions concerning responsibility.
Due
to the interrelatedness of Edwards' view of the will, freedom, and
responsibility, it will be necessary to provide a synopsis of Edwards' view on
the nature of free-will. In fact, it is Edwards' contention that once the
Arminian concept of freedom is derailed, the Arminian doctrine concerning
responsibility falls as well. Edwards writes:
Tis
easy to see how the decision of most of the points in controversy, between
Calvinists and Arminians, depends on the determination of this grand article
concerning the freedom of the will
requisite to moral agency; and that by clearing and establishing the
Calvinistic doctrine at this point, the chief arguments are obviated, by which
Arminian doctrines in general are supported, and the contrary doctrines
demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, that God's moral
government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the
objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings, expostulations, promises,
threatenings, rewards, and punishments, is not inconsistent with a determining
disposal of all events, of every kind, throughout the universe, in his
providence; either by positive efficiency, or permission.[11]
In Edwards' personal estimation, he
successfully refuted the Arminian notion of freedom, and thus undermined the
validity of related conclusions concerning responsibility.
Technically, if Edwards was correct in his
refutation of the Arminian notion of freedom, he could have ended his polemic
at this point, but, instead, he proceeded to address particular objections to
moral necessity. After reviewing Edwards' analysis and objections to the
Arminian notion of freedom, the focus of this thesis will turn to specific
objections pertaining to moral necessity, namely, objections concerning
praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and theodicy.
It is often the case that the times in which
we live have a profound affect on our individual development and concerns. It
would seem that this was certainly the case with Jonathan Edwards. Jenson
writes:
Jonathan
Edwards' fame, and much of his theology, began in the same event with which
began the most remarkable phenomenon of American religious history, the
sequence of "revivals." This circumstance by itself would make
Edwards a key figure for the understanding of our religious possibilities. The
event in question is the "Awakening" at Northampton, kindled in 1734
by Edwards' sermons against "Arminianism," and on justification by
faith alone.[12]
In short, a tension was developing with
respect to how people come to be accepted by God. Could man initiate the
process of salvation, or, was it necessary for God to initiate
reconciliation? Furthermore, if it is
conceded that God must be the initiator, a concession which some were not
willing to make, could God's efforts be rejected? Answers to these questions largely depend upon one's
understanding of the state of the will after the Fall. In other words, had the
will become so corrupted that man could no longer turn to God, or, had it been
damaged, but not so severely as to render it incapable of seeking reconciliation
with God? H. Shelton Smith makes the
following observation:
Prior
to 1750 New England Puritans maintained their doctrine of original sin with
practical unanimity. Within the next decade, however, dissenting notions began
to attract attention; and by the end of the century the original doctrine had
been considerably modified by some of the more liberal thinkers.[13]
Original sin carried with it the idea
that, as a result of Adam's sin, all mankind descending from Adam sinned in
him, and, as such, mankind suffers complete corruption. Calvinists argued that,
due to the utter corruption of mankind's nature, people cannot turn to God
apart from God's efficacious intervention.
In
his theological treatise, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin
writes,
Because
of the bondage of sin by which the will is held bound, it cannot move toward
good, much less apply itself thereto; for a movement of this sort is the
beginning of conversion to God, which Scripture is ascribed entirely to God's
grace.[14]
Thus, according to Calvin, after the
Fall, mankind is in a state in which it cannot turn to God unless God
efficaciously restores the damaged will so that mankind can again see the Lord
in all of his splendor and grace. It is also important to note that, according
to Calvin, when God, through the power of the Holy Spirit, restores mankind's
ability to see the Lord in all of his beauty, he does so in such a way that
repentance and restored fellowship with himself (God) necessarily transpires.
It
is interesting to note that some theologians do not see as large a difference
between Arminius and Calvin with respect to the state of man after the
Fall. F. Stuart Clark writes:
Arminius would have sided with Luther
against Erasmus, in asserting the bondage of the will in the natural state of
man. Equally false is the contention of some Calvinist critics that Arminianism
gravely underestimates the crippling effect of sin on man's powers. But
Arminius insists that the human will is not completely destroyed. It is bound
to sin, and may later be set free by grace.[15]
Importantly, though Clark is attempting
to demonstrate similarities between Arminians and Calvinists, he does admit
that Arminius did not hold to the complete destruction of the will. In other words,
after the Fall, mankind is still capable of turning, or not turning, it's
affections toward God. For Arminians, salvation was available to all because
sufficient and/or prevenient grace enables all people, with their own
graciously enabled free will, to turn to God.[16]
Additionally,
according to Arminianism, people are also capable of resisting God's grace and
mercy. Thus, it can be said that people play a critical role in their own
salvation. Arminius writes:
All unregenerate persons have freedom of
will, and a capability of resisting the Holy Spirit, of rejecting the proffered
grace of God, of despising the counsel of God
against themselves, of refusing to accept the gospel of grace, and of not opening to Him who knocks at the door
of the heart; and these things they can actually do, without any difference of
the elect and of the reprobate.[17]
Though Arminians are promoters of the
grace of God, they do not accept the Calvinistic doctrine of irresistible
grace. "As irresistibility was the distinguishing mark of Calvinism, so
was conditionalism of Arminianism."[18]
The
Arminian insistence on the resistibility of God's grace led to further
conclusions which exacerbated the tensions between Arminians and Calvinists.
Ramsey sums the situation up well:
The
Arminians of the seventeenth century, however, placed great stress upon God's
side of the divine-human relationship. Nevertheless, their teaching that the
grace of God might be resisted opened the way to an increasing emphasis upon
the ethical and the human among later Arminians. This passed over easily into
Pelagianism, which dwells more upon the example of Christ than upon his atoning
work, and into deism or natural religion, in which the ethical and the human
gain complete ascendancy. Thus, "Arminianism" became but a loose term
for all forms of the complaint of the aggrieved moral nature against the harsh
tenets of Calvinism.[19]
Thus, the reasons for Edwards writing his
treatise becomes intensified by the conclusions which could, and often did, follow
from the Arminian notion of freedom.
By
taking his argument to the root of the debate, namely, the Arminian notion of
freedom, Edwards could undermine conclusions concerning responsibility which
follow such a premise. Ramsey writes, "Thus Edwards planned to join
argument with Arminianism precisely on the ground of its great strength, i.e.
the importance of the ethical and the human for understanding the relation
between God and man."[20]
Despite
the influence of the Great Awakening, which was characterized by a commitment
to the radically depraved nature of mankind after the Fall, questions
concerning original sin were clearly on the rise in New England. Smith writes,
"Nevertheless, even while the Great Awakening was still stirring New
England, alien ideas were already infiltrating that Calvinist stronghold and
were destined to undermine the Puritan doctrine of original sin."[21]
Though New England had been consistently Calvinistic, and, despite the great
leaders of the Awakening, the influence of Enlightenment thought was beginning
to be felt. Smith writes the following concerning the changing tide.
Within
England elements of the Enlightenment had been penetrating both nonconformist
and Anglican thought throughout much of the seventeenth century. By the opening
of the eighteenth century, Arian, Socinian, and Pelagian tendencies had all
gained considerable rootage. Because of the growing commercial and cultural
contact between Boston and London, eastern Massachusetts was directly exposed
to the modes of liberal thought. The two English liberals who became especially
influential in that region were, Daniel Whitby (1638-1726) and John Taylor
(1694-1761).[22]
Whitby expressed great dissatisfaction
with the doctrine of original sin and he considered Augustine's view of
imputation to be unacceptable.[23]
Taylor
also began to reject the idea of original sin and eventually wrote his
treatise, Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin.[24]
In this treatise, Taylor attacked, biblically and philosophically, the doctrine
of original sin. Taylor's repugnance toward the Calvinistic views of original
sin are forcefully stated, and he argued that such a view is wholly
inconsistent with Scripture. Taylor writes:
A
representative of moral action is what I can by no means digest. A
representative, the guilt of whose conduct shall be imputed to us, and whose
sins shall corrupt and debauch our nature, is one of the greatest absurdities
in all the system to corrupt religion . . . That any man without my knowledge
and consent, should so represent me, that when he is guilty I am to be reputed
guilty, and when he transgresses I shall be accountable and punishable for his
transgression, and thereby subjected to the wrath and curse of God, nay,
further, that his wickedness shall give me a sinful nature, and all this before
I am born, and consequently while I am in no capacity of knowing, helping or
hindering what he doth; surely anyone who dares use his understanding, must
clearly see this is unreasonable, and altogether inconsistent with the truth,
and goodness of God.[25]
Taylor's treatise spread throughout New
England and was warmly received by many. David Weddle writes, "Many
preachers (of the younger generation, and mostly Harvard graduates) were encouraged
in their apostasy from Puritan Calvinism by this sophisticated expression of
continental Arminianism."[26]
Taylor's treatise later triggered Edwards' response, The Great Christian
Doctrine of Original Sin. In this work, Edwards attempted to defend the
imputation of Adam's sin to all mankind by way of analogy of the tree to its
branches.[27]
As debate between Taylor and Edwards
concerning original sin escalated, Taylor began to attack the idea of
necessity. Smith states that Edwards had already dealt with the issue of
necessity in Freedom of the Will and in his dealings with Whitby, and,
therefore, he was quite prepared to deal with Taylor's arguments. Like Whitby,
Taylor argued that necessary sin is not blameworthy sin.
With
the above discussion in mind, we can appreciate the circumstances which gave
rise to Edwards writing his treatise, Freedom of the Will. Edwards
writes:
Tis
very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning this point,
should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined:
for without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about
original sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of
the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned
modern divines, if they maintain their particular notion of freedom, consisting
in the self-determining power of the will, as necessary to moral agency, and
thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then
they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain
invincible, in all the controversies they have with reformed divines,
concerning original sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption,
conversion, the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving
faith perseverance of the saints, and other principles of the like kind.[28]
In other words, if man's will was free
according to the Arminian notion of freedom, then Edwards' system of theology
would collapse. Thus, in Freedom of the Will, Edwards sought to cut off
Arminianism, and, thus, illustrate the legitimacy of other Calvinistic
strongholds. Storms appropriately
writes,
As
with the volume on original sin, the proximate cause for the writing of Freedom
of the Will is to be found in Edwards' lingering fear of the Arminian
threat and its consequences for the Christian faith if left unchecked.[29]
The
theological problem has already been alluded to. Both Whitby and Taylor argued
that people do not rightly deserve praise or blame if their actions are
performed out of necessity. In other words, if we are not freely making
choices, how can God rightly reward or punish us for our decisions?
Furthermore,
due to the deterministic nature of Calvinism, it would seem that, if pushed to
its logical extreme, God would become the author of evil. Thus, some Arminians
asserted that Calvinism inherently made God the author of evil.
In
summary, there are numerous theological tensions which develop between
Arminianism and Calvinism. This thesis will examine Edwards' analysis of a few
of the tensions which Edwards addresses in his work, Freedom of the Will.
CHAPTER
II
Edwards'
refutation of the Arminian notion of the will was of paramount importance if
Calvinism was to remain alive. Ola Elizabeth Winslow aptly describes the
importance of the denial of free will with respect to Calvinism when she
writes:
As
this dilemma took other forms in other generations, synods and councils of
ministers continued to deal with it to the best of their ability; but in some
form or other it was always with them. As they well knew, denial of free will
in man was basic to the whole Calvinistic structure. If man's will were free,
and he might accept divine grace or reject it, then his eternal salvation could
no longer be foreordained by a power outside himself: he would be saved by his
own choice, not by immutable decree. And if this were true, then God's
sovereignty was limited, not absolute. There would be reins on His omnipotence,
and man would hold them. It was unthinkable. If man's will were free, the
Calvinistic structure was ruined.[30]
Thus, with the Calvinistic system in
jeopardy, Edwards put his best attempts forward to uphold the tenets of
Calvinism. It is interesting to note that Edwards' definition of the will is
somewhat different from that of traditional Calvinism. Winslow writes:
His
refutation of the Arminian position amounts, in essence, to a new definition of
human liberty by which he thought at one stroke to save both the dignity of man
and the omnipotence of God. He grants man freedom of action to carry out his
own choices, but insists that these choices are determined by motives which lie
outside of man's control. . . . This is not pure Calvinism or Calvinism as
modified by New England Dissent. Jonathan Edwards' contribution was to make
man's freedom an intermediate step. He had qualified freedom rather than denied
it; or, in more modern phrase, he had represented human liberty as
"conditioned."[31]
Thus, Edwards' explication of the will,
to a degree, softened the harsh Calvinistic portrayals of the will, while at
the same time, maintained its fundamental tenets.
In
order to provide an overview of Edwards' teaching on the will, it is critical
that we understand the terms as they are being used. Robert W. Jenson writes:
The
first part of Freedom of the Will is a piece of what would now be called
ordinary-language analysis. All parties agreed that humans are willing agents;
that their agency is, at least sometimes, free: and that God is sovereign. How
then can a controversy arise? In
Edwards' view, because "philosophers" do not use terminology of
"will," "cause," "necessity" and
"liberty" in its ordinary-language senses, but create
"philosophical" uses detached from the ordinary uses, and then do not
consistently remember that they have done so, continuing sometimes to use the
words by their old rules.[32]
Because of the misuse of terms, Edwards
meticulously formulated and clarified the terms which he believed
philosophers, metaphysicians, and polemic
divines had said concerning them in the midst of heated debate.[33]
Before
we delineate Edwards' definition of the will, it will perhaps be beneficial to
observe the Arminian notion of the will. In his discussion concerning original
sin, James Arminius writes the following which provides us with an important
insight concerning his view of the will:
.
. . the will is the proper, adequate, and immediate cause of sin, and has two
motives and incentives to commit sin, the one internal, the other external. The
internal, which lies in man himself, is the love of himself and a concupiscence
of lusting after temporal things, or of the blessings which are visible. The
external motive is an object moving the appetite or desire; such objects are
honors, riches, pleasures, life, health, and soundness. . . . But these motives
do not move the will so efficaciously that the will is necessarily moved; for,
in this case, the will would be excusable from sin; but they move the will
through the mode of persuasion and enticement.[34]
Thus, Arminius clearly did not believe
that motives were sufficient to move the will. Furthermore, according to
Arminius, if motives are efficacious and move the will, an assertion in which
Edwards categorically insisted upon, the will is neither blameworthy or
praiseworthy. As we will shortly observe, Edwards believed that the 'motive,'
which
is that which is perceived to be the
greatest immediate good, was the driving force behind the will.
Edwards
formulated his definition of the will as simply being the act of choosing.
Edwards writes:
And therefore I observe, that the will
(without any metaphysical refining) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses
anything. The faculty of the will is that faculty or power or principle of the
mind by which it is capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an
act of choosing or choice.[35]
Thus, according to Edwards, an act of the
will is a choosing of one thing over another without reference to an antecedent
cause of the action. Storms writes the following concerning Edwards' definition
of the will,
By
this he intends to say that it is not the will that chooses, rather the mind
(or man) chooses and the will is the power by which this is accomplished. Thus
we are to speak not of the will as being free or not free, but of the man as
free or not free . . .[36]
Edwards goes on to write.
For
in every act of the will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than
another; it chooses something rather than the contrary, or rather than the want
of nonexistence of that thing. So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the
absence of the thing refused; the positive and the negative are set before the
mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative. . . . So whatever names we
call the act of the will by--choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving,
liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding,
forbidding, inclining--or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with--all
may be reduced to this choosing.[37]
Thus, in the simplest of terms, the will
performs the act of choosing.
It
is important to note that Edwards departs from Locke in that Edwards argued
that the will and desire never run counter to each other. Locke, on the other
hand, claimed that the will and desire often oppose each other. The following
will clarify the significance of Edwards' departure from Locke.
Mr.
Locke says, "The will is perfectly distinguished from desire; which in the
very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our wills
set us upon. A man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use
persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may
not prevail on him. In this case 'tis plain the will and desire run
counter." I don't suppose, that "will" and "desire"
are the words of precisely the same signification: "will" seems to be
a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent.
"Desire" respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation
and posture, suppose sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may will it.
But yet I can't think they run counter. A man never, in instance, wills
anything contrary to his desire, or anything contrary to his will. The
forementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, don't prove that he ever
does. He may, on some consideration or other, will to utter speeches which have
a tendency to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade
them: but yet his will and desire don't run counter at all: the thing which he
wills, the very same he desires: and he don't will a thing, and desire the
contrary in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully observed,
what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired: if it were, it would
be found that will and desire don't clash in the least. The thing willed on
some consideration, is to utter such words: and certainly, the same
consideration so influences him, that he don't desire the contrary; all things
considered, he chooses to utter such words, and don't desire not to utter 'em.
. . . In order to prove that the will and desire may run counter, it should be
shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with
respect to the very same object of will or
desire: but here the objects are two: and in each, taken by themselves, the
will and desire agree.[38]
This lengthy quote is included because
its conclusion, namely, that will and desire never run counter, is critical to
Edwards' position. If the will can be said to run counter to desire, then the
will cannot be said to be 'related' to that which is perceived as being the
greatest apparent good, and, thus, the will could be said to be independent
and/or contrary to the strongest motive. If such reasoning is accepted, then
Edwards' system breaks down.
Edwards'
refutation of Locke's argument is based on the fact that in Locke's example there
are two objects of desire, not just one. In other words, the first object of
will and desire is the act of speaking. The second object of will and desire is
that the speaking will not be persuasive. Therefore, for will and desire to run
counter, they must be demonstrated to run counter with respect to the willing
to speak, or, with respect to the willing that the speaking will not be
persuasive, but not both. Locke inadvertently combines the two respective
desires and, thus, his example is defective. Storms provides the following
explanation of this important point.
Edwards
is quick to point out, however, that Locke has failed to take careful note of
the thing willed and the thing desired. The thing willed in this
case is the uttering of such words, and I do not desire the contrary. I had
rather utter these words than not utter them, and, therefore, I desire
to utter them. Thus what I will (to utter them) and desire (to utter them) are
the same. To the thing of which Locke speaks as desired (that being,
that the words, although spoken, should not persuade), my will is not
contrary. I do not will that they should persuade but that they should not, as
I desire.[39]
In summary, in order for Locke to prove that
will and desire run counter, he needs to demonstrate how they run counter to
one and the same thing.
Norman
Geisler also challenges Edwards' notion of freedom in a similar manner as did
Locke. Geisler writes:
Edwards
has a mistaken notion of freedom. He defines freedom as desire, not decision.
This is wrong biblically, philosophically, and experientially. First of all,
men sometimes choose to do what they do not desire to do (e.g., carry out the
garbage). Secondly, men often desire to do what they do not decide to do (e.g.,
punch someone in the nose who has wronged them).[40]
Geisler is mistaken on two accounts.
First, he confuses Edwards' definition of freedom with his definition of the
will. According to Edwards, 'freedom' is the power, opportunity or advantage
that people have to do that which they please. The 'will' is that by which the
mind chooses something. Geisler's confusion of these terms leads him to falsely
conclude that will and desire run counter. Furthermore, Geisler's two examples
demonstrate his failure to understand that choice is based on the individual's
greatest immediate perceived good. In reference to Geisler's examples, people
choose to take out the garbage because doing so is perceived as being the
greatest immediate good. Though there may be some thoughts or desires of not
taking out the garbage, these thoughts and desires are overruled by greater
thoughts and desires concerning the need for the garbage to be taken out. Thus,
will and desire do not run counter, but rather are wholly consistent.
Similarly, a man may desire to punch someone in the nose, but chooses not to do
so because he knows the result of doing so is less favorable than not doing so.
Therefore, again, will and desire do not run counter, but instead, they are dynamically
consistent.
In
summary, the 'will' is that by which I execute a choice. In every act of the
will there is a choice. In choosing an action or object one necessarily chooses
one over another as a result of the greatest immediate perceived good. Thus,
the will is necessarily fixed and determined to that which is perceived as
being the greatest immediate good.
The
whole of that which moves a person to will something is called the motive. The
strongest motive is always the driving force behind the will and may be
composed of various conjunctive elements. Edwards' writes,
And
when I speak of the "strongest motive," I have respect to the
strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition,
whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.[41]
Edwards' clarification of the meaning of
motive is, in part, an effort to refute the Arminian notion that the will is
self-determined. W.P. Jeanes writes,
"To say that the will is determined by the 'strongest motive' only means
that it is not self-determined."[42]
Thus, the will is not self-determined, but rather the will is determined, or
more properly speaking, the will is as the motive is.
It
is important to understand, that to say, that the will is as the motive is, is
distinct from saying that the will is the same as motive. It is on this issue
that one of Edwards' chief critics,[43]
James Dana,[44] attacks
Edwards' notion of the will. Storms describes Dana's objection in the following
manner:
Dana
begins his critique with Edwards' assertion that the will always is as the
greatest good is (or strongest motive is). He then argues that by this
statement Edwards has denied that the will is caused, inasmuch as it is
identical with the strongest motive as viewed by the mind. Edwards appears to
have left himself with an uncaused will, which is no different from the
Arminian theory he so vigorously attacks. Dana asks Edwards whether the motive
be previous to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to choice. If Edwards says
that motive and will (choice) are not properly distinct but that the will is
as motive is, he must, argues Dana, say that motive is simultaneous
with choice. Therefore, Edwards has not shown what is the immediate and
original cause of volition.[45]
In other words, if the will and the
motive are synonymous, then the will is self-determined, an assertion which
Edwards utterly opposed. Storms addresses Dana's arguments as follows:
Dana,
however, is mistaken in his initial premise that Edwards identifies motive and
will. When Edwards says that the will is as the motive is, he is not denying
that the motive is the ground or cause of the will. Rather he uses such
terminology because "an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind's
preferring or choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly
distinct." That is to say, Edwards contends that the will always is as the
motive is, only because he wishes to emphasize that never is the will not
as the motive is. The strongest motive as perceived by the mind is the ground
and cause why the will is as it is at all times, and therefore the will is as
motive is. The choice of the mind never varies from that which appears most
agreeable. To say that the will is as the motive does not mean the will is
the motive. Edwards simply uses this phraseology to express the inherent and
perpetually
coinciding
causal connection between motive and will, not to prove their identity.[46]
Thus, as Storms adeptly clarifies,[47]
will and motive are not synonymous, but rather dynamically related in a causal
relationship. Allen C. Guelzo describes this relationship as follows:
Perceiving
the apparentness of a good, understanding that it is apparently the greatest
good, and willing to do it or possess it, cannot be diced up as separate
operations or even laid out in a neat, sequential order. Let there be a motive
of surpassing agreeableness, and the movement from the motive to the action
will be so swift and interrelated that the middle terms can virtually be
dropped out, and a direct line drawn from the motive itself to the willing of
it.[48]
It
is also important to note that Edwards points out that the motive cannot induce
or invite the mind to will or act beyond that which has been perceived,
"for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the minds view,
can't affect the mind at all."[49]
So, for example, while most would agree that suicide is never the choice which
results in the greatest good, if the act of suicide is perceived as being the
greatest immediate good, the carrying out of suicide is inevitable. Edwards
goes on to write:
That
which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the
understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to
excite and induce the choice, is what I call the "strongest motive."
And in this sense, I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest
motive.[50]
In other words, motives are the
antecedent causes which give rise to the act of willing.
Thomas
Chubb asserted that motives merely represent opportunities. As such, motives
can easily be accepted and/or rejected. In this way, "every man is at
liberty to act, or refrain from acting, agreeably with, or contrary to what
each of these motives
. . . would excite him to."[51]
Guelzo points out, however, that Edwards assertively addressed Chubb's concept
of cause. Guelzo writes,
"If
every act of the will is excited by motive," Edwards' noted--and Chubb had
plainly said that motives are in some sense "necessary" to
action--"then that motive is the cause of the act of the will." And
if, in any sense, "volitions are properly the effects of their
motives," then they are necessarily connected with their motives, and it
becomes "manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not from any
self-determining power in the will."[52]
In other words, Edwards' argued that
Chubb's concept of cause was not too unlike that of Edwards', however, Chubb's
did not hold to Edwards' idea of the 'strongest motive' which was claimed to be
the driving force behind the will.
A
critical facet of Edwards' position is his conviction that nothing comes to
pass without a cause. "To talk of the determination of the will, supposes an
effect, which must have a cause. If the will be determined, there is a
determiner."[53] According to Edwards, this 'determiner' is
God. Samuel T. Logan writes:
.
. . while he talks of faith as that by which, on our part, we become united in
Christ, Edwards maintains fervently and clearly that faith in our hearts is
accomplished ("caused") by God's sovereign grace. . . . Time after
time, in his sermons and in such treatises as Religious Affections, Freedom
of the Will, and Original Sin, Edwards expounds the doctrine of
unregenerate inability. God does not "have faith for" man but God
does cause the faith in man, understanding the notion of "cause" in
an Edwardsean sense.[54]
Thus, God is the necessary cause if faith
is to be actualized in fallen mankind. It is also important to note that,
according to Edwards, though the Holy Spirit is the causal force behind a
believer's obedience, this does not diminish the meritoriousness of that
obedience. Arminians, on the other hand, argue that the will can come to action
without a cause. However, if the above premise is true, then it must be
concluded that that which exists without a cause is eternal and eternality can
only be ascribed to God. Furthermore, though the Arminian notion concerning the
spontaneity of the will was generated in an attempt to avoid the cause and
effect chain of events which was foundational for Edwards' view, it actually
resulted in a weak link in their thinking. To be more specific, if events come
to pass spontaneously, without a cause, then the act is not worthy of blame or
praise because it was brought about by nothing. In other words, it just
happened. Therefore, it would seem strange to believe that something, which
occurred for no reason whatsoever, should be worthy of praise or blame. Furthermore,
the Arminian notion of self-causation is found to be irrational. If we conclude
that things are self-caused, we find ourselves in a world where things happen
for no discernable reason and everything loses meaning.
In
summary, Edwards' definition of cause rules out the Arminian notion of
spontaneity of the will as well as self-causation. A cause is both a necessary
and sufficient condition for its given effects. Guelzo sums up the process as
follows:
Acts
of the will are effects; effects must have causes; the cause is the appearance
of the greatest apparent good in the view of the mind, and since understanding,
perceiving, and willing are inseparable, what the mind is pleased to perceive
and understand, the will is pleased to act on for it.[55]
From Edwards' concept of causality, he
develops his notion of freedom.
Edwards
states that the "plain and obvious meaning of the words 'freedom' and
'liberty,' in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that anyone
has, to do as he pleases."[56]
From this definition Edwards makes it clear that such freedom entails a lack of
any hindrance or impediment which would prevent such an action. Furthermore, as
Ramsey rightly points out, "Edwards plainly admits, even contends, that whether
a man is determined in his choice by some prior cause or by no cause at all
does not enter into the definition or the experience of freedom."[57]
Ramsey also writes:
By
designating the meaning of freedom and then analyzing an act of volition,
Edwards merely places in brackets--he does not set entirely aside--his belief
in divine determination, or what causes the strength of motives, or his
confidence that all events, even moral events, have their causes. His
definition of liberty and his account of voluntary action have the clarity and
force of a phenomenological analysis. This analysis may be consistent with
various metaphysical views, such as determinism or indeterminism, which were
bracketed.[58]
Thus, it is helpful to understand that
Edwards defines freedom without reference to
various
antecedents which play a role in determining the will. In doing so, Edwards is
interested in avoiding what he considers to be the Arminian error of suggesting
that the will is, in some sense, an agent unto itself, separate from the
person. Edwards writes: I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of
the will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of
willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be their meaning,
because nothing can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In
all cases, when we speak of the powers or principles of acting, as doing such
things, we mean that the agents which have these powers of acting, do them, in
the exercise of those powers. . . . So when it is said, the will decides or
determines, the meaning must be, that the person in the exercise of a power of
willing and choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines.[59]
Storms writes the following concerning
this matter:
.
. . Edwards contends that it is not possible to speak of the will being
free or having liberty. The will is not itself an agent that has a will; the
power of choosing, itself, has not the power of choosing. . . . Therefore, if
we define freedom as a power, it is the individual who possesses a will who has
the freedom and not the will itself.[60]
The 'will' can, therefore, be absolutely
free and yet be completely determined. In other words, if a man is able to do
that which he chooses and/or desires, though his choices and/or desires are
determined with absolute necessity, he is said to be free.
Thus,
in the simplest of words, freedom is the ability to do as one pleases without
any hindrance. Jeanes appropriately writes, "Thus man is free and justly
accountable for his conduct, while his will is dependent upon 'some external
motive, or internal habitual bias'."[61]
Edwards
refuses to accept the notion of self-determination because if such a concept is
true, his entire scheme of things crumbles. Jeanes writes the following
concerning Edwards' persistent refutation of the Arminian
notion of self-determination:
Jonathan
Edwards is constantly represented as denying that volitions are
self-determining, or that the mind is the efficient cause of its own acts, or
that man is an agent, because he wrote against the self-determining power of
the will as taught by Clarke and Whitby.[62]
If the will determines its own acts by
choosing its own acts then choice orders and determines the choice. From this,
it follows that the will is self-determined. This conclusion elicits Edwards'
following response:
Which
brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the will
preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest;
or a free act of the will, before the first free act of the will. Or else we
must come at last to an act of the will, determining the consequent acts,
wherein the will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this
notion of freedom: but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing
the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free.[63]
Edwards is simply arguing that the
Arminian belief in the self-determination of the will, which was largely a
conviction put forth to avoid the infinite regress of determinism, was in
actuality an argument which itself leads to an infinite regress. Edwards argues
that self-determined acts are the result of antecedent self-determined acts
and, when the train of events is traced back to the first alleged
self-determination of the will, there is no antecedent to initiate the first
self-determined act of the will. From this line of argumentation, Edwards
points out the following:
But
if the first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the will, then
that volition is not determined by the will, and so is not free, in the
Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the will's self-determination.[64]
Thus, it logically follows that if the first
act of the will is not free, all other subsequent acts of the will cannot be
free. Instead, they are all dependent upon their prior acts and ultimately, the
first act logically must have been caused by something other than the will
itself, namely, God. Thus, as Edwards defined freedom and ability, he countered
the Arminian assertion that fallen mankind can choose either good or evil, an
assertion which questioned the Calvinistic conclusions concerning original sin.
Again, according to Edwards, before the Fall, mankind had the ability to sin or
not to sin, but, after the Fall, mankind only had the ability to sin. Though
mankind might do some good things according to the world, he could not do that
which pleased God and thus reestablish the broken fellowship with God. Edwards
writes:
The
case with man was plainly this: when God made man at first, he implanted in him
two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called
natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with
those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in
which his love to his liberty, honor, and pleasure, were exercised; these, when
alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call flesh.
Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spiritual, holy, and
divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual
image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in
Scripture the divine nature. . . . When man sinned, and broke God's covenant,
and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed
God then left him; that communion with God, on these principles depended,
entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house.[65]
Thus, there exists a fundamental
distinction between Calvinists and Arminians with respect to man's capacities
for righteous living. 'Freedom' is the power and/or opportunity people have to
do that which they will/choose.
An
understanding of Edwards' clarification of natural and moral necessity, as well
as natural and moral inability, to be discussed in the next section, is
particularly germane for the purposes of this thesis, for it is at this
juncture that Edwards' opponents assert that responsibility is obliterated. In
other words, according to Edwards' opponents, necessity forfeits any conception
of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and, furthermore, necessity is said to
be an indictment against God because it makes God the author of evil. Thus,
before we can formally discuss such issues as praiseworthiness,
blameworthiness, and theodicy, we must first understand Edwards' view of
necessity.
For
Edwards, necessity consisted of the relationship between causes and effects.
When Edwards spoke of the connection between causes and effects, he recognized
the distinction between moral causes and natural causes. Edwards writes the
following in regard to this matter:
Therefore
I sometimes use the word "cause," in this inquiry, to signify any
antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event,
either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it
is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than
not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any
antecedent with which a consequent event is so
connected,
that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that
event, is true.[66]
From this explanation of cause, Edwards
concludes that all things are caused. Consequently, it follows that if
something is self-existent, it must be from eternity and must be unchangeable.
Therefore, if anything has a beginning, it necessarily has a cause. Edwards
writes:
That
whatsoever begins to be, seems to be the first dictate of the common and
natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the
main
foundation
of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to come.[67]
Edwards argues that this conclusion must
be embraced in order to maintain our evidence for the existence of God. This
line of argumentation is important for Edwards in his opposition against the
Arminian notion of the spontaneity of the will.
Edwards
states that a thing is "said to be necessary, when it must be, and cannot
be otherwise.[68] From this
rudimentary understanding of necessity, Edwards explains that the common use of
the term necessity, and other related terms, such as, 'impossible' and
'irresistible,' often carries the connotation that various external forces are
acting in opposition to our wills. Edwards writes:
Things
are said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when they are, or will
be, though we desire or endeavor to the contrary, or try to prevent or remove
their existence: but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or
implies opposition to our wills. . . . So anything is said to be impossible to
us, when we would do it, or have it brought to pass, and endeavor it; but all
of our desires and endeavors are, or would be in vain. And that is said to be
irresistible, which overcomes all of our opposition, resistance, and endeavor
to the contrary. And we are said to be unable to do a thing, when our
supposable desires and endeavors to do it are insufficient.[69]
This brings Edwards to a critical
conclusion, namely, terms such as 'necessary', 'impossible', and/or
'irresistible', cannot properly be used when there is no external opposition or
desire to the contrary. In other words, internal actions, which are free from
external forces which would hinder the actualization of the will, cannot
properly be said to be necessary. So, as Storms appropriately writes:
If
a man desires to choose the virtuous rather than the vicious, being of the
inclination to such a choice and in no way inclined to the contrary, then we
cannot properly say that his choice (of virtue) was necessary, for there is no
supposed opposition involved, insofar as the case at hand asserts a being
willing and a desiring.[70]
Thus, it can be said that actions, which
result from moral necessity, demonstrate the true nature of the person in
question. Weddle appropriately writes, "For Edwards it is not what men in
fact do, but what they would most prefer to do, that reveals the innate
disposition of the heart."[71]
Similarly, Jeanes writes the following concerning Edwards' doctrine of free
agency:
The
doctrine of free agency, that underlies Edwards' thought, is removed from a
mechanical necessity which precludes the possibility of responsibility; from a
theory of contingency which assumes that an act, in order to be free must be
uncertain; and from a self-determined will, which acts independently of reason,
conscience, inclinations, and feelings. He teaches that a man is a free and
responsible being because he is the author of his own acts and because he is
determined to act by nothing outside of himself, but by his own views,
convictions, inclinations, feelings, and dispositions. His acts are the true
products of the man and reveal what his true nature is.[72]
Thus, if Edwards' clarification of terms
is accepted, then his opponents have used key terms incorrectly, and,
therefore, cannot properly argue that necessary moral choices are neither
praiseworthy of blameworthy.
Edwards'
proceeds to clarify that 'philosophical necessity' is nothing more than
certainty. Edwards writes:
Philosophical
necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the
things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms
something to be true. When there is such a connection, then the thing affirmed
in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any
opposition, or contrary effort be supposed, or supposable in the case, or no. .
. . And in this sense I use the word "necessity," in the following
discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with
liberty.[73]
This clarification of philosophical necessity
is a fundamental component of Edwards' treatise. Furthermore, moral and natural
necessity become subsets of philosophical necessity.
Edwards writes the following concerning his
use of the phrase, "moral necessity":
. . . "moral necessity" is defined
as that necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral
causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which
there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions.
And it is in this sense, that I use the phrase "moral necessity" in
the following discourse.[74]
Whereas moral necessity is the result of
internal forces, natural necessity is the result of external forces. Edwards
writes:
By "natural necessity," as applied
to men, I mean such necessity as men are under through the force of natural
causes; as distinguished from what are called
moral
causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and
inducements.[75]
The critical point to be noted is that
natural necessity renders a person free from praise or blame, whereas moral
necessity renders a person subject to praise or blame, depending on the action.
Storms appropriately writes:
If
a man should do something evil due to that necessity which is external to his
will (natural necessity), the man is absolved from responsibility for his
action. If he acts evilly due to a necessity that is in his will and one
with it (moral necessity), he is surely to blame for that action. In other
words, moral necessity refers to the cause/effect relationship within
the will itself, whereas natural necessity refers to the cause/effect
relationship external and prior to the will. Thus, when it is said that
a man lied because of a moral necessity to lie, he is to blame, for the cause
of such a action was wholly his, being within the will itself. If
he should lie because of a natural necessity, i.e., if the cause which issues
in lying be external to and compelling upon the will, his action is then
not wholly his and he is thus excused from blame.[76]
The significance between natural and
moral necessity cannot be overstated. Edwards' clarification between the two
retains mankind's dignity and responsibility, while at the same time, upholds
the sovereignty of God. Though God is the ultimate cause behind mankind's moral
choices and subsequent actions, man performs them without any external force
and, therefore, actions can be properly ascribed as being blameworthy or
praiseworthy.
It is noteworthy that Dana
challenged Edwards' notion of natural necessity. Storms describes Dana's
challenge as follows:
Dana
says that since Edwards allows for natural causes to be involved in determining
moral effects and since, according to Edwards, material causes (i.e., natural
necessity) rule out responsibility, we cannot know "how much" a
person is to blame unless we know "how much" natural cause is
involved in the choice.[77]
One might suggest, however, that it
matters not if man knows how much one is, or is not, to blame, for such judgments
are only for God to discern. Therefore, it is rather irrelevant whether we know
the degree in which natural necessity comes into play. Furthermore, and perhaps
more importantly, Storms rightly asserts that Dana confuses the interplay
between natural causes and moral effects. More specifically, Dana wrongly
concludes that all forms of natural necessity render an individual free from
responsibility. The fact of the matter is that Edwards held that responsibility
is hindered only when natural necessity is contrary to the will. Storms
elucidates this point as follows:
Again, I believe, Dana has mistaken
Edwards' argument. The latter says that choice may in many cases arise from
nature or from the nature of things. In allowing this, however, Edwards is not
referring to extrinsic factors that are opposed to the will but to those that
are extrinsic and yet one with the will. Only when a natural cause is
against, antecedent to, and compelling upon the will does it alleviate the
person from responsibility. If all the natural, material, and corporeal causes
in the world influenced, touched, existed in, about, and around one's choice
and yet were not compelling against it, the individual remains responsible, and
those causes in no way alter what have been done (or chosen) had they not been
operative in the first place. Thus, Dana contends that any form or degree of
natural necessity involved in an act of volition excuses one from
responsibility and blame, he fails to realize that such is the case only if the
natural necessity with its causes compel and/or restrain the will to a decision
contrary to that which would have obtained had the natural causes not been
present.[78]
In short, responsibility is annulled only
when natural necessity evokes action which is antithetical to the will. If
natural necessity is one with and/or consistent with the will, then
responsibility is sustained.
With
an understanding of natural and moral necessity in mind, we can readily come to
an understanding of natural and moral inability. We must understand Edwards'
concept of natural and moral inability if we are to appreciate Edwards'
meticulous defense of Calvinism. Edwards writes:
We
are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we can't do it if we will,
because what is most commonly called nature don't allow of it, or because of
some impending defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will; either in the
faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral
inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of
inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of
sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or
strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both of these may be resolved
into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the
opposition or want of inclination.[79]
In other words, if we desire the
performance of a deed, but we are hindered by an external force from
actualizing that deed, we are not responsible for the non-performance of the
desired action. This is simply to say that we are not culpable for our natural
inabilities. On the other hand, if we are free from external forces which would
result in natural inability, and we nonetheless choose the non-performance of a
moral deed, we are wholly responsible and blameworthy. In other words, moral
inability is no excuse for the non-performance of an action. Storms writes the
following important conclusion concerning this issue, "Consequently, it is
evident that moral necessity as defined by Edwards is not incompatible with
human responsibility, nor is determinism contrary to one being worthy of praise
or blame."[80]
In
discussing moral inability, Edwards wanted to refute any notion that 'moral
inability' relieves a person from blame. Norman Fiering writes:
.
. . moral responsibility, Edwards argued, is no more than a strong inclination
to act in a requisite way, and it is precisely inclinations that deserve moral
judgement. It is an opposition of the will, and men are properly held
responsible above all for what they will, that is, for their voluntary acts. If
disobedience to a moral command is excusable merely on the grounds of the
inability of a person to obey because of the strength of his or her contrary
inclinations, "then wickedness always carries in it that which excuses
it."[81]
In other words, a wicked heart has wicked
inclinations. A person with a wicked heart has particular trouble with respect
to doing that which is required. Thus, inability is directly related to the
wicked inclinations of the heart and, therefore, a person is properly
blameworthy because their wicked heart leads them to the non-performance of the
things required of them. Fiering writes:
Jesus
remains praiseworthy even though it was morally impossible for him to sin,
because moral value lies above in constancy of dispositions, not in particular
acts. Moreover--and this was Edwards's [sic] most effective insight--the
virtuousness or viciousness of dispositions must be evaluated solely on the
basis of their essential nature without relation to alleged causes or origins.
To say, for example, that Jesus' holy disposition was caused by God's will is
completely irrelevant to moral evaluation. Moral appraisal of internal
inclinations or dispositions is of a different order than that used in judging
outward actions, Edwards pointed out, although the two are easily confused.[82]
In
summary, according to Edwards, people do things according to their nature. If
their nature is corrupt and their heart is wicked, they do that which is evil.
More importantly, they do that which is evil, quite willingly, by choice. On
the other hand, those who do that which is righteous, do so because their
nature has been restored from the Fall. Therefore, they do that which is good,
willingly, by choice. Thus, people can properly be said to be blameworthy or
praiseworthy.
If
Edwards' arguments against the Arminian notion concerning freedom of the will
are accepted, then it follows that all other notions which depend on its
reliability are suspect. Edwards provides us with a list of these Arminian
notions which are dependent upon their belief in liberty:
These
several things belong to their notion of liberty: 1. That it consists in a self-determining
power in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its
own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions: so as not to be dependent in
its determinations, own any cause without itself, nor determined by anything
prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to liberty in their
notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition be, in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is
another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common
acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to
all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or
reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of liberty so much to consist
of these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no
real freedom, how much soever he may be at liberty to act according to his
will.[83]
(emphasis mine)
If the above is accepted, then the
Calvinistic system crumbles, and Edwards' arguments concerning praise, blame,
and theodicy are without support. Thus, due to the allegedly erroneous views of
freedom, which the bulk of the Arminian notions rests upon, Edwards concludes
that his opponents conclusions are suspect because they are derived from a
critical misunderstanding of liberty.
CHAPTER
III
EDWARDS'
ANALYSIS OF THE ARMINIAN
OBJECTIONS
TO MORAL NECESSITY
After
Edwards was convinced that he had demonstrated the inherent inconsistencies of
the Arminian notion of freedom, he felt that he could next address various
objections concerning moral necessity. This chapter will be devoted to Edwards'
analysis of three Arminian objections to moral necessity, namely, objections
pertaining to praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and theodicy.
One
of the Arminian objections to moral necessity is that it is devoid of any
concept of virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. Dr.
Whitby, one of Edwards' chief opponents writes:
If
all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being
capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can blame
a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth
praise only for what he could not avoid?[84]
Similarly, Whitby writes:
There
is no place for election and deliberation about this action; because all
election and deliberation is about the means and not about the end. It
therefore where [sic], I say, by the divine influx determined to one,
there is equally no place for refusing that one, or for not choosing it; that
action though it may be voluntary upon the same account, it cannot be free,
praiseworthy or rewardable.[85]
Whitby's attitude reflected in the above
quote is further enforced by his constant restatement of this position in his Six
Discourses.
According
to Arminians, random freedom and/or freedom which is liberated from any
influence, is absolutely necessary if actions are to be worthy of praise or
blame. In response to such a notion, Edwards argues that God is without any
such freedom and, yet, he is worthy of praise. In other words, despite the fact
that God is necessarily holy, he is still quite worthy of being praised for his
holiness and acts of righteousness.[86]
Nonetheless, according to the Arminian notion of what constitutes virtue and
vice, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, reward and punishment, God deserves
no merit. Edwards writes:
Virtue,
when ascribed to him, is but "an empty name"; and he is deserving of
no commendation or praise; because he is under necessity, he can't avoid being
holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it. It seems, the
holiness, justice, faithfulness, etc. of the most High, must not be accounted
to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not
deny, that these things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that
they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of anything commendable, than the
good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent; as the brightness of
the sun, and the fertility of the earth are good, but not virtuous, because
these properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of
self-determining power.[87]
Edwards desires to demonstrate that if it
is appropriate to ascribe the virtues of holiness and goodness as attributes of
God, despite the necessity of his holiness and goodness, then it likewise
follows that moral necessity does not violate the worthiness of ascribing
praise or blame to mankind.
Edwards
proceeds to argue that, in the event that 'praise' is meant to be the
"exercise or testimony of some sort of esteem, respect, or honorable reward,"[88]
then it would follow that mankind is in the position of being worthy of various
commendable attributes in which God is incapable of being worthy. In other
words, because there are times when mankind allegedly acts appropriately
without necessity, and, because God's actions are necessary, man is capable of
achieving that of which God is incapable. From such a conclusion Edwards
writes:
If
so, it must be because of some sort of peculiar excellency in the virtuous man,
which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference; some dignity,
that is entirely distinguished from any excellency, amiableness or
honorableness in God; not in imperfection and dependence, but in pre-eminence;
which therefore, he don't receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern
of it; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competition with him, as the
object of honor and regard; but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation
and glory, that God can have no pretension to. Yea, God has no right, by virtue
of his necessary holiness, to intermeddle with that grateful respect and
praise, due to the virtuous man, who chooses virtue, in the exercise of freedom
ad utrumque;[89]
any more than a precious stone, which can't help avoid being hard and
beautiful.[90]
Edwards is, therefore, questioning the
source of such honor, respect, and praise if it is not from God. Edwards
asserts that the Scriptures abundantly demonstrate God as being the source of
all that is holy and good, in fact, God is the author and the perfect
representation of such virtues. Therefore, it does not follow from the
Scriptures that man has anything over God by which he deserves any special
honor or praise in himself. Instead, all honor and praise due to man is
directly related to God's enablement of man to do that which evokes praise.
Lastly,
with respect to the praiseworthiness of God, though some Arminians suggest that
moral necessity, when applied to mankind, is inconsistent with the goodness of
God, it would seem that necessity, by definition, is perfectly consistent with
the holiness of God. For the same reason that God is worthy to be praised for
his holiness, so is mankind worthy of praise for holiness. This is particularly
true in light of the source of mankind's holiness, namely God. God is
necessarily holy and righteous and, therefore, necessity is not to be feared
and rejected, but rather warmly embraced.
Edwards
further validates his argument that moral necessity is consistent with
praiseworthiness by describing aspects of the life of Christ. Because of
Christ's humanity, Edwards' arguments concerning Christ's moral necessity are
particularly germane. In other words, though Christ was fully God, he was also
fully man and, therefore, there is a closer correspondence between Christ and
mankind. An important facet of Whitby's objection to Edwards' arguments
involves the issue of testing. In other words, though man is in a state of
being tested, God is not. Whitby writes:
That
the liberty belonging to this question, is only that of a lapsed man in a state
of trial, probation and temptation; whether he hath a freedom to choose life or
death, to answer or reject the calls and invitations of God to do, by the
assistance of the grace afforded in the gospel to him, what is spiritually good
as well as evil; or whether he be determined to one, having only a freedom from
coaction, but not from necessity. This liberty is indeed no perfection of human
nature; . . . ;but yet it is a freedom absolutely requisite, as we conceive, to
render us capable of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of
praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punishments; nor is this
liberty essential to man as man, but only necessary to man placed in a state of
trial and under the power of temptation. And therefore vain are the ensuing
arguments.
1st. That God is a free agent, and yet can
have no freedom to do evil, since he is in no state of trial, nor can he be
tempted to do evil. Or, 2dly. [sic] That the confirmed angels have not
lost their freedom though they cannot sin; for if there was time when they were
not confirmed in goodness, as now they are, they have lost that liberty, ad utrumuis, they then had and being
thus confirmed they are not in a state of trial, nor under any temptation to do
evil, nor are their actions not rewardable, since they already do enjoy the
beatific vision and so they cannot act out of respect to any future recompense,
or be induced to action out of hope or fear, as in the state of trial all men
are.[91]
Guelzo writes the following concerning
this matter:
.
. . when he came to consider the will in itself, Whitby showed himself, if not
more wise, then certainly more shrewd. He began by insisting that the human
will, whatever it was, had to be considered in the context of being in a state
"of trial or probation." The significance of this emerged only later,
for Whitby was planning to head off the very criticism that Edwards later used
to such a good effect, that a necessitated human will was no obstacle to morality
since God's will was necessarily holy but still free. Whitby preempted this
with his location of the human will specifically in a context of trial and
temptation.[92]
Though Whitby argues that neither God nor
angels are being tested, he does not make any comments with respect to the life
of Christ. This is probably due to the fact that Scripture clearly teaches that Christ was indeed tested (Matt.
4:1-11). Though Christ was surely tested, Edwards argues that he necessarily
could not sin.
Just
as God, by virtue of his nature, is incapable of anything short of holiness,
Christ, by virtue of his nature, is necessarily holy and good. Christ, in his
humanity, is utterly incapable of doing anything which is less than holy and
righteous. Furthermore, despite the fact that Christ's blameless life followed
from absolute necessity, he is unequivocally worthy of praise and honor.
Edwards, in keeping with his painstaking efforts toward thoroughness,
delineates eleven biblically based proofs of this important truth. Though it is
not necessary to survey all eleven, it will be beneficial to include a few of
Edwards' comments concerning this matter.
To
begin with, Edwards mentions the promise of Isaiah 42:1-4:
Here
is my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen one whom I delight; I will put my
Spirit on him and he will bring justice to the nations. He will not shout or
cry out, or raise his voice in the streets. A bruised reed he will not break,
and a smoldering wick he will not snuff out. In faithfulness he will bring
forth justice; he will not falter or be discouraged till he establishes justice
on earth. In his law the islands will put their hope (NIV).
Edwards states that this promise relates
to the time when Christ would manifest himself on earth.
And
the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's Spirit, that he
should be preserved from sin; particularly from pride and vainglory, and from
being overcome by any of the temptations he should be under to affect the glory
of this world; the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and praise of
men: and that he should be so upheld, that he should by no means fail of
obtaining the end of his coming into the world, or bring forth judgment unto
victory, and establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth.[93]
In other words, Christ's earthly mission,
which would eventually result in the establishment of the earthly kingdom, was
superintended by God's Spirit so as to assure that God's eternal plan would
necessarily come to fruition. It was not based on chance and/or the
peculiarities of mankind, but rather on God's determining of the events before
the creation of the world. Christ, as the result of God's sustaining power,
would carry out God's plan without apostasy. Regardless of the trials and
sufferings Christ would endure, he would remain steadfastly holy and obedient
until his task was perfectly accomplished. All of this, out of necessity.
Edwards
proceeds to describe the promises which were given to our forefathers, more
specifically, the promises concerning a Messiah. This Messiah would be the
Savior unto the people and they would, thus, be freed from physical and
spiritual bondage. Additionally, these promises were further guaranteed by
formal oaths, particularly the Davidic Covenant. Edwards writes:
Thus
abundant is the Scripture in representing how impossible it was, that the
promises made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah
should fail: which implies, that it was impossible that this Messiah, the
second Adam, the promised seed of Abraham, and of David, should fall from his
integrity, as the first Adam did.[94]
By the mere fact that God made promises,
which were further guaranteed by formal oaths, and by the fact that God's
holiness is dependent on the actualization of his promises and oaths, it is
abundantly evident that the words and works of Christ on earth occurred with
absolute necessity.
Furthermore,
had Christ fallen into sin and, thereby, failed at his work of the redemption
of mankind, then the eternal
plan of God would in turn have failed.
Edwards writes:
God
could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save all that should
believe in, and obey Christ, unless he had absolutely decreed that salvation
should be provided, and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the
Arminians themselves strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers necessity;
hence it became necessary that Christ should persevere, and actually work out
salvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of sin.[95]
God promised a Messiah who would deliver
his people from sin and thus Christ, by virtue of his nature and preordained
ministry, was incapable of sin. This of course is the commonly debated issue of
the impeccability of Jesus Christ. Theologically, the question is whether
Christ is posse non
peccare or non
posse peccare. In other words, was Christ able not to sin, or was he not
able to sin.[96] Edwards
appropriately writes:
If
it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the will of his Father, and
so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for sinners, then
salvation of all the saints, who were saved from the beginning of the world, to
the death of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation.[97]
(emphasis mine)
In addition to Edwards' proofs concerning
the necessity of Christ's holiness, and yet his worthiness to be praised,
Edwards also demonstrates the very important point of how Christ was indeed
subject to law, precepts and commands, promises and rewards.
Arminians
commonly asserted that freedom, without necessity, was mandatory if laws,
commands, injunctions, and prohibitions were to have any meaning. In other
words, why make demands, whether positive or negative, if actions are
determined by God and are thus necessary? Edwards points out that Christ was
subject to the commands of the Father (John 12:49, 50; and 14:31), and, that
Christ lived a life of perfect obedience to his Father (Rom. 5:19; Phil. 2:8;
Heb. 5:8). As already shown, Christ's actions were necessary, yet praiseworthy.
Thus, it is natural to conclude that Christ necessarily obeyed commands given
to him by the Father, and was nonetheless quite worthy of praise.
As
already suggested, many Arminians had argued that promises offered as motives for
obedience are nonsense if obedience is the result of necessity. Edwards writes
the following in response to this assertion:
If
there be any truth in Christianity or the holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jesus
had his will infallibly, unalterably and unfrustrably determined to good, and
that alone; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to him, on
condition of his persevering in, and perfecting the work which God had
appointed
him (Is. 53:10, 11, 12; Ps.2 and 110; Is. 49:7, 8, 9).[98]
The same truth is found in Revelation
3:21, "To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me on my throne;
even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father on his throne."
From these, and other, passages, Edwards demonstrates how Christ was not only
motivated by promises and rewards that follow obedience, but Christ himself
used promises and related rewards as enticements for obedience. The Palestinian
covenant, for example, promised blessings for obedience and curses for
disobedience.
The
following quote, though lengthy, states Edwards point well:
And
how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy and
excellent temper and behavior of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he
performed under such great trials, was not virtuous or praiseworthy; because
his will was not free ad utrumque, to
either holiness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one; that upon this
account, there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's humility, meekness,
patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world,
heavenly-mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to his
commands (though he was obedient unto death, even the death of the cross), his
great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his faithfulness
to God and man, under such great trials; his praying for his enemies, even when
nailing him to the cross; that "virtue," when applied to these
things, "is but an empty name"; that there was no merit in any of
these things; that is, that Christ was "worthy" of nothing at all on
the account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honor or respect from
God or man; because his will was not indifferent, and free either to these
things, or the contrary; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the
things that were excellent, as made it impossible
that he should choose the contrary; that upon this account (to use Dr. Whitby's
language) "it would be sensibly unreasonable"
that
the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things![99]
That Christ was necessarily holy and that
he was given promises by the Father which motivated obedience is difficult to
deny. That Christ obeyed the Father and is in the process of receiving the
associated blessings is also difficult to deny. Finally, in light of the fact
that Christ was holy and obeyed his Father, even unto death, the Father could
appropriately state, "This is my beloved Son, in who I am well
pleased" (Matt. 17:5).
In
summary, Edwards' provides a number of arguments which seem to demonstrate that
moral necessity is consistent with praiseworthiness. Edwards argues that in no
way does necessity conflict with praiseworthiness, neither in the life of
Christ, nor in the lives of mankind. Reward and praise is a benefit conferred
as a consequence of something morally excellent in behavior, "in testimony
of well-pleasedness in that moral excellency, and respect and favor on that
account."[100]
A
common objection put forth by the Arminians concerning moral necessity is that
it allegedly results in a situation where mankind could not be blameworthy of
sins necessarily committed. In other words, if mankind sins out of necessity,
how can they be held responsible? Who can blame a person for doing that which
he or she could not help? We have already noted Whitby's objections concerning
necessity with respect to praiseworthiness and can appreciate how they likewise
apply to blameworthiness. Furthermore, Whitby stated the importance of
mankind's present state of trial. In other words, because mankind is in a state
of trial, then people must be equally free to live in obedience or
disobedience. Thus, according to Whitby, people are blameworthy, if they
inappropriately respond to such freedom. If moral necessity is a reality, then,
according to Whitby, there can be no legitimate basis for blame.
Before
Edwards attempts to refute this assertion, he first reemphasizes his notion of
freedom, and, natural and moral necessity. People must have the ability to
either perform or abstain from the action in question. In other words, if a man
or woman were either forced to do that which he or she did not desire and/or
choose to do, or if he or she was not permitted to do that which they desired
and/or choose to do, they cannot be held accountable for their actions and/or
non-actions. Instead, in order to be responsible for one's actions, he or she
must be free to do that which he or she chooses, without hinderance.
As
already stated, Arminians were suggesting that if actions were performed out of
moral necessity, then such actions could not be blameworthy. Edwards argues
that if this was indeed the case, then those who God gives up to sin could not
be responsible for their actions. Edwards writes the following concerning this
matter:
That
there is such a thing as men's being given up to sin, is certain, if the
Scripture rightly informs us; such a thing being often there spoken of: as in
Ps. 81:12, "So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they walked
in their own counsels." Acts 7:42: "Then God turned, and gave them up
to worship the host of heaven." Rom. 1:24: "Wherefore, God also gave
them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor
their own bodies between themselves." . . . If God don't order things so,
by action or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the event
proves that they are not given up to that consequence. If good be the
consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in that
good; which mercy must be contrary to God's judgement in giving up to evil. If
the event must prove that they are given up to evil as the consequence, then
the persons who are the subjects of this judgment, must be the subjects of such
an event, and so the event is necessary.[101]
In other words, when people do that which
is good, God's mercy is to be acknowledged. On the other hand, when God
delivers people over to evil, they will necessarily do that which is evil
because of God's judgement upon them. Furthermore, those given over to evil are
utterly blameworthy for their subsequent necessary transgressions.
Edwards
further substantiates his line of argumentation by citing how Judas, according
to Arminian notions of blameworthiness, must have been blameless after Christ
gave him over to sin. Edwards writes:
If
not only coaction, but all necessity, will prove men blameless, then Judas was
blameless, after Christ had given him over, and had already declared his
certain damnation, and that he should verily
betray him. He was guilty of no sin in betraying his master, on this
supposition: though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated
sin, more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him.[102]
In short, Edwards is arguing that if the
Arminian assertion is true, namely, that sins committed out of moral necessity
cannot be culpable, then sins which are committed as the result of God giving
various individuals over to sin cannot be blameworthy. This, however, would
seem to be in conflict with various biblical accounts where individuals, having
been disposed by God to corruption, are guilty and blameworthy for subsequent
sin. Judas, for example, was clearly responsible for his actions, despite the
fact that his sin would seem to have followed with necessity.
Whitby,
however, asserted that people, who are given over to sin by God, are still
capable of doing that which is good, though doing that which is good may become
more difficult.
Dr. Whitby (Discourse on Five Points, pp.
302, 303) denies that men, in this world, are ever so given up by God to sin,
that their wills should be necessarily determined to evil; though he owns, that
hereby it may become "exceedingly difficult" for men to do good,
having a strong bent, and powerful inclination to what is evil.[103]
In other words, according to Whitby,
though men may have a strong inclination towards evil, they are not necessarily
destined and/or determined to do evil actions. Instead, they still have the
capability to choose right from wrong. If this were the case, however, then the
judgment of giving one over to sin is equally frustrated. In other words, the
person given over to sin is only responsible to the extent that he or she is
not given over to sin. Edwards writes:
For
if an impossibility of avoiding sin wholly excuses a man; then, for the same
reason, its being difficult to avoid excuses him in part; and this just in
proportion to the degree of difficulty. . . . All natural difficulty, according
to the plainest dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some degree, so
that the neglect is not so blameable, as if there had been no difficulty in the
case; and so the greater difficulty is, still the more excusable, in proportion
to the increase in difficulty.[104]
As already noted, according to many
Arminians, the act of avoiding sin and blame, and the performance of that which
is virtuous and praiseworthy, must be equally easy.[105]
If this is truly the case, it would seem to follow that responsibility
decreases as responsible actions become more difficult to perform.
Additionally,
many Arminians accepted the fact that mankind, in the state of depravity, was
not able to live in perfect obedience. If this is accepted, then it follows
that sin is consistent with necessity. In other words, because man necessarily
sins as a result of the fall of Adam, then we cannot argue that man is not
blameworthy for that which he necessarily does. Edwards writes:
If
we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to
be blameless: and if so, we are under a necessity of being blameworthy. And how
does this consist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsistent
with blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect
obedience to all of the commands of God, then we are under a necessity of
breaking some commands, in some degree; having no power to perform so much as
commanded.[106]
Thus, Edwards demonstrates the Arminian
inconsistency concerning responsibility. While believing that it would be
inconsistent for God to blame someone for sin which was unavoidable and/or
necessary, they, at the same time, believe that mankind is unable to live a
life without sin as a result of the fall of Adam. Nonetheless, because of
mankind's inability to live sinless lives, they conclude that Christ died in
order to satisfy the imperfections of our fallen status. In other words, Christ
died so that we could be accepted despite our imperfections. But why must
Christ die if we are not responsible for the imperfections which are a result
of the fall of Adam? According to their own scheme, the imperfections of our
disobedience do not deserve to be punished.[107]
Theodicy
refers to the attempts to justify and/or explain the existence of evil in light
of the existence of a sovereign God who is all powerful and the Creator of all
things. If God is the Creator of all things, and if nothing comes into
existence without the expressed will of God, then how are we to explain the
presence of evil. David Hume capsulized the problem when he wrote of God:
"Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he
able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing:
whence then is evil?"[108]
It
is possible that the problem of evil is the most problematic feature of
Calvinism, but, that is not to say that it is not a problem for Arminianism as
well. Arminians tend to link the origin of evil with the will. James Arminius
provides his explanation of the problem of theodicy in the following manner:
If,
now, the will produces a moral action, whether good or evil, it produces it, of
its own energy, and this cannot be attributed to nature itself as a cause,
though nature may implant the will in man, since the will, (though from nature)
is the peculiar and special principle of moral actions, instituted by the Deity
in nature. But if the blame of this cannot be attributed to nature as a cause,
by what right, I pray, can it be attributed to God, who, by the mode and medium
of nature, has placed the will in man?[109]
Of particular interest is Arminius's
comment stating that the will produces actions by means of its own energy. In
other words, he eliminates the idea of a causal force. Problems with respect to
the claim of an absence of a causal force are obvious according to Edwards'
deterministic cause and effect system. According to Edwards, nothing ever comes
to pass without a antecedent cause. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
Arminius's solution does not explain the natural and/or environmental evils of
the world. In other words, natural disasters such as hurricanes and tornadoes
have nothing to do whatsoever with the choices people make. Therefore, when
considering the evil in this world, one must also consider evil events which are
unrelated to the choices and/or actions of mankind.
Because Calvinism is deterministic
and ultimately traces everything back to a first cause, it has been charged
with making God the author of evil. Douglas J. Elwood writes:
It
is granted that God has created a world in which floods and tornadoes,
earthquakes and hurricanes take their perennial toll; in which disease, pain,
sorrow, and death are known facts. Idiots are born, lepers suffer, wars are a
constant threat, and anxiety drives many to paranoia. "It is evident by
experience," Edwards acknowledges, "that great evil, both moral and
natural, abounds in the world. It is manifest that great injustices, violence,
treachery, perfidiousness, and extreme cruelty to the innocent, abound in the
world; as well as innumerable extreme sufferings, issuing finally in
destruction and death, are general all over the world in all ages." That
such "should be ordered or permitted in a world absolutely and perfectly
under the care and government of an infinitely holy and good God, discovers a
seeming repugnancy to reason, that few, if any, have been able fully to
remove." An appeal to causality only enlarges the problem, for we are
caught in the dilemma of affirming that "either the First Cause must be
both good and evil, wise and foolish, or else there must be
two
First Causes, an evil and irrational, as well as a good and wise
principle." [110]
With this in mind, it is obvious why
Calvinism has often been regarded as a system which intrinsically makes God the
author of evil. This allegation was one of the many allegations Taylor and Dana
put forth against the notion of necessity and, therefore, Edwards felt it
incumbent upon himself to address the problem of theodicy.
Edwards
begins his analysis by describing the problem as it had been presented to him.
He writes:
Tis
urged by Arminians, that the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions, or
their necessary connection with antecedent events and circumstances, makes the
first cause, and supreme order of all things, the author of sin; in that he has
so constituted the state and course of things, that sinful volitions become
necessary, in consequence of his disposal.[111]
Edwards' response to this assertion is
developed in four major points.
Edwards'
first observation is that the problem of theodicy is not a problem inherent to
Calvinism. Instead, the problem of theodicy is equally as problematic to the
Arminian scheme of things. In other words, it is an illegitimate claim to
suggest that the problem of evil is a problem which stems only from a
Calvinistic theology. Arminianism is equally burdened with the problem of evil
and, therefore, it is intellectually dishonest to ascribe the problem
specifically to Calvinism. According to the Arminian scheme of things, God becomes
equally involved in the presence of evil in this world. In other words, if God
decrees and/or predestines evil actions which he foresees in advance, he is
decreeing and predestining that which is evil and, therefore, has his hand in
on then actualization of evil. Despite the fact that Arminianism is equally
plagued with the problem of evil, Edwards proceeds to address the problem from
a Calvinistic point of view.
Edwards
describes Whitby's objections as follows:
Dr.
Whitby supposes that if sin necessarily follows from God's withholding
assistance, or if that assistance be not given which is absolutely necessary to
the avoiding of evil; then in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly
the author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From whence,
according to what he himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be
the proper author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: he must be the
efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of the perfect malignity
against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the insatiable
cruelty of their disposition.[112]
This conclusion is based on the Arminian
objection to moral necessity, which leads to the determination of evil. As already
noted, Edwards points out that Calvinism is no more bound to this assertion
than is Arminianism. Edwards writes:
Again,
if it will follow at all, that God is
the author of sin, from what has been supposed of a sure and infallible
connection between antecedents and consequent's, it will follow because of this, viz. that for God to be the author or
orderer of those things which he knows beforehand, will be infallibly be
attended with such a consequence, is the same thing in effect, as for him to be
the author of that consequence. But if this be so, this is a difficulty which
equally attends the doctrine of Arminians themselves; at least, of them who
allow God's certain knowledge of all events. For on the supposition of such a
foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed:
God knew, that if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such
sins would infallibly follow.[113]
Many Arminians asserted that God
determined that which he "knew in advance" would come to pass without
necessity. This was an attempt to break loose from the uncomfortable restraints
of determinism. Nonetheless, such a scheme is as deterministic as that of
Calvinism[114] and,
furthermore, it similarly implies that God determines that evil should transpire.
Edwards'
discussion of the life of Judas provides a good example where it would seem
clear that God has clearly ordered and/or determined events which lead to sin.
Edwards writes:
God
certainly knew, long before Judas was born, at such a time, and at such a
place, and that his life should be preserved, and that he should, in divine
providence, be led into accountancy with Jesus; and that his heart should be so
influenced by God's spirit or providence, as to be inclined to be a follower of
Christ; and that he should be one of those twelve, which should be chosen
constantly to attend him and his family; and that his health should be
preserved so that he should go up to Jerusalem, at the last Passover in
Christ's life; and it should be so ordered that Judas should see Christ's kind
treatment of the woman which he anointed at Bethany, and have that reproof from
Christ, which he had at that time, and see and hear other things, which excited
his enmity against his master, and other circumstances should be ordered, as
they were ordered; it would be what would most certainly and infallibly follow,
that Judas would betray his Lord, and would soon after hang himself, and die
impenitent, and be sent to hell, for his horrid wretchedness.[115]
That the above is the clear teaching of
Scripture is difficult to deny and, therefore, the problem of theodicy is a
difficulty which is incumbent for all systems of theology to ponder, not just
Calvinism.
Edwards'
second observation is that the Arminians putting forth such an objection
concerning theodicy should explain what is meant by the phrase, 'the author of
sin.' Edwards is indignant if 'the author of sin' is intended to imply that God
is the sinner and/or the agent of sin, for such would amount to utter
blasphemy. Edwards writes the following concerning this matter:
But
if by "author of sin," is meant the permitter, or not the hinderer of
sin; and at the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner,
for wise, holy and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be
permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if
this be all that is meant, by being the author of sin, I don't deny that God is
the author of sin (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use
and custom is apt to carry another sense), it is no reproach for the most High
to be thus the author of sin.[116]
The important distinction to be noted is
that Edwards is opposed to the claim that God himself is the actor of sin. That
God permits and/or designs events that lead to sin by others is perfectly
acceptable to Edwards because he believes such a conclusion is distinctively
different from the former. Elwood writes the following concerning Edwards'
conclusions:
The
larger explanation of the problem of evil in Edward's thought is a direct
corollary of his ontology. In line with the Platonist-realist tradition he
adopted a form of the argument that the deformity of the parts augments the
beauty of the whole. With this framework in view he could reason that God
creates a situation under which sin inevitably comes to pass, but he does not
create sin as such.[117]
From
this conclusion, Edwards proceeds to present an extensive list of biblical references
wherein God orders events which inevitably lead to sin. The following is a
sampling of Edwards' references:
In
such a manner God ordered the obstinacy of Pharaoh, in his refusing to obey
God's commands, to let the people go. Ex. 4:21: "I will harden his heart,
and he shall not let the people go," Ch. 7:2-5: "Aaron thy brother
shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land.
And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the
land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not harken unto you; that I may lay mine hand
upon Egypt, by Great judgment," . . . Ch. 10:1, 2: "And the Lord said
unto Moses, go up unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of
his servants, that I might shew these my signs before him, and that thou mayst
tell it in the ears of thy son, and thy son's son, what things I have wrought
in Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst them, that ye may know that I
am the Lord."
.
. . And it is certain that in such a manner, God for wise and good ends,
ordered that event, Joseph's being sold into Egypt by his brethren. Gen. 45:5:
"Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me
hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life." Ver. 7, 8:
"God did send me before you to preserve a posterity in the earth, and to
save your lives by a great deliverance: so that now it was not you, that sent
me hither, but God." . . . Tis certain, that God thus, for excellent,
holy, gracious and glorious ends, ordered the fact which they committed who
were concerned in Christ's death; and that therein they did but fulfill God's
designs. As, I trust, no Christian will deny it was the design of God, that
Christ should be crucified, and that
for this end, he came into the world. 'Tis very manifest by many scriptures,
that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the
treachery of Judas, that made way for it, was ordered in God's providence, in
pursuance of his purpose; notwithstanding the violence that is used with those
plain Scriptures, to obscure and pervert the sense of 'em. Acts 2:23: "him
being delivered, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have
taken, and with wicked hands, have crucified and slain." Luke 22:21, 22: "But
behold the hand that betrayeth me, is with me on the
table:
and truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined."[118]
From these, and an abundance of other of
Scriptures, Edwards demonstrates that, whether from a Calvinistic scheme or an
Arminian scheme, God permits and/or even orchestrates events that lead to sin.
In this way, it can be said that God is the author of evil. Guelzo writes the
following concerning Edwards' comments:
God
never performs sin, and therefore is
not a sinner. Still, Edwards realized, God could be accused of being an
accomplice, if not by performing, then by decreeing someone else's performance
of evil, or at least motivating it. But, insisted Edwards, the two are not
really the same: "We do not mean by decreeing an action as sinful, the
same as decreeing an action so that it shall be sinful. In decreeing an action
as sinful, I mean decreeing it for the sake of the sinfulness of the action.
God decrees that they shall be sinful, for the sake of the good that he causes
to arise from the sinfulness of the acts, whereas man decrees them for the sake
of the evil that it intends."[119]
In other words, though man sins willfully
and with evil in mind, God decreed that sin would come to pass so that a
greater good would ultimately occur. God does not desire sin because he loves
sin, but rather that a greater good should arise.
Edwards'
third point is the emphasis on the difference between God's allowance of an
event that will necessarily yield sin, and God being the actualizer and/or committer
of the sin Himself. John H. Gerstner writes:
Although
a defender and preacher of absolute divine predestination, Edwards never
regarded God as the author of evil in the sense of being the instigator of it.
In the treatise on the Freedom of the Will he discusses this question
and says plainly that God is the "orderer" of sin but not the
"actor" or author of sin. "Sin," he continues, may be an
evil thing, and yet that there should be such a disposal and permission, as that
it should come to pass, may be a good thing."[120]
In
his discussion concerning this difficult issue, Edwards appeals to the
differences between the sun's being the cause of light and the warmth of the
atmosphere, among other things, and its being the cause of darkness and frost
as the result of the sun descending below the horizon. Edwards writes the
following concerning this matter:
The
motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kinds of events; but it is not
the proper cause, efficient or producer of them; though they are necessarily
consequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of
the divine Being the cause of the evil of men's will. If the sun were the
proper cause of cold and darkness, it
would be the fountain of these
things, as it is the fountain of light and heat: and then something might be
argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the
sun; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and
that his beams are black and frosty.[121]
In other words, Edwards argues that the
attendant consequences of the sun's absence in no way links it with the cause
of darkness and coldness. Instead, these circumstances demonstrate that the sun
is absolutely antithetical to darkness and coldness. In a parallel fashion, the
consequence that results from the absence of God's presence and/or input,
namely sin, is not even remotely linked to God. Edwards concludes his third
argument by writing:
It
would be strange arguing indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when
God leaves 'em to themselves, and
necessarily sin, when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves, but from God; and so,
that God must be a sinful being; as strange as it would be to argue, because it
is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present,
that therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must
needs be black.[122]
In other words, for Edwards, it seems to be
fallacious to conclude that men are blameless of sins committed out of
necessity due to God's absence. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to ascribe to
God the responsibility for such sins. Elwood writes the following concerning
Edwards' arguments:
That
God should design and order the existence of evil does not mean that his will
is evil, that his actions are moved by an evil impulse. Sin is, by definition,
selfishness springing from a preoccupation with the unrelated self and a narrow
view of reality. The term is therefore applicable only to the finite mind. The
occasion of moral evil is the condition in which man, under the limitations of
finitude, may and inevitably will, through a perverted sense of value, isolate
and absolutize some part or particle of the infinite circle of being. Sin is
not a positive creation, he insists, but a privative condition resulting from
the absence of divine agency in the human soul, as darkness and cold result
from the absence of the light and warmth of the sun. Evil is a minus quality.[123]
Edwards'
fourth argument revolves around an Arminian assertion that some Calvinists
ascribe inconsistent wills to God, an assertion which Edwards claims to be
without foundation.[124]
In other words, some Arminians claimed that Calvinists believed in a 'secret'
will of God and a 'revealed' will of God. The secret will of God is said to be
that will which wills evil, for example, the crucifixion. The revealed will of
God would be something such as obedience and righteous living. Thus, it is charged
that God has inconsistent wills. Basinger writes the following concerning the
two wills of God:
A
second way some Calvinists attempt to avoid arbitrary and dangerous fatalism
hinges on the ambiguity in the notion of "God's will." All believers
feel that it is important to seek and submit to God's will. We want to live our
lives within the will of God. But as R.C. Sproul warns: "When we seek the
will of God, we must first ask ourselves which will we are seeking to
discover?" And it is common among Calvinists to distinguish between two
distinct wills of God.
On
the one hand, there is God's sovereign
or decretive will which unilaterally determines every event in the world. Here
we are speaking of God's exhaustive, eternal and immutable plan for the world.
On the other hand, there is the moral
or perceptive will of God which refers to what God desires for his creation.
This includes types of human actions which are pleasing in God's eyes and is
captured in moral precepts (e.g., "Thou shalt not kill") and also
God's desires, wishes or inner dispositions (e.g., "God is not willing
that any should perish").[125]
With this in mind, the relationship
between the two wills of God becomes a curious matter. In other words, it would
seem that the wills of God become contradictory. For example, on the one hand,
God's moral will is that all will be saved. On the other hand, God's sovereign
will is that not all will be saved. So, we must ask, which will of God is the
'true' will of God? Basinger suggests
the following:
Obviously
it must be the sovereign will, because this is what God ultimately brings
about. But what then of the moral will? In what sense is it real; to what
extent can it represent something about God?
The Calvinist appears to be in an unresolvable dilemma. If God's moral
will represents what God really wants to happen, then human sin really thwarts
God's will. But then God is not sovereign. On the other hand, if God is
sovereign, then the human will cannot be outside the divine will. But then how
can it be true that God really does not want humans to sin. Arminians escape
this dilemma by denying that God has an exhaustive sovereign will and thereby
preserve both the reality of sin and the reality of God's moral will. Calvinist
must try to have it both ways.[126]
Edwards
first points out that it is logical to conclude that God, in his supreme and
absolute omniscience, should desire for events to unfold according to his will.
If this were not the case, then events would unfold without cause and without
direction and without design. Edwards writes:
Is
it not better, that the good and evil which happens in God's world, should be
ordered, regulated, bounded and determined by the good pleasure of an
infinitely wise Being, who perfectly comprehends within his understanding and
constant view, the universality of all things, in all their extent and
duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with respect to every
individual thing and circumstance, throughout the grand system, and the whole
of the eternal series of consequences; than to leave these things to fall out
by
chance, and to be determined by those
causes which have or understanding or
aim?[127]
In short, Edwards argues that it is better
for God, who is perfectly righteous and all knowing, to determine the events of
this world according to his eternal plan, rather than to allow things to unfold
by chance.
Furthermore,
it is incumbent upon God to determine the events of this world so that the
greater good is the ultimate outcome. In other words, it would seem strange for
God to surrender his perfect and eternal will up to the laws of random chance,
for to do so, could very likely result in God's total frustration. It is God's
eternal plan which is of consequence and, therefore, it is quite acceptable for
God to order the events of history so as to guarantee the actualization of his
sovereign will.
That
the determination of the events of history include the allowance of sin should
not be unsettling. Edwards provides the following example:
So
the crucifixion of Christ, if we consider only those things which belong to the
event as it proceeded from murderers, and are comprehended within the compass
of the affair considered as their act, their principles, dispositions, views
and aims; so it was one of the most heinous things that ever was done; in many
respect the most horrid of all acts: but consider it, as it was willed and
ordered by God, in the extent of his designs and views, it was the most
admirable and glorious of all events; and God's willing of the event was the
most holy volition of God, that ever was made known to men; and God's act in
ordering it, was a divine act, which above
all
others, manifests the moral excellency of the divine Being.[128]
Thus, there is no inconsistency in the
notion that God may hate a thing in itself, and yet, desire its actualization
so as to lead to a greater end. Edwards also points out that despite objections
concerning the alleged need for 'moral evil' in the world, the fact of the
matter is that our sovereign God has chosen for such a thing and, therefore,
such a choice is not evil, but absolutely wise and holy.[129]
In
summation, Edwards presents four observations which demonstrate that moral necessity
does not make God the author of evil, if it is meant by 'the author of evil'
that God is the sinner, agent, or actor in sin. It can be said, however, that
God allows evil, not out of a love for evil, but rather out of his desire for
the consequences which evil, when divinely directed, yields. Lastly, if the
greatest good could not be actualized without the influences of evil, it would
be a defect in God's wisdom to forbid its occurrence.
CHAPTER
IV
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION
As
suggested in Chapter One, not everyone will agree with all of the conclusions
of Edwards' treatise on the will. Nonetheless, it clearly stands as one of the
finest sources for continued dialogue concerning the sovereignty of God and the
will of man. Though it must be conceded that Edwards' treatise does not
completely answer the perennial question concerning the sovereignty of God and
the will of man, it does escalate the discussion to a higher plane. This thesis
will have accomplished much if it causes the reader to give greater
consideration to one of the deepest and most mysterious truths of Scripture.
When
the student of Scripture formulates his or her theological positions, he or she
goes through a process by which many systems and theories are analyzed,
scrutinized, and formalized. Eventually it becomes incumbent upon the student
of Scripture to determine which approaches to Scripture yield, in their
opinion, the greatest degree of truth. To be sure, all systems of theology have
their points of tension and/or difficulty; however, it seems logical to choose
the system of theology which presents the least and most acceptable
difficulties. It is also important to accept the clear teaching of Scripture,
even when we cannot necessarily understand why some things are as they are. It
has always been true, that the "what's" of Scripture are not
particularly difficult to ascertain, but the "whys" are often
difficult, if not impossible, to explain.
With
the above in mind, this writer concludes that Edwards articulately demonstrates
inconsistencies and weaknesses of the Arminian objections concerning moral
necessity. This was first accomplished by showing inconsistencies of the
Arminian notion of freedom. By demonstrating the fallacy of the Arminian notion
of freedom, Edwards undermines respective conclusions based on that particular
premise. Nonetheless, Edwards does not terminate his investigation at that
point. Instead, he proceeds to examine and demonstrate the inherent weaknesses
of specific Arminian objections to moral necessity.
Though
a great many of Edwards' arguments were not mentioned in this thesis, three of
the most important Arminian objections were reviewed. Edwards skillfully and
persuasively establishes the illegitimacy of the Arminian objections concerning
moral necessity as it is connected with praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, and
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Journal
Articles
Aldrich, William M.
"Perseverance." Bibliotheca Sacra 457 (January-March 1958): 9-19.
Baillie, Donald M. "Philosophers and Theologians on the
Freedom of the Will." Scottish
Journal of Theology 4 (June 1951):
113-22.
Barnhouse, Donald G. "The Restoration of Jonathan
Edwards." Eternity 8
(September 1957), 46-47.
Basinger, Randall. "Divine
Sovereignty: What Difference Does it Make?" Evangelical Journal 5 (Spring
1987): 15-29.
Byington, Ezra Hoyt. "Jonathan
Edwards, and the Great Awakening." Bibliotheca Sacra 55
(January-March 1898): 114-27.
Chadwick, Owen. "Arminianism in
England." Religion in Life 29 (Autumn 1960): 548-55.
Chamberlain, Ava. "The Theology of
Cruelty: A Look at the Rise of Arminianism in
Eighteenth
Century New England." Harvard Theological Review 85 (1992): 335-56.
Clark, Gordon H. "Determinism and
Responsibility." The
Evangelical Quarterly 4 (January
March
1932): 13-23.
Clark, Stuart F. "The Theology of
Arminius." London Quarterly and Holborn Review 24 (October 1960):
248-53.
Coleman, Robert E. "Jonathan
Edwards: A Man Swallowed up in God." Christian Education Journal 11
(Autumn 1990): 87-93.
Davies, Rupert E. "The Controversy
Today." The London Quarterly and Holborn Review 24 (October 1960):
264-68.
Deiter, Melvin E. "Telling the
Arminian Story: Some Observations on Revivalistic Evangelicalism Past and
Present." Evangelical Journal 10 (Fall 1992): 47-54.
Dunn, Bruce. "The World Will End!
The World Will End!" Moody Monthly 6 (June 1983): 13.
Foster, Mary C. "Theological Debate
in a Revival Setting: Hampshire County in the Great
Awakening."
Fides et Historia 5 (Spring 1974): 31-47.
Geisler, Norman L. "Man's Destiny: Free
or Forced?" Christian Scholar's Review 9 (1979): 99-109.
Gerstner, John H. "An Outline of the
Apologetics of Jonathan Edwards." Bibliotheca Sacra 133
(January-March 1976): 3-10.
Goring, Jeremy. "Calvinism in
Decline." Hibbert Journal 60 (July 1962): 204-11.
Grant, Leonard T. "A Preface to
Jonathan Edwards' Financial Difficulties." Journal of Presbyterian
History 45 (March 1967): 27-32.
Holbrook, Clyde A. "Jonathan Edwards
Addresses Some 'Modern Critics' of Original Sin." Journal of Religion
63 (July 1983): 211-230.
Jeanes, W.P. "Jonathan Edwards'
Conception of Freedom of the Will." Scottish Journal of Theology 14
(1961): 1-14.
Kastner, Patricia Wilson. "God's
Infinity and His Relationship to Creation in the Theologies of Gregory of Nyssa
and Jonathan Edwards." Foundations 21 (October-December 1978):
305-321.
Logan, Samuel T. "The Doctrine of
Justification in The Theology of Jonathan Edwards." The
Westminster Theological Journal 46
(Spring 1984): 26-52.
Olson, Roger, and others, "Has God Been
Held Hostage by Philosophy? A forum on free-will
theism,
a new paradigm for understanding God." Christianity Today 39
(January 1995),
30-34.
Opie, John. Finney's Failure of Nerve:
The Untimely Demise of Evangelical Theology."
Presbyterian
History 51 (Summer 1973): 155-67,
Otto, Randall E. "The Solidarity of
Mankind in Jonathan Edward's Doctrine of Original Sin."
Evangelical
Quarterly 62 (1990): 205-221.
Pask, Alfred H. "The Influence of
Arminius on John Wesley." London Quarterly and Holborn Review 24
(October 1960): 258-63.
Pickell, Charles N. "The Freedom of
the Will in William Ames and Jonathan Edwards." Gordon Review 5
(Winter 1959): 168-74.
Rattenbury, H. Morley. "The
Historical Background and Life of Arminius." London Quarterly
and
Holborn Review 24 (October 1960): 244-48.
Storms, Samuel C. "Jonathan Edwards on the Freedom of the
Will." Trinity Journal 3
(Fall
1982):
131-69.
Vulgamore, Melvin L. Charles G. Finney:
Catalyst in the Dissolution of American Calvinism."
Reformed
Review 17 (June 1964): 33-42.
Wakefield, Gordon S. "Arminianism in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." London
Quarterly
and Holborn Review 24 (October 1960): 253-58.
Weddle, David. "Jonathan Edwards on
Men and Trees, And the Problem of Solidarity."
Harvard
Theological Review 67 (1974): 155-175.
Westra, Helen Petter. "Jonathan
Edwards and 'What Reason Teaches.'" Journal of the
Evangelical
Theological Society 34 (December 1991): 495-503.
Barnett, Das Kelley. "The Doctrine of Man in the Theology of
Jonathan Edwards
(1703-1758)." Ph.D. diss., The Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 1944.
Dean, Kevin W. "A Rhetorical Biography of Jonathan Edwards: Beyond the
Fores of Hell." Ph.D. diss.,
University of Maryland, 1989.
Gustafson James W. "Causality and Freedom in Jonathan
Edwards, Samuel Alexander, and
Brand Blandshard." Ph.D. diss, Boston University, 1967.
Gerlach, Harlan. "The Arminian
Doctrine of Prevenient Grace." Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary,
1956.
Holtrop, Elton. "Edwards' Conception of the Will in Light of Calvinistic
Philosophy." Ph.D.
diss.,
Case Western Reserve University, 1948.
Morimoto, Anri. "The Reality of Salvation in the Soteriology of Jonathan
Edwards." Ph.D. diss., Princeton
Theological Seminary, 1991.
Storms, Samuel C. "An Analysis of Jonathan Edwards on the
Freedom of the Will." Th.M thesis,
Dallas Theological
Seminary,
1977.
[2]Edward H. Davidson, "Sovereign God and Reasoning Man," in Critical Essays on Jonathan Edwards, ed. William J. Scheick (Boston, MA: G.K. Hall and Co., 1980), 33.
[3]The full title of this work is A careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, Which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. Unless otherwise noted, all citations from Edwards' treatise will be from the Yale edition, hereafter to be listed as Freedom of the Will.
[4]C. Samuel Storms, "Jonathan Edwards on the Freedom of the Will," Trinity Journal 3 (Fall 1982): 132.
[5]Though it does raise the level of the debate to a higher plane, it must be conceded that Edwards' treatise does not fully answer the problem concerning the sovereignty of God and the will of man.
[6]Brian Davies, foreword to Jonathan Edwards: Puritan, Preacher, Philosopher by John E. Smith (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), vi.
[8]Robert W. Jenson, America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 53-54.
[9]David Basinger and Randall Basinger, ed., Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1986), 9.
[10]Randall Basinger, "Divine Sovereignty: What Difference Does it Make?," Evangelical Journal 5 (Spring 1987): 15.
[13]H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions or Original Sin: A Study in American Theology Since 1750 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), 1.
[14]John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. by F.L. Battles, Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), 1:294.
[15]F. Stuart Clark, "The Theology of Arminius," London Quarterly and Holborn Review 24 (October 1960): 249.
[16]Harlan Gerlach, "The Arminian Doctrine of Prevenient Grace," (Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1956), 65.
[17] The Writings of James Arminius, trans. James Nichols and W.R. Bagnall (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1956), 2:497.
[24]Jeremy Goring summarizes this treatise as a candid examination of "what we call today Original Guilt. The first two parts of the book, with their minute analysis of biblical texts and lengthy footnotes in Hebrew and Greek, are a monument of careful scholarship, but it is perhaps the third part, where the textual critic turns moral philosopher and holds up some of the tenets of Calvinism to the clear light of reason, that made the biggest and most lasting impressions on contemporary readers. 'What can be more destructive of virtue,' he asks, 'than to have a notion that you must, in some degree or other, be necessarily vicious?'" "Calvinism in Decline," Hibbert Journal 60 (October 1961--July 1962): 206.
[25]John Taylor, The Scriptural Doctrine of Original Sin, quoted in Randall E. Otto, "The Solidarity of Mankind in Jonathan Edwards' Doctrine of Original Sin," Evangelical Quarterly 62 (1990): 206.
[26]David Weddle, "Jonathan Edwards on Men and Trees, And the Problem of Solidarity," Harvard Theological Review 67 (1974): 158.
[27]Edwards writes, "God in each step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being one with him. And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the head of the whole body, and the root of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.
From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches . . . I think, this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in this affair." Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin, ed. Clyde A. Holbrook (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 389-90.
[29]C. Samuel Storms, Tragedy in Eden: Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 155.
[30]Ola Elizabeth Winslow, Jonathan Edwards (MacMillan Co., 1940; repr., New York: Collier Books, 1961), 274.
[32]Robert W. Jenson, America's Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 157.
[33]Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 137.
[34]The Writings of James Arminius, trans. James Nichols and W.R. Bagnall, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1956), 2:525-26.
[36]C. Samuel Storms, "Jonathan Edwards on the Freedom of the Will," Trinity Journal 3 (Fall 1982): 136.
[39]C. Samuel Storms, Tragedy in Eden: Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 159.
[42]W.P. Jeanes, "Jonathan Edwards' Conception of Freedom of the Will," Scottish Journal of Theology 14 (1961): 2.
[43]Guelzo asserts that many commentators on Edwards' Freedom of the Will overlook that Edwards spent a considerable amount of time taking apart, in a painfully specific manner, three individual proponents of the current prevailing notions concerning the will, namely, Thomas Chubb, Daniel Whitby, and Issac Watts. This oversight, which is suggested to be largely the result of being fascinated with the deadly neatness of Edwards' arguments concerning freedom, is unfortunate because "Edwards' comments on these three champions of free will substantially extend the scope of his critique." Edwards on the Will: A Century of American Theological Debate (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 54.
[44]For a more thorough review of Dana's objections to Edwards' notion of Freedom of the Will, see James Dana, An Examination of the Late Reverend President Edwards' 'Inquiry on Freedom of the Will' (Boston: printed by Daniel Keeland, 1770).
[47]For a more in depth review of Storms' rebuttal of Dana's refutations against Edwards, see Tragedy in Eden: Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 199-206.
[48]Allen C. Guelzo, Edwards On the Will: A Century of American Theological Debate (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 41.
[51]Thomas Chubb, "Tract 29," A Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects (London: 1754), 2:306, quoted in Guelzo, Edwards on the Will, 56.
[54]Samuel T. Logan, "The Doctrine of justification in The Theology of Jonathan Edwards," Westminster Theological Journal 66 (Spring 1984): 36.
[65]Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin, ed. Clyde Holbrook (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 389-90.
[70]C. Samuel Storms, "An Analysis of Jonathan Edwards on Freedom of the Will" (Th.M. thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1977), 37-38.
[71]David Weddle, "Jonathan Edwards on Men and Trees, And the Problem of Solidarity," Harvard Theological Review 67 (1974): 159.
[81]Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 314.
[84]Daniel Whitby, Six Discourses: Concerning I. Election and Reprobation. II. Extent of Christ's Redemption. III. The Grace of God. IV. Liberty of the Will. V. Defectibility of the Saints. VI. Answer to Three Objections (Worcester, MA: At the Press and for Isaiah Thomas, 1801), 231-32.
[86]Edwards does acknowledge that Arminians, to the extent of his awareness, affirm the necessity of God's holiness and the appropriateness of praising him for that which he necessarily does.
[87]Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 278.
[92]Guelzo, Edwards on the Will: A Century of American Theological Debate (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 61.
[96]For a lucid discussion of this issue, see Joseph G. Sahl's article "The Impeccability of Jesus Christ," in Vital Theological Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 1994), 83-91.
[108]David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part 10, quoted in Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1983), 412.
[109]The Writings of James Arminius, trans. W.R. Bagnall, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1956), 3:58.
[110]Douglas J. Elwood, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 67.
[114]One way many present day Arminians solve this problem is by claiming that God cannot know future free choices. For a more thorough examination of this, see A Case for Arminianism: The Grace of God, The Will of Man, ed. Clark Pinnock (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1989). Also see "Has God Been Held Hostage by Philosophy? A forum on free-will theism, a new paradigm for understanding God," Christianity Today, 9 January 1995, 30-34.
[120]John H. Gerstner, The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Orlando, FL: Ligonier Ministries, 1993), 3:29.